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I
Thesis in Context
I.

INTRODUCTION

International fisheries organisations have been in existence since 1902.1 Their emergence
over the years was not on the basis of a logically consistent and overall design, but on when
States identified the need for international cooperation in the management of fisheries. The
introduction of international fisheries organisations may therefore be characterised as
piecemeal and as ad hoc responses to specific concerns such as the need to obtain the best
scientific information on a fishery, the management and status of shared stocks, and
cooperation between fishing States. Heightened international concerns arising from
overfishing and the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activity gave impetus
to the work of international fisheries organisations and led to the negotiation of international
1

The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), an international organisation that develops
science and advice for the sustainable use of the oceans was established in 1902 by exchange of letters between
Denmark, Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Russia and United Kingdom. For a
background on international fisheries organisations see for example Albert W Koers, International Regulation
of Marine Capture Fisheries – A Study of Regional Fisheries Organisations (Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1973); Are
K Sydnes, ‘Regional Fishery Organizations: How and Why Organizational Diversity Matters’ (2001) 32 Ocean
Development & International Law 349–372; Robin Allen, ‘International management of tuna fisheries:
arrangements, challenges and a way forward’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper No 536 (FAO,
2010); Ronald Barston, ‘The Law of the Sea and Regional Fisheries Organisations’ (1999) 14(3) The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 333 – 352; Ted L McDorman, ‘Implementing Existing Tools:
Turning Words into Actions – Decision-Making Processes of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations
(RFMOs)’ (2005) 20(3 – 4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 423 – 457; Evelyne Meltzer, The
Quest for Sustainable International Fisheries: Regional Efforts to Implement the 1995 United Nations Fish
Stocks Agreement: an overview for the May 2006 review (National Research Council Research Press, 2009);
Judith Swan, ‘Decision-making in Regional Fishery Bodies or Arrangements: the evolving role of RFBs and
international agreement on decision-making processes’ FAO Fisheries Circular No 995 (FAO, 2004); Judith
Swan, ‘Regional fishery bodies and governance: issues, actions and future directions’. FAO Fisheries Circular
No 959 (FAO, 2000); Judith Swan, ‘International action and responses by Regional Fishery Bodies or
Arrangements to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.’ FAO Fisheries
Circular No 996 (FAO, 2004).
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fisheries instruments built upon the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea2.
The adoption of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement3 was pivotal in improving
international coordination in the establishment and responsibilities of regional and
subregional fisheries management organisations and arrangements.4 As international and
regional fisheries organisations have evolved to address concerns, it is posited that
international law has in parallel evolved in response to necessities and crises in fisheries.

Given the pace of decision-making and activity of regional fisheries organisations, it is useful
at this juncture to take stock of their influence and interaction on distinct areas of
international law. By doing so, one can take stock of the trends influenced by these
organisations. This thesis is devoted to assessing the practice of tuna Regional Fisheries
Management Organisations (RFMOs) and their individual and collective influence on
international law. The practice of tuna RFMOs may in fact be challenging and at the same
time influencing changes in the implementation of “traditional” international law precepts
such as the sovereignty of a port State over its ports, the primacy of flag State jurisdiction,
non-flag State enforcement on the high seas, the sovereign rights of a coastal State in
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing living resources within its exclusive
economic zone, and the sources of international law.

II.

THESIS APPROACH AND JUSTIFICATION

The critical problem for all international fisheries organisations is ensuring that the objective
of long term sustainability is achieved. Sustainability mandates that appropriate governance
frameworks are in place and functional. According to one view, the key determinant of
2

Opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 396 (entered into force 16 November 1994), hereinafter
‘1982 LOSC’ or ‘1982 Convention’.
3

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks,
opened for signature 5 November 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (1995), 2167 UNTS 88 (entered into force 11 December
2001), hereinafter ‘1995 Agreement’.
For the purposes of this thesis, the term ‘RFMO’ refers to organisations with management competence, whilst
regional fisheries arrangements may refer to organisations with an advisory competence only.
4
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sustainability is governance, that is ‘the sum of the legal, social, economic and political
arrangements used to manage fisheries’.5 Indeed, governance must be robust in scope,
multidisciplinary and holistic in order to achieve the objective. But in the quest for long term
sustainability, what level of change is acceptable? In terms of international law, are changes
to fundamental principles and rules acceptable if the goal is sustainability? RFMOs have been
established to manage fisheries especially in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The question
of how tuna RFMOs in particular are changing fundamental principles and contributing to
international law is not clear. That is the focus of this thesis.

Tuna RFMOs have been selected because of their efforts to coordinate and harmonise
initiatives in the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks. Unlike non
tuna RFMOs, there seems to be a greater level of synergy amongst tuna RFMOs. An
evaluation of their contribution in specific fields of international law such as in international
institutional law and on the rights and responsibilities of States in the Law of the Sea does not
appear to have been addressed elsewhere.

Thus the justification for this thesis is four-fold. First the thesis investigates the trends in the
development of tuna RFMOs and the concomitant development of international law including
international fisheries law and the Law of the Sea. Like other international organisations, tuna
RFMOs appear to be dynamic and continually evolve in order to meet the interests of its
members and the international community. In this investigation, the relationship between the
practice of tuna RFMOs and development of international law relating to fisheries and
international organisations is elucidated.

Second the thesis evaluates the contributions of tuna RFMOs and consistency with respect to
principles recognised in international law. By assessing decisions and actions of tuna RFMOs,
the thesis explores whether the practice of tuna RFMOs is supported at a regional level and

Ray Hilborn, J M Orensanz, Ana M Parma, ‘Institutions, incentives and the future of fisheries’, Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society of London – Series B: Biological Sciences 2005, 360: 47 – 57.
5
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complemented by State practice. That is not to say that States are not involved in the
decisions in the first place. In fact, States primarily comprise the membership of tuna RFMOs
and make the decisions. Implementation of those decisions is separate and distinct from their
making. Where the tuna RFMO decision is not supported by State practice, should such
RFMO practice be given less weight vis-à-vis State led practice? In addition, there is the
secondary issue that State practice may potentially be confused with or assimilated with
regional practice of tuna RFMOs.

Third the thesis aims to reflect on whether specific tuna RFMO contributions lend support to
the development of customary international law. Customary international law, also referred to
as “international custom” or simply “custom” is the generalisation of the practice of States.6
There may be local custom or a regional custom that are only binding on States in a particular
geographical region or area.7 The determination of whether customary international law
exists is a tedious task that is not attempted here. Nevertheless in assessing the contributions
of tuna RFMOs, emphasis will be placed on State practice rather than tuna RFMOs practice
to identify whether custom is emerging. After all, customary international law is grounded on
State practice and will, although tuna RFMOs may act as the catalyst for the introduction of
legally binding measures.

The fourth justification is an intention to make a positive and novel input to tuna RFMOs
literature at the very least and at best to potentially influence the direction of tuna RFMOs
individually or collectively and their respective membership.

In analysing the contribution of tuna RFMOs to international law, the thesis applies the
following hypotheses: (i) That tuna RFMOs are contributing positively to the development of

Article 38.1(b) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice refers to “international custom, as evidence
of a general practice accepted as law”. Judge Read in the Fisheries (United Kingdom v Norway), ICJ Reports
(1951), 191 said: “Customary international law is the generalization of the practice of States”. See generally,
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Cambridge University
Press, 1982) 368 – 393; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th edn,
2008) 6 – 12; Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005) 156 – 166; James
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th edn, 2012).
7
Fisheries case, above n 6, 131; Colombia v Peru, ICJ Reports (1950) (Asylum case), 266, 277 – 278.
6
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international law; (ii) That tuna RFMOs are enhancing the jurisdiction of sovereign States in
international law; and (iii) That tuna RFMOs are complementing State practice in the
development of international law.

Given the scope of the research, questions that are addressed include whether tuna RFMOs
are functioning in a manner consistent with their constituting instruments, whether tuna
RFMOs are fettering, or otherwise, the jurisdiction of sovereign States, whether the practice
of tuna RFMOs is undermining or given more weight than State practice, and whether tuna
RFMOs in effect complement State practice in the development of international law.

III. METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING CONTRIBUTION

This thesis evaluates the contribution of tuna RFMOs by examining trends in State, regional
or global practice in select areas of international law. To determine a contribution, an analysis
is made of international law in a given field. Tuna RFMO decisions and practices (and where
possible State practice) are then compared against international law to identify convergence
or divergence. The impact on international law is then evaluated.

Tuna RFMOs may directly or indirectly influence the development of international law. The
set of rules governing the conduct of relations between States as well as international
organisations is derived from a number of sources. The sources of international law are
conveniently set out in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:

(a) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognised by the contesting States;

(b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;
5

(c) the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations;

(d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.8

Applying this list of “formal” sources, the approach used for determining the contributions of
tuna RFMOs will closely examine tuna RFMO contributions to items (a), (b) and (c):

a) International conventions and legally-binding instruments in particular constituent
instruments, conservation and management measures, recommendations and resolutions.9

Law-making treaties create general norms for the parties and obligations are same and
binding on all parties.10 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has even given evidential
weight to treaties that are yet to enter into force,11 and to provisions in treaties that have been
signed but not ratified by a State12.

8

Article 59 provides that the decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and in
respect of that particular case.
9

Note that in the tuna RFMOs terminology of legally binding measures or rules differ. For example a
‘recommendation’ is binding in the International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
(Convention on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, art 8), while a ‘resolution’ is binding in the Indian Ocean
Tuna Commission (IOTC Agreement, art 9 refers to ‘measures’) and the Commission on the Conservation of
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) but resolutions
are not binding in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). In the WCPFC,
‘conservation and management measures’ rather than resolutions are binding.
10
Brownlie, above n 6¸12 – 15.
11
See Gulf of Maine case ICJ Reports (1982), 294 – 5, paras. [94] – [96], and Libya-Malta Continental Shelf
case, ICJ Reports (1985), 29 – 35, [27] – [34].
12
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases ICJ Reports (1969) 3. In that case the ICJ concluded that the first three
articles of the Continental Shelf Convention were emergent or pre-existing customary law, 32 – 41.
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The thesis takes into account the practice of tuna RFMOs in the implementation of
provisions of treaties that are in force as well as those treaties which are not. In addition to
the traditional approach of only using international conventions and binding instruments, the
thesis also takes into account soft law.13 The latter is undertaken because in the practice of
tuna RFMOs several soft law instruments have been incorporated in legally-binding
measures and decisions.14

The identification of tuna RFMO contribution to international law through international
conventions, legally binding instruments, and non-binding instruments is likely to be the
source through which a clear contribution may be delineated.

b) Contribution to Customary International Law

Tuna RFMOs have the potential to contribute to international custom by influencing State
practice for a rule in question. Acknowledging that States are primarily the decision makers
within RFMOs, the statement in the preceding sentence is circular. However, as alluded
earlier, the implementation of an RFMO decision by a State is important and should be
distinguished. The primary elements of customary international law are: (a) uniformity,
consistency of practice, (b) generality of practice, and (c) Opinio juris et necessitatis or
simply opinio juris. Brownlie asserts that there is an additional element of time that is
associated with evidence of generality and consistency.15 However, the ICJ does not
emphasise the time element.

On the first element of uniformity or consistency, complete uniformity is not necessary but
substantial uniformity is essential. In the Asylum case16, the ICJ decided that the burden of
Soft law refers to rules that are neither strictly binding in nature nor completely lacking legal significance.
In general, see for example Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford
University Press, 2007).
14 These include: the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing, <
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/012/y1224e/y1224e00.pdf > ; and the FAO International Plan of Action on
Seabirds< http://www.fao.org/3/a-x3170e.pdf >.
13

15
16

Brownlie, above n 6, 7. Crawford, above n 6.
Asylum case, above n 7.

7

proving uniformity or consistency rests with the party relying upon it, and that in considering
facts brought to its knowledge found that such facts: 17

…disclose so much uncertainty and contradiction, so much fluctuation and
discrepancy in the exercise of diplomatic asylum and in the official views expressed
on different occasions; there has been so much inconsistency in rapid succession of
conventions on asylum, ratified by some States and rejected by others, and the
practice has been so much influenced by considerations of political expediency in the
various cases, that it is not possible to discern in all this any constant and uniform
usage, accepted as law…

The second element of generality of practice complements the first. Universality of practice is
not required. Lauterpacht suggests that:18

...if universality is to be made the condition of the application of customary rules, it
may become doubtful whether many rules would qualify for that purpose. For while
in most fields of international law there is agreement as to broad principle, there is
almost invariably a pronounced degree of divergence with regard to the application of
specific rules.

It is observed that the difficulty in satisfying this element arises when there is protest by a
substantial number of States while the practice is followed by others.19Indeed, silence may
denote either tacit agreement or a lack of interest or a position on the issue. This point is
acutely pertinent in the consensus decision-making of tuna RFMOs.

17

Asylum case, above n 7, 276 - 277. See also North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, ICJ Reports (1969), 43.
Nicaragua v United States (Merits) ICJ Reports (1986) 14, 98;
18
Lauterpacht, above n 6, 370.
19
Brownlie, above n 6, 8. See also the Lotus case, PCIJ, Ser, A, no. 10, 9 – 10, and the Fisheries Jurisdiction
(United Kingdom v Iceland) case (1974) ICJ Rep. 3.

8

The element of opinio juris lends support to general practice that is accepted as law and is
practice recognised by States as obligatory. It is the psychological element required for the
formation of custom. The ICJ has adopted two methods of approach to determine the
existence of opinio juris. In many cases the ICJ has assumed the existence of an opinio juris
on the bases of evidence of general practice, or consensus in the literature, or previous
decisions. As opposed to that approach, the ICJ has adopted a more rigorous approach in a
few cases calling for more positive evidence of the recognition of the relevant rules in the
practice of States.20 In the North Sea Continental Shelf case21, the ICJ in considering the joint
continental shelf boundary between Denmark, the Netherlands and the Federal Republic of
Germany laid down an important test for determining the existence of customary
international law. The ICJ stated:

Although the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a
bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law on the basis of what
was originally a purely conventional rule, an indispensable requirement would be that
within the period in question, short though it may be, State practice, including that of
States whose interests are specially affected, should have been both extensive and
virtually uniform in the sense of the provision invoked; - and should moreover have
occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a rule of law or legal
obligation is involved.

The State must have behaved so that their conduct is “evidence of a belief that this practice is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. The need for such a belief,
i.e. the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive
necessitatis.”22The evidence that is sought to establish customary international law are
practices generally recognised by States as obligatory. There are numerous material sources

20

See in particular Lotus case, op cit, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969), and Nicaragua v United
States (Merits) ICJ Reports (1986) 14.
21
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v The
Netherlands) (1969) ICJ Rep. 3.
22
ICJ Reports (1969), 44, para. 77.
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of custom and they include: diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, opinions of legal
advisers, and State legislation.23

A significant element in the formation of customary international law is the existence and
uniformity of State practice. Where there is a lack of uniformity in State practice, customary
international law or custom may not be emerging or exist at all. The international courts have
played a significant albeit perfunctory role in the determination of custom. However,
international courts may not have had the opportunity to undertake a thorough analysis of
State practice on a particular issue. Admittedly, judges may not be privy to the necessary
information in assessing the practice of States.

Lauterpacht notes the difficulties in the determination of opinio juris and the power of the
judge in finding out whether there was a conviction that the rule in question was followed as
a matter of legal obligation.24 He adds:25 “Unless judicial activity is to result in reducing the
legal significance of the most potent source of rules of international law, namely, the conduct
of States, it would appear that the accurate principle on the subject consists in regarding all
uniform conduct of Governments (or, in appropriate cases, abstention therefrom) as
evidencing the opinio necessitatis juris except when it is shown that the conduct in question
was not accompanied by any such intention.”

The influence of tuna RFMOs on the creation of legal obligations is expected to have a
marked influence on the formation of international custom. Although the determination of
custom is best left to the judiciary, arguably, the thesis attempts to identify whether State
practice will lend support to emerging international custom.

23

Brownlie, above n 6, 6.
Lauterpacht, above n 6, 379.
25
Lauterpacht, above n 6, 380.
24
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iii) Contribution to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.

There is a significant body of literature on general principles of law.26 Simply put, this source
of law allows international tribunals to apply general principles of domestic jurisprudence in
so far as they are applicable to the relations of States. The tribunal in choosing, adapting and
applying contributes to a new element of international law influenced by domestic law.27

Tuna RFMO practice may indirectly influence this source of law by directly influencing
domestic law. State practice does evolve rules of procedure and evidence which an
international court may employ. It is envisaged that domestic law on procedures and evidence
relating to IUU fishing may be adapted by courts such as the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) when deciding a matter. Indeed, the converse is also possible.

In 2015, the ITLOS delivered an advisory opinion on questions posed by the Sub-Regional
Fisheries Commission on obligations of States relating to flagged fishing vessels fishing
within areas under national jurisdiction and beyond, as well as the rights and obligations of
coastal States in ensuring sustainability of shared stocks and stocks of common interest.28
This opinion is significant in that it is perhaps the first time that an international fisheries
organisation sought an opinion from ITLOS on the rights and duties of States with respect to
their vessels and maritime spaces. The opinion also considered national legislation and treaties
in interpreting international law. Decided by the ITLOS in 2014, the ‘Virginia G’ case also
considered national legislation and practice of Guinea Bissau on the regulation of bunkering
within the exclusive economic zone to determine consistency with international law, in
particular, Articles 56 and 58 of the 1982 LOSC.29 These decisions are noteworthy in that

26

See for example Literature identified above n 6.
Brownlie, above n 6, 16 – 18.
28
ITLOS, Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, Advisory
Opinion, 2 April 2015
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/advisory_opinion/C21_AdvOp_02.04.pdf>.
29
The M/V “Virginia G” case (Panama v Guinea-Bissau), ITLOS Case 19, Judgment 14 April 2014 <
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.19/judgment/C19Judgment_14.04.14_corr2.pdf>.
27
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they elaborate on principles and rules for the law of the sea and the role of States as well as
international organisations, and are considered further in this thesis.

IV. OVERVIEW OF RFMOs

A

Introduction to literature on Regional Fisheries Management Organisations

Literature and research on RFMOs and international fisheries law have grown since the
1970s with early work by Koers for example.30 In the 1970s to 1990s there was considerable
effort on general topics including developments in international fisheries management, the
contribution of the 1982 Convention, and challenges in fisheries governance.31 The
establishment of new RFMOs and the adoption of new international and regional fisheries
instruments since the 1990s has seen a heightened level of literature and research on specific
topics such as their institutional effectiveness32, implementation of fisheries management
principles and international standards,33 their role in the implementation of the 1995 Fish
Stocks Agreement,34 the evolution of international law relating to high seas fisheries through
the negotiation of the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,35 RFMO flag State enforcement and non-

30

Koers, above n 1,
See above n 1.
32
See for example: Sydnes, above n 1, 349–372.
31

33

34

Allen, above n 1.
See generally Barston, above n 1; Meltzer, above n 1.

35

Francisco Orrego Vicuna, The changing international law of high seas fisheries (Cambridge University Press,
1999).
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flag State enforcement practice on the high seas,36 and RFMO practices to combat IUU
fishing37.

RFMO effectiveness has been questioned. A recent quantitative assessment on RFMO
effectiveness on whether each has met its main objectives, has found that RFMOs have
failed.38 That assessment found that in prioritising the exploitation of fish stocks RFMOs had
neglected to demonstrate a genuine commitment to conservation even though conservation is
part of their respective mandates. The assessment suggested that newer RFMOs such as the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission performed better because it was able to
conform to new trends addressing conservation measures.39Given the attention, RFMOs have
undertaken performance reviews to identify challenges and enhance effectiveness. 40 Current
literature provides valuable context specific aspects of RFMO governance, and the dynamics
and influences on international fisheries management. However, it appears that the literature
provides peripheral benefit but does not directly address the subject of this study.

B

Overview of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

RFMOs may be considered to contain ‘epistemic communities’ in the broadest sense.41 An
epistemic community is defined by Haas as a ‘network of professionals with recognized

36

Rosemary G Rayfuse, ‘Countermeasures and High Seas Fisheries Enforcement’ (2004) L1 Netherlands
International Law Review 2004(1): 41 – 76; Rosemary G Rayfuse, Non-flag State Enforcement in High Seas
Fisheries (Martinus Nijhoff, 2004).
37
See for example: MaryAnn Palma, Martin Tsamenyi, and William Edeson, Promoting Sustainable Fisheries:
the international legal and policy framework to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2010).
Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly, ‘Failing the high seas: A global evaluation of regional fisheries
management organizations’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 1036 – 1042.
39
Ibid, 1041.
40
See for instance M Ceo, S Fagnani, J Swan, KTamada, and H Watanabe, ‘Performance Reviews by
Regional Fishery Bodies: Introduction, summaries, synthesis and best practices, Volume I: CCAMLR, CCSBT,
ICCAT, IOTC, NAFO, NASCO, NEAFC’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Circular No 1072, (FAO, 2012),
24 – 28.
41
The predominant view is that epistemic communities refer to scientific communities.
38
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expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy‐relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue‐area’.42 Shared values, beliefs and assumptions
provide the common bond for such communities and allows them to influence outcomes,
including in the management of fisheries.43 The work of such communities within and
between RFMOs shapes the decisions and measures and promotes homogenous practice.

By definition, RFMOs are international organisations. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International
Organizations, 198644 defines an “international organisation” as “an intergovernmental
organization”.45 The International Law Commission Draft Articles on the Responsibility of
International Organisations defines an “international organisation” as “an organization
established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and possessing its
own international legal personality…”46

Writers differentiate international organisations from regional organisations.47 In the context
of RFMOs, the differentiation may be superfluous since they are all, by definition,
intergovernmental organisations. Notwithstanding, to qualify as an international organisation,
an organisation must meet the following criteria:48



Its membership must be composed of States and/or other international organisations.

Peter M. Haas, ‘Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination’ (1992)
International Organization, 46,1-35, 3. See also James K Sebenius, ‘Challenging conventional explanations of
international cooperation: negotiation analysis and the case of epistemic communities’ (1992) International
Organization, 46, 323-365. For the application to environmental policy, see: Peter M. Haas ‘Do regimes matter?
Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution control’ (1989) International Organization, 43, 377-403;
Peter M Haas, ‘Banning chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to protect stratospheric ozone’
(1992) International Organization, 46, 187-224.
42

43

For application to RFMOs, see in particular Stuart Kaye, International Fisheries Management, (Kluwer Law
International, 2001).
44
Opened for signature 21 March 1986, 25 ILM (1986) 543 (Not in force).
45
Article 2(h).
46
Article 2(a), ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, Sixty-third session,
Geneva 26 April – 3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011, UNGA A/CN.4/L.778.
47
See for instance Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International Institutions (Sweet &
Maxwell, 6th edition, 2009), 15 – 18.
48
Ibid, 15 - 16.
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It must be constituted by a treaty or other international law instrument.



It must be autonomous from its members and be vested with legal personality; and



It must be capable of adopting “norms”/decisions with respect to its members.

RFMOs satisfy all of the above criteria for qualification as international organisations. The
reference to RFMOs as “regional” organisations may be appropriate only because of their
area of competence, but not necessarily accurate from a membership perspective, since
membership, subject to eligibility requirements, is usually global. That said, membership may
be qualified by the requirements for demonstrating a real interest in the fishery. Indeed, the
general requirement for eligibility is a real interest in the fishery.49 Further, although the area
of competence of RFMOs may be regional, their decisions usually extend beyond the
respective region to, for instance, the territory of States that are party to or have agreed to be
bound by the decision of the RFMO, to market States, and port States.

C

Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

In contrast with other RFMOs, tuna RFMOs have been proactive in collaborating with the
view to harmonising their activities through joint meetings. Although the meetings resulted in
joint outcomes, these outcomes are not legally binding on the respective tuna RFMO member
States. Nevertheless, the joint meetings have strengthened harmonisation of actions. Japan
hosted the first joint meeting in Kobe in January 2007. Participants at the meeting included
the tuna RFMO secretariats, members and cooperating non-members. The major issues
discussed were a review of the current situation of RFMOs and markets, actions to coordinate
adopted measures, and the control of fishing capacity and the outcomes of the first meeting
include an action plan and recommendations to harmonise tuna conservation and
management measures.50 In sum there have been three joint meetings and several
international workshops addressing the management of tuna fisheries, monitoring control and
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1995 Agreement, arts 8.3 and 9.2.
Report of the Joint Meeting of Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organisations, 22 – 26 January 2007,
Kobe Japan, < http://www.all-creatures.org/fact/fact-20080604-2.pdf >; see also Report of the Second Joint
Meeting of Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) (San Sebastian, Spain, June 29 –
July 3, 2009), <http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Meetings/Docs/2009_TRFMOs_REP_ENG.pdf>.
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surveillance, and the management of by-catch. The thesis now introduces each tuna RFMO in
chronological order based on year established.

(1) Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)

The IATTC was established in 1949 under a Treaty between the United States and Costa
Rica.51 The objective of the 1949 Treaty was primarily to maintain the populations of
yellowfin and skipjack tuna and associated fish species taken by tuna fishing vessels in the
eastern Pacific Ocean and to co-operate in the gathering and interpretation of fisheries
information to support maximum sustainable yield.52

The area of application of the IATTC is the Eastern Pacific Ocean bounded by the coastline
of North, Central, and South America and by the following lines: i) the 50°N parallel from
the coast of North America to its intersection with the 150°W meridian; ii) the 150°W
meridian to its intersection with the 50°S parallel; and iii) the 50°S parallel to its intersection
with the coast of South America.53

At its 61st session in June 1998, the Commission adopted a resolution for the establishment of
a working group to review the 1949 IATTC Convention. In June 2003 the Commission after
considering the report of the working group including a draft convention, adopted a
resolution for the adoption of the Antigua Convention54 and a resolution on the participation
of fishing entities.55

51

Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica, opened for signature 31
May 1949 (Entered into force 3 March 1950), hereafter ‘IATTC 1949 Convention’.
52
Preamble, IATTC 1949 Convention.
53
Antigua Convention, art III.
54
Convention for the strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission established by the 1949
Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica , opened for signature 14
November 2003 (Entered into force 27 August 2010), hereafter “Antigua Convention”.
55

IATTC Resolutions C-03-02 and C-03-09 respectively.
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The Antigua Convention incorporates provisions of the 1982 LOSC, affirms principles in soft
law instruments such as the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 of the Conference on
Environment and Development of 1992, the Johannesburg Declaration and Plan of
Implementation adopted by the World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, and the
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries adopted by the Conference of the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in 1995. The explicit emphasis on the 1982
LOSC and soft law instruments is deliberate given that the majority of Commission members
are not party to the 1995 Agreement.56

In any case, the preamble to the Antigua Convention notes the resolution of the UN General
Assembly in the adoption of the 1995 Agreement. Although the majority of IATTC members
are not party to the 1995 Agreement,57 the Antigua Convention incorporates several aspects
contained in the 1995 Agreement including: the application of the precautionary approach,
the requirement of compatibility, compliance and enforcement obligations of States parties
and fishing entities, and the duties of flag States and fishing entities.58

With respect to performance reviews, the IATTC at its meeting in October-November 2014,
adopted the terms of reference for the review of the IATTC and the AIDCP.59 The objectives
of the review are to assess the achievements of IATTC and AIDCP since February 1999 in
relation to: i) the achievement of the IATTC’s objectives regarding fish stocks; ii) human
resources planning, managing and development; iii) operating structure, decision making,
planning and communication; iv) financial planning, accountability and monitoring; and v)
effectiveness and efficiency. In addition the terms sought recommendations on ways to

56

States parties that signed the resolution for the adoption of the Antigua Convention are Costa Rica, Ecuador,
El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, United States of America, Vanuatu,
Venezuela, and Spain. Of these 9 are States parties to the 1982 LOSC, 6 are party to the 1995 Agreement whilst
Ecuador, El Salvador, Peru and Venezuela are not party to either instrument.
57
Belize, Canada, Costa Rica, EU, France, Japan, Kiribati, Panama and the USA are party to the 1995
Agreement.
58
Antigua Convention, art IV, art V, arts XVIII and XIX, and arts XX and XXI respectively.
59
IATTC Resolution C-14-09.
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improve the performance of the IATTC and AIDCP. The performance review found, among
other things, the
scientific program structure and outcomes achieved by the IATTC and AIDCP is highly
commendable but that the consensus model of governance has on the IATTC’s decisionmaking ability.60

(2) International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)

The International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, establishes ICCAT and
defines its area of application as “all waters of the Atlantic Ocean, including the adjacent
Seas”.61 The objective of ICCAT is embedded in the preamble which states: “The
Governments…considering their mutual interest in the populations of tuna and tuna like
fishes found in the Atlantic Ocean, and desiring to cooperate in maintaining the population of
these fishes at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other
purposes”. Therefore the objective is to maintain populations of tunas and tuna-like fishes at
levels that will permit maximum sustainable yield. 62

Unlike the IOTC which is an organisation established under Article XIV of the FAO
Constitution, the ICCAT has a working relationship with the FAO and the FAO Director
General is the depositary of the constituent instrument.63In accordance with its constituent
instrument, the ICCAT entered into an agreement with the FAO for consultation and
collaboration in areas of common interest, particularly in the collection and analysis of

60

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission and Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation
Program Performance Review, 20 June 2016 < https://www.iattc.org/Meetings/Meetings2016/June/pdffiles/IATTC-AIDCP-Performance-Review-Final-ReportENG.pdf> .
61
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, opened for signature 14 May 1966, 673
UNTS 63 (Entered into force 21 March 1969), hereafter ‘the ICCAT Convention’. Modified by the Paris
Protocol 1984 and the Madrid Protocol 1992. Article I refers to the Convention Area.
62
63

Preamble, ICCAT Convention.
ICCAT Convention, art XI.
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statistics, stock assessment and the formulation of conservation and management measures
relating to tunas and tuna-like stocks of the Atlantic Ocean.64

The ICCAT has considered the relationship between its convention and the Agreement since
1995. At its fourteenth and fifteenth sessions, ICCAT discussed the relationship between the
ICCAT Convention and the 1995 Agreement based on the question of whether ICCAT used
in its statistical calculations the precautionary principle or the precautionary approach. 65 A
decade later, the Commission adopted a resolution aimed at strengthening the organisation. 66
The resolution states that at the 2006 annual meeting the Commission should review
ICCAT’s conservation and management program taking into account relevant international
fisheries instruments. In November 2007, a working group on the future of ICCAT was
established to review the Convention and evaluate its compatibility with the development of
international law since 1969.

The recent performance review of ICCAT, among other things, suggests that ICCAT has
failed in its mandate as a number of key fish stocks are well below MSY. The review panel
however was of the view that rather than ICCAT failing in its mandate, it is ICCAT that has
been failed by its members (CPCs).67Indeed, this view is accurate from an institutional
perspective since it is the CPCs that comprise ICCAT and decide on its direction.

As far as ICCAT’s basic legal instruments are concerned the review panel identified 16 issues
including no provision in the basic texts but some provision in measures for the precautionary
approach, fishing allocations and opportunities, flag State duties, port State duties,

64

Agreement between the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, the ICCAT, informed that the Agreement had been adopted
by the FAO Conference, approved the Agreement at its Third Regular Meeting in 1973.
65
ICCAT, 1995. Report. Vol. 1, Part 11, 51 – 52. Canada proposed at the fifteenth meeting of the Commission
in Madrid, 14 – 21 November 1997, that a new working group on the precautionary approach should be
established by ICCAT.
66
Resolution to Strengthen ICCAT 05-10.
67
Ceo et al, above n 39, 24 – 28.
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cooperative mechanism to detect and deter non-compliance, and market-related measures.68
The review also found no provision in either the basic texts or conservation and management
measures regarding the compatibility of measures and dispute settlement procedures.

(3) Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)

For the Indian Ocean, the organisation is established under the IOTC Agreement.69 In
contrast to the ICCAT Convention, the IOTC Agreement is concluded under Article XIV of
the FAO Constitution and it is therefore also an FAO body. The area of competence of the
IOTC is the Indian Ocean (defined as being FAO statistical areas 51 and 57 identified on the
map in Annex A to the IOTC Agreement) and adjacent seas, north of the Antarctic
Convergence, insofar as it is necessary to cover such seas for the purpose of conserving and
managing stocks that migrate into or out of the Indian Ocean.70

The objective of the Commission is to “promote cooperation among its Members with a view
to ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilization of
stocks covered by this Agreement and encouraging sustainable development of fisheries
based on such stocks”.71 The Commission is empowered, inter alia, to “to carry out such
other activities as may be necessary to fulfil its objectives…” and adopt decisions and
recommendations, as required, with a view to furthering the objectives of the Agreement.72

Since its inauguration, the Commission has undergone two performance reviews, the most
recent was called for in 2013. The objectives of the review followed recommendations made
at the first joint tuna RFMO meeting in 2007 and specifically sought: i) an evaluation of
progress made on the recommendations arising from the first performance review; ii) a focus

68

Ibid.
Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Approved by the FAO Council on
25 November 1993 (entered into force on 27 March 1996), hereafter ‘IOTC Agreement’.
70
IOTC Agreement, art II.
71
Article V.1.
72
Article V.2(h) & V.3.
69
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on the effectiveness of the Commission to fulfil its mandate, in accordance with the set
criteria; and iii) an evaluation of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and risks to the
organisation. The outcomes of the review reported in 2016 appears however to place
particular emphasis on the option for the IOTC to not be an FAO Article XIV body.73

(4) Commission on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)

The constituent instrument of the CCSBT was adopted in 1993 to ensure, through appropriate
management, the conservation and optimum utilisation of southern bluefin tuna (Thunnus
maccoyii).74

Given the interests in accommodating the fishing entity of Taiwan, the European Union and
other States, the CCSBT agreed in 2001 to establish the Extended Commission and Extended
Scientific Committee.75Noting the impetus for their establishment, the Extended Commission
and the Extended Scientific Committee performs the same tasks as the Commission and the
Scientific Committee including but not limited to, deciding upon a total allowable catch and
its allocation among participants. Once admitted, a State, fishing entity or entity is entitled to
equal voting rights. However, there are certain decisions which are reserved for States.76

Like other tuna RFMOs, the CCSBT has undertaken performance reviews, in 2008 and in
2014.77The first 2008 review was effectively a self assessment of performance undertaken by
a working group comprised of officials from Australia, Indonesia, New Zealand and Japan,
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IOTC, Report of the 2nd IOTC Performance Review. Seychelles 2–6 February & 14–18 December 2015
Document IOTC–2016–PRIOTC02–R[E], (IOTC, 2016) <http://www.iotc.org/documents/report-2nd-iotcperformance-review >. See Chapter II.
74
The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna , opened for signature 10 May 1993, ATS
1994 No 16 (Entered into force 20 May 1994). The Convention was signed by Australia, Japan and New
Zealand, in May 1993.
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CCSBT Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee of 20 April
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76
See Chapter VI on fishing entities.
77
Serge M Garcia and Holly R Koehler, Performance Review of the CCSBT 2009 – 2013 (CCSBT, 2014),
<http://www.tuna-org.org/Documents/2014_CCSBT_Independent_Performance_Review.pdf >.
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which produced a report that was reviewed by an independent expert later that year.78 In
contrast, the 2014 review was undertaken by independent experts with the objectives of
assessing: i) performance using the agreed criteria developed following the 2007 Kobe
meeting, already used for the first review; ii) progress in implementing the recommendations
from the review in 2008; and iii) the extent to which modern fisheries management standards
have been incorporated into the CCSBT’s decisions. While the 2014 review identified
improvements in terms of processes since the 2008 review, it also highlighted the need, inter
alia, for enhancing the data collection and verification regime, the application of ecosystem
based approaches to management, conformity with the requirements in the 1995 Agreement,
and for improvements in the monitoring, control and surveillance regime, particularly with
the observer, vessel monitoring system, and high seas boarding and inspection programme. 79

(5) Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC)

The WCPFC was inaugurated in December 2004 after the entry into force of its constituent
instrument and has the objective of ensuring, through effective management, the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the western and central
Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement. 80

Without prejudice to the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the 1982 LOSC and the
1995 Agreement, the area of competence of the Commission

CCSBT, Report of the Performance Review Working Group, 3 – 4 July 2008, Canberra, Australia,
<https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/ccsbt.org/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_15/repor
t_of_PRWG.pdf >. See also CCSBT, Report of the Independent Expert, September 2008
<https://www.ccsbt.org/sites/ccsbt.org/files/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_15/Perf
ormanceReview_IndependentExpertsReport.pdf >.
79
Above n 77.
80
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean, opened for signature 5 September 2000, 2275 UNTS 40532 (entered into force 19 June
2004), hereinafter ‘WCPF Convention’.
78
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comprises all waters of the Pacific Ocean bounded to the south and to the east by the
boundaries identified in the constituent instrument.81 In addition to the spatial context, the
WCPF Convention applies to all stocks of highly migratory fish within the defined area
except sauries. As a compromise to the interests of coastal States in the region in particular,
measures adopted are to be applied throughout the range of the stocks, or to specific areas
within the area of competence, as determined by the WCPFC.82

In terms of functions, the WCPFC is responsible for, inter alia, determining the total
allowable catch or total level of fishing effort for identified highly migratory fish stocks
within the area of competence, adopting conservation and management measures and
recommendations, and promoting cooperation and coordination between members to ensure
that conservation and management measures for stocks in areas under national jurisdiction
and measures for the same stocks on the high seas are compatible. Notwithstanding, all the
functions of the WCPFC are to be performed without prejudice to the sovereign rights of
coastal States for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing highly
migratory fish stocks within areas under national jurisdiction.83

Although established in 2004, the WCPFC has supported a review of its performance.84 The
2012 report of the review panel provides several recommendations including that members
cooperate to resolve different legal interpretations of the constituent instrument in relation
to the area of competence and the duty to establish compatible and effective conservation
and management measures across the range of the stocks. It was suggested that the
resolution of interpretations could be achieved through agreement on an interpretive
interpretive declaration.85 At the same time, the review recommended that a
process be established for consideration and adoption of measures to
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WCPF Convention, arts 3 and 4.
WCPF Convention, art 3.3.
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WCPF Convention, art 10 chapeau.
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WCPFC, Review of the Performance of the WCPFC, Document WCPFC-2011/12 28 February 2012, <
http://www.tuna-org.org/Documents/WCPFC-PerformanceReviewRep.pdf >.
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ensure that they are technically sound from a legal point of view and consistent with other
measures and instruments of WCPFC.86

V.

THESIS STRUCTURE

An ambitious undertaking such as this would ideally encompass and thoroughly evaluate
several individual aspects of international law over which tuna RFMOs have influence, such
as: the regulation of fishing vessels, the prerogative of States over their ports, the
responsibilities of flag States, and the freedoms of the high seas. Regrettably, given thesis
parameters, it is difficult to cover all. Thus the thesis is structured according to select topics
addressed by tuna RFMOs.

Chapter III examines the influence of tuna RFMOs on the jurisdiction of coastal States.
Jurisdiction refers to specific aspects of the general legal competence or sovereignty of a
State. The chapter will explore how tuna RFMO practice affects the jurisdiction, in its widest
sense, of coastal States, including their powers over marine spaces within their jurisdiction.

Chapter IV considers the high seas regime and how tuna RFMO practice may impact on
fundamental rules of international law. The chapter will elucidate the role of tuna RFMOs in
the establishment of regulatory mechanisms for fishing and related activities on the high seas.
Novel concepts and principles introduced in practice are identified.

Unlike earlier chapters, Chapter V does not address jurisdictional aspects or marine spacerelated matters. The focus on third States aims to identify practices which may have
implications primarily on the pacta tertiis rule, i.e., a treaty binds the parties only and does
not create obligations or rights for third States. An evaluation of tuna RFMO practices is
undertaken and questions posed on whether tuna RFMOs are exposed to liability for
measures taken against third States.
86

At its annual session in December 2013, the WCPFC included an agenda item on this recommendation but did
not consider it.
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Chapter VI is to an extent similar in focus to chapter V because the emphasis remains with
participants in the fishery. Fishing entities is a term used particularly in international fisheries
fora and refers only to Chinese Taipei or Taiwan. The chapter questions whether the practice
of tuna RFMOs is lending support to the recognition of the fishing entity as an independent
sovereign State. This is a particularly contentious issue politically, but in academia, it is less
so.

Chapter VII explores how tuna RFMOs are combatting IUU fishing and the effects of their
decisions on international law. It is apparent that the international community through the
United Nations General Assembly and the governing bodies of each RFMO, considers IUU
fishing a significant threat to sustainability. Consequently, tuna RFMOs are positioned at the
fore. The main question considered in that chapter is whether the decisions of tuna RFMOs
are congruent with rules of international law.

Chapter VIII will distil all the analyses against the hypotheses and questions posed in order to
assess the contributions of tuna RFMOs to international law. That chapter also identifies
issues and pending questions that are research worthy.

But first, Chapter II examines the legal characteristics of tuna RFMOs. Emphasis will be
placed on their respective international legal personality and legal capacity or powers. These
aspects define what an organisation can and cannot do, and are central to the corpus of
international institutional law. An evaluation of the practice of tuna RFMOs as international
institutions is not treated effectively in the literature on international institutional law and is
therefore necessary.
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II
Legal Characteristics
I.

INTRODUCTION

The legal character of an organisation is essential to evaluate in order to ascertain, among
other things, the personality and powers of the organisation vis-à-vis its members. This
Chapter considers the characteristics of tuna RFMOs in particular their legal personality and
capacity or powers. Although these may be considered the same, they are distinct; capacity is
derived from legal personality. The goal of this Chapter is to elucidate the contributions of
tuna RFMOs to international law in particular the branch of international law relating to
international institutions. A general discourse on international legal personality is undertaken
before attention is placed on the legal personality of international institutions and the
application of the normative and functional approaches to the constituent instruments and
responsibilities of each tuna RFMO. The Chapter concludes with observations on how tuna
RFMO practice may be contributing to international institutional law.

II.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITY

In international law an entity with legal personality is capable of possessing rights and
exercising obligations on the international plane and in at least one domestic legal system. 1

James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press,8th edition,
2012) 115 - 126; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press,7th edition,
2008) 676 – 679; Henry G Schermers and Niels M Blokker, International Institutional Law: Unity within
Diversity, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 987 – 994; Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett’s Law of International
Institutions (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition, 2009) 474 – 516; Jan Klabbers, An Introduction to International
Institutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 46 – 51.
1
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This conventional definition is circular since the indicia depends on the existence of a legal
person.2 Historically sovereign States only were regarded as subjects of the law in that they
are capable of possessing international rights and duties and have the capacity to maintain
their rights. Since the early 1900s other entities have been recognised as having legal
personality.3 In addition to a State, an entity may be a political entity legally proximate to
States, a condominium, internalised territories, United Nations administered territories
immediately prior to independence, an intergovernmental organisation, agencies of States, or
such other body recognised as having that capability under international law.4
States remain the primary subjects of the law and the “backbone” of the international
community5. States possess the totality of international rights and duties recognised in
international law. As one observes:6
The basic reason for this position is, of course, that ‘the world is to-day organized on
the basis of the co-existence of States, and that fundamental changes will take place
only through State action, whether affirmative or negative. The States are the
repositary of legitimated authority over peoples and territories. It is only in terms of
State powers, prerogatives, jurisdictional limits and law-making capabilities that
territorial limits and jurisdiction, responsibility for official actions, and a host of other
questions of co-existence between nations can be determined…This basic primacy of
the State as a subject of international relations and law would be substantially
affected, and eventually superseded, only if national entities, as political and legal
systems, were absorbed in a world state.

Unlike States, all other subjects of international law have limited legal capacity in the area of
international rights and obligations, limited capacity to act either in putting into effect their

2

Brownlie, ibid, 57.
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (Cambridge University
Press, 1982) 173.
4
Brownlie, above n 1, 58 – 61; Crawford, above n 1; Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford University
Press, 2nd edn, 2005) 71 – 72. Entities capable may include international non-governmental organisations and
international corporations.
5
Cassesse, above n 4, 71.
6
Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (Columbia University Press, 1964) 213.
3
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rights and powers or in exercising the right to enforce such rights.7 Aside from States, the
established legal persons are:8

(a) Political entities legally proximate to States such as the former Free City of
Danzig;

(b) Condominia, i.e., where there is a joint exercise of State power within a particular
territory under an autonomous local administration such as the New Hebrides (now
known as Vanuatu) during the period of dependence on the governments of France
and Britain;

(c) Internalised territories with special status created under a multilateral treaty such
as the former Free City of Danzig;

(d) United Nations administered territories immediately prior to independence such as
the United National Transitional Administration in East Timor with the mandate to
prepare East Timor for independence and the Administration had full legislative and
executive powers;
(e) Intergovernmental or International organisations;9
(f) Agencies of States – are inter-governmental bodies established by States for a
specific purpose such as the former European Commission of Danube; and

(g) Other entities recognised as having capability under international law such as the
fishing entity Chinese Taipei or Taiwan10.

7

Cassese, above n 4, 72.
Brownlie, above n 1, 58 – 61; Cassese, above n 4, 71 – 72; Crawford, above n 1, 115 - 126.
9
According to Gaya, the decision of the ICJ in LaGrand (Germany v United States of America), Judgment ICJ
Report (2001), 494, that individuals are also subjects of international law, may lead the Court to assert the legal
personality even of NGOs: International Law Commission, First Report on Responsibility of International
Organizations, ILC Doc. A/CN.4/532, [17] < legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/English/a_cn4_532.pdf>.
10
Crawford, above n 1, 125, acknowledges that Taiwan is a ‘fishing entity’ for law of the sea purposes and
‘[t]hough not recognized as a state, it has an international legal identity’. For further information on the fishing
entity see chapter VI.
8
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Notwithstanding established legal persons, Brownlie and Crawford describe entitles with
special types of personality: non-self-governing peoples, national liberation movements,
States in statu nascendi, belligerent and insurgent communities, entities sui generis, and
individuals.11 These special types will not be addressed here except the personality of nonself governing peoples and individuals given the potential for such types to assert their rights
under international law. The question of whether inhabitants of a mandated territory have
rights under international law was considered by the International Court of Justice in 1950 in
its Advisory Opinion on the International Status of West Africa12. The Court affirmed the
rights of peoples and of States arising from mandates and this right was subsequently
maintained by Article 80 of the United Nations Charter.13

On the special personality of individuals, the Permanent Court of International Justice
considered whether a treaty could confer rights directly on individuals in its Advisory
Opinion on the Jurisdiction of Courts of Danzig.14 According to Lauterpacht this is the first
most important pronouncement of the Court on subjects of international law.15 When the
Court was established in 1920 there were already tensions between doctrine and practice
where the predominant view was that States only were subjects whilst in actual practice there
were treaties that had accorded rights to intergovernmental organisations or agencies of
States.16 The case considered the pecuniary claim of Danzig railway officials who were
passed into the Polish service. Poland argued that the international treaty was not
incorporated in Polish municipal law so rights and obligations were only held by the
contracting parties. The Court advised that the answer must depend on the intention of the
contracting parties:

It cannot be disputed that the very of object of an international agreement, to the
intention of the contracting parties, may be the adoption by the parties of some
definite rules creating individual rights and obligations and enforcement by national
courts.”17

Brownlie, above n 1, 62 – 65; Crawford, above n 1, 115 – 126.
ICJ Rep. 1950, 133.
13
Ibid, 133, 134, 136 and 137.
14
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, PCIJ Ad. Op. 15, Series B, No. 15 (1928), 17.
15
Lauterpacht, above n 3, 173.
16
Ibid.
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Ad. Op. 15, Series B, No. 15 (1928) 17.
11
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The Court found that it was indeed the intention of the parties and accordingly Danzig
railway officials had a right of action against the Polish Railway Administration for the
recovery of pecuniary claims based on the Treaty between Poland and Danzig.In doing so the
Court effectively denied the exclusiveness of States as beneficiaries of international rights,
and in granting individuals covered under a treaty a right of action, set a precarious precedent
that challenges the requirement (in some jurisdictions) for domestication of treaties, and that
automatically accords rights to individuals that are subjects (and not party) to the treaty. The
categories and types of entities that will be accorded legal personality or special personality is
expected to evolve over time. As the types of entities are complex, facile generalisations on
the subject of legal personality is discouraged.

III. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
Unlike States, international organisations do not have legal personality ipso facto. Legal
personality determines whether an international organisation is able to possess rights and
exercise obligations on the international plane. Legal personality is not an absolute concept;
instruments from which rights and obligations are derived ought to be examined to determine
whether an international organisation enjoys such personality.18The practice of such
organisations is also important as both subsequent agreements and practice aid interpretation
and elaborate personality and capacity. However, there are limits to rights and obligations of
international organisations, as well as their capacity. Rights and obligations held depend on
the organisation’s purpose and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents
and developed in practice. Where legal personality is not explicitly conferred on an
organisation, there are two ways for determining legal personality – the normative approach,
and the functional approach.

The normative approach involves an examination of the binding agreements and
arrangements concluded by the entity and an extrapolation of the personality recognised by
other parties to agreements. The recognition of the possession of legal personality by the

18

Schermers and Blokker, above n 1, 987 – 993.
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other parties to agreements with an entity confers personality upon the entity.19 On the other
hand, the functional approach is used when the normative approach alone is inadequate.
Under the functional approach there is an examination of certain functions of the entity and
its duties and responsibilities to determine whether the entity has the requisite competence to
discharge its functions.20

That said, the theoretical explanations about legal personality and the approaches used is
inadequate but appear to be accepted. Although the theoretical basis for international legal
personality has evolved over time, it remains elusive.

Autonomy and Legal personality

An international organisation must enjoy autonomy and legal personality vis-à-vis its member
States. Legal personality has been described as the most important criterion of an
international organisation.21 The three fundamental elements of legal personality of an
international organisation are:22

1. A permanent association of States, with lawful objects, equipped with organs;

2. A distinction between the international organisation and its member States; and

3. The existence of legal powers exercisable on the international plane and within
domestic systems of one or more States.

Historically, legal personality and capacity of an international organisation was exercised
only in the territory of each member State.23 This restrictive approach was put in place to
allay concern that the United Nations was a “super-state” usurping the sovereignty of
19

See for example: Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The Legal Substance and Status of Fishing Entities in International Law:
A Note’ (2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law, 123-131, 125. Tsamenyi refers to the
agreement defining the status and immunities of the League of Nations and its officials in Switzerland as an
example of conferral of legal personality by recognition: Article 1 of the Status and Immunities of the League of
Nations, 18 September 1926. <http://untreaty.un.org>.
20
The functional approach was developed by the International Court of Justice in the Reparations case
discussed in more detail below.
21
Sands and Klein, above n 1.
22
Brownlie, above n 1, 677.
23
United Nations Charter, art 104.
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States.24 International organisations established after the Second World War that followed
this approach include the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Intellectual
Property Organisation.25

The 1949 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the Reparation of Injuries
suffered in the Service of the United Nations provides far-reaching dicta on the question of
legal personality of international organisations.26 This opinion arose as a result of the death of
the Swedish Count Folke Bernadotte and several of his associates while working for the
United Nations in the Middle East. Count Bernadotte was the United Nations mediator sent to
appease the unrest caused by the establishment of the state of Israel. The question put to the
Court from the General Assembly concerned the situation where an agent of the United
Nations suffers injuries in the performance of duties in circumstances involving the
responsibility of a State. In particular, whether the United Nations as an organisation has the
capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible de jure or de facto
government with a view to obtaining reparation due in respect of damage caused to the
organisation, or to victims or persons entitled through them.

In considering the intended characteristics of the organisation, the Court developed the
functional approach, or perhaps more appropriately the functional necessity test, in the
determination of legal personality.27 The Court opined:

The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or
in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the
community. Throughout its history, the development of international law has been
influenced by the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase in
the collective activities of States has already given rise to instances of action upon the
international plane by certain entities which are not States. This development
culminated in the establishment in June 1945 of an international organization whose

24

Sands and Klein, above n 1, p474.

25

IAEA Statute, art XV, and Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization,
art 12(1) respectively.
26

Advisory Opinion on the Reparation of Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Reps
174, hereafter “Reparations Case”.
27
Tsamenyi, above n 19, uses the term “functional necessity”.
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purpose and principles are specified in the Charter of the United Nations. But to
achieve these ends the attribution of international personality is indispensable.28

The Court relied on the attribution of legal capacity, immunities in the territory of member
States, and the capacity to conclude treaties to reach a unanimous decision that the
organisation possessed a juridical personality on the international plane and hence was
capable of presenting such a claim. The Court continued:
…the organisation was intended to exercise and enjoy, and is in fact exercising and
enjoying, functions and rights which can only be explained on the basis of the
possession of a large measure of international personality and the capacity to operate
upon an international plane. It is at present the supreme type of international
organisation, and it could not carry out the intentions of its founders if it was devoid
of international personality. It must be acknowledged that its members, by entrusting
certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed it
with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged.29

The will of member States in establishing and vesting an international organisation with
functions in the constituent instrument is paramount. The rights and duties of an international
organisation on the international plane will be defined by its purposes and functions as
stipulated or implied in constituent instruments and developed in practice. The ICJ in
considering the functions of the United Nations said that they are of such a character that
could not be effectively discharged other than by the organisation itself having the requisite
capacity to bring international claims in the discharge of its functions.30 By taking into
account the functions, rights and responsibilities of the organisation the ICJ deemed that the
United Nations possesses international legal personality. The Reparations case provided the
basis for developments concerning international legal personality, and the autonomy of
international organisations with legal personality from its member States. However, not all
organisations will have the same juridicial status and legal capacity on the international plane.

28

Above n 26, 178.
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In its advisory opinion on the Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the
WHO and Egypt the International Court of Justice stated:31

International organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by
any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under
their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties.

That advisory opinion appears to shift the emphasis from functional necessity to the
normative approach. Interestingly, the approach taken seems to differ from that applied in the
Reparations case which supported functional necessity. Be that as it may, an analysis of how
each approach may be applied to tuna RFMOs is now made.

IV. LEGAL PERSONALITY OF TUNA REGIONAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS

The constituent instrument of the IATTC, CCSBT and the WCPFC provide explicitly for its
legal capacity and personality.32 Explicit reference to personality in the constituent instrument
satisfies the normative approach. But should the scope of personality be confined to that text
or can personality be expanded, also taking into account functional necessity. The latter
appears to be the appropriate approach for tuna RFMOs because of their evolving
responsibilites.

A

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

ICJ Reports 1980, 89 – 90, [37].
Convention for the strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission established by the 1949
Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica , opened for signature 14
November 2003 (Entered into force 27 August 2010), hereinafter ‘Antigua Convention’, art VI(3); The
Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna , opened for signature 10 May 1993, ATS 1994 No
16 (entered into force 20 May 1994), hereinafter ‘SBT Convention’, art 6(9); Convention on the Conservation
and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, opened for
signature 5 September 2000, 2275 UNTS 40532 (entered into force 19 June 2004), hereinafter ‘WCPF
Convention’, art 9(6).
31
32

34

The 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica
for the establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission did not provide for the
legal personality of the Commission either through an explicit conferral or through specific
capacities.33
Carroz and Roche observed that the IATTC sought official status as an “international
organization” under the United States International Organizations Immunities Act and
adopted a resolution in 1962.34 In that year, the United States President made an executive
order designating the IATTC as a public international organisation with certain privileges,
exemptions and immunities under law.35 Member countries of the IATTC granted certain
privileges including allowing free entry and exit of Commission staff and their personal
effects and scientific equipment when on Commission business.36

Unlike its predecessor, the Antigua Convention, provides explicitly for legal personality.
Article VI(3) provides:

3. The Commission shall have legal personality and shall enjoy, in its relations with
other international organizations and with its members, such legal capacity as may be
necessary to perform its functions and achieve its objective, in accordance with
international law. The immunities and privileges which the Commission and its
officers shall enjoy shall be subject to an agreement between the Commission and the
relevant member.

This is an explicit conferral of legal personality to the IATTC by States Parties. Accepting
that, the legal capacity or power to carry out specific acts on the international plane are set
out in various provisions of the Antigua Convention, in particular Article VII (Functions of
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Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica, opened for signature 31
May 1949 (entered into force 3 March 1950). Articles I.13(e) and I.16 of the 1949 Convention fall short of a
treaty-making capacity by providing that the Director of Investigations is responsible, inter alia, for
arrangements for the co-operation with other organisations or individuals that the Commission has requested
technical and scientific services of.
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Jean Carroz and A G Roche, ‘The Proposed International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas’ (1967) 61 American Journal of International Law 673 – 702, 697.
35
John F. Kennedy: "Executive Order 11059," October 23, 1962. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T.
Woolley, The American Presidency Project. <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=58998>.
36
Ibid.
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the Commission), Article XXIII (Cooperation and Assistance), Article XXIV (Cooperation
with Other Organisations or Arrangements), and Article XXVI (Non-members). Each of
these provisions support the autonomy of the Commission and secretariat from members. For
example, the Commission’s functions in Article VII provides inter alia for the determination
of the status of stocks and the level of fishing capacity and effort, based on the best scientific
information available, the adoption of necessary measures and recommendations for species,
and, the establishment of such subsidiary bodies necessary for the achievement of objectives.
Further, the power to enter into treaties with other organisations or arrangements in Article
XXIV is exemplified in the agreement with the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission concerning the IATTC-WCPFC overlap area.37

B

Commission on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna

The SBT Convention provides explicitly for legal personality in Article 6(9):

The Commission shall have legal personality and shall enjoy in its relations with other
international organisations and in the territories of the Parties such legal capacity as
may be necessary to perform its functions and achieve its ends. The immunities and
privileges which the Commission and its officers shall enjoy in the territory of a Party
shall be subject to agreement between the Commission and the Party concerned.

Provisions in the SBT Convention that elucidate the legal capacity of the Commission
include: Article 8 (Functions), and Article 12 (Cooperation with other International
Organisations).

C

Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission

Article 9(6) of the WCPF Convention in comparison to the equivalent provisions for the
IATTC and CCSBT, provides the broadest terms for legal personality of that Commission:

37

Memorandum of Understanding Between the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, June 2006, <www.wcpfc.int>.
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6. The Commission shall have international legal personality and such legal capacity
as may be necessary to perform its functions and achieve its objectives. The privileges
and immunities which the Commission and its officers shall enjoy in the territory of a
Contracting Party shall be determined by agreement between the Commission and the
member concerned.

Unlike the conferral provisions of the IATTC and CCSBT, Article 9(6) does not restrict legal
personality to relations with other international organisations. The generality of this provision
is noteworthy because it confers the broadest scope of legal personality within the objectives.

Acknowledging that the constituent instrument of the WCPF Commission grants legal
personality, the legal capacity or power to carry out specific acts on the international plane
are set out in various provisions of the WCPF Convention, in particular Article 10 (Functions
of the Commission), Article 22 (Cooperation with Other Organisations or Arrangements),
and Article 32 (Non-Parties to this Convention).

D

International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas

Since the ICCAT Convention38 does not explicitly refer to the legal personality of the
organisation, the functional necessity approach is applied. The overarching objective of this
instrument is the maintenance of the populations of tuna and tuna-like species in the Atlantic
Ocean at levels which will permit the maximum sustainable catch for food and other
purposes, and the conservation of those species.39

In establishing the Commission, Article III indirectly mandates the organisation to carry out
the objectives set forth in the Convention. In carrying out the objectives, Article IV provides
for the broad responsibilities including the study of the populations of tuna and tuna-like

38

International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, opened for signature 14 May 1966, 673
UNTS 63 (entered into force 21 March 1969), and modified by the Paris Protocol 1984 and the Madrid Protocol
1992, hereinafter ‘ICCAT Convention’.
39
Preamble, ICCAT Convention.
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fishes and such other species of fishes exploited in tuna fishing in the Convention area as are
not under investigation by another international fishery organisation. The same article
provides specific powers supporting collaboration with other agencies and organisations:

The Commission, in carrying out these responsibilities shall, insofar as feasible,
utilise the technical and scientific services of, and information from, official agencies
of the Contracting Parties and their political sub-divisions and may, when desirable,
utilise the available services and information of any public or private institution,
organization or individual, and may undertake within the limits of its budget
independent research to supplement the research work being done by governments,
national institutions or other international organizations.

In addition, Article XI of ICCAT Convention distinguishes the Commission from the FAO
by mandating a “working relationship” and the conclusion of an agreement pursuant to
Article XIII of the FAO Constitution.40 Article XIII deals with cooperation between the FAO
and other international organisations and persons, and enunciates the procedure for entering
into agreements with such organisations. This clearly signifies the autonomy of the
Commission from the FAO. Article XI of the ICCAT Convention specifies the powers of the
Commission, including the power to enter into agreements with other international fisheries
commissions and scientific institutions, and the power to invite observers from other
international organisations, States members of the United Nations and specialised agencies of
the United Nations to observe meetings of the Commission.41

The ICJ and prominent jurists have isolated the power to enter into agreements as a power in
itself signifying legal personality.42 In its Advisory Opinion on a judgment relating to a
complaint against the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD),43 the ICJ
affirms the power to enter into agreements as an indicator of legal personality. The Court in
that matter considered the merits, among other things, the legal personality of the IFAD and
40

ICCAT Convention, art XI.1.
Articles XI.2 & XI.3.
42
Reparations case, above n 26; Elihu Lauterpacht, ‘The Development of the Law of International
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above n 1, 476. Notwithstanding, the entity must also have legal personality in at least one domestic legal
system, see n 1.
43
Advisory Opinion on Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour
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the Global Mechanism. The latter was housed under IFAD and its modalities and
administrative operations were provided for under a memorandum of understanding between
the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
and IFAD.44 While affirming the legal personality of IFAD, the Court opined that the Global
Mechanism does not have legal personality of its own: “Neither the Convention nor the MOU
expressly confer legal personality on the Global Mechanism or otherwise endow it with the
capacity to enter into legal arrangements.”45

The ICJ in the IFAD case elevates the capacity to enter into legal arrangements as a
determining feature for the conferral of legal personality. In other words, if the constituent
instrument does not expressly confer legal personality on an entity, then the endowment of
the capacity to enter into legal agreements or arrangements would achieve the same objective
of conferring legal personality.

Applying the reasoning of the ICJ in the Reparations case to the circumstances of the
ICCAT, it is put that the Commission cannot carry out the intentions of its founders if it was
devoid of international legal personality. Contracting Parties to the ICCAT Convention have
effectively clothed the Commission with the competence required to enable the effective
discharge of its functions.

In considering the United Nations Charter, the ICJ in the Reparations case reasoned that the
organisation has international legal personality with the conferment of specific legal
capacities and of particular functions which could not be carried out if the organisation did
not possess juridical personality at the international level.46 The same reasoning can be
adapted to an international organisation that does not explicitly have international legal
personality in its constitutive or other instrument.

44

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought
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Notable writers have taken a similar approach as the ICJ in asserting that it is not necessary
for a treaty to specifically confer legal personality.47 As one put it:48

It should come as no surprise, then, that practice has shown a more pragmatic
approach to questions of international legal personality, perhaps best captured by the
phrase ‘presumptive personality’” as soon as an organization performs acts which can
only be explained on the basis of international legal personality, such an organization
will be presumed to be in possession of international legal personality.

Even though the legal personality of ICCAT is not explicitly conferred, it is argued that the
Commission holds international legal personality through either the application of the
functional necessity approach or the capacity to enter into agreements. Notwithstanding,
despite the absence of reference in the ICCAT Convention, there is explicit reference to
juridical personality in Article 1 of the Seat Agreement between the Spain and the
Commission: 49

Juridical personality
Article 1
The Spanish Government recognizes the juridical personality of the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and its capacity to enter into
contracts, to purchase and to dispose of personal property and real estate, and to
initiate legal action.

The terms of the Seat Agreement indicates the recognition by Spain of the legal personality
of the Commission within her jurisdiction including enabling the juridical personality of the
Commission within the domestic legal sphere of Spain. However when considered in light of
the powers of the Commission in the ICCAT Convention such as the power to enter into
agreements with international organisations, Article 1 allows for the making of agreements or
contracts with other international organisation and corporate entities outside Spain. The

47

For example, Sands and Klein, above n 1, 476, Carroz and Roche, above n 34, 700 refer to the international
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48
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article also allows for the initiation of legal action, arguably within the domestic legal system
only.

E

Indian Ocean Tuna Commission

The Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission does not provide
explicitly for the legal personality of the Commission.50 Like the ICCAT, personality may be
presumed through the performance of acts mandated under the constituent instrument.
However, as will be seen, the application of a presumption is not a simple matter. Unlike
other tuna RFMOs, the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission is created under Article XIV of the
FAO Constitution.

The issue of whether IOTC has its own legal personality arose in 2003 when the Commission
had to consider accommodating Taiwan and the personality to enter into agreements.51 The
Commission was of the view that it does have legal personality on the grounds that it could,
independently of FAO, enter into agreements.52 Article XV of the IOTC Agreement allows
for the possibility for the Commission to enter into agreements with organisations and
institutions in that the Commission may:
…cooperate and make appropriate arrangements therefore with other
intergovernmental organizations and institutions, especially those active in the
fisheries sector, which might contribute to the work and further the objectives of the
Commission in particular with any intergovernmental organization or institution
dealing with tuna in the Area. The Commission may enter into agreements with such
organizations and institutions.
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Approved by the FAO Council on 25 November 1993, (entered into force 27 March 1996).
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According to one view, the conferment to the IOTC of capacity to enter into agreements
through Article XV (1) was sufficient evidence of international legal personality.53 As
discussed earlier, the capacity to enter into agreements signifies legal personality and the ICJ
in the IFAD case is unequivocal.54
On the contrary, the FAO Secretariat submitted that IOTC does not have legal personality of its

own.55 Simply put, the basis of the FAO Secretariat position was the absence of explicit
reference to legal personality in the constituent instruments, the requirement for FAO
involvement with agreements entered into by the Commission and the inability of an
agreement concluded under the FAO Constitution to withdraw from the FAO framework
through an amendment to the constituent instrument.56 Notwithstanding, Article XIV bodies
may have the necessary capacity to undertake its functions but not the autonomy sought by
the Commission particularly given the FAO institutional framework.57

According to the FAO Secretariat, the absence of explicit reference in the constituent
instrument meant that that the Commission had to act through FAO or draw from FAO’s
legal capacity:

At present, IOTC has no legal personality. In particular, it has no capacity to operate
autonomously as a legal person and to perform legal or material acts, on its own right.
It does so through FAO, which acts on its behalf. Consequently, since the
establishment of IOTC, FAO has been performing a large number of legal and
material acts, with particular reference to all contractual arrangements which are
required by the activities of the Commission. Similarly, all arrangements dealing with
the status of the Commission within the various countries are either those which
define the status of FAO in those countries (with particular reference to the
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Tsamenyi, above n 19, 125. Edeson, above n 53, 747, affirmed that the capacity to enter into agreements
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Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies) or specific
agreements which were negotiated and concluded by FAO.58
Although Article XV of the IOTC Agreement is clear, the FAO Secretariat posited that the
capacity to sign agreements had to be seen in the context of the FAO constitution and
relevant rules.59 In relation to the question of Taiwan, the FAO Secretariat’s view was that
since the constituent agreement was created under the FAO Constitution the three options
available to the Commission are to: i) amend the agreement provided there are no new
obligations, ii) adopt a resolution for participation, and iii) remove IOTC from the framework
of the FAO. The last option involved the termination of the agreement and the Commission
and the creation of a new treaty with a new body with legal personality.60 The Secretariat
warned the Commission of the additional obligations of having its own legal personality and
the liabilities that would be borne by the Commission and its member States.61

The FAO Secretariat added that no international body established pursuant to Article XIV
can have international legal personality of its own. FAO CCLM paper entitled “Legal Status
of Bodies Established under article XIV of the FAO Constitution” assumes that international
legal personality has to be conferred explicitly.62 In relation to bodies established by treaties
under Article XIV, the paper refers to Article XIV and the General Rule of the FAO, in
particular Rule XXI, paragraph 1(c) which allows the Conference or the Council to approve
any convention, agreement etc. provided that such agreements contain provisions to the effect
that (i) any international body or machinery established or any activity undertaken under such
convention or agreement is within the framework of the FAO, and (ii) recommendations
adopted and reports by any such body are transmitted to the FAO Director-General.

The Commission in response argued that it had performed acts which can only be explained
on the basis of international legal personality. Member States considered that the
Commission has the legal capacity to take decisions with a view to achieving its objectives.
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Members also observed that the Secretariat could only respond to one authority, the
Commission. In light of this capacity, members instructed the Executive Secretary to sign the
agreement with another international organisation, namely the La Commission de l’Océan
Indien, removing references to the FAO/IOTC. 63 Another agreement with the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission was entered into by the Commission without the
involvement of the FAO Director-General.64

Further, the dispute settlement provision of the IOTC Agreement also provides for functions
that can only be exercised by the Commission having legal personality on the international
plane.65 Edeson indicates that while the Commission is limited to the conciliation procedure,
it is not precluded from setting up a conciliation procedure which drew on conciliators from
outside the Commission. 66 The broad provision for dispute settlement could therefore appear
to position the Commission as having the legal personality to refer the matter for settlement
including conciliation. The existence of the role in dispute settlement procedure may, in
itself, be seen as presumptive personality.
Moreover, Article 3 of the IOTC Headquarters Agreement provides that “IOTC shall enjoy
legal personality in Seychelles and shall act through its Secretary”.67 This Agreement also
provides for privileges and immunities of the IOTC. The Headquarters Agreement itself may
indicate legal personality, albeit primarily in the domestic law of Seychelles.68

F

Comparison of the effects of attribution of international legal personality
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Legal personality has no pre-determined content in international law, and attribution of
personality does not authorise an international organisation to perform a specific act.
Constituent instruments may differentiate between attribution of personality and the
attribution of specific capacities. The constituent instruments of the IATTC, CCSBT, and
WCPFC all proclaim the legal personality of the respective organisations, and provide broad
legal capacity. Both IATTC and CCSBT instruments use the term “legal personality”
combined with the enjoyment of “relations with other international organisations” and its
members, whilst the WCPFC instrument contains “international legal personality”. The

difference in drafting is generally interpreted to achieve the same result of conferring on the
organisation the legal personality to deal with its responsibilities on the international plane.
But on closer scrutiny it is evident that the legal personality of IATTC and CCSBT only
supports relations with other international organisations and members or Parties.

Applying a conservative interpretation of these provisions, it may be argued that the
international legal personality of IATTC and CCSBT do not extend to States that are not a
party, or to legal entities that are not international organisations, or to private persons.
However, the decisions and practice of the respective Commissions have adopted a liberal
approach which has effectively built into the constituent instruments implied powers.
The liberal approach is supported by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969.69
The VCLT 1969 sets out the general rule for the interpretation of treaties. Article 31.1
provides that “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose.” Together with the context for the purposes of interpretation, any subsequent
agreement between the parties, any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty, and
any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, may be
taken into account.70 The decisions and practice of both Commissions in dealing with third
States, entities and persons not explicitly identified in the legal personality provisions have
“supplemented” the texts of constituent instruments.
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The ICJ in the Reparations case recognised that the United Nations has international legal
personality and ‘is a subject of international law and capable of possessing international
rights and duties’.71 On the question of whether the international personality would extend to
non-member States, the Court affirmed that the “vast majority” of States had the power, to
establish an entity possessing international personality in relation to member States and nonmember States as well. The view has been expressed that:
…other international organizations of a universal character could claim international
personality vis-à-vis non-member states on the grounds cited by the International
Court; closed international organizations could not. Closed organizations will have
international personality only with regard to those states which have recognized them
expressly, or implicitly by concluding mutual agreements, by exchanging diplomatic
missions, or by entering into any other kind of mutual relations. This restriction does
not affect the capacity of international organizations to act under international law.72
RFMOs are considered “closed” international organisations because their membership is
drawn from a group of States that satisfy the criteria for membership. As seen earlier, the
criteria includes a “real interest” in the fishery, extent of cooperation for the conservation of
living resources on the high seas, and the record of compliance with conservation and
management measures.

Sands and Klein observe that the ambiguity surrounding the attribution of international legal
personality to an international organisation stems from the inference of specific capacities
from the recognition of personality.73 They also note the “logical difficulty” with the
reasoning of the ICJ in the Reparations case in referring to specific powers that are inherent
with personality and others that could be implied (such as the power to bring an international
claim).74 A general treaty-making power, although not explicit in an instrument, may also be
implied but “personality is itself deduced from a specific treaty-making power”, rendering the
reasoning of ICJ circular.75
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In the situation where the treaty text is not explicit, can international legal personality be
presumed to extend to other States and organisations when the treaty text is explicit but not
encompassing all States? If the treaty text is restrictive, i.e., allows only for relations with
other international organisations and Parties, then the international organisation may for
instance be strictly precluded from having relations with non-Parties. This may not be the
ideal or intended effect of the drafters as it is contrary to provisions of the same constituent
instruments,76 severely hinders cooperation with non-Parties,77 and undermines the objectives
of long term sustainability and responsibility. The extent to which powers may be implied is
in issue.

The ICJ in the Reparations Case applied the doctrine of implied powers in interpreting the
United Nations Charter. Rights and duties of an organisation on the international plane
depend on its purpose and functions as specified or implied in its constituent documents and
developed in practice. In order for the organisation to be functionally effective, it had to have
such powers: “Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties”.78 Interpretation by
international courts or tribunals may lead to an expansion of the competence of an
organisation if the teleological principle is used.79 The view has been expressed that “the
judicial power of appreciation is wide, and the principles enunciated in this fashion may be
used as a cloak for extensive legislation”.80
In his Dissenting Opinion in the Reparations case Judge Hackworth stated that, “powers not
expressed cannot freely be implied. 81 Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed powers,
and are limited to those that are "necessary" to the exercise of powers expressly granted.”
Although the majority supported implied powers in this case, a cautious approach is
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recommended to avoid expansion of the capacity and powers of an organisation, from the fact
of legal personality.

The Certain Expenses of the United Nations case also considered the purpose and functions
of the United Nations in relation to questions on whether the authorisation by the General
Assembly of expenses for operations in the Congo and of the United Nations Emergency
Force in the Middle East was within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the UN
Charter.82 In his Dissenting Opinion Judge Winiarski observed:

Indeed, it has been asserted that these purposes and in particular the maintenance of
international peace and security may provide a legal justification for certain decisions,
even if these are not in conformity with the Charter, and that in any event a
consideration of the purposes must furnish guidance as to the interpretation of the
Charter. In the case before the Court, however, this argument certainly has not the
importance which there is a temptation to attribute to it; on the contrary, care must be
taken not to draw conclusions too readily from it.83

This cautionary advice is useful in ensuring that an interpretation of the constituent
instrument identifies the purposes and powers that may be attributed to an international
organisation, and that a higher level of care is taken when a power to be attributed is not in
conformity with an instrument.

The constituent instruments for IATTC, CCSBT and WCPFC provide for such legal capacity
as may be necessary to perform its functions and achieve its objectives.84 The extent of such
legal capacity would then need to be determined on a case-by-case basis and in congruity
with the function and mission of the organisation. That said, the general terms used in the
provisions allow for considerable scope for their extension in practice.

In the case of the ICCAT and IOTC, international legal personality is attributed with the
reasoning provided earlier. Given that personality is presumed the specific legal capacity of
82
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the respective organisations is not clear. The exact scope of those rights and duties will be
guided by the functions and mission of the organisation. Before addressing the specific legal
powers of the tuna RFMOs, a general discussion on legal capacity is warranted.

V.

LEGAL CAPACITY

Unlike States, international organisations are not sovereign and obtain their powers from the
powers attributed to them by States. Therefore international organisations cannot generate
their own power nor do they have the competence to determine their own competence.85 With
legal personality, an international organisation is able to possess rights and responsibilities
exercisable on the international plane. Legal capacity or powers that may be exercised to
fulfill the functions of the organisation may be express or implied from the constituent
instrument or other instruments or rules of the organisation.

The ICJ accepted the doctrine of implied powers in the Reparations opinion in determining
whether the UN possessed the capacity to bring an international claim: “whereas a State
possesses the totality of international rights and responsibilities recognized by international
law, the rights and duties of an entity such as the Organization must depend upon its purposes
and functions as specified or implied in its constituent instruments and developed in
practice.” 86 The Court held: “under international law, the Organization [UN] must be deemed
to have those powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon
it by necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.”87
The ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, has also pointed out, “international organizations
are governed by the ‘principle of speciality’, that is to say, they are invested by the States
which create them with powers, the limits of which are a function of the common interests
whose promotion those States entrust to them”.88 The speciality principle is the same as the
principle of attributed or conferred powers.89 This principle applies to each tuna RFMO who
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are entitled to exercise powers to achieve the objects of their respective constituent
instruments, namely the long term sustainable conservation and management of highly
migratory fish stocks in their respective regulatory area. The powers or competence of an
international organisation is inextricably linked to the functions of the international
organisation and include all indispensable acts for the exercise of those functions.
In the Nuclear Weapons opinion, the ICJ supports the existence of implied or “subsidiary
powers”:90

The powers conferred on international organizations are normally the subject of an
express statement in their constituent instruments. Nevertheless, the necessities of
international life may point to the need for organizations, in order to achieve their
objectives, to possess subsidiary powers which are not expressly provided for in the
basic instruments which govern their activities. It is generally accepted that
international organizations can exercise such powers, known as “implied” powers.
Although the ICJ uses the term “subsidiary” it is submitted that this may not necessarily be
appropriate because it ranks powers and presumes that there is an overarching power from
which the subsidiary power is derived. The term denotes that there are two tiers to powers
that may be exercised by an entity – principal powers, and subsidiary powers. Principal
powers are explicitly provided for in instrument while subsidiary powers are not and are
implied. If for instance, the capacity to bring an international claim is not explicitly provided,
then it would be considered a subsidiary power but the ICJ itself in the Reparations opinion
did not treat this power as subsidiary. Further, the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons opinion
referred to the Reparations opinion and stated that “[i]t is generally accepted that
international organizations can exercise such powers, known as ‘implied’ powers” if essential
to the performance of its duties.91

Although the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons opinion enunciated the principle of speciality and
applied the doctrine of implied powers based on necessity, a narrow view was adopted by the
court. Unlike the Reparations opinion, the Court in the Nuclear Weapons opinion applied the
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criterion of an essential implied power restrictively by concluding that the WHO did not have
any implied power to address the legality of the use of nuclear weapons even in view of the
health and environmental effects. In that matter the World Health Organisation requested the
ICJ to advise on the question of whether “in view of the health and environmental effects, . . .
the use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict [would] be a breach of
its obligations under international law including the WHO Constitution”. The ICJ considered
whether the question was within the scope of activities of WHO as provided in Article 96.2
of the UN Charter and held that the question was beyond the scope and thus could not give an
opinion. In contrast, if the ability of an international organisation to interpret and apply its
own constitution is in issue, Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties
of 1969, interpreted literally may allow the organisation to extend its mandate de facto.92
Generally, there are at least four limitations to implied powers.93 The first expounded in the
Reparations opinion, is that an implied power must be necessary or essential to the
performance of functions. Secondly, the existence of an explicit power in the constitutive
instrument limits the scope or existence of an implied power.94 Thirdly, the use of implied
powers must not violate fundamental rights and principles of international law.95 Fourthly,
implied powers must not alter the distribution of functions within an organisation. This is
pertinent in the Certain Expenses opinion in which the role of the General Assembly vis-à-vis
the responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and
security was considered.

Taking account of the few enunciations of the ICJ relating to international organisations,
there is a need for greater guidance by the ICJ on the theoretical bases for such entities.
Where there are contradictions, there must also be clarity on how these are resolved. For
instance, in the Certain Expenses opinion the majority of the court adopted a broad approach
whilst in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, a narrow view was taken in regard to the powers of
the WHO.
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Concerning tuna RFMOs, all of the limits to implied powers above apply. In addition, there
are two further limitations peculiar to tuna RFMOs. The first is that implied powers may be
qualified by the legal relationship between a constitutive instrument and the 1982 LOSC and
1995 Agreement. For example, the WCPF Convention requires that the interpretation and
implementation of its provisions must be made in a manner consistent with the 1982 LOSC
and 1995 Agreement. Thus an implied power is qualified by such parameters. In addition,
implied powers are qualified by the jurisdictional competence of the respective tuna RFMO.
To illustrate, an implied power to manage highly migratory fish stocks throughout their
migratory range would not have effect in areas under national jurisdiction in which the tuna
RFMO does not have jurisdictional competence. The discussion now focuses on specific
legal capacities of tuna RFMOs to examine the application of express and implied powers.

VI. LEGAL CAPACITY OF TUNA REGIONAL FISHERIES
MANAGEMENT ORGANISATIONS
The specific capacities of tuna RFMOs are explicitly provided in constituent instruments, or
implied. Given that each tuna RFMO has international legal personality, they exercise to
varying degrees the following specific capacities: i) Capacity to conclude treaties or
arrangements; ii) Capacity to make legally binding rules for the conservation and
management of highly migratory fish stocks; iii) Capacity to allow or restrict access to a
fishery; iv) Capacity to make allocations for stocks in a fishery; v) Capacity to regulate
fishers, including input and output controls; vi) Capacity to monitor trade in fish and fish
products; vii) Capacity to monitor ports; and viii) Capacity to bring an international claim.

A

Capacity to conclude treaties or arrangements

The capacity to enter into agreements and arrangements with States, other international
organisations or entities is vital to the exercise of the functions of any tuna RFMO, and as
described earlier, reflects international legal personality of an organisation.
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Each of the constituent instruments of the tuna RFMOs contains provision in support of this
capacity.96 By way of illustration, Article XXIV of the Antigua Convention sets out the
entities with which that Commission shall cooperate with and the arrangements that may be
put in place:

1. The Commission shall cooperate with subregional, regional, and global fishery
organizations and arrangements and, as appropriate, shall establish relevant
institutional arrangements such as consultative committees, in agreement with such
organizations or arrangements, with the goal of promoting the achievement of the
objective of this Convention, obtaining the best available scientific information, and
avoiding duplication with respect to their work.
2. The Commission, in agreement with the relevant organizations or arrangements,
shall adopt the rules of operation for the institutional arrangements established in
accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.
3. Where the Convention Area overlaps with an area under regulation by another
fisheries management organization, the Commission shall cooperate with such other
organization in order to ensure that the objective of this Convention is reached. To
this end, through consultations or other arrangements, the Commission shall strive to
agree with the other organization on the relevant measures to be taken, such as
ensuring the harmonization and compatibility of the conservation and management
measures adopted by the Commission and the other organization, or deciding that the
Commission or the other organization, as appropriate, avoid taking measures in
respect of species in that area which are regulated by the other.

The IATTC may conclude agreements with subregional, regional, and global fishery
organisations and arrangements. This includes arrangements with organisations which are not
inter-governmental such as the (dolphin free tuna) or entities that do not have international
legal personality of their own. Compared to the IATTC, the power to enter into agreements or
arrangements of the CCSBT is limited to inter-governmental organisations which have
related objectives.97 Like the CCSBT, the IOTC is empowered to cooperate and enter into
agreements with intergovernmental organisations and institutions, especially those active in
96
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the fisheries sector.98 The agreements enter into shall promote complementarity and avoid
any duplication or potential conflict between the activities of the relevant organisations.

A narrower mandate is provided to ICCAT. The Commission should have a working
relationship with the FAO and conclude an agreement under Article XIII of the FAO
Constitution.99 In addition, the Commission is to cooperate and may enter into agreements
with “international fisheries commissions and scientific organizations”.100 The description of
entities that the Commission may enter into agreements with is narrow because it arguably
precludes regional and sub-regional organisations and arrangements, and non-governmental
entities.

The most elaborate and prescriptive cooperation provision is with the WCPFC. That
Commission is explicitly mandated to cooperate with the FAO, relevant intergovernmental
organisations such as the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, the CCSBT, the IOTC, the IATTC, the Pacific Community and the Forum
Fisheries Agency and may enter into agreements with any of these organisations and with
other appropriate organisations.101

In summary the capacity of tuna RFMOs to enter into agreements is confined to their
speciality. The entities with which a tuna RFMO may enter into a relationship agreement
with varies, but at a minimum includes international fisheries commissions and scientific
organisations. While the CCSBT, ICCAT, and IOTC have a narrower agreement making
power, there seems to be a wider scope for the IATTC and the WCPFC.

The subject matter of the agreements entered into must be in conformity with the constituent
instruments and the rules of the Commissions that are parties, and promote the mutual
objectives of the relationship. When a tuna RFMO exceeds its agreement making power or
goes beyond the scope of the articles identified, this may normally constitute an ultra vires
action. However since the members of a Commission in practice endorse the text and scope

98

IOTC Agreement, art XV.
ICCAT Convention, art XI.1.
100
ICCAT Convention, art XI.2.
101
WCPF Convention, art 22.5.
99

54

of such agreements, it is submitted that the members of the Commission nullify the otherwise
ultra vires act and give it legitimacy.

B

Capacity to make legally binding rules for the conservation and management of
highly migratory fish stocks

Each tuna RFMO is explicitly empowered in its constituent instrument to make binding rules
for the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks within its geographical
area of competence.102 The power to make such rules over vast areas of ocean, primarily high
seas areas, in itself, indicates autonomy and legal personality.

A comparative analysis of the enabling power shows that the tuna RFMOs may adopt
measures based on the best scientific evidence available to ensure the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of the fish stocks covered by the respective Commission and
to maintain or restore the populations of harvested species at levels of abundance which can
produce the maximum sustainable yield103 or promote the objective of optimum utilisation104.

In addition, the IATTC and the WCPFC are provided a specific power to adopt conservation
and management measures and recommendations for non-target species and species
dependent or associated with the target species.105 The inclusion of species dependent upon or
belonging to the same ecosystem within the management framework is contained in the 1982
LOSC and the 1995 Agreement106 as well as in soft law instruments such as the Code of
Conduct.107
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Nevertheless, the absence of explicit reference for the adoption of measures relating to nontarget species and dependent species in the constituent instruments of the CCSBT, IOTC, and
ICCAT does not preclude the exercise of this power. It would seem logical and pragmatic
that the capacity falls within the implied powers of these organisations, as it is necessary for
the exercise of functions and the achievement of objectives.

C

Capacity to allow or restrict access to a fishery

The 1982 LOSC sets the broad legal framework for fishing access to the high seas and
empowers the coastal State to exercise its sovereign rights in determining access to exclusive
economic zones. The 1995 Agreement provides more explicit support for the regulation of
fisheries access through RFMOs and in doing so contributes somewhat a layer of complexity
to the role of tuna RFMOs by introducing the concept of “real interest” in Article 8(3),
adding criteria for participation and allocations, requiring the full recognition of the special
requirements of developing States, and setting the principles relating to those special
requirements.108

The capacity of tuna RFMOs to allow or restrict access to a fishery applies to Parties and
cooperating non-Parties as well. Whilst there appears to be convergence in the practice of
tuna RFMOs in allowing or restricting access to its members, practice varies in relation to the
fishing opportunities accorded to new members or entrants. In relation to new members, the
practice of an RFMO is influenced by its constituent instruments and rules, the extent of
inter-State cooperation, geographical considerations, and to an extent, the special
requirements and developments aspirations of developing States members.
Since the introduction of the concept of “real interest”, practice of tuna RFMOs governing
new members (and the participation of current members) has changed, albeit slightly.109
108
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Although the concept is not explicitly defined in the 1995 Agreement, the practice of RFMOs
in general is determinative. Article 8(3) of the 1995 Agreement provides:
…States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned may become members of
such organization or participants in such arrangement. The terms of participation in
such organization or arrangement shall not preclude such States from membership or
participation; nor shall they be applied in a manner which discriminates against any
State or group of States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned.
A proposal by Chile during the negotiations of the 1995 Agreement to add the word “real”
with “interest” was supported while an additional proposal to cross-reference to Article 118
of the 1982 LOSC was not.110 The effect of the inclusion of Article 118 would have been to
add the obligation to cooperate in taking measures necessary for the conservation of living
resources of the high seas, i.e., extent of cooperation can be a criteria for access. In practice
however the extent of cooperation or compliance with measures is already a criteria applied
by tuna RFMOs in assessing access rights.

What constitutes a real interest? Traditionally a real interest was equated with catch history.
But this is only one criterion that is applied. Orrego Vicuña submits that the requirement of a
real interest only means the conduct of actual fishing operations of significance in the region
and past fishing or the intention to do so in future is “not enough to qualify for membership
or participation under the real interest criteria”.111 He also argues that new entrants should be
accommodated to the extent possible and only when there is a large surplus of the stock and
“other interests geographically more closely related have been ensured an adequate share of
the available resources”.112 This latter view appears to be consistent with the preferential
treatment accorded to a coastal State as recognised by the ICJ in the 1974 Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Merits) cases.113 In those cases the ICJ held that under customary international
law a coastal State particularly dependent on fishing for its economic livelihood enjoyed
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preferential rights of access to the high seas fishery adjacent to its coasts. This decision
however has been criticised because of the lack of evidence the “imprecision of the rule”
pronounced.114In contrast, others have argued that new entrants must be offered a share or
must in principle not be precluded from a share.115
The concept of “real interest” may support the entry of States that have fished or have
interests in fishing in an area but it may also be used as a bar to participation. The
interpretation and criteria applied by members of a commission determines the level at which
the bar is set for new members. There are generally three categories to describe tuna RFMO
practice: 1) inclusive process; 2) inclusive with stringent conditions for participation; and 3)
exclusive and restrictive process.

The constituent instrument of each tuna RFMO contain the conditions which govern access to
a fishery and criteria to allow, for example, the fishing interests of new members or
entrants.116 Fundamental provisions in constituent instruments are usually supplemented in
conservation and management measures, and applied in practice.

The commissions must first determine the total level of fishing capacity and/or level of
fishing effort based on the status of the stock. The determination of the fishing interests
available to new members follows. Criteria adopted by tuna RFMOs for new entrants vary.
The Antigua Convention provides that the IATTC may adopt or apply citeria that may
accommodate the fishing interests of new members, taking into account “relevant
international standards and practices”.117 The phrase “relevant international standards and
practices” is encompassing and necessarily includes the practices of other tuna RFMOs
thereby promoting the cross-fertilisation of tuna RFMO rules and practices.

In the WCPFC, there seems to be a three tiered access mechanism. The first relates to
existing Commission members including the development aspirations of developing State
114
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members. The second relates to the fishing interests of new members and the Commission
decides on the means by which the fishing interests of any new member of the Commission
may be accommodated. Similarly, the third provides for cooperating non-members, i.e.,
States that are not parties but have consented to comply with the WCPF Convention and its
measures.118

D

Capacity to make allocations for stocks in a fishery

The allocation of fish and fishing related opportunities is perhaps the most contentious matter
dealt with by tuna RFMOs. The legal capacity to make fishery allocations is vested in all tuna
RFMOs. This power is derived from the will of States parties and strengthened by the
provisions of the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement. To ensure impartiality and
independence, the power to make allocations can only be effectively made by an organisation
with legal personality separate from States.

International jurisprudence on fishery allocations is to an extent settled. Firstly, there is the
view that a tradition of fishing activity in an area creates preferential treatment or special
rights. Whether a State is entitled to preferential treatment was the primary question before
the ICJ in the 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction (Merits) cases.119 In those cases Iceland claimed
special coastal State rights and Germany and the United Kingdom argued for special flag
State rights for the same area. The ICJ decided that coastal State preferential rights denote,
…a certain priority, but cannot imply the extinction of the concurrent rights of other
States, and particularly of a State which, like the applicant, has for many years been
engaged in fishing in the waters in question, such fishing activity being important to
the economy of the country concerned. The coastal State has to take into account and
pay regard to the position of such other States, particularly when they have
established an economic dependence on the same fishing grounds.120
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The establishment of the EEZ regime and the concomitant transfer of custodial rights to
coastal States have substantially enhanced the rights of coastal States. Although the 1974 ICJ
cases did not envisage the extension of the preferential treatment of coastal State to high seas
areas today, certain principles are included in fisheries instruments. For instance, the 1995
Agreement takes into account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States
fishing on the high seas on the stocks concerned in determining the compatibility of
measures.121 In short coastal States which have a tradition of fishing in an area would have
certain rights, preferential or special. But such rights cannot lead to the extinction of the
rights of other States.

A second view is that there must be an allocation to support the special requirements of
developing States, in particular, participation in fishing on the high seas. The 1995
Agreement calls on States to assist developing States, in particular the least-developed among
them and small island developing States, to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries
for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, including facilitating access to such
fisheries.122 The constituent instrument of the WCPFC includes the special requirements
principles from the 1995 Agreement.123 Other tuna RFMOs, perhaps as a consequence of
their origins and constitutive basis, do not seem to have similar provisions on special
requirements.

Be that as it may, the tuna RFMOs are mandated to develop criteria for, and make decisions
relating to, the allocation of total allowable catch, or total allowable fishing capacity,
including carrying capacity, or the level of fishing effort, taking into account relevant
factors.124 Relevant factors are prescribed in the constituent instruments or in conservation
and management measures such as in Article 10.3 of the WCPF Convention. In terms of
process, allocation decisions are made by consensus and all tuna RFMOs have adopted
allocations for major stocks, albeit pseudo-allocations in some instances.125
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E

Capacity to regulate fishers, including input and output controls

The capacity to regulate fishing and related activity in a region is a power exercisable by all
tuna RFMOs. Like the capacity to allow or restrict access and the capacity to make
allocations, the impartiality and independence of the organisation regulating fishers is
essential. Also the constituent instruments of tuna RFMOs allow for the adoption of measures
relating to fishery inputs such as the level of fishing effort, the fishing gear or technology that
may be used, fishing vessel numbers, types and sizes that may be used, or outputs such as the
quantity of any species or stocks that may be caught.126

F

Capacity to monitor trade in fish and fish products

The monitoring of catch and trade in fish and fish products is an effective tool used by tuna
RFMOs to deter and eliminate illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing operations. In
all constituent instruments, there are broad provisions requiring the establishment of
standards for the collection and analysis of statistics, information or data relating to a
fishery.127 A typical example is contained in the IOTC Agreement where the Commission is
obligated, “to keep under review the conditions and trends of the stocks and to gather,
analyse and disseminate scientific information, catch and effort statistics and other data
relevant to the conservation and management of the stocks and to fisheries based on the
stocks covered by this Agreement.”128

Catch or statistical documentation schemes have been adopted by the majority of tuna
RFMOs to support the monitoring of fish and fish products. The IOTC for instance has a
statistical document programme for bigeye tuna which mandates the submission and
validation of the IOTC Bigeye Tuna Statistical Document for imports, and the IOTC Bigeye
Tuna Re-export Certificate for re-exports.129Validation of an IOTC Bigeye Tuna Statistical
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Document can only be carried out by a government official or other authorised individual or
institution of the flag State of the vessel that harvested the tuna. In instances where the vessel
is operating under a charter arrangement, validation may be undertaken by a government
official or other authorised individual of the exporting State. Validation of a re-export
certificate may be carried out by a government official or other authorised individual or
institution of the state that re-exported the tuna. The Commission provides oversight over the
programme and collects, analyses and circulates information to members. The IOTC
statistical document programme works in tandem with its recommendation concerning trade
measures.130

The IOTC recommendation on trade measures introduces a stringent monitoring, control and
sanctioning regime. A Party that has failed to discharge obligations under the IOTC
Agreement in respect of IOTC conservation and management measures, in particular, by not
taking measures or exercising effective control to ensure compliance with IOTC conservation
and management measures by vessels flying its flag may be sanctioned. 131 Similarly a nonContracting Party that has failed to discharge its obligations under international law to cooperate with IOTC in the conservation and management of tuna and tuna-like species, in
particular, by not taking measures or exercising effective control to ensure that its vessels do
not engage in any activity that undermines the effectiveness of IOTC conservation and
management measures may also be sanctioned. The non compliant States are given an
opportunity to respond and the Compliance Committee evaluates the responses with any
relevant information before making recommendations to the Commission. Amongst the
recommendations that may be given is the adoption of non-discriminatory trade restrictive
measures against the non compliant State.132

The ICCAT has agreed on various measures for the monitoring of the trade in fish and fish
products.133 Like the measures adopted by the IOTC, the ICCAT recommendations set the
obligation for the collection of statistics on key species, the requirement for the recording of
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catch by fishing vessels in the regulatory area, and the requirements for trade. The
recommendation concerning trade measures sets the requirements for the documentation of
imports and exports, provides the process for the consideration of information from non
compliant States, and the Commission decides on whether a sanction, including nondiscriminatory trade restrictive measures, should be imposed.

For the Eastern Pacific Ocean the IATTC in 2003 adopted a resolution to establish a bigeye
statistical documentation programme.134The resolution puts in place a programme similar in
scope and requirements to the bigeye tuna statistical document programmes established by
ICCAT and IOTC.

Compared to IATTC, ICCAT, and IOTC, the CCSBT has taken a different approach. The
Commission implemented a Southern Bluefin Tuna Statistical Document Programme similar
to the programmes implemented by the majority of tuna RFMOs under the end of 2009. At its
12th session in 2005, the Commission agreed on guidelines for the development of a catch
documentation scheme, which were incorporated in a resolution in 2006.135 The current
scheme documents the movement of all Southern Bluefin Tuna and contains documentation
and tagging requirements.136

At the time of writing, the WCPFC is yet to adopt a comprehensive catch documentation
scheme.137 There are however various general obligations for the reporting of catches,
transhipments, and landings contained in conservation and management measures.138

G

Capacity to monitor ports

The sovereignty of a State applies to its ports and offshore terminals. Whilst the majority of
constituent instruments do not contain explicit reference to ports and the role of port States,
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supplementary rules such as recommendations, resolutions and measures contain such
reference. The WCPF Convention is the only constituent instrument that is explicit on this
point given its strong relations with the 1995 Agreement:

1. A port State has the right and the duty to take measures, in accordance with
international law, to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and global
conservation and management measures. When taking such measures a port State
shall not discriminate in form or in fact against the fishing vessels of any State.

2. Whenever a fishing vessel of a member of the Commission voluntarily enters a
port or offshore terminal of another member, the port State may, inter alia, inspect
documents, fishing gear and catch on board such fishing vessel.

3. Members of the Commission may adopt regulations empowering the relevant
national authorities to prohibit landings and transhipments where it has been
established that the catch has been taken in a manner which undermines the
effectiveness of conservation and management measures adopted by the
Commission.

4. Nothing in this article affects the exercise by Contracting Parties of their
sovereignty over ports in their territory in accordance with international law.139

Decisions adopted by tuna RFMOs on the monitoring of ports have been influenced by the
increase in IUU fishing activity and the use of ports by recalcitrant operators. The recent
international instrument for port States is an example of action by the international
community to combat and deter IUU fishing through stringent and harmonised port State
action.140 The FAO Port State Measures Agreement puts in place minimum standards for port
State action. Although the FAO Agreement recently entered into force, three tuna RFMOs
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incorporated its provisions within its decisions as early as 2010.141 Other tuna RFMOs have
agreed to basic port State requirements.142

Traditionally tuna RFMOs have not played a substantive role in the monitoring of ports. In
the last two decades, the situation has changed. Member States of tuna RFMOs are endowing
their Commission with a greater capacity to monitor ports, perhaps out of necessity. The
increasing role of Commissions may, on the one hand, be seen as undermining the
sovereignty of a port State over its ports. According to this view, the jurisdiction of tuna
RFMOs continues to creep into the territory of coastal States and ultimately usurp the
prerogative of a port State over its ports and territory. On the other hand, port State
obligations may be seen as a means of strengthening the exercise of sovereignty.

H

Capacity to bring an international claim

The ICJ in the Reparations Case opined that the United Nations, although its Charter was not
explicit on international legal personality, has the capacity to bring a claim on the
international plane, to negotiate, to conclude a special agreement, and to prosecute a claim
before an international tribunal, and to claim adequate reparation for damage to the
organisation, and to damage suffered by the victim or by persons entitled through him.143

The Court also expressed the view that the United Nations could also being international
claims against a State regardless of whether it was a member of the United Nations.
According to one view the Court produced a statement which is an assertion of political and
constitutional fact rather than a reasoned conclusion. 144 The Court opined: “fifty States,
representing the vast majority of the members of the international community, had the power,
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in conformity with international law, to bring into being an entity possessing objective
international personality, and not merely personality recognized by them alone, together with
capacity to bring international claims.”145

Strictly, by extending obligations to a third State, this opinion may be construed as
undermining the general rule regarding third States, i.e., a State that has not agreed to be
bound by the terms of a Treaty does not enjoy any rights or obligations arising from such
Treaty.146 Put another way, a constituent instrument is res inter alios acta for third States and
may not bind them.147 If the strict view is adopted, then a claim cannot be brought against a
State that is not a party or has agreed to be bound by a Treaty. The ICJ, albeit without strong
reasons, asserts the United Nations endowed with a purpose of ensuring States act in
accordance with the principles necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security may bring a claim against a responsible State, regardless of whether the State is a
member of the organisation.

If the rationale that the majority of members of the international community have the power
to create an organisation with international personality and the capacity to bring an
international claim against a member or third State is followed, it is submitted that tuna
RFMOs may have the requisite capacity. This position is based on two arguments – the
recognition by States, and the practice of tuna RFMOs on third States.

Although each tuna Commission has a relatively small number of member States or
cooperation non-member States, the collective membership is significant. This is not to say
that there is currently a collective capacity to bring an international claim. In addition, tuna
RFMOs are explicitly recognised under the 1995 Agreement. Article 17 of the 1995
Agreement provides that States Parties to the Agreement that are not members of tuna
RFMOs, are not dispensed from their obligation to cooperate with adopted conservation and
management measures and are not to authorise vessel flying their flag to fish for species
regulated by the tuna RFMOs. The 1995 Agreement extends the reach of measures adopted
by tuna RFMOs, and extends the recognition to States that are party to the Agreement but not
a member of a tuna RFMO. Effectively all States Parties to the 1995 Agreement and all other
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States that are not party to the Agreement but are members or participants of tuna RFMOs
recognise the legal personality of tuna RFMOs and the capability in bringing an international
claim.

That said, there are incidental issues arising from a claim against a third State, including
recognition by the State concerned of the organisation and submission to the process for
resolving the claim, including negotiation, settlement, arbitration, or an adjudicative tribunal.

The second argument is based on the practice of tuna RFMOs vis-à-vis third States. Each tuna
RFMO has taken action against third States ranging from the unilateral imposition of nondiscriminatory trade measures, the listing of flagged vessels of third States on Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated fishing vessel lists, the boarding of vessels on the high seas, and
the communication of non-compliance activity and repercussions of such activity. Tuna
RFMO practice in relation to third States seems to be progressive and influences international
law. Through regional practice, member States of the respective Commissions have arguably
attributed each, directly and indirectly, with the requisite power to take action against third
States, including the capacity to bring an international claim. The impact of tuna RFMO
practice in relation to third States is analysed later in Chapter V.

The question now at hand is whether the tuna RFMOs can initiate legal proceedings including
an international claim, or vice versa, whether legal proceedings can be taken against tuna
RFMOs? With international legal personality each tuna RFMO may, bring an international
claim against a member State or cooperating non-member State or entity. Towards this end,
all avenues for legal redress between the Commission and the relevant member State or
cooperating non-member State should be exhausted before an international claim is
instituted.148

A tuna RFMO may also, with the consent of its member States, bring an international claim
against a non-member. The rationale for obtaining consent of members is to attain explicit
endorsement for action, and to ensure that due process has been followed.
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On the question of whether tuna RFMOs may bring an international claim against a member
or cooperating non-member for damage sustained by the respective Commission, the
likelihood exists and the answer may be in the affirmative. Noting the arguments above, a
tuna RFMO may bring an international claim against a third State for damage sustained by
the respective Commission. On the other side, can a member, cooperating non-member, third
State or another international organisation bring an international claim against a tuna RFMO
for an internationally wrongful act such as the violation of rights under international law or
discriminatory treatment? Given that tuna RFMOs are international legal persons capable of
possessing rights and responsibilities under international law, the answer seems to be in the
affirmative. Indeed the question of legal responsibility of tuna RFMOs is worthy of research
consideration elsewhere.

I

Other legal capacities

In addition, there are other legal capacities not identified in this Chapter that a tuna RFMO
may exercise. Examples include the capacity to establish mechanisms for effective
monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement,149the capacity to impose nondiscriminatory measures against IUU fishers, and the capacity to sanction States. An analysis
of the implications of each legal capacity is vital, yet not necessarily considered or
undertaken. Implications on the specific roles and responsibilities of States ought to be
delineated vis-à-vis the capacities granted to tuna RFMOs.

VII. PERCEIVED CONTRIBUTION OF TUNA RFMOS TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW
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Taking the above into account, it is now appropriate to consider the contributions of tuna
RFMOs to international law, primarily international institutional law.

A

Legal personality of tuna RFMOs

Whilst tuna RFMOs do not feature prominently in literature on international institutional law,
they are international organisations with international legal personality. This Chapter shows
how each tuna RFMO including the IOTC is capable of possessing international rights and
powers and is capable of maintaining rights on the international plane. Whether legal
personality is explicit in the constituent instruments or presumed through overarching
objective, functions and practice, tuna RFMOs through six decades have a worthwhile
contribution to make in the evolution of international institutional law. Legal capacity or
power however varies between tuna RFMOs but homogeneity appears to be emerging.

B

Extending the limits to speciality of tuna RFMOs

The Nuclear Weapons opinion pointed out that, “international organizations are governed by
the ‘principle of speciality’… they are invested by the States which create them with powers,
the limits of which are a function of the common interests whose promotion those States
entrust to them”.150 The speciality principle is the same as the principle of attributed or
conferred powers.151 Although explored briefly in the discussion of legal capacities, this
thesis will demonstrate that in the context of tuna RFMOs the principle of speciality is much
broader than envisaged. Tuna RFMOs, although primarily responsible for managing highly
migratory fish stocks in their respective area of competence, are also making decisions on
other aspects including – navigation, vessel requirements and standards, trade, market
requirements, third States, and the imposition of port inspection standards. While one may
view these aspects to be essential components of fisheries management now, this has not
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historically been the case. In any event, tuna RFMO practice appears to be creeping into other
areas and jurisdictions that they were not originally designed to address.

C

Implied powers and capacities and limits

In the discussion of capacities of tuna RFMOs above, it is evident that there is a growing
number of legal capacities that are not explicitly provided for in constituent instruments but
attributed or implied through the functions of the organisation. The capacity exercised across
the tuna RFMOs are generally consistent given the cross-fertilisation of measures through,
among other fora, the joint tuna RFMO workshops and the regional fishery body secretariat
network. Members of tuna RFMOs must be vigilant when granting specific capacities to the
organisation. Adapting Justice Winiarski warning in the Certain Expenses case, a higher level
of care must be taken if the granting of specific capacity on a tuna RFMO through binding
measures or recommendations is not in conformity with the constituent instrument.152 Unless
the members of tuna RFMOs decide otherwise, there is no end to the exercise of implied
powers.

Legal capacities of tuna RFMOs are not absolute. The four limitations to implied powers of
international organisations have been discussed earlier.153 Admittedly there is a need for
greater guidance by the ICJ on the theoretical bases for resolving the question of implied
powers.154 The contrast is illustrated in the Certain Expenses opinion which applied a broad
approach in considering the role of the General Assembly vis-à-vis the responsibility of the
Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, compared to the
Nuclear Weapons opinion, where a narrow view was taken in regard to the powers of the
WHO.

In addition to these four limits, there are two further limitations peculiar to tuna RFMOs. The
first is that implied powers are qualified by the legal relationship between a constitutive
instrument and the 1982 LOSC and 1995 Agreement. This limit arguably applies to all tuna
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RFMOs even though the constitutive instrument may not explicitly provide this. The LOSC
lays the legal foundation which supports the jurisdictional basis of tuna RFMOs. In
elaborating on the framework for the governance of highly migratory fish stocks, the 1995
Agreement sets the broad principles and parameters to be followed by tuna RFMOs,
regardless of explicit reference in the constitutive instrument.

Where reference is explicit, it is argued that a higher burden rests with the Commission. The
WCPF Convention requires that the interpretation and implementation of its provisions must
be made in a manner consistent with the 1982 LOSC and 1995 Agreement. Thus an implied
power is qualified by such parameters – the Commission may not take a decision that is
incongruous with the 1982 LOSC and 1995 Agreement.

Secondly, implied powers are qualified by the jurisdictional competence of the respective
tuna RFMO. An implied power to manage highly migratory fish stocks throughout their
migratory range would not have effect in areas under national jurisdiction in which the tuna
RFMO does not have jurisdictional competence. To illustrate, the WCPF Convention
provides the functions of the Commission “without prejudice to the sovereign rights” of the
coastal State for the conservation, management, exploration and exploitation of highly
migratory fish species.155 Conservation and management measures shall be applied
throughout the range of the
stocks, or to specific areas within the area of competence of the Commission, as determined
by the Commission.156 Therefore the Commission does not have implied powers to make
decisions in areas under the sovereignty of a coastal State, or the powers to make a decision
in the exclusive economic zone without the consent of a coastal State.

D

Diminishing importance of the normative approach in determination of legal
personality?
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In the context of tuna RFMOs, the normative approach appears to be diminishing in
importance. This does not mean that the approach should be abandoned altogether but it is
useful to reflect on how tuna RFMO practice places more emphasis on implicit capacities or
powers rather than explicit capacity established in constituent instruments. Basic capacities in
constituent instruments of the ICCAT and IOTC have been supplemented by binding
recommendations that have in effect accorded specific capacities upon the Commissions. In a
similar vein, constituent instruments of the CCSBT, WCPFC and IATTC have been
supplemented by binding decisions of their Commissions. For example, decisions that the
port States of the Commissions must take within their ports according to one view arguably
usurps sovereignty of the port State. But according to another, such decisions are agreed by
State and in so doing, such States assume additional obligations. Others may view port State
requirements not as an act of undermining sovereignty per se but as a necessary obligation
that runs in tandem with the exercise of responsible fisheries governance.

In any case, the normative approach is the first step that needs to be taken in the
determination of legal personality of international organisations. If legal personality is
granted explicitly, as with the CCSBT, IATTC Antigua Convention and WCPFC, that
suffices. Where legal personality is not explicitly accorded, the functional approach may then
be invoked.

E

Predominance of the functional necessity approach in determination of legal
personality and capacities of tuna RFMOs

In determining the existence of legal personality of the IOTC and ICCAT, the functional
necessity approach is applied. Personality of the organisation is “presumed” as soon as the
organisation performs acts which can only be explained on the basis of international legal
personality.157 The phrase “functional necessity” requires one to ask whether it is necessary
for the tuna RFMO to be empowered to exercise a certain function to achieve its objective.
Since the objective of tuna RFMOs is broad in scope – i.e. the long term conservation and
management of highly migratory fish stocks, tuna RFMOs have been endowed with
capacities on the basis of “functional necessity”.
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It is submitted that the functional necessity approach may also be applied in the justification
of specific capacities of tuna RFMOs (that may not be essential to international legal
personality). In the case of the CCSBT, IATTC and WCPFC for example, specific powers
not included in the constituent instruments may be justified as a necessary function.

F

Effect of capacities or powers that may be granted by members but inconsistent with
or absent from constituent instruments

There are several examples where specific capacities have been granted by member State of
tuna RFMOs but such capacities may not be consistent with or are absent in constituent
instruments, including: i) port State requirements and standards, ii) trade and market State
requirements, and iii) the regulation of fishing and related activity in waters under national
jurisdiction. Given the inconsistency or otherwise, what is the effect of these capacities? On
the application of international law principles, a State is bound by what it has consented to. It
follows that where a State has given its consent to a decision to grant specific capacity to a
tuna RFMO, then the State would incur binding legal obligations.

In tuna RFMO practice, it would appear that a State that has not formally objected to the
granting of specific capacity, ipso facto consents to such grant. The mechanism used by tuna
RFMOs are legally binding conservation and management measures or recommendations.158
This mechanism is consistent with the traditional requirement in international treaty of means
for expressing consent to be bound contained in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties 1969:

The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature,
exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession, or by any other means if so agreed.

Members of tuna RFMOs have agreed to the mechanism for decision-making in a fishery
including through conservation and management measures and recommendations. Effectively
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States upon ratification, accession or acceptance of the constituent instrument of a tuna
RFMOs agree to make decisions for the fishery through measures or recommendations. In the
event that a specific capacity in a measure or recommendation is inconsistent or otherwise
with the constituent instrument, the member States by default are effectively endorsing a shift
in support of the granting of the new capacity to the RFMO, whilst supplementing in practice
the provision(s) of the constituent instrument. 159To resolve such apparent inconsistencies, the
onus is on each State member and the tuna RFMO to identify and seek explicit consent of
each member prior to the decision.

G

Importance of tuna RFMO practice

The ICJ in the Reparations case included “practice” as a factor in the determination of
international legal personality. As Klabbers put it, “practice” has shown a more pragmatic
approach to questions of international legal personality.160 The practice of the international
organisation or for the purposes of this study tuna RFMOs is considered. It is argued that
“practice” must be preceded by enabling authority whether prescribed in constituent or other
binding instrument or decisions of the tuna RFMO. Acts or decisions made by an
international organisation that are not in conformity with constituent instruments should
reduce the weight accorded to the ensuing practice of the organisations or preclude
consideration altogether.

In highlighting practice, the ICJ perhaps only intended that practice be considered in
determining international legal personality. However the inclusion of practice of
organisations in the determination of legal personality has significant implications. The most
significant implication is the weight given to State practice in the determination of
personality of an international organisation. Currently State practice is a lesser consideration
than the practice of the international organisation. If this is taken as the modus operandi then
there are also implications on the sources of international law. One may rebut these points by
simply arguing that States members of an international organisation are by default the
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organisation so there is no need to distinguish or separate them. Be that as it may, the
decisions and practice of international organisations, including tuna RFMOs, seems
increasingly relevant in the determination of customary international law.

H

State Practice versus tuna RFMO practice

The attention placed on the practice of international organisations by the ICJ and prominent
writers, leads to a potential conflict between State practice and tuna RFMO practice. As
discussed earlier, customary international law is determined by State practice and opinio
juris. It is understandably difficult to accurately determine State practice and opinion juris
through the practice of tuna RFMOs given the varied decision-making processes of each tuna
RFMO. Furthermore, the standard decision-making requirement for consensus only reveals
that members did not raise any objection at the time a decision.

This potential conflict gives rise to another layer of practice of member States of a tuna
RFMO. Although a decision may be taken by a tuna RFMO, State practice of its members
may range from no State practice at all, practice in support of the decision, or practice
contrary to the decision. In reality the two layers, namely tuna RFMO practice and State
practice, may be divergent in scope or content.

Although the practice of international organisations is considered in determining international
legal personality, it may also be used in assessing specific legal capacities of the organisation,
and in identifying emerging customary international law. It is argued that State practice
within tuna RFMOs should always be the yardstick. Placing greater emphasis on tuna RFMO
practice results in an outcome that may not accurately represent the intention and will of
States that accorded the organisation personality at the outset.

I

Emerging principle of the needs of the international community?

The overarching needs of the international community to ensure long term sustainable
fisheries, through primarily the improved implementation of obligations, appears
to be an emerging principle that will influence State practice and tuna RFMO
practice. Efforts to combat IUU fishing and related activities
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exemplify a preoccupation of the international community in the last decade. Initiatives and
measures put in place by tuna RFMOs and States include the strengthening of monitoring,
control and surveillance tools, increasing penalties for non-compliance, regulating export and
import controls, and requiring minimum port State approval and inspection standards.
Specific legal capacities of tuna RFMOs have been granted, absent specific enabling
provisions in constituent instruments such as trade and market requirements in the IOTC and
ICCAT, or in the case of port requirements for instance, supplementing and or superseding
existing general provisions.

In time, the needs of the international community and the capacities of tuna RFMOs are
expected to prevail, on an apparently incremental basis, over long held rules of customary
international law, such as the sovereignty of a port State over its ports, sovereignty over
respective maritime zones, sovereign rights within the exclusive economic zone, and the
qualified freedom to fish on the high seas. That said, emerging needs of the international
community will influence the exercise of the international legal personality of tuna RFMOs
and guide the granting of specific legal capacities.

J

Functional necessity and practice key factors to consider

It is observed that in relation to the international legal personality of tuna RFMOs, functional
necessity and practice are the two key factors to consider. To an extent they substantiate the
decisions and acts of tuna RFMOs as international legal persons. They also reveal specific
legal capacities exercisable only on the international plane that may not exist in constituent
instruments.

Gaja, the Special Rapporteur for the International Law Commission in its study on the
responsibility of international organisations supported a very strong functional test:
“In the literature current definitions of the term “international organization” often
state that an organization may be characterised as such only if it has been established
by an agreement under international law…..What seems to be significant for our
purposes is not so much the legal nature of the instrument establishing the
organization, as the functions that the organization exercises. A reference to the
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governmental functions that the organization exercises is directly relevant, while the
nature of the constituent instrument has only a descriptive value.”[my italics]161

Practice of tuna RFMOs are governed by its functions, which are in turn identified through
specific legal capacities bestowed on the RFMO by its members. The widespread and
consistent practice of tuna RFMOs may arguably, and at the very least, be an important
source for determining trends international law.

K

Consequences of international legal personality of tuna RFMOs

The consequences of tuna RFMO international legal personality and the exercise of specific
capacities include the need: i) to ensure consistency with constituent instruments in the
exercise of specific functions and capacities; ii) to maintain State practice as the yardstick; iii)
to ensure that tuna RFMO practice is considered in the context of decisions and State
practice; iv) for consistency between tuna RFMO practice and generally accepted principles
of international law; and v) the ensuing legal responsibility.

Legal personality may constitute a shield behind which a tuna RFMO (or another entity with
legal personality) may evade its responsibility. In a similar vein, legal personality may shield
member States and other entities from their responsibilities. The questions arising from the
legal responsibility of tuna RFMOs are numerous given that international law in this area is
in its infancy. Tuna RFMOs need to develop a mechanism for addressing their legal
responsibility. Such a mechanism would necessarily be consistent with the United Nations
Charter and the LOSC and elucidate, among other things, judicial organs that may be relied
upon for dispute settlement, procedures for member States bringing a claim or for the tuna
RFMO making a claim, and options for settlement.
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VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Their legal personality and legal capacities, enables tuna RFMOs to exercise powers and
responsibilities. It may be put that all tuna RFMOs have international legal personality.
Personality is explicitly conferred in the constituent instruments of the IATTC, CCSBT and
the WCPFC. The functional necessity approach is used to attribute legal personality to the
ICCAT and, this approach may arguably be applied to the IOTC, notwithstanding its
institutional complexities and peculiarities.

In determining the specific powers of tuna RFMOs, examination of the constituent
instrument, rules and practice of tuna RFMOs is made. Whether express or implied, powers
must be exercised with prudence and in congruity with constituent instruments, rules and
directions of member States. This chapter has highlighted the varying practice of tuna
RFMOs in the exercise of specific capacities such as the capacity to enter into agreements,
capacity to allow or restrict access to a fishery, capacity to allocation fishing opportunities,
and the capacity to monitor trade in fish or port activity. The variance is explained simply by
the extent of power granted to the respective Commission by its members.

Where implied powers are invoked, a greater degree of prudence is called for. For example,
the capacity to bring an international claim is not contained in any tuna RFMO instrument.
Although justified by the ICJ in the Reparations case in relation to the United Nations,
organisational mandates of the tuna RFMOs differ. As the ‘supreme’ international
organisation responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, the initiation
of an international claim for injuries sustained is perhaps more warranted compared to tuna
RFMOs. Nevertheless, with international legal personality, it is argued has an emerging right
to bring an international claim against a State or other entity, and to also be the subject of a
claim.

The trend and contribution of tuna RFMOs to the determination of international legal
personality has been discussed. A noteworthy contribution is the predominance of functional
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necessity and practice in the determination of international legal personality. Specific legal
capacities of tuna RFMOs may also be so substantiated. With an emphasis on functions and
practice, there is an inherent danger of ignoring constituent instrument and the original
intention of the States that established the organisation. Also there may be a risk of apparent
inconsistencies in provisions in existing constituent instruments and recent binding measures
and recommendations.

Furthermore, the emphasis on tuna RFMO practice may lead some to eventually diminish the
importance of State practice. This is certainly not advocated. It is argued that the role that
States play must remain paramount and that if necessary State practice should be assessed to
determine whether tuna RFMO practice is effectively substantiated. Without the support of
State practice, it is argued that tuna RFMO decisions in theory cannot be implemented nor be
defined in practice, after all States are the backbone of the international community.

In the next Chapter, the thesis examines how the practice of tuna RFMOs impacts on the
jurisdiction of coastal States, particularly rights, jurisdiction and duties relating inter alia to
maritime spaces, fishing vessels flying their flag, and nationals.
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III
Coastal State Jurisdiction
I.

INTRODUCTION

The jurisdiction of a State is a subject that has been considered extensively and in different
contexts has different meanings.1Jurisdiction refers to specific aspects of the general legal
competence, or sovereignty, of a State and is inherent in Statehood.2Therefore the term may
also be used to refer to the ‘sovereignty’ or ‘sovereign rights’ of a State.3 Jurisdiction is an
omnibus term relating for instance to territorial, legislative, national, judicial and universal
matters. For the purposes of this thesis, and in the particular context, emphasis is placed on
the territorial, legislative or national aspects of jurisdiction.

International organisations such as tuna RFMOs are endowed with powers through which
they derive their competencies. International organisations may also have inherent powers
that in theory would allow that organisation to undertake all kinds of activities unless
explicitly prohibited, but hitherto this does not seem to have been applied to tuna RFMOs. 4
Although tuna RFMOs have rights under international law, they do not enjoy jurisdiction in
the same way that a State does. The mandate and competencies derived from express and
implied powers do not, in a narrow sense, give tuna RFMOs, jurisdiction per se.

See in particular James Crawford, Brownlie’s Pinciples of Public International Law, (Oxford University Press,
8th edn, 2012); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2008),
70 – 83; James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2006);
Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005), 71 – 80; Jan Klabbers,
International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 69 – 84.
2
Brownlie, ibid, 299; Klabbers, ibid, 105 – 6.
3
Crawford, Brownlie’s Pinciples of Public International Law, above n 1, 448; Brownlie, above n 1, 291.
4
Klabbers, above n 1, 106.
1
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Clearly, tuna RFMOs are established with a mandate to conserve and manage highly
migratory fish stocks primarily in areas beyond national jurisdiction. As seen in Chapter II,
their powers have gradually increased over time and appear to be encroaching into maritime
zones under the jurisdiction of coastal States. As well, obligations arising from the need to
combat IUU fishing activities have extended the oversight of tuna RFMOs from the high seas
to exclusive economic zones and gradually into waters under the sovereignty of coastal States
and over ports. The significant growth in tuna RFMO competence and their implications on
the jurisdiction, in its widest sense, of coastal States are worthy subjects for discussion.

This Chapter first discusses international law pertaining to the rights and responsibilities of
the coastal State derived particularly from the 1982 LOSC5 and the 1995 Agreement6. The
instruments and practices of tuna RFMOs are then analysed to identify trends in practice.
Then there is an evaluation of the perceived contribution of tuna RFMOs to coastal State
jurisdiction.

II.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

Jurisdiction, an aspect of sovereignty, identifies the limits of a State’s authority or
competence to legislate, enforce or adjudicate. The competence to make laws or rules,
referred to as prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction is to be distinguished from the power to
enforce those laws or rules, such power referred to as enforcement or prerogative jurisdiction.
By virtue of its nexus with statehood, there is the proposition that jurisdiction is territorial.7

In the context of international fisheries law, the jurisdiction of coastal States is generally
derived from (i) customary international law, (ii) maritime zones established in accordance
with the 1982 LOSC, (iii) rights and obligations identified in the 1982 LOSC, (iv) rights and

5

United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1245
(entered into force 16 November 1994), hereinafter ‘1982 LOSC’.
6
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 August 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (entered into force 11 December
2001), hereinafter ‘1995 Agreement’.
7
See Brownlie, above n 1, 299 for weaknesses of the territorial theory.
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obligations stipulated in the 1995 Agreement, and (v) rights and obligations under treaties. A
starting point is that the sovereignty of a State extends from its land territory to its internal
waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea.8 The International Court of Justice has stated
that the legal status over the territorial sea is customary international law.9

Although the ICJ has not addressed the customary international law status of the archipelagic
States regime in Part IV of the 1982 LOSC, legal scholars seem to agree that the legal regime
for archipelagic waters is part of customary international law.10 Living marine resources
within archipelagic waters are subject to the sovereignty of the archipelagic State and as one
put it:
…the archipelagic state has no legal obligation to cooperate with fishing states
regarding the conservation and utilization of HMS stocks in these waters although in a
practical sense the necessities of providing for efficient harvesting in the EEZ and
high sea do not permit wholly separate treatment of the fishing that could transpire in
archipelagic waters.11

In other words, the conservation obligations identified in Article 61 of the 1982 LOSC apply
only in the EEZ and not in the internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial sea of a
coastal State. If such an obligation were to exist it would be derived from customary
international law. At this time, the practice of archipelagic States does not lend support to the
existence of such legal obligation.

The largest maritime zone over which a coastal State exercises its jurisdiction is the exclusive
economic zone or EEZ, created under specific regime in Part V of the 1982 LOSC. Since
8

1982 LOSC, art 2. See also Robin Churchill and A Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester
University Press, 3rd edn, 1999); Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University
Press, 2012); Donald R Rothwell and Tim Stephens, The International Law of the Sea (Oxford, 2010).
9
See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United
States) [1986] ICJ Rep, 111 [212] for analysis of territorial sea provision in Convention on the Territorial Sea
and Contiguous Zone, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS 205 (entered into force 10 September
1964), arts 1(1) and 2; and Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v Colombia) [2012] ICJ Rep 690,
[177] for territorial sea provision in 1982 LOSC, art 2.
10
Churchill and Lowe, above n 8, 130; Rothwell and Stephens, above n 8, 189; Cf Tanaka, above n 8, 109. See
also Closing Statement of the President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 10
December 1982, 135 – 6 where it is indicated that the legal regime of archipelagic waters is a consequence of
the development of international law and not the codification of the law.
11
William T Burke, ‘Highly migratory species in the new law of the sea’ (1984) 14(3) Ocean Development and
International Law, 273 – 314, 300.
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1984 the ICJ has held that the concept of the EEZ is customary international law.12 The
creation of a sui generis regime in the EEZ bestowed custodianship and property rights of
vast fisheries resources on coastal States. It also elevated the international recognition of
developing coastal States and enhanced their national autonomy and international standing.
Developing coastal States were put in a stronger position to deal with developed States on an
equal basis.13As one put it:

Under the so-called freedom of the seas doctrine, the poor, developing coastal states
have been second-class citizens of international society. With the modification of this
outmoded, outdated principle, the coastal states have become masters in their own
houses in waters close to their shores.14

While developing coastal States did gain significantly, developed coastal States with long
coastlines also benefited greatly, even more so than developing States, in terms of EEZ area
amassed. The extension of coastal State jurisdiction was not without criticism. Ambassador
Arvid Pardo of Malta argued that the extension was a curiously flawed approach to the
problem of securing distributive justice for the disadvantaged nations of the world.15

Jurisdiction over highly migratory species within the EEZ was also in issue until the early
1990s. According to coastal States, tuna present in the EEZ is the property of that coastal
State until it departs.16 In response, distant water fishing States argued that the 1982 LOSC, in
particular paragraph 1 of Article 64 did not give coastal States any jurisdiction over highly
migratory species. As the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ended
most fishing States acquiesced to the coastal State position with the exception of the United
12

Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States)
[1984] ICJ Rep 294, [94]. See also Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v Malta) [1985] ICJ Rep 33,
[34].
13
Douglas M Johnston, ‘Is coastal state fishery management successful or not?’ (1991) 22(2) Ocean
Development and International Law 199 – 208, 201.
14
Ram Prakash Anand, ‘The politics of a new legal order for fisheries’, (1982) 11(3 – 4) Ocean Development
and International Law, 265 – 295, 288.
15
Arvid Pardo, ‘The Convention on the Law of the Sea: A Preliminary Appraisal’ (1982 – 3) 20 San Diego Law
Review 489, 498 – 501. See also Douglas M Johnston, ‘Is coastal state fishery management successful or not?’
(1991) 22(2) Ocean Development and International Law 199 – 208.
16
See for example Gordon R Munro, ‘Extended jurisdiction and the management of Pacific highly migratory
species’ (1990) 21(3) Ocean Development and International Law 289 – 307; Judith Swan, ‘Tuna management
in the South Pacific’, in T A Clingan Jr (ed). The Law of the Sea: What lies ahead? (Law of the Sea Institute,
1988) 184 – 203.
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States.17 The United States inserted its position on highly migratory species in its legislation
declaring that US jurisdiction over fisheries resources within its 200 mile zone does not
include highly migratory species, and any foreign coastal State that impeded a US fishing
vessel in its harvesting of tuna within the foreign State’s EEZ will be penalised through an
embargo on US imports of that State’s fishery products.18 Cooperation among coastal States
in the Pacific Islands as well as Latin America was effective in persuading the United States
to abandon its objections to coastal State jurisdiction over highly migratory species within the
EEZ.19

Accepting that there is now no dispute as to coastal State jurisdiction over highly migratory
species within its EEZ, it is useful to explore the provisions of the 1982 LOSC and its 1995
Agreement on the jurisdiction of coastal States.

A

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The 1982 LOSC contains the fundamental provisions supporting the jurisdiction of coastal
States. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends from its land territory to its internal waters,
archipelagic waters (in relation to an archipelagic State), and territorial sea.20For its territorial
sea, a coastal State has the right to make laws and to enforce those laws, i.e., legislative
jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction respectively. A coastal State has the right to enact
legislation concerning, among other matters, navigation, navigational aids, submarine cables
and pipelines, living resources of the sea, the prevention of infringement of the fisheries laws
and regulations of the coastal State, preservation of the marine environment, the prevention
of infringement of the customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws.21 Coastal States laws are
not to apply to the design, construction, manning or equipment of foreign vessels except

17

William T Burke, 1984, above n 11.
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act and Fishermen’s Protective Act were in fact
applied to embargo imports from a number of States including the Solomon Islands and Mexico in the early
1980s.
19
See for instance Gordon Munro, above n 16.
20
1982 LOSC, art 2.
21
1982 LOSC, art 21(1).
18
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where such laws give effect to generally accepted international rules or standards.22 States
also cannot legislate to impede or impose charges on innocent passage.23

While both are part of the power to exercise control over a foreign vessel, the enforcement
jurisdiction of a coastal State is to be distinguished from its legislative jurisdiction. The first
requirement is a prohibition on discriminating in form or in fact against foreign vessels
carrying cargo to, from or on behalf of another State.24 The enforcement jurisdiction
provisions in articles 27 and 28 of the 1982 LOSC are taken largely from the 1958 Territorial
Sea Convention.25 In summary the enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State in its territorial
sea is in theory absolute except for (a) jurisdiction over crimes committed before a vessel,
merely passing through the territorial sea, entered the territorial sea, and (b) jurisdiction in
civil matters to arrest a vessel for liabilities not incurred in relation to its voyage through the
territorial sea.26Once the foreign vessel enters the internal waters of a coastal State, the right
of innocent passage no longer exists and the legislative and enforcement jurisdiction of the
coastal State over such vessels, in principle broadens.

Sovereignty however, is subject to obligations owed to other States, including the right of
innocent passage in the territorial sea, i.e., passage which ‘is not prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security’ of the coastal State.27The right of innocent passage is widely
considered to be established in customary international law.28 In relation to foreign vessels in
waters under the sovereignty of the coastal State, the coastal State cannot impose
requirements on such vessels which have the practical effect of denying or impairing the right
of innocent passage, or to discriminate in form or in fact against foreign vessels or against
vessels carrying cargoes to, from or on behalf of any State.29

22

1982 LOSC, art 21(2).
1982 LOSC, art 24(1) and 26.
24
1982 LOSC, art 24(1)(b).
25
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS
205 (entered into force 10 September 1964), art 19.
26
1982 LOSC, arts 27 and 28. See also discussion in Churchill and Lowe, above n 8, 95 – 100.
27
1982 LOSC, arts 17 – 19. See also Corfu Channel case [1949] ICJ Rep 1.
28
Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions Between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v Bahrain), [2001] ICJ
Rep 91, 110 [223]; Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, above n 1, 265; Brownlie,
above n 1,186; Churchill and Lowe, above n 8, 87; Tanaka, above n 8, 85. But a warships’ right of innocent
passage is not established in customary international law – see for instance Tanaka, above n 8, 89.
29
1982 LOSC, art 24.1.
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On the legislative jurisdiction of the coastal State in relation to fisheries resources, a coastal
State may make fisheries legislation pertaining to its internal waters, archipelagic waters in
relation to an archipelagic State, and the territorial sea. In the exclusive economic zone, a
coastal State has sovereign rights to conserve, manage, explore and exploit living marine
resources.30 Similarly for living marine resources on the continental shelf, namely sedentary
species, a coastal State has sovereign rights to explore and exploit such resources.31

In the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf a coastal State in exercising its
sovereign rights must also take heed of duties to other States. The concept of the exclusive
economic zone and certain high seas freedoms that may be exercised therein are established
in customary international law.32 Within the exclusive economic zone, there are several
obligations that are due to other States, namely, respecting the freedoms of navigation and
overflight, laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and lawful uses of the sea related to
those freedoms such as those related to the operation of vessels, and the coastal State in
exercising its sovereign rights shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States
and shall act in a manner compatible with the 1982 LOSC.33In addition the rights of
landlocked States, and geographically disadvantaged States, are to be accommodated.34

Aside from the rights of other States, there are rights and duties in connection with the
fisheries resources that a coastal State is to implement. These include the: i) duty to cooperate
with other States in the conservation of living resources; ii) duty to ensure the maintenance of

30

1982 LOSC, Part V, art 56(1)(a).
1982 LOSC, Part VI, art 77. Sedentary species are defined in art 77(4) as ‘organisms which, at the harvestable
stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are unable to move except in constant physical contact with
the seabed or the subsoil’.
32
Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v United States),
[1984] ICJ Rep 294 [94]; Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libya v Malta), [1985] ICJ Rep 33 [34]; Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States), [1986]
ICJ Rep 111 [214] (high seas freedom of navigation applies in EEZ). See also Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles
of Public International Law, above n 1, 277;
33
1982 LOSC, art 58 in conjunction with art 87, and art 56(2) respectively. See consideration by ITLOS of ‘due
regard’ in “Hoshinmaru” (Japan v. Russian Federation), Prompt Release, Judgment, ITLOS Reports 20052007, 18, para 88; M/V “Virginia G” (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2014, 4, para 270;
and Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2
April 2015, ITLOS Reports 2015, para 216. Cf In the Matter of the Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration
(Mauritius v United Kingdom), Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award of 18 March 2015, where the arbitral
tribunal considered the meaning of ‘due regard’ in article 56(2) in the circumstances and the nature of rights (see
paras 519 – 534). The arbitral tribunal also found the obligation in article 194(4) 1982 LOSC to be functionally
equivalent to the obligation to give ‘due regard’ in article 56(2).
34
1982 LOSC, arts 69 and 70.
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living resources in the exclusive economic zone is not endangered by over-exploitation;35iii)
right to determine the total allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic
zone;36 iv) duty to take into consideration the effects on species associated or dependent on
the target species;37 v) duty to exchange scientific information, catch and fishing effort
statistics, and other relevant data through competent international organisations;38 vi) duty to
promote the objective of optimum utilisation of the living resources in the exclusive
economic zone;39 vii) right to determine its capacity to harvest the living resources in the
exclusive economic zone;40 viii) duty to grant surplus of harvestable living resources to other
States through agreements or other arrangements;41 ix) duty to give due notice of
conservation laws and regulations;42 x) duty to promptly release arrested foreign vessels and
crew on the posting of a reasonable bond or security; 43 and the xi) duty to protect and
preserve the marine environment.44In cases where the 1982 LOSC does not attribute rights or
jurisdiction to the coastal State or to other States within the exclusive economic zone and a
conflict relating to such rights or jurisdiction arises, the conflict should be resolved on the
basis of equity taking into account the interests of the parties involved and that of the
international community as a whole.45It is worthy to note that in interpreting the application
of 1982 LOSC provisions, international tribunals can consider the legislation of States as well
as tuna RFMO instruments and measures to determine State practice.46
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1982 LOSC, art 61(2).
1982 LOSC, art 61(1).
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For the continental shelf, duties of the coastal State to other States include the duty not to
infringe or unjustifiably interfere with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other
States provided for in the 1982 LOSC.47 The exercise of the sovereign rights of the coastal
State over its continental shelf should not undermine or unjustifiably interfere with navigation
and other rights and freedoms of other States.48

With respect to the enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal State in the exclusive economic
zone, the 1982 LOSC sets out the fundamentals. The coastal State may, in the exercise of its
sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the living resources in the
exclusive economic zone, take such measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and
judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure compliance with its laws adopted in
conformity with the 1982 LOSC.49Penalties for infringements of fisheries laws and
regulations in the exclusive economic zone however are not to include imprisonment unless
there is an agreement between the States concerned, and any form of corporal punishment.50

B

The 1995 Agreement

The 1995 Agreement, an implementing treaty of the 1982 LOSC, elaborates on the
jurisdiction of a coastal State.51The 1995 Agreement is innovative and bridges a gap in the
1982 LOSC by providing the framework for the establishment and functions of regional and
subregional fisheries management organisations. A seemingly inchoate phrase used often in
the Agreement is ‘areas under national jurisdiction’.52 Its inclusion has resulted in two
contrasting interpretations of its meaning. The first, supports a narrow interpretation, that
applies to the term to the EEZ only, and the second wider interpretation, applies the term to
all maritime zones of the coastal State. Each carries significant implications to the

47

1982 LOSC, art 78(4).
1982 LOSC, art 78(2).
49
1982 LOSC, art 73(1). See discussion of sovereign rights (art 56) in the Virginia G case and the SRFC
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52
The term is used in Articles 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 7.1, 7.1(b), 7.2, 7.2(a), 7.2(d), 14.3, and in Article 1.1 of Annex 1 of
the 1995 Agreement. The term “areas of national jurisdiction” is used only in Article 11(f).
48

88

management of fish stocks and has attracted debate within some tuna RFMOs.53 In light of
the interpretation provision within the 1995 Agreement and its primary application on the
high seas, the narrow view appears more salient. The 1995 Agreement maintains the strong
legal relationship with the 1982 LOSC providing that, ‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall
prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the Convention’ and that the
‘Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with
the Convention’. In practice this relationship provision may be considered an overarching
guiding policy rather than a principle. On the one hand it may be interpreted to align
everything under the 1995 Agreement so that they fall within the parameters laid down in the
1982 LOSC. For example, the sovereign rights of a coastal State in the management of
fisheries resources in its EEZ are not prejudiced by the management measures adopted by an
RFMO that apply within that zone. On the other hand, it may be viewed as an ideal which
States endeavour to achieve, but do not necessarily achieve. So if management measures of
an RFMO impinge on the sovereign rights of a coastal State within its EEZ, the interaction
needs to be managed in a way that is in conformity with the 1982 LOSC. One writer
considers that innovative provisions in the 1995 Agreement may be considered a departure
from the 1982 LOSC.54 Practice observed within RFMOs however show an absence of regard
for the relationship provision. This may be attributed to: (i) a State’s express consent for their
rights, jurisdiction and duties to be changed, (ii) a State’s inability or unwillingness to
challenge changes, (iii) Acceptance by a State of RFMO initiatives, (iv) State consent to be
bound by treaties which effectively alter their rights, jurisdiction and duties, and an
unfortunate situation where (v) the State is unaware of the implications of an RFMO
initiative. In any event, the relationship provision is useful for the purposes of this chapter in
identifying if and the extent to which tuna RFMO initiatives have affected the relationship
between constituent instruments, the 1995 Agreement and the 1982 LOSC.
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On the adoption of the 1995 Agreement, the conference chair Ambassador Satya Nandan said
that the instrument is ‘far-sighted’, ‘far-reaching’, ‘bold’ and ‘revolutionary’.55 The 1995
Agreement in addressing weaknesses in the management of high seas fisheries also
introduced principles and requirements that are to be complied with by States. An example of
its far reaching aspect is that a State party to the Agreement, that is not a member of a
subregional or regional fisheries management organisation or a participant in a subregional or
regional fisheries management arrangement and does not otherwise agree to apply fisheries
measures established, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in the conservation
and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.56 The inclusion of the phrase
‘in accordance with the Convention and this Agreement’ in that provision ensures that the
general duty to cooperate in the management of stocks is the minimum required. Although
the 1982 LOSC sets out the general duty to cooperate, interpretation of the nature and scope
of that duty differs among States.

Notwithstanding that the 1995 Agreement is intended to apply primarily to the high seas,
there are several provisions which add to the obligations of a coastal State namely, the
requirement to apply general principles, application of the precautionary approach, principle
of compatibility, and provisions on cooperation, port State and flag State responsibilities. The
1995 Agreement requires coastal States to implement the precautionary approach and the
principle of compatibility within areas under national jurisdiction ‘subject to the different
legal regimes that apply within areas under national jurisdiction and in areas beyond national
jurisdiction as provided for in the Convention’.57The inclusion of the quoted text is intended
to safeguard the interests of States but may be interpreted as confining the application of both
principles. In other words for example, coastal States in the region are to apply the
precautionary approach and the principle of compatibility within areas under jurisdiction but
their application are subject to the domestic legal regime. In the exercise of their sovereign
rights within areas under national jurisdiction, coastal States are to apply the general
principles that are laid out in Article 5 of the 1995 Agreement. States parties are also required
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to give due consideration to the respective capacities of developing States in applying articles
5, 6 and 7 in areas under national jurisdiction.58

Article 5 of the 1995 Agreement sets out the general principles for the conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.59 These principles are
influenced and derived from international instruments particularly the 1982 LOSC, the Rio
Declaration and Agenda 21 resulting from the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED), and to some extent the Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries.60 An achievement of the 1995 Agreement is that it included provisions for the
implementation of general principles for conservation and management established under the
1982 LOSC.61 These principles may also be seen as supporting the operationalisation of the
general duty to cooperate contained in the 1982 LOSC. The mechanism for cooperation
between States is governed by the principles of good faith, to which one can add principles of
contemporary fisheries management in implementation processes.62 The overarching
principle would appear to be the long term sustainability of fish stocks and their optimum
utilisation. The Code and other provisions in the 1995 Agreement, such as flag State
responsibilities, introduce an additional objective of promoting responsible fisheries.
Measures adopted by States need to support long term sustainability. Sustainability cannot be
achieved without greater responsibilities upon all concerned. Accepting the obligation to
implement general principles, it is envisaged that the debate in the international community,
and to an extent within tuna RFMOs, would now shift from their theoretical existence to their
operationalisation.

Scholars have analysed the principles in Article 5 of the 1995 Agreement
comprehensively.63For the present purpose, it is useful to note the use of best science, the
ecosystem approach, and discuss the precautionary approach and the requirement of
compatibility. Conservation and management measures are to be based on the best scientific
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evidence available in order to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing
maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors,
including the special requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing
patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international
minimum standards.64 The goal of maximum sustainable yield has been criticised because of
its inherent flaws.65 Larkin, argued in 1977, that for even a single species population it is not
likely that the goal is really attainable on a sustained basis.66Fisheries management, through
the goals of MSY and optimum sustainable yield is further complicated with the reference to
factors that qualify fishing effort limits.

In addition, the ecosystem approach to fisheries captured in the 1995 Agreement requires the
assessment of impacts of fishing and other factors on targets stocks and species belonging to
the same ecosystem or species dependent on the target stocks. Management measures
adopted for species within the same ecosystem are to ensure that the level of reproduction of
these species is not seriously threatened. Complementary principles require the reduction of
waste, discards and the catch of non target species in the fishery, and the protection of
biodiversity in the marine environment.

Precautionary approach

The most common definition of the precautionary principle is contained in Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED).67The precautionary approach embodied in the 1995 Agreement is derived mainly
from UNCED and builds on the relatively low conservation standard in the 1982 LOSC.68
Article 5(c) of the 1995 Agreement requires States to apply the precautionary approach in
64
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accordance with Article 6. States are to apply the approach to conservation, management and
the exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to attain
the goals of protecting living marine resources and preserving the marine environment.69
States are to be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate, and
the absence of scientific information cannot be used as an excuse for postponing or failing to
take measures.70The 1995 Agreement acknowledges that improved decision-making for
fisheries conservation and management can only be achieved through sharing of the best
scientific information available and applying improved techniques for dealing with risk and
uncertainty.71Guidelines for the determination of stock specific reference points provide a
firm platform for decision-makers in applying the precautionary approach. That said, the
effectiveness of fisheries conservation and management (and the application of the
precautionary approach) depends on the existence of data collection programmes and
research activities that provide insight into the size and productivity of stocks, level of
recruitment, levels and distribution of fishing mortality, and the impact of fishing on non
target and associated or dependent species.

Despite the importance attached to precaution, its gradual implementation by States,
consideration in the literature, inclusion in several international instruments, and application
by tuna RFMOs, the precautionary principle does appear to be approaching crystallisation in
customary international fisheries law.72 Notwithstanding differences in interpretation, States
are actively implementing the principle in domestic policies and laws in the management of
fisheries. The principle has also been recognised in the Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Weeramantry in the examination of the 1974 Nuclear Test Case.73 It has been identified as an
obligation of States sponsoring activities in the Area in the advisory opinion of the Seabed
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Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.74 In the Southern
Bluefin Tuna cases, Judge Laing in a separate opinion considered the question of whether the
precautionary approach was a general obligation under international law. After examining the
instruments and the obligations entailed, Judge Laing stated:

It might be noted that treaties and formal instruments use different language of
obligation; the notion is stated variously (as a principle, approach, concept, measures,
action); no authoritative judicial decision unequivocally supports the notion; doctrine
is indecisive, and domestic juridical materials are uncertain or evolving.75

Notwithstanding views to the contrary, the practice of the majority of States demonstrates
that the precautionary approach is applies in fisheries policies and laws. Admittedly tuna
RFMOs are influencing State practice.

Compatibility

The concept of compatibility or consistency between measures established in areas under
national jurisdiction and adopted in the high seas is not novel. Of note, the constituent
instruments of the North West Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) and the North East
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) adopted respectively in 1978 and 1980 both require
consistency between measures adopted for the high seas with measures established by coastal
States in areas under their jurisdiction.76

74 Responsibilities and obligations of States sponsoring persons and entities with respect to activities in the
Area (Request for Advisory Opinion submitted to the Seabed Disputes Chamber) ITLOS Advisory Opinion, 1
February 2011 [125] – [35], <
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October 1978 (entered into force 1 January 1979), art XI, <http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/convention.html>.
On 28 September 2007, NAFO commenced work towards a reformed convention through the adoption of the
Amendment to the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries. The
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast Atlantic Fisheries, opened for signature 8
November 1980 (entered into force 17 March 1982), art 8, < http://archive.neafc.org/about/docs/londondeclarlation_and_new_convention.pdf>. This treaty replaced the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Convention of 24
January 1959.

94

Article 7 of the1995 Agreement provides for the duty to cooperate to ensure compatibility of
conservation and management measures within areas under national jurisdiction and on the
high seas. With respect to highly migratory fish stocks, relevant coastal States and States
whose nationals fish for such stocks in the region shall cooperate with a view to ensuring
conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation of stocks within and beyond
areas under national jurisdiction.77The obligation to cooperate is without prejudice to the
sovereign rights of coastal States for exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing living
marine resources within areas under national jurisdiction, and the rights of States engaged in
fishing on the high seas.78The reference to ‘sovereign rights’ and Article 61 of the 1982
LOSC in article 7 indicates that the maritime zone of interest is the EEZ only. Thus the
territorial sea, archipelagic waters in the case of an archipelagic State, and the internal waters
of a coastal State are excluded from the scope of compatibility. It follows that any reference
to compatibility for areas under national jurisdiction is confined to the EEZ. But that
interpretation, although technically correct, may not in the broadest sense, support the intent
of the principle. Compatibility of conservation and management measures adopted for areas
under national jurisdiction and established for the high seas is designed to ensure
conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in
their entirety.79 The use of the phrase ‘in their entirety’ suggests that measures are to be
adopted for the stocks regardless of where such stocks may be found, and seems to contradict
the suggested application of compatibility for high seas areas and the EEZ only.

To identify compatible conservation and management measures, States are mandated to: i)
take into account conservation and management measures adopted by a coastal State in
accordance with article 61 1982 LOSC for the stocks within areas under national jurisdiction
and ensure that measures established for the high seas do not undermine the effectiveness of
coastal State measures;80 ii) take into account previously agreed measures established for the
high seas for the same stocks by coastal States and States fishing on the high seas;81 iii) take
into account measures established and applied to those stocks by a subregional or regional
77
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fisheries management organisation or arrangement;82 iv) take into account the biological
unity and biological characteristics of the stocks, geographical peculiarities and the extent to
which the stocks occur and are fished within areas under national jurisdiction;83 v) the
dependence of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas on stocks;84 and States are to
ensure that measures do not harmfully impact living marine resources as a whole.85 In
addition, States are required to make every effort to agree on compatible measures within a
reasonable period of time, and failing that, the procedures for dispute settlement may be
utilised.86States are also encouraged to make every effort to enter into provisional
arrangements of a practical nature in the absence of agreement on compatible measures, and
in the absence of such arrangements, may seek to obtain provisional measures from a court or
tribunal.87In this regard, Article 32 of the1995 Agreement also facilitates the application of
Article 297.3 of the LOSC.88 States are required to regularly inform other States of measures
adopted within areas under national jurisdiction and measures adopted for their flagged
vessels on the high seas.89

It has been argued that to be effective conservation measures should apply throughout the
migratory range of a given stock.90 This view may be seen as subordinating the jurisdiction of
the coastal State in the exercise of its sovereign rights within its EEZ. Conversely it may be
considered to strengthen the jurisdiction of the coastal State in supporting long term
sustainability. Given coastal State practice thus far, the latter view is arguably correct. In
supporting compatibility of measures throughout the geographical range of stocks, the coastal
State agrees to cooperate to ensure that measures adopted for the EEZ are compatible with
measures taken on the high seas. Based on Article 64 of the 1982 LOSC and the sovereign
rights of a coastal State, some have suggested that coastal State interests in setting measures
in areas under national jurisdiction seem to precede the measures adopted by States fishing on
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the high seas.91 In providing for compatibility, Article 7 of the 1995 Agreement appears to
balance the interests of coastal States and States fishing on the high seas by mandating
cooperation and requiring that measures in areas under national jurisdiction and on the high
seas are compatible. There may still remain a bias towards coastal States with the inclusion in
paragraph 1 of the ‘without prejudice’ text.

III. TUNA RFMO PRACTICE
It is posited that tuna RFMOs through their constituent instruments and subsequent practice
have evolved to delineate a substantive oversight role vis-à-vis coastal States in the
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks. Over time the responsibilities
within juridical zones through which the stocks migrate will need further elucidation to
reflect where tuna RFMOs have either a lead, shared or an oversight role in the conservation
and management of stocks. Distinguishing the roles of coastal States and tuna RFMOs in the
different juridical zones within areas under national jurisdiction and beyond may result in the
blurring of legal powers and competencies.92

In analysing the effect of tuna RFMO practice on coastal State jurisdiction, this section
considers how each tuna RFMO is applying contemporary principles of fisheries
management, including the use of the best science available, the application of the
precautionary approach, and the implementation of compatibility. It also explores how tuna
RFMOs are dealing with substantive issues such as port monitoring and control, observers,
the listing of IUU fishing vessels alleged to have contravened national laws, and the
formation of compliance and sanctioning processes.

A.

IATTC
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The Antigua Convention accommodates contemporary management principles and
incorporates several features of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the 1995
Agreement, including the application of: (i) the precautionary approach, (ii) the requirement
of compatibility, and iii) general principles for conservation and management of fisheries.
Reference to the two instruments is made because several members of the Commission, in
particular a number of Latin American States, are not party to the 1995 Agreement and
favour the Code.

1 Precautionary approach
Article IV of the Antigua Convention provides an obligation on each member of the
Commission to ‘directly and through the Commission’, apply the precautionary approach as
described in the Code ‘and/or’ the 1995 Agreement. The Commission is also required to
apply the precautionary approach in accordance with that provision.93Where measures are
adopted in the absence of adequate scientific information, the Commission shall as soon as
possible obtain scientific information necessary to maintain or modify such measures.94The
involvement of the Commission in the application of the precautionary approach binds
member States and fishing entities and is intended to ensure compliance.

Interestingly, the reference to the Code and the 1995 Agreement provides for dual, and
possibly divergent, pathways for the application of the precautionary approach. Members of
the Commission may choose to apply the precautionary approach as set out in the Code rather
than the 1995 Agreement or vice versa. Unlike the 1995 Agreement, the precautionary
approach contained in the Code is drafted as principles, for instance paragraph 6.5 reads:

States and subregional and regional fisheries management organizations should apply
a precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of
living aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic
environment, taking account of the best scientific evidence available. The absence of
adequate scientific information should not be used as a reason for postponing or
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failing to take measures to conserve target species, associated or dependent species
and non-target species and their environment.

This is repeated and elaborated upon in paragraph 7.5 of the Code, which also calls for the
determination of target reference points and limit reference points.95Compared to the
provisions in the 1995 Agreement, the Code among other aspects, does not elaborate on
actions to be taken when a stock is at risk of falling below a limit reference point, the
identification of provisional reference points, and the minimum standard for limit reference
points. The Agreement may be described as adding operational provisions to the application
of the precautionary approach. Therefore, the Commission is likely to develop its practice
based on the minimum requirements in the Code. States party to the 1995 Agreement may
however be inclined to apply the 1995 Agreement.

2 Compatibility

The requirement of compatibility in article V of the Antigua Convention appears to be
broader in scope than the 1995 Agreement because it purports to extend the requirement of
compatibility to the management of living marine resources within areas under the
sovereignty of a coastal State. However, paragraph 1 of article V ensures that the Antigua
Convention does not prejudice or undermine the sovereignty or sovereign rights of a coastal
State, or the right of all States for their nationals to fish on the high seas in accordance with
the 1982 LOSC. It is important to note that the compatibility requirement in the 1995
Agreement only refers to the sovereign rights of a coastal State and the right of all States to
engage in fishing on the high seas, without any reference to sovereignty.96 Depending on the
preferred interpretation, the inclusion of ‘sovereignty’ may be considered to be restrictive on
the one hand or to be flexible on the other. Paragraph 2 then provides that measures
established for the high seas shall be compatible with those adopted for ‘areas under national
jurisdiction’.97This may be interpreted by some to include all maritime zones of a coastal
State or alternatively it may be interpreted to refer to the EEZ or Exclusive Fisheries Zone
only. While the latter interpretation is favourable the inclusion of paragraph 1, the contents of
95
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which are derived from the relationship article in the 1995 Agreement, introduces a level of
confusion to the application of compatibility. Notwithstanding, the Antigua Convention
seems to progress the requirement of compatibility and the practice of member States and the
Commission will determine the extent of its application within the internal waters and
territorial seas of States.

To safeguard the longstanding and widely documented interests of member States of the
Commission concerning the Law of the Sea, the Antigua Convention also provides for the
rights of States:

No provision of this Convention may be interpreted in such a way as to prejudice or
undermine the sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction exercised by any State in
accordance with international law, as well as its position or views with regard to
matters relating to the law of the sea.98

While seemingly positive, this safeguarding provisions apparently seems to conflict with the
compatibility provision referred earlier. The compatibility provision on the one hand states
that nothing in the Convention prejudices the sovereignty, and sovereign rights of the coastal
State in exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing fish stocks within waters under its
sovereignty and under its national jurisdiction (i.e. EEZ). Yet there is a requirement for
compatibility of measures on the high seas and for areas under national jurisdiction. In
contrast, the safeguarding provision does not refer to maritime zones but sovereignty,
sovereign rights or jurisdiction. As identified at the outset, jurisdiction may refer to both
sovereignty and sovereign rights, thus introducing ambiguity. The predominant view is that it
considered to overlay a blanket exclusion on any interpretation that prejudices or undermines
the State and its position with regard to law of the sea matters. The effect would be to negate
the application of compatibility in waters under sovereignty at the least and arguably the EEZ
also, and make redundant the without prejudice paragraph in the compatibility provision.

Finally, each Party is obliged to take measures necessary to ensure the implementation of and
compliance with the Antigua Convention and conservation and management measures
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adopted by the Commission, including through the enactment of legislation.99 The
Convention also establishes the committee for the review of implementation of measures
adopted by the Commission. Among other things, the committee is tasked with reviewing and
monitoring compliance with conservation and management measures of the Commission,
providing information and advice to the Commission on the implementation and compliance
with measures, and recommending means of promoting compatibility among the fishery
management measures of the members of the Commission.100 The specific establishment of a
committee in a constituent instrument to provide an oversight role in the implementation and
compliance of measures is an emerging trend among tuna RFMOs.101 More impressive is the
inclusion of specific responsibilities such as the ability to recommend means of promoting
compatibility of measures. This in itself may be interpreted as prejudicial to the coastal State
in the exercise of its sovereignty and sovereign rights. On the other hand the committee may
be viewed as strengthening the role of the coastal State in achieving long term sustainable
fisheries.

B.

ICCAT

In the Atlantic Ocean, fishing or related activities for tuna on the high seas or in areas under
national jurisdiction is to be undertaken in accordance with the International Convention for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna.102The Atlantic Tuna Commission is an example of an
article 64-type organisation responsible for the management of highly migratory fish stocks
in that region.103Although its constituent instrument is now the oldest amongst tuna RFMOs,
the Commission is progressive in setting contemporary measures such as the catch
documentation scheme, the scheme for the inspection of fishing vessels in port, and the
application of precaution in fisheries management. But there does appear to be difference of
views on the area of application of binding recommendations of the Commission.

99

Antigua Convention, art XVIII [1].
Antigua Convention, art X and Annex 3.
101
The WCPFC has established a committee under a conservation and management measure that promotes
compliance.
102
International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, adopted 14 May 1966, 673 UNTS 63 (in
force 21 March 1969), hereafter ‘ICCAT Convention’.
103
Cf Churchill and Lowe, above n 8, 314 who indicate in 1999 that the ‘Commission is not yet, however, fully
an example of an article 64-type organisation as several Atlantic coastal States are not (yet) members’.
100

101

In 2013, Norway tabled a proposal to change the time and area closures in place for longline
and purse seine vessels operating in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean bluefin tuna
fishery. The rationale for the proposal was to allow Norway to fish its ICCAT quota when
bluefin tuna are in Norwegian waters. Given the absence of consensus on the proposal,
Norway called for a vote and the proposal was adopted.104 This situation is significant in that
a coastal State in seeking a variation to the time and area closures in order to utilise its quota
to fish within its EEZ, has to obtain endorsement from other States. ICCAT through its
subsidiary panel, had to endorse the variation to allow Norway to fish its quota when the
fishing was optimal in its EEZ. A second point is the willingness of the coastal State to call
for a vote in order to safeguard its fishing interests within its EEZ. The third point is the
application of the ICCAT measure to the Atlantic and Mediterranean without distinguishing
waters under national jurisdiction, except for the Norway clause. In response, the United
States of America clarified that highly migratory species must be managed throughout their
range and the inclusion of Norway’s text should imply that ICCAT measures are applied
differently within domestic waters and the high seas.105 Norway concluded that all applicable
ICCAT measures would be implemented in the Norwegian bluefin tuna fishery but that it
reserved its right to implement stricter measures where necessary in waters under Norwegian
fisheries jurisdiction.106

1 Precautionary approach
Of the principles enunciated in the 1995 Agreement, the precautionary approach features
prominently in decisions of the Commission. That is not to say that other principles have not
been included. In fact the Commission favourably supported the development of the Code of

ICCAT, ICCAT 2013 – 2014 biennial report, 327. The proposal was adopted with 17 votes in favour
(Algeria, Belize, Brazil, China, Egypt, Guatemala, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Libya, Mexico, Norway, Panama,
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Recommendation 13-07 reads: [21] Bluefin tuna fishing shall be permitted in the eastern Atlantic and
Mediterranean by large-scale pelagic longline catching vessels over 24 m during the period from 1 January to 31
May with the exception of the area delimited by West of 10 W and North of 42 N, as well as in the Norwegian
Exclusive Economic Zone, where such fishing shall be permitted from 1 August to 31 January. [22] Purse seine
fishing for bluefin tuna shall be permitted in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean during the period from 26
May to 24 June, with the exception of the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone, where such fishing shall be
permitted from 25 June to 31 October.
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Conduct and urged that the general principles of the Code be developed by FAO.107 The
Commission has adopted several measures which relate to threatened or vulnerable shark
species, seabirds, turtles and minimum size requirements of target species, all of which
promote the protection of biodiversity, minimise the taking of non target species and reduce
bycatch and discards in the fishery.108In 2011 the Commission adopted a recommendation on
principles of decision making for conservation and management measures and a resolution on
the best available science.109 The recommendation allowed for the use of a strategy matrix, in
a format agreed with other tuna RFMOs, which provided fisheries managers with the
statistical probability of achieving management targets.110 It was acknowledged that this
format for the presentation of the results of stock assessments applies the precautionary
approach by providing Commissions with the means of assessing and adopting management
options at different levels of probability of success.111

Further, in 2014 the Commission adopted terms of reference for a standing working group to
facilitate dialogue between fisheries scientists and managers.112The objective of the working
group is to enhance communication and promote mutual understanding between scientists
and managers in support of the development and implementation of management strategies.
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The development of a framework for the implementation of management objectives and
strategies is to be ‘consistent with the Convention objectives, the ecosystem-based and
precautionary approaches’.113In addition the recommendation encourages mutual
understanding of concepts related to management strategies, such as the adoption of limit and
target reference points, the development of harvest control rules and the application of
management strategies evaluation. In sum, although contemporary principles of fisheries
management are not contained in the constituent instrument, they are applied through
recommendations of the Commission.

2 Ports
The first port inspection scheme adopted by the Commission was in 1978 and has been
revised since.114 Implementation of the scheme began in 1979 and facilitated monitoring of
compliance with the Commission’s regulations in ports, during tuna transshipment or landing
operations or during port calls of vessels.115Among other things, the scheme required that
there be no discrimination between national vessels and those of other Contracting Parties
and vessels entering ports on the grounds of force majeure are exempt from inspection. In
2003 additional measures that require States to prohibit landings, placing in cages for farming
and transhipment of tuna or tuna-like species caught by IUU fishing activities were
adopted.116 This obligation was qualified in that it had be undertaken in a manner consistent
with the relevant rights and obligations under international law. In 2012 the Commission
adopted the recommendation for a scheme for minimum standards for inspection in port
which replaced earlier recommendations.117The 2012 scheme is adapted from the FAO
Agreement on Port State Measures and introduces several layers of obligations to a port
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State, including at least five percent inspections of all landings and transshipments made by
foreign fishing vessels in port each year.118

3 IUU listing
Chapter VII addresses IUU listing in detail. ICCAT’s IUU listing recommendation is
progressive and was first adopted a recommendation in 2002 establishing a list of vessels
presumed to have carried out IUU fishing in the ICCAT convention area.119 A criterion for
listing is the harvesting of tuna or tuna-like species in waters under the national jurisdiction
of a coastal State without authorisation and or in contravention of national laws.120Although
the criterion is without prejudice to the sovereign rights of the coastal State concerned, listing
of the vessel without the consent of the coastal State may be viewed as undermining the
sovereign rights of that State. Listing without the consent of the coastal State may cast a
negative light on that State as being incapable of exercising its sovereign rights to manage
resources and also enforce compliance with its laws. Another criterion for listing would be
the use of prohibited fishing gear in contravention of the Commission’s measures.121 If a
vessel uses prohibited fishing gear within areas under national jurisdiction in the ICCAT
convention area in contravention of national laws and the Commission’s measures, it may be
argued that that vessel should only be listed if it has fled the jurisdiction of the coastal State
and legal proceedings cannot be instituted by that State. The coastal State would also need to
consent to listing. If listing proceeds without the consent of the coastal State in whose waters
the contravention occurred, then the same argument above applies.

4 Compliance monitoring
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Compliance with conservation and management measures is of importance to all tuna
RFMOs. In 1995 the Commission agreed to the mandate and terms of reference for its
conservation and management measures compliance committee.122 Since then the
Commission has adopted several measures with the objective of promoting compliance with
measures such as the measure in 2003 delineating the duties of contracting parties and
cooperating non-contracting parties, entities or fishing entities in regards to their vessels
fishing in the ICCAT convention area.123 In 2008 the Commission adopted a measure for the
reporting and review of compliance information.124 The compliance committee considers the
level of compliance as determined under the compliance index measure and makes
recommendations to the Commission.125 Penalties may also be applied where a State has not
complied with reporting obligations or other aspects. The requirement for reporting of data to
the Commission is linked to benefits. Noncompliance with reporting is likely to attract the
loss of benefits in the fishery. For example the ICCAT Criteria for the Allocation of Fishing
Possibilities links access to the fisheries with the obligation to provide accurate data on
fishing effort and catch.126 Also, the failure to report on the catch of certain shark species will
result in a prohibition on the retention of such species the following year until such data is
received by the Commission secretariat.127The compliance committee monitors the
compliance of the members and cooperating non members of the Commission and
recommends sanctions for non compliance. Through this mechanism the sovereign rights of a
coastal State is conditioned by the Commission; a failure to comply with a reporting
requirement for instance leads to a loss in benefits in the fishery. The reporting requirement
may arise from fishing activities within areas under national jurisdiction and the loss in
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benefits may also apply in that zone. The establishment of the conservation and management
measure compliance committee, a subsidiary body with the ability to recommend sanctions
for noncompliance, is of interest particularly because it lacks specific support in the
constituent instrument. A similar argument may be made for the adoption of port measures
and the precautionary approach. Despite the absence of support for these initiatives in its
constituent instrument, ICCAT has adopted a rather flexible and evolving mandate; an
approach shared other tuna RFMOs, particularly the IOTC.

C. IOTC

Pursuant to its constituent instrument and interests, the IOTC may adopt conservation and
management measures for both the high seas and marine zones under national jurisdiction. 128
Given Article XVI which provides that the IOTC Agreement does not prejudice the exercise
of the coastal State’s sovereign rights over fisheries in its EEZ, the coastal State may also
establish measures for tuna within that zone.129

Weaknesses in the IOTC Agreement have been identified by the performance reviews of the
Commission. In relation to principles, the legal review recommended that: i) the IOTC
Agreement be amended or replaced to include modern fisheries management principles such
as the precautionary approach, ii) pending such amendment or replacement, that the
Commission implement the precautionary approach set forth in the Agreement, and iii) the
need to develop and take into account modern principles for fisheries management, including
ecosystem based approach, protection of marine biodiversity and reducing the harmful
impacts of fishing on marine environment.130 The suggestion for an amendment to the IOTC
Agreement may not take into account existing treaty principles in international law, including
the effect of subsequent agreements and subsequent practice of parties to a treaty.
Paradoxically, the IOTC has adopted several decisions binding on its members despite
weaknesses in its constituent instrument. Although the IOTC Agreement was adopted before
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the 1995 Agreement, its decisions capture aspects of the latter, such as the adoption of port
State measures that mimic the FAO Port State Measures Agreement, a compliance
monitoring framework which arguably goes well beyond the 1995 Agreement, and the
application of the precautionary approach.

1 Precautionary approach
In the absence of amendments or a new agreement altogether, the Commission is applying
the precautionary approach in accordance with relevant internationally agreed standards, in
particular with the guidelines set forth in the Agreement.131 In adopting the measure on
tropical tunas, the Commission noted the importance of applying the precautionary approach
in the management of tropical tuna stocks, in particular bigeye and yellowfin tuna.132 When
applying the precautionary approach, the Commission considers the advice of its scientific
committee before adopting stock specific reference points (including target and limit
reference points) and associated management actions referred to as harvest control rules.
Both reference points and harvest control rules are determined according to the best available
science and the least risk of negative impact on the sustainability of tuna resources in the
Indian Ocean.133The application of the approach is also required in the terms of reference for
the science and management dialogue workshop of the Commission that aligns management
strategies of IOTC fisheries with principles such as the precautionary approach and
ecosystem-based approach to fisheries.134Target and limit reference points or interim
reference points are also considered.135These initiatives, adopted in the absence of provisions
in the IOTC Agreement, place the Commission in a reasonable position in implementing the
precautionary approach and other fisheries management principles.

2 Compatibility
Although compatibility is not provided in the IOTC Agreement, the Commission has
identified the need to address weaknesses and to enhance its role to a level commensurate

131

IOTC Resolution 12/01 On the implementation of the precautionary approach, [1]; The precautionary
approach is also referred to in several resolutions including IOTC Resolution 13/10 on interim target and limit
reference points and a decision framework; IOTC Resolution 13/04 on the conservation of cetaceans; Resolution
13/05 on the conservation of whale sharks (Rhincodon typus); IOTC Resolution 14/03 On enhancing the
dialogue between fisheries scientists and managers.
132
IOTC Resolution 14/01 for the conservation and management of tropical tuna stocks in the IOTC area of
competence, preamble.
133
IOTC Resolution 12/01, above n 133, [2].
134
IOTC Resolution 14/03, above n 133, [3].
135
IOTC Resolution 13/10, above n 133.

108

with other tuna RFMOs. In 2009 the Commission agreed that ‘all deficiencies in the IOTC
Agreement inhibiting the Commission’s ability to perform its mandate consistent with
internationally-agreed principles of fisheries conservation and management must be
addressed, in accordance with international law’.136

On compatibility of management measures, the performance review of the IOTC
recommended that ‘IOTC Members should be invited to promptly implement IOTC
conservation and management measures through their national legislation’.137On its face the
recommendation seems to lean towards domestic legislative implementation rather than the
requirement to ensure compatibility between measures taken within areas under national
jurisdiction and on the high seas. It follows that the Commission and States that are members
of the Commission are required to implement the precautionary approach and other
contemporary fisheries management principles.

3 Port monitoring
Depending on one’s perspective, the jurisdiction of a coastal State may be undermined or
strengthened with the obligation to inspect foreign fishing vessels in port. In 2005 the
Commission identified the need to establish an IOTC programme of inspection in port and
assured that ‘[n]othing in this recommendation affects the exercise by States of their
sovereignty over ports in their territory in accordance with international law.138 The
Commission in 2010 then agreed on a measure to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing
through the implementation of effective port State measures to control the harvest of fish
caught in the IOTC Area.139The port State resolution while stating that a port State has
sovereignty over its port, effectively directs the State to take certain actions in granting or
denying access to a port, granting or denying the use of port services, conducting inspections,
and reporting on the results of inspections and actions taken on a vessel. The State also must
carry out inspections of at least five percent of landings or transhipments of foreign fishing
vessels in its ports during each reporting year.140
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4 IUU listing
Before the adoption of the 1982 LOSC, coastal States around the world had enacted
legislation claiming the sovereign right to explore, exploit, conserve and manage living
marine resources in the EEZ. Sovereign rights as iterated in Article 56 of the 1982 LOSC is
part of customary international law.141 Resolutions of the IOTC may be seen as undermining
sovereign rights. For instance, a criteria for IUU listing of a vessel is that the vessel harvested
tuna or tuna-like species in the waters under the jurisdiction of a coastal State without
authorisation and or in contravention of the laws of that State.142Although this criteria is
without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States to take measures against such
vessels, any measures taken by the Commission should defer to the coastal State in whose
waters the contravention occurred; the Commission deciding otherwise may be prejudicing
the sovereign rights of the coastal State. Hence, the listing and removal of such vessels from
the IOTC IUU list must be supported by the coastal State concerned.

5 Compliance monitoring
Finally, the Commission has established a compliance committee by resolution to primarily
monitor compliance with the IOTC conservation and management measures. The terms of
reference of the committee was formally agreed in 2002 and revised in 2010.143Compliance
by each State contracting parties and cooperating non contracting parties with each
Commission measure is reviewed and reported to the Commission. Monitoring is conducted
by the committee through the assessment of reports on implementation and compliance with
measures. The monitoring of compliance of coastal States with Commission measures
appears to be a role that was not initially envisaged for the Commission. Monitoring of State
activities in itself may be viewed as fettering the sovereignty and sovereign rights of a coastal

See for instance Churchill and Lowe, above n 8, 161 – 2. In 1999 they however state that ‘it is much more
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142
IOTC Resolution 11/03 Establishing a list of vessels presumed to have carried out illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing in the IOTC area of competence, [1h].
143
IOTC Resolution 02/03 Terms of reference for the IOTC Compliance Committee; Resolution 10/09 Terms of
reference for the IOTC Compliance Committee.
141

110

State by ensuring that certain omissions are resolved with the possible threat of sanctions if
actions are not taken within specified timeframes.

D.

CCSBT

The Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna was adopted before the 1995
Agreement and does not contain the requirement for the application of principles in areas
under national jurisdiction.144That said the Commission and the Extended Commission have
taken decisions to implement contemporary principles in the conservation and management
of southern Bluefin tuna. As far as principles supporting coastal State jurisdiction are
concerned, recognition of the sovereign rights of States is at the fore. The preamble of the
CCSBT contains two provisions which safeguard the sovereign rights of States in the
conservation and management of southern bluefin tuna:

Noting that States have established exclusive economic or fishery zones within which
they exercise, in accordance with international law, sovereign rights or jurisdiction for
the purposes of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living
resources;
…
Noting that the coastal States through whose exclusive economic or fishery zones
southern bluefin tuna migrates exercise sovereign rights within such zones for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living resources
including southern bluefin tuna;

Sovereign rights over fisheries marine resources in the EEZ gives rise to the legislative
jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State. On enforcement, each State party
is required to take all action necessary to enforce the Convention and ensure compliance with
binding measures.145

144

Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, adopted 10 May 1993, 26 LOSB 57 (1994)
(entered into force on 20 May 1994) hereinafter ‘CCSBT Convention’.
145
CCSBT Convention, art 5[1].

111

The rights of States under international treaties is protected under Article 4 which intimates
that nothing in the constituent instrument or any measures adopted by the Commission ‘shall
be deemed to prejudice the positions or views of any Party with respect to its rights and
obligations under treaties and other international agreements to which it is party or its
positions or views with respect to the law of the sea’. This provision is compatible with
equivalent provisions in other tuna RFMO instruments but arguably extends further than
those by reference also to the positions or views of a State with respect to its rights and
obligations under treaty law or its positions or views on the Law of the Sea.146

In addition the resolution of the Commission to establish an extended Commission and an
extended scientific committee does not supplement the CCSBT in terms of recognition and
protection of coastal State rights; the resolution merely allows for the participation of the
fishing entity of Taiwan in the conservation and management of southern Bluefin tuna.147All
other aspects relating to rights, duties and jurisdiction of States under the CCSBT remain
intact.

1 Principles
Notwithstanding the absence of contemporary fisheries principles in the constituent
instruments, the Commission and the Extended Commission have worked to incorporate
principles in the assessment of stocks and determination of total allowable catch and quotas.
The Extended Scientific Committee developed an integrated management procedure at its
annual meeting in July 2011. That year the Extended Commission agreed to the management
procedure, which incorporates ‘metarules’.148 Metarules are defined by the Commission as
“rules” which prespecify what should happen in unlikely, exceptional circumstances when
application of the total allowable catch generated by the management procedure is considered
to be highly risky or highly inappropriate. Given the difficulties in defining ‘exceptional
circumstances’, the Commission resorted to describing a process for determining whether
146

See for instance Antigua Convention, art V[1] and XVII; WCPF Convention, art 4.
Resolution to Establish and Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee, adopted at the
Seventh Annual Meeting (18 – 21 April 2001), revised at the Tenth Annual Meeting (7 – 10 October 2003).
148
Resolution on the Adoption of a Management Procedure (adopted at the Eighteenth Annual Meeting – 10-13
October 2011).
147

112

exceptional circumstances exist.149 The management procedure includes criteria for the
rebuilding of the interim target reference point for southern bluefin tuna and rules relating to
the management of total allowable catch. On the face of it, the procedure incorporates the
precautionary approach. Commencing in 2012, the management procedure has been used to
guide the setting of the global total allowable catch to ensure the southern bluefin tuna
spawning stock biomass achieves the interim rebuilding targets.

2 Compatibility
Neither the CCSBT nor the measures of the Commission provide for the requirement of
compatibility. There is the view that this may not be necessary since the Commission and the
Extended Commission may take decisions relating to southern bluefin tuna regardless of the
maritime zone in which the fishing or related activity takes place.

3 IUU listing
The Extended Commission revised its IUU listing resolution in 2014.150 Like other tuna
RFMOs, the IUU listing criterion that permits listing for the harvesting of tuna without
authorisation in areas under national jurisdiction is without prejudice to the sovereign rights
of a coastal State and the same arguments raised earlier apply.151Chapter VII is devoted to
IUU listing.

4 Compliance monitoring
Compliance monitoring in the Commission appears to be well organised with the adoption of
several policies. The compliance plan is unique among tuna RFMOs and provides a
framework to improve compliance with the aim of achieving full compliance with all
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Commission measures.152 Responsibilities of members, the Commission, the compliance
committee and the secretariat are identified in the plan. The compliance committee is tasked
with, among other things, recommending policy frameworks, guidelines, and technical
assistance, to facilitate effective and consistent implementation of CCSBT measures by
members, monitoring the performance of implementation of CCSBT measures by members,
recommending investigations of alleged serious non-compliance and, if necessary,
recommending corrective actions or remedies.153 From these it is clear that the Commission
through the compliance committee may recommend investigating a member for alleged
serious non-compliance and also recommend the institution of sanctions against such
member. A contravention of Commission measures within waters under the national
jurisdiction of a member is included.

E.

WCPFC

The Western and Central Pacific Ocean region is unique amongst tuna RFMOs because of the
location of fourteen small island developing States within the Convention Area.154 With the
relative abundance of tuna within the EEZs of these States and sensitivities towards the
protection of sovereign rights as well as their special requirements to participate in the
fishery, the Commission faces challenges in reconciling coastal State jurisdiction with the
rights of fishing States on the high seas and its own mandate to conserve and manage highly
migratory species in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. Given the characteristics of the
region, the majority of members of the WCPFC are sensitive to any adverse impact on coastal
State jurisdiction. Unlike other tuna RFMOs, issues covered in this chapter are more
pronounced in the WCPFC, thus, a lengthier discussion seems to be in order.
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The WCPF Convention is a third generation treaty built upon the 1995 Agreement and the
1982 LOSC.155 Article 4 ensures that nothing in the WCPF Convention ‘shall prejudice the
rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under the 1982 Convention and the Agreement’. Put
another way, the WCPF Convention shall not undermine or usurp the rights, jurisdiction and
duties of States that are derived from the 1982 LOSC and 1995 Agreement. However, the
rights, jurisdiction and duties of States may be affected if States explicitly consent. So if
States explicitly consent to a measure which prejudices their rights and jurisdiction as defined
in the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement, that is acceptable given the explicit consent.
Arguably, implied consent through consensus decision making may not be acceptable
because a State may not have agreed for their rights, jurisdiction and duties to be prejudiced.
In contrast to other tuna RFMO constituent instruments, Article 4 requires that the WCPF
Convention be interpreted and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with the
1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement. This ensures for instance that terms used that relate to
marine zones are interpreted accordingly. For instance, any reference to sovereign rights to
explore, exploit, conserve and manage stocks relates only to the EEZ and cannot be
interpreted to extend landwards beyond that zone. Although this provision is quite important
to maintain consistency in interpretation, in practice it may not be relied upon and utilised
effectively.

1 General principles
With respect to principles, the WCPF Convention mimics the 1995 Agreement. Article 5
provides for principles and measures for conservation and management, Article 6 requires the
application of the precautionary approach, and Article 8 supports compatibility of measures.
Article 5 contains the same general principles that are in the 1995 Agreement with the
exception of the principle for the promotion of scientific research and the development of
appropriate technologies.156 The overarching principle is the adoption of measures to ensure
long-term sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area and the
promotion of the objective of their optimum utilisation. Measures are to be based on the best
scientific evidence available and are to be designed in a way that maintains or restores stocks
at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield. Maximum sustainable yield is
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qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements
of developing States in the Convention Area, particularly small island developing States, and
is to take into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of stocks and any generally
recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional or global.157

2 Precautionary approach
The application of the precautionary approach under the WCPF Convention is undertaken by
States and the Commission firstly through its scientific committee and then by the plenary of
Commission. States are to apply the precautionary approach in accordance with the WCPF
Convention ‘and all relevant internationally agreed standards and recommended practices and
procedures’.158This inclusion departs somewhat from the formula in the 1995 Agreement
since it may introduce parallel and even competing standards and practices in the application
of the precautionary approach. Seen positively the inclusion allows for the application of
internationally agreed standards, perhaps agreed by all tuna RFMOs in the future, or the use
of best practices that may not be currently available. That said, Article 6 the WCPF
Convention defers to the guidelines in Annex II of the Agreement, considered an integral part
of the WCPF Convention, in the formulation of stock specific reference points. The scientific
committee of the Commission deliberates over scientific reports of each State and the advice
of the science provider before formulating their advice to the Commission. Annex II of the
1995 Agreement is applied in the formulation of stock specific reference points by coastal
States in the formulation of national tuna management plans as well as the scientific
committee in assessing the status of each tuna stock. The Commission then develops or
amends stock specific measures that takes into account the scientific advice and other
considerations. In the determination of stock specific measures, the Commission in 2012
agreed on a non binding resolution on the best science available to inter alia, enhance
dialogue and cooperation between science providers to the Commission, promote the
collection and provision of data to science providers, support scientific research programmes,
and support scientific collaboration between the Commission and the IATTC.159

The Commission has also included statements on principles in its measures. For instance, in
the now repealed measure on bigeye and yellowfin tuna, the Commission stated that it will
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not postpone the adoption of precautionary measures while research to reduce the fishing
mortality on juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna is being undertaken.160

Article 7 requires the implementation of principles stipulated in Article 5 within areas under
national jurisdiction. There are two points that are noteworthy: the first is that the principles
are to be applied by the coastal State in the exercise of sovereign rights, indicating
implementation in the EEZ only.161 This is equivalent to Article 3.2 of the 1995 Agreement.
Whether a coastal State wishes to apply the principles in their territorial sea, archipelagic
waters in the case of an archipelagic State, or internal waters, would be at their discretion.
While measures of the Commission may not delineate this clearly, there are examples where
the distinction is acknowledged. In an earlier version of the measure on bigeye and yellowfin
tuna for example, member coastal States were ‘encouraged’ to ensure that the effectiveness of
these measures is not undermined by a transfer of effort into archipelagic waters and
territorial seas.162 In contrast, measures may acknowledge but at the same time further qualify
sovereign rights of coastal States. The 2014 bigeye and yellowfin measure for instance states
that nothing in its paragraphs referring to FAD and catch retention measures in the EEZ ‘shall
affect the sovereign rights of coastal States to determine how these management measures
will be applied in their waters, or to apply additional or more stringent measures’.163 These
types of paragraphs are similar to those used in the imposition of obligations on the
management of ports.
The second point is that the Commission is obliged to give ‘due consideration to the
respective capacities of developing coastal States, in particular small island developing
States’ and their need for assistance.164Capacities of developing coastal States are
intrinsically linked to their respective special requirements, including their legitimate rights to
develop their domestic fisheries. Special requirements have been viewed with suspicion by
developed States and traditional fishing States as a means of introducing more fishing
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capacity into the fishery.165 Measures of the Commission have included statements
recognising the legitimate rights and obligations of small island developing State members,
such as paragraph 6 of CMM 2005-01:

6. Nothing in this decision shall prejudice the legitimate rights and obligations of
those small island state Members and participating territories in the Convention Area
seeking to develop their own domestic fisheries.

Cautious of the implications, such as the risk of overfishing, excess capacity and reductions
in allocation, arising from the recognition of rights and obligations of developing small island
State members and participating territories, the Commission in 2008 qualified paragraph 6. In
the 2008 bigeye and yellowfin measure the phrase ‘unless otherwise stated’ was added to the
beginning of the paragraph to qualify and subject the special requirements of developing
small island State members and participating territories to other provisions of the measure.166
This concern was further elaborated in measures on the stocks concerned in 2012 and 2013
where an additional sentence was added with the effect of not applying the paragraph to key
operative provisions in the measure.167 That inclusion effectively negates the legitimate rights
and interests aspects of developing small island State members and participating territories
and enhances the obligatory aspects of the measure. It may also be said that there may no
point in the inclusion of the paragraph in the first place if the legitimate rights and interests of
developing small island State members and participating territories are not recognised or
seem diluted. An argument may also be made that the paragraph is inconsistent with Article
30 of the WCPF Convention which fully recognises the special requirements of developing
States, in particular the least developed among them, and small island developing States and
participating territories in the convention area. It is also useful to note that this Commission

165

Ironically some of these States have reflagged or chartered their vessels to coastal States to support the
domestic fisheries development.
166
See also Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean, CMM 2005-01; Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna in the
Western and Central Pacific Ocean, CMM 2006-01; Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and
Yellowfin Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, CMM 2011-01; Conservation and Management
Measure for Bigeye, Yellowfin and Skipjack Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, CMM 2012-01;
Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye, Yellowfin and Skipjack Tuna in the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean, CMM 2013-01; Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye, Yellowfin and Skipjack
Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, CMM 2014-01.
167
CMM 2012-01, ibid, [7]; CMM 2013-01, ibid, [7]; CMM 2014-01, ibid, [7].

118

(and any other tuna RFMO) does not appear to have a formal mechanism, aside from plenary,
or the political will to ensure consistency.

Noting the negation of the legitimate rights paragraph, a small island developing State
member of the Commission, the Republic of Kiribati, sought to protect its interests with the
inclusion in 2013 of an additional paragraph. The Republic of Kiribati has one of the largest
EEZs within the Western and Central Pacific Ocean spread out and separated by areas of high
seas. The inserted paragraph reads:

8. In giving effect to this [measure], the Commission shall pay attention to the
geographical situation of a small island developing State which is made up of noncontiguous groups of islands having a distinct economic and cultural identity of their
own but which are separated by areas of high seas.168
It is unclear how the Commission will ‘pay attention’ to the geographical characteristics and
implications of the measure on one small island developing State given the inclusion of
paragraph 7 which negates the legitimate rights and interests of such states and participating
territories. Since the adoption of the paragraph in 2013 there does not appear to be any
change in the Commission’s treatment of the legitimate rights and interests of small island
developing States and participating territories. If anything, the paragraph is useful in that it is
a placeholder and provides a useful foundation for intervention in future.

The WCPF Convention also provides for the responsibilities of the coastal State in, inter alia:
i) identifying obligations as members of the Commission; ii) controlling flagged vessels; iii)
compliance and enforcement; iv) boarding and inspection of fishing vessels; v) placement of
observers; vi) regulation of transhipment; vii) the imposition of measures for access to and
use of ports; and viii) cooperation with non parties. It is also noteworthy that each coastal
State in the region is part of the Commission. So in terms of decision making the
Commission cannot be seen as a totally separate body, although this appears to be the view
held by some delegates. To a large extent, the Commission has respected the jurisdiction of
coastal States but there are several instances when this is not the case.
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Conservation and management measures made by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission contain binding decisions. Article 3.3 of the WCPF Convention states that it
‘shall be applied throughout the range of the stocks, or to specific areas within the
Convention Area, as determined by the Commission’. Unlike its equivalent provision in the
Agreement, this provision allows the Commission to either make measures that apply
throughout the range of the stocks concerned, or to specific areas only. It goes without saying
that this is an ongoing subject of debate between States that support management throughout
the range of stocks on the one hand, and States that confine management to specific areas on
the other. The former comprises developed States and large fishing States, while the latter
consists of developing coastal States. It is useful to note that in response to the perceived
‘creeping jurisdiction’ of the Commission, some coastal States have taken legislative action
to distinguish between measures in the EEZ and measures that are considered to apply in the
territorial sea, archipelagic waters and internal waters.169In response, the EU in particular
treats archipelagic waters differently from the coastal State views identified. The position of
the EU appears to be that conservation and management measures of tuna RFMOs apply to
the high seas as well as to the waters under national jurisdiction, including the archipelagic
waters.170 In its official third State notification to Tuvalu, EU stated:
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territorial and archipelagic waters from the application of the Vessels Day Scheme (VDS), a system that limits
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Tuvalu does not apply any WCPFC conservation and management measures in its
archipelagic waters and has only limited compatible measures in place. Taking into
consideration the highly migratory and straddling nature of tuna resources and the
importance of tuna stocks and fishing activities in Tuvalu archipelagic waters, which
are an important geographical spawning area for tuna species, that situation puts at
stake any conservation effort on tuna stocks as a whole in the Pacific region.
Therefore, Tuvalu does not ensure application of conservation and management
measures in all waters under its jurisdiction in a manner compatible with WCPFC’s
requirements, and in accordance with the obligation to ensure that species under the
jurisdiction of the coastal State are not endangered by over-exploitation. 171

The EU perspective demonstrates differences in the interpretation of the WCPF Convention
in particular the provisions for the area of application, the relationship with the 1982 LOSC
and the 1995 Agreement, and the qualifications on the functions of the Commission.172 To
illustrate it is useful to consider various measures of the Commission. In 2005 the
Commission adopted its first measure on bigeye and yellowfin tuna which applied basic
measures for the stocks over the convention area.173For specific fisheries, such as the purse
seine fishery, the application of measures is restricted to an area within the Convention Area
bounded by 20ºN and 20ºS.174 Over time, measures have been more articulate in defining
their area of application. This is perhaps attributed to a greater awareness of the rights and
jurisdiction of coastal States. The 2013 and 2014 measures on bigeye and yellowfin
exemplify this by inserting a section entitled ‘area of application’ which is as follows:

11. This Measure applies to all areas of high seas and all EEZs in the Convention
Area except where otherwise stated in the Measure.

12. Coastal States are encouraged to take measures to reduce fishing mortality on
juvenile bigeye and yellowfin tuna in archipelagic waters and territorial seas and to
notify/inform the WCPFC Secretariat of the relevant measures that they will apply in
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these waters including longline bigeye catch limits and expected number of FAD sets
or bigeye catches from purse seining.175

That said, of all tuna RFMOs, the issues and implications arising from the application of
measures is more pronounced in the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission given
the geopolitical characteristics within the convention area.

3 Compatibility
To elaborate on the provision in its constituent instrument, the Commission has included the
requirement of compatibility in several measures.176 One of the first is in the bigeye and
yellowfin tuna measure of 2005 which agreed that the Commission had to implement
compatible measures ‘to ensure that purse seine effort levels do not exceed 2004 levels on the
high seas in the Convention Area or the total fishing capacity will not increase in the
Convention Area’.177 The paragraph is ambiguous in that it appears to be more about limiting
high seas fishing effort levels than the compatibility of measures taken within the EEZ and
the high seas. The paragraph that follows concentrates on fishing effort within the EEZ and
the application of the vessel days scheme by a group of States that are party to the Palau
Arrangement, and the obligation on other coastal States to implement ‘similar measures’.178
Thus, although interested in compatibility, the Commission in the 2005 measure focussed its
attention on limiting fishing effort levels on the high seas separately from limits in the EEZ
without taking account of the factors listed in Article 8 or offering guidance on how measures
on the high seas are to be compatible with the effort limits in the EEZ.

The Commission attained a level of maturity in addressing compatibility in its 2008 measure
on bigeye and yellowfin tuna.179 This is due to a large extent on the initiatives of the parties
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to the Nauru Agreement in adopting the vessel days scheme and entering into the Third
Implementing Agreement earlier that year.180 The preamble of the measure contains the
following:

Taking note of Article 8(1) of the Convention requiring compatibility of conservation
and management measures established for the high seas and those adopted for areas
under national jurisdiction;

Recalling Article 8 (4) of the Convention which requires the Commission to pay
special attention to the high seas in the Convention Area that are surrounded by
exclusive economic zones (EEZs);

Noting the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) have agreed to implement the Third
Arrangement of the Nauru Agreement of May 2008…;

Also noting that the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) Members will be
adopting a system of zone-based longline limits to replace the current system of flagbased bigeye catch limits within their EEZs.181

In promoting compatibility the Commission then defined management measures for the main
gear types used in fisheries in the EEZ and the high seas. For parties to the Nauru Agreement,
the measure in providing for the purse seine fishery was to be implemented through domestic
processes and legislation, including the vessel days scheme with limits to total days fished no
greater than 2004 levels.182The measure also introduced a prohibition on the fishing on FADs
between 1 August and 30 September, and the requirement for the retention of catch,
following the terms of the Third Arrangement. Coastal States not party to the Nauru
Agreement were to implement compatible measures to reduce purse seine fishing mortality
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on bigeye tuna in their EEZs.183 So it was up to the coastal State concerned to determine what
was compatible with the vessel days scheme to reduce purse seine fishing in its EEZ.

For its part, the 2008 measure indicated that the Commission was to consider the
development of a high seas vessel day scheme to be compatible with the vessel days scheme
of the parties to the Nauru Agreement in order to ‘provide a common currency for managing
purse seine effort’. The recommendations from subsidiary bodies of the Commission on such
a scheme were to have been considered at its annual session in 2009 with a view to adoption
at the 2010 session but this has failed to eventuate.184 It is noteworthy that the Commission in
2008 sought to establish a similar scheme for the high seas in order to implement
compatibility. Developed States and fishing States have indicated that they do not support the
vessel days scheme but have failed to provide a compatible alternative.

Since the 2008 measure, there has been little change in the implementation of compatibility.
The 2014 measure on tropical tunas maintains that the parties to the Nauru Agreement shall
restrict the level of purse seine effort in their EEZs to 2010 levels through the vessel days
scheme.185 Interestingly members and cooperating non members of the Commission are
required to support the ongoing development and strengthening of the vessel days scheme
including implementation and compliance with the requirements of the scheme as
appropriate.186 Other coastal States within the Convention Area with effort in their EEZs
exceeding 1,500 days annually over the period 2006-2010 shall limit effort in their EEZs to
the 2001-2004 average or 2010 levels.187 Coastal States within the Convention Area other
than the parties to the Nauru Agreement or coastal States with EEZ effort exceeding 1,500
days a year are to establish effort limits, or equivalent catch limits for purse seine fisheries
within their EEZs.188 Moreover coastal States are to report against EEZ limits determined in
accordance with the measure.

On the high seas the Commission appears to have shifted away from the idea of developing a
high seas vessel days scheme. At its 2014 session, the Commission agreed that in 2015, non-
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SIDS members shall restrict the level of purse seine effort on high seas to the limits identified
in the measure and the Commission at its 2015 session intends to review and adopt high seas
purse seine effort limits that would apply after 2015.189

4 Ports
Like other tuna RFMOs, the WCPF Commission has introduced several provisions in its
measures requiring a State to under certain obligations for vessels in its ports. These may be
interpreted to give effect to Article 27 of the WCPF Convention which stipulate that a port
State has the right and the duty to take measures, in accordance with international law, to
promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and global conservation and management
measures, without discriminating in form or in fact against the fishing vessels of any State.190
Landings and transhipments taken in a manner which undermines the effectiveness of
measures adopted by the Commission may be prohibited.191 An example of port controls in
measures is found in paragraph 10 of measure 2006-01 which affirms Article 27.3 by
requiring members and cooperating non members to prohibit landings and transshipment of
tuna and tuna products that are positively identified as originating from fishing activities
that undermine Commission measures.192 However that paragraph includes a prohibition on
all ‘commercial transactions’ in such products, and therefore goes beyond what is provided
for in the WCPF Convention. The prohibition of landings and transshipments is fairly straight
forward because the State may exercise its prerogative accordingly. But the inclusion of
‘commercial transactions’, a term not defined in the measure, seems to require domestic
legislative changes in order to prohibit nationals and anyone within the territory of a State
from entering into any transaction of a commercial nature with a fishing vessel that has
engaged in activities which undermine Commission measures, or a company acting on behalf
of such vessel.

In addition, States are to carry out monitoring of all landings and transshipments in port to
assess the amount of catch by species.193The results of monitoring activities are also required
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to be reported annually to the Commission. The measure does not ‘encourage’ a State to take
action in its port but rather uses the word ‘shall’ for both the obligations to monitor and to
report the results. By compelling a State to carry out certain tasks within its port, the measure
seems to be challenging the sovereignty of that State. This would appear to be inconsistent
with the terms of Article 27 paragraph 4 of the Convention which assures that, nothing in this
article affects the exercise by Contracting Parties of their sovereignty over ports in their
territory in accordance with international law. The question may be asked on options
available in such circumstances; the following are suggested: i) the paragraph in the measure
may be voided on the basis of inconsistency with the Convention; ii) the paragraph in the
measure may be considered within the category of ‘subsequent practice’ and be considered
effective; iii) a State may choose not to implement the monitoring requirement; or iv) a State
may choose to subordinate its sovereignty over its port to satisfy its treaty obligations and the
objective of long term sustainable fisheries. Each of the options have their merit and a State
may in fact choose to implement as it sees fit. The WCPF Commission (or any of the other
tuna RFMOs) does not appear to have a mechanism to resolve such issues, although there
have been attempts in the past to discuss such issues.194

5 Compliance monitoring
The WCPF Convention provides for the obligations of members including the requirement
for prompt implementation of the Convention and decisions of the Commission.195In
addition, measures of the Commission continually add to the compliance obligations of
members and cooperating non members. An example is the requirement that began in 2010
for complete observer coverage on purse seine fishing vessels.196Purse seine vessels fishing
within the area bounded by 20N and 20S exclusively on the high seas, or on the high seas and
in waters under the jurisdiction of one or more coastal States, or fishing in waters under the
jurisdiction of two or more coastal States, are mandated to carry an observer from the

The performance review of the Commission made the following recommendation: “It is recommended that a
process be established for consideration and adoption of CMMs to ensure that they are technically sound from a
legal point of view and consistent with other CMMs and instruments of WCPFC.” The 9th meeting of the
Technical and Compliance Committee of the Commission requested that the Executive Director prepare a paper
for the 10th session of the Commission proposing a way forward on establishing a process for ensuring that
existing and new measures are technically sound from a legal point of view and consistent with other measures.
In 2013, the Commission at its 10th session agreed to an agenda item on the subject ‘Legal Framework for
CMMs’ but no discussion eventuated.
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Commission’s regional observer programme.197The requirement for observer coverage within
waters under the jurisdiction of coastal States overlaps with the sovereign right of a coastal
State to take measures to ensure compliance with its laws. Observer programmes of tuna
RFMOs would therefore appear to pose a threat to a coastal State’s right to monitor and
control fishing activities within waters under its jurisdiction. An alternative view is that
observer programmes do strengthen the ability of a coastal State to monitor and control
fishing activities thereby improving the exercise of sovereign rights.

Similar to developments in other tuna RFMOs, the Commission has developed a compliance
monitoring scheme and all the arguments raised earlier apply.198 The scheme is designed to
(i) assess compliance with obligations; (ii) identify areas in which technical assistance or
capacity building may be needed to support compliance; (iii) identify aspects of measures
which may require refinement or amendment for effective implementation; (iv) respond to
non-compliance through remedial options that include a range of possible responses that take
account of the reason for and degree of non-compliance, and include cooperative capacitybuilding initiatives and, in case of serious non-compliance, such penalties and other actions
as may be necessary and appropriate to promote compliance with measures and other
Commission obligations; and (v) monitor and resolve outstanding instances of noncompliance.199The Commission intends to implement a graduated response to noncompliance that takes into account the type, severity, degree and cause of non-compliance.
While the scope of obligations identified refers generally to reporting obligations relating,
inter alia, to catch and effort limits, catch and effort reporting, non-target species,
authorisations to fish and record of fishing vessels, scientific information, and the submission
of annual reports, another paragraph allows the Commission to evaluate compliance with
collective obligations arising from the Convention or measures related to fishing
activities.200Interestingly the scheme is not to prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of
any member or cooperating non-member in the enforcement of its national laws or to take
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more stringent measures in accordance with its national laws, consistent with their
international obligations.201 The inclusion of this paragraph, albeit comforting for concerned
States, is odd. Although the scheme is without prejudice to the rights, jurisdiction and duties
of a States to enforce its national laws or take more stringent measures, this may only be
undertaken as long as it is consistent with international obligations. In other words,
enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State may be exercised but is subject to the international
obligations of that State.

IV. PERCEIVED CONTRIBUTION OF TUNA RFMOs TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Conditioning sovereignty and sovereign rights of coastal States

In the exercise of their competencies, tuna RFMOs appear to be conditioning the sovereign
rights of coastal States within areas under national jurisdiction, and even extending their
reach into the territorial sea, archipelagic waters and the port of coastal States. A coastal State
can no longer determine the total allowable catch or effort of highly migratory species within
its EEZ unilaterally since tuna RFMOs have adopted catch and effort limits that need to be
taken into account. Similarly, although the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement appears to
be biased towards the interests and rights of coastal State, a coastal State cannot unilaterally
establish measures relating to a specific species if the tuna RFMO has adopted measures for
the adjacent high seas. Coastal States are now bound by the requirement for compatibility. In
addition, all tuna RFMOs have adopted decisions that create obligations for port monitoring,
inspections or controls. Under customary international law, the 1982 LOSC, the 1995
Agreement and even tuna RFMO constituent instruments, a State has sovereignty over its
ports. With the implementation of port measures, the long standing principle of sovereignty
of States over their ports appears to be confronted. It is posited that the legal capacity and
competencies of tuna RFMOs appears to be creeping into the EEZ, territorial sea,

201

WCPFC CMM 2014-07, above n 200, [8].

128

archipelagic waters and internal waters, thereby conditioning or qualifying the sovereignty
and sovereign rights of coastal States.

B. Implementation of specific principles set out in 1982 LOSC and Agreement

All tuna RFMOs are implementing principles set out in the 1982 LOSC and the 1995
Agreement, albeit in varying degrees. The most common objective implemented by all is the
adoption of measures to ensure the long term sustainability of tuna and tuna-like stocks and
the promotion of the objective of their optimum utilisation. Measures are to be based on the
best scientific evidence available and are to be designed in a way that maintains or restores
stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield. Each tuna RFMO has
adopted decisions that protect the biodiversity of the marine environment, and support the
ecosystem approach by providing for threatened or endangered species, and non target
species. Additional principles implemented include the minimisation of wastes and discards,
and lost or abandoned fishing gear, measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess
fishing capacity, the requirement for compatibility, and the precautionary approach.
C. Application of Precautionary Approach
Although the precautionary approach is a relatively recent principle, tuna RFMOs are
applying the approach irrespective of the absence of explicit reference in some constituent
instruments. Implementation varies somewhat amongst tuna RFMOs and this is attributed to
the extent to which a tuna RFMO has incorporated the 1995 Agreement, and the Code of
Conduct, into its measures. Unlike other tuna RFMOs which place emphasis on the 1995
Agreement, the IATTC, given the position and interests of its members, provides the choice
of the Agreement or the Code in the application of the approach. While national positions are
understandable, on its face the choice would result in conflicting or diverging practice. But
this is not the case. The general provisions of the Code and the 1995 Agreement concerning
the precautionary approach are compatible. The difference between them are the guidelines in
Annex II of the 1995 Agreement which set out how States may develop target and limit
precautionary reference points. It is to be noted that reference points are also included in the
provisions of the Code. Both instruments acknowledge that precautionary reference points
should be stock-specific to account, inter alia, for the reproductive capacity, stock resilience
and the characteristics of fisheries exploiting the stock, as well as other sources of mortality
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and major sources of uncertainty. Taking this into account, it would appear that all tuna
RFMOs are applying the precautionary approach in generally the same manner.

In light of State practice in the implementation of the principle in fisheries management, its
existence in several instruments, the recognition, albeit in a dissenting opinion, by the ICJ,
and the Seabed Disputes Chamber of ITLOS, and the concerns raised, tuna RFMOs appear to
be influential in promoting clarity and harmonisation in practice, towards the crystallisation
of the precautionary approach in customary international law in the field of fisheries. It
follows that the emergence of the principle in customary international law is likely to vary by
sector. Reliance on the requirements for the application of the precautionary approach in the
1995 Agreement and the Code of Conduct has positioned tuna RFMOs and the fisheries
sector at an advantage vis-a-vis other sectors and results in relatively uniform implementation
and consistency amongst all tuna RFMOs. Over time it is envisaged that the application of
the precautionary approach would be intrinsic to fisheries management and an integral part of
the general obligation of due diligence of tuna RFMOs in the assessment and management of
highly migratory fish stocks.202

D. Operationalising Compatibility

The obligation to ensure compatibility between measures adopted for the high seas and
measures established for waters under national jurisdiction arising under the 1995 Agreement
is explicit in the WCPFC and IATTC compared to the CCSBT, ICCAT, and IOTC, and
presents an ongoing challenge. This arises from the difficulties in balancing the interests of
coastal States in exercising their sovereign rights to conserve and manage highly migratory
fish stocks within their EEZ on the one hand, and the interests of States fishing on the high
seas on the other. Compatibility however recognises the importance of maintaining the
biological unit of the stocks and managing them throughout their range. As was evident in the
negotiations for the Agreement, there are differing views on compatibility with some
advocating the application of similar measures, and others the application of measures that
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would achieve the management objective. In the experience of the WCPFC, compatibility
appears to have been initially supporting the former view but has now shifted to the latter.
The recognition of the application of the vessel days scheme for the management of the purse
seine fishery within the EEZs of certain members in 2008 saw an intention to develop a high
seas equivalent. This has not eventuated. At a recent session the WCPFC has continued to
place fishing effort limits on States fishing on the high seas, but for areas under national
jurisdiction, the vessel days scheme applies for the parties to the Palau Arrangement, and for
other coastal States the establishment of similar measures is sought. Compatibility between
measures taken within the EEZ is useful but would be undermined by an absence of
compatible measures for the adjacent high seas. After all the objective of the compatibility
principle is the application of compatible measures in the EEZ through to the high seas.

In contrast to the practice in the WCPFC, the Antigua Convention of the IATTC progresses
compatibility by superficially extending it to waters under the sovereignty of a State. Under
the provision on compatibility it is provided that nothing in that convention shall prejudice or
undermine the sovereignty or sovereign rights of coastal States related to the exploration and
exploitation, conservation and management of the living marine resources within areas under
their sovereignty or national jurisdiction as provided for in the 1982 LOSC.203The
accompanying paragraph then only refers to compatibility between measures on the high seas
and measures for areas under national jurisdiction. Taking this into consideration, the Antigua
Convention may either be alluding to the likelihood of compatibility of measures on the high
seas, EEZ and the territorial sea, or simply supporting compatibility of high seas and EEZ
measures without prejudice to a coastal State introducing compatible measures for its
territorial sea in the exercise of its sovereignty.

Tuna RFMOs, in particular the WCPFC, plays a lead role in the operationalisation of the
principle of compatibility. While the notion of compatibility is expected to evolve, two views
have emerged in the practice of the WCPFC. The first is that compatibility requires the
application of similar measures, and the second is that as long as the measures applied
achieve the management objective for the stock, compatibility is satisfied. Despite the
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paramountcy of the biological unity of the stocks, in reality political and fishing interests are
brought to the fore in the negotiations for compatible measures. The challenge for tuna
RFMOs is the management of these interests in such a manner so that the sustainability of
stocks is upheld.

E. Shared Responsibility of Tuna RFMOs and Coastal States
Although the mandates of tuna RFMOs apply primarily on the high seas, their areas of
competence encompass areas within national jurisdiction. Through the mechanisms adopted
tuna RFMOs appear to be undermining the sovereign rights of coastal States to conserve and
manage highly migratory fish stocks as well as the right to monitor and control fishing
activity, and the right to enforce contraventions of national laws.

To illustrate, compliance committees established by tuna RFMOs are expected to introduce
sanctions for noncompliance. These sanctions may indeed by applied to coastal States for a
failure to comply with obligations pertaining to areas within the national jurisdiction. By
introducing sanctions, tuna RFMOs apparently take a role superior to that of the coastal State.
It is argued that in effect the sovereign rights of a coastal State is conditioned through the
process – the coastal State will not able to enjoy certain benefits in the fishery until there is
compliance. One may even argue that sovereign rights of a coastal State is subjected to or
subordinate to the mandate of the tuna RFMO. The question may be asked whether tuna
RFMOs were envisaged to play such a role on their establishment. Although this question has
some merit it does not take into account the principle in treaty law which recognises the
subsequent practice of States. Therefore, although States may not have envisaged such a role
at the outset, their subsequent practice has evolved the organisation into what it is today.

With practice over time, it is anticipated that tuna RFMOs will assume responsibilities of
their own within areas under national jurisdiction. Already it can be seen that there is shared
responsibility in the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks within the
EEZ. While the coastal State exercises sovereign rights and is able to enforce contraventions
of its laws within the EEZ, tuna RFMOs already set overall catch and species specific limits
pertaining to areas under national jurisdiction, and also monitor and ensure compliance with
measures throughout their areas of competence. Tuna RFMOs may sanction a coastal State
for noncompliance and remove benefits to a fishery. This illustrates how tuna RFMOs
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mandates may be seen as superior in some respects to that of a coastal State. Indeed the
oversight role and responsibility of tuna RFMOs in the management of fish stocks is expected
to grow.

F. Diminished coastal State jurisdiction for contraventions in waters under
national jurisdiction?

The expansion of the legal capacity or power of tuna RFMOs over time is a reality. Tuna
RFMOs have each established a list for fishing vessels presumed to have engaged in illegal,
unreported or unregulated fishing activity within their respective areas of competence. The
criteria for listing and the processes for review and the delisting of a vessel is similar but not
identical. Harvesting of fish in waters under national jurisdiction without authorisation or in
contravention of national laws and regulations allows for listing. Listing measures do not
prescribe that a coastal State in whose waters the contravention occurred must propose such a
vessel for listing on the draft IUU vessel list. Consent of that coastal State is also not required
for listing. Before inclusion on the provisional IUU vessel list, the list that would be
submitted to the Commission plenary, the position of the flag State seems to be considered
paramount. A vessel alleged to have carried out IUU fishing will not be placed on the
provisional IUU vessel list if the vessel’s flag State demonstrates: i) the vessel fished in a
manner consistent with Commission measures or the laws and regulations of a coastal State
when fishing in waters under the jurisdiction of that State, or ii) effective action has been
taken in response to IUU fishing activities in issue, or iii) the case regarding the vessel
concerned has been settled to the satisfaction of the member submitting the vessel for listing
and the flag State of such vessel.204If for instance the flag State demonstrates that it has taken
effective action against its vessel through for example revoking the vessel’s authorisation to
fish and suspending the certificate of the captain of the vessel, the Commission may be
inclined to agree in favour and not place the vessel on the provisional IUU vessel list. Hence
the position of the flag State of the vessel alleged to have carried out IUU fishing in the
waters under the jurisdiction of a coastal State is elevated while the right of the coastal State
204

See for instance WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure to establish a list of vessels presumed to
have carried out illegal, unreported or unregulated fishing activities in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean,
CMM 2010-06, [15].
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concerned to enforce its national laws and regulations is subjugated. This situation seems
inconsistent with the rights of that coastal State in the enforcement of contraventions of its
laws.

Some tuna RFMOs even include the provision that contraventions in waters under national
jurisdiction is without prejudice to the coastal States right to enforce its national laws,
intimating that such State may institute legal proceedings as well. Tuna RFMO listing
processes include a criterion which allows for listing where a vessel has used prohibited
fishing gear in a way that undermines that Commission’s measures.205 If prohibited fishing
gear was used in areas under national jurisdiction in contravention of national law and is also
contrary to a measure, the vessel may be listed and the coastal State may at the same time
institute legal proceedings. Yet a vessel that is listed on a draft or provisional tuna RFMO
IUU fishing list should not be discriminated against.206The listing process of the tuna RFMO
has become a method relied upon for contraventions within waters under national
jurisdiction. In sum, tuna RFMOs through processes for the listing of IUU fishing vessels
appear to be diminishing the significance of the jurisdiction of coastal States for
contraventions within waters under national jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the measures for the listing of IUU fishing vessels of tuna RFMOs creates a
new regime for the penalisation of contraventions in the EEZ. Article 73 of the 1982 LOSC
facilitates enforcement by a coastal State and the imposition of penalties for contraventions of
its law. The penalty regime under the IUU fishing listing measures is independent, uncertain,
and as suggested appears to prevail over coastal State actions for redress. Hence the penalty
regime may be viewed as working in parallel or in opposition to penalties that a coastal State
may impose. Also a coastal State is not likely to benefit if the flag State assures the tuna
RFMO that adequate measures have been taken.

For some tuna RFMOs where the relationship of constituent instruments and the 1982 LOSC
and the 1995 Agreement is upheld in constituent instruments, the circumstances created by
the listing of IUU fishing vessels for contraventions within waters under national jurisdiction
may be untenable.

205
206

See for instance WCPFC CMM 2010-06, above n 206, [3f].
See for instance WCPFC CMM 2010-06, above n 206, [24].
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G. Use of tuna RFMOs for foreign State notifications

Tuna RFMOs are also playing an important procedural role in the notification of States, a role
primarily reserved for States given that States are the primary actors in international law. The
creation of tuna RFMOs has seen the endowment of such organisations with legal capacity
including the role of communicating with States that are members, States that are nonmembers but are interested in membership, or States that are non-members. It is recalled that
in cases of arrest or detention of foreign vessels the coastal State shall promptly notify the
flag State, through appropriate channels, of the action taken and of any penalties
subsequently imposed.207Indeed this obligation to notify the flag State still rests with the
coastal State concerned. However, in the processes for the listing of IUU fishing vessels, tuna
RFMOs are also empowered to notify the flag State for a contravention. Some listing
processes even provide that the tuna RFMO may be the alternative option for the notification
of the flag State on behalf of the nominating State.208In cases where the flag State does not
respond to the notification, the nominating State is to consider other alternative options for
notification which are not identified.209In some cases, such as a situation where the
nationality of the vessel is in question, it would be reasonable for the coastal State nominating
listing to defer to the tuna RFMO for notification. This may be viewed by a nominating State
as the easiest option for notification which also satisfies the procedural requirement in IUU
fishing listing measures. Nevertheless, increasingly States are relying on tuna RFMOs to
notify flag States of alleged contraventions of its vessels; this notification role further
illustrates the powers delegated by States to tuna RFMOs.

H. Limitations on sovereignty over ports

207

1982 LOSC, art 73(5).
See for instance WCPFC CMM 2010-06, above n 206, [5].
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‘Sovereignty characterises powers and privileges resting on customary law and independent
of the particular consent of another state.’210 Sovereignty over ports has long been recognised
as part of customary international law. International instruments all recognise that and also
stipulate that nothing in their provisions relating to ports affects the exercise by States of their
sovereignty over ports in their territory in accordance with international law.211Thus a State
may institute legal proceedings against any vessel for a contravention of its laws relating to
the entry and use of its port.

While ICCAT, the IOTC and CCSBT have adopted schemes setting minimum standards for
the inspection of foreign fishing vessels in ports, there are similar initiatives being developed
in the IATTC and the WCPFC.212 These emerging minimum standards adapted from the FAO
Port State Measures Agreement, require inter alia, that the port State consider requests for the
entry into port, use of port services, and also prescribe standards for the inspection of vessels,
notification of relevant Parties, and options for dealing with vessels presumed to have
engaged in or in support of IUU fishing. Contraventions of a fishing vessel within the scope
of authority of the port State may be addressed accordingly, and contraventions of the vessel
that is the responsibility of its flag State will need to be communicated to that State. For
vessels that have engaged in such fishing, the State is prohibited from permitting landing,
transshipment of catch, or allowing the vessel to undertake any commercial transaction
relating to the catch.213

Through the inclusion of port State requirements in stock specific measures or port inspection
regimes, tuna RFMOs may be considered to be diminishing the sovereignty of States over
their ports. In rebuttal it may be argued that the requirements do not diminish sovereignty
since the measures ought to be without prejudice to the sovereignty of a State and that State
may still impose more stringent measures or institute legal proceedings for a contravention.
Further and in support of the rebuttal is the view that such prescriptive requirement enhances
rather than diminishes sovereignty by assisting a State in identifying minimum port State
measures for implementation. Nevertheless, the increasing obligations on a State to monitor
control and enforce measures relating to its ports demonstrate how tuna RFMOs are virtually
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, above n 1, 448; Brownlie, above n 1, 291.
See for instance 1995 Agreement, art 23[4], WCPF Convention, art 27[4].
212
The EU has played an instrumental role in introducing port State measures in ICCAT and IOTC and similar
proposals for other tuna RFMOs.
213
This prohibition is contained in several species specific measures of tuna RFMOs.
210
211
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prescribing how a State is to regulate the entry, use and provision of services, and inspection
of foreign fishing vessels in port.

Moreover, becoming a party to a treaty is a sovereign act. States consent to specific
obligations and in return make concessions and accept limitations on the exercise of their
powers in port. Through binding measures of tuna RFMOs providing requirements in port,
States that are parties as well as those that are cooperating non parties, have respectively
consented to specific obligations. Thus by virtue of treaties and measures explicitly
addressing obligations in port, States are gradually accepting limits on their powers over
ports. It follows that in the prescription of measures to be taken in ports and the acceptance
by States, tuna RFMOs are effectively qualifying the exercise of port State sovereignty in
relation to fishing vessels.

I. Monitoring and enforcing compliance with conservation and management
measures

The monitoring, control and enforcement of conservation and management measures is the
joint responsibility of the relevant tuna RFMO and the member State or entity. The member
of the tuna RFMO must ensure that it satisfies its obligations under the constituent instrument
and adopted measures of the organisation. Where the member State does not comply with its
obligations, the tuna RFMO through its compliance monitoring processes, may take specific
remedial action including the imposition of penalties. While obligations may relate to
reporting requirements, they also include collective obligations under constituent instruments
and binding decisions. Therefore, if a State is not complying for instance with its obligations
to prohibit landings, transshipment and commercial transactions of fishing vessels that are
believed to have undermined measures of a Commission, then that Commission may impose
sanctions against that State. Over time and unchecked, it is expected that the compliance
processes developed by tuna RFMOs will endow such organisations with significant legal
powers. The emerging role of tuna RFMOs in monitoring and enforcing compliance with
obligations under constituent instruments and binding decisions, even where compliance is
required in areas under the sovereignty of a State, may be considered inimical to the
sovereignty and sovereign rights of a coastal State.
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J. Observation of fishing activity within EEZ

All tuna RFMOs have observer programmes designed to support scientific observations of
the fishery, or to satisfy both scientific and compliance purposes.214It would appear that
observer programmes apply both on the high seas and in waters under the jurisdiction of a
coastal State.215 The monitoring of fishing and related activities within areas under national
jurisdiction is traditionally the sole domain of coastal States. Indeed, the ITLOS affirms that
‘sovereign rights’ of coastal States encompasses all rights necessary for and connected with
the exploration, exploitation, conservation and management of natural resources, including
enforcement.216 Legislation enacted by coastal States allows for the appointment and
accreditation of observers that have the authority to perform observer responsibilities within
areas under national jurisdiction. The development of tuna RFMO observer programmes to
include the performance of duties within areas under national jurisdiction, creates a role for
the tuna RFMO that may be considered parallel to that of the right of the coastal State. The
question is whether the tuna RFMO programme is contrary to the right of the coastal State to
monitor fishing activities within its jurisdiction. Given that the coastal State has agreed, by
consensus, to the establishment and scope of application of the tuna RFMO observer
programme, it may be argued that there is no contradiction. Nonetheless an argument may be
made that the lack of explicit consent for the adoption of the measure establishing the
programme will render the programme contrary to the right of the State concerned. That is a
weak argument if the coastal State concerned has since the establishment of the programme
acquiesced by, among other ways, not objecting formally. It remains to be said that to give
effect to a tuna RFMO observer programme, a coastal State must enact legislative provisions
that allows for the appointment and recognition of foreign observers carrying out their duties
within areas under national jurisdiction. Taking this into account and absent formal objection,
tuna RFMOs and coastal States would appear to have a shared and parallel right, albeit with
differing objectives, to monitor fishing activities in areas under national jurisdiction. The
sustainability of this joint arrangement depends, among other things, on the coordination and
214

For instance the IATTC observer programme is only for scientific purposes while in the WCPFC, observers
also document activities of noncompliance.
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See for instance WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure for Regional Observer Programme, CMM
2007-01, [5].
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M/V “Virginia G” (Panama/Guinea-Bissau), Judgment, ITLOS Reports 2014, 4, para 211.
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exchange of data collected by observers, and respect for the predominant right of the coastal
State.

K. General obligation of coastal States dependent on highly migratory fish
stocks

Before concluding, it is worthwhile reflecting on international legal trends and how these
may impact on the role of tuna RFMOs in the management of highly migratory fish stocks.
The management of fish stocks is an “integral element in the protection and preservation of
the marine environment”.217 All States Parties to the 1982 LOSC have an obligation to
protect and preserve the marine environment.218Accordingly, States have the sovereign right
to exploit their natural resources in accordance with their laws and policy and with their duty
to protect and preserve the marine environment.219 The dictum of the International Tribunal
on the Law of the Sea in the Southern Bluefin Tuna case is that “the conservation of the living
resources of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine
environment”.220 The Tribunal has consistently maintained that since article 192 applies to all
maritime areas, the flag State is under an obligation to ensure compliance by vessels flying its
flag with the relevant conservation measures concerning living resources enacted by the
coastal State for its exclusive economic zone because, such measures “constitute an integral
element in the protection and preservation of the marine environment”.221

Besides jurisprudence of the Tribunal, in the advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat
and Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ identified the general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States and of
areas beyond national control.222Although the context differs from the present, linkages may
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Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27
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be drawn. Adapting the obligation to fisheries and the approach maintained by the ITLOS,
there would be a general obligation on States to respect the objective of long term
sustainability of the fisheries, and ensure that fishing and related activities within their
jurisdiction and control do not adversely affect the sustainability of the stocks. It follows that
where one or more States do not satisfy the obligation, and environmental harm occurs
through overfishing and the depletion of stocks, for example, offending States may be held
liable. The primary challenge would be in demonstrating the nexus between the failure to
satisfy obligations and the resultant harm, not to mention other aspects, such as contributory
factors.

If this notion stands, then four categories may be considered. The first consists of coastal
States. Coastal States have primary responsibility for the management of resources. 223 Where
coastal States have not complied with the obligation by ineffective management in waters
under their jurisdiction, and the stocks in a region are affected, such coastal States may be
liable. It is noteworthy however that the coastal State is not obliged to accept submission to
any dispute settlement relating to its sovereign rights over living resources within its EEZ or
their exercise.224 The second category consists of States fishing on the high seas; such States
are to ensure that they effectively monitor and control their vessels and ensure such vessels
do not undermine conservation and management measures. But in the event of poor flag State
monitoring and control, such flag States are held accountable. The third category applies to
States that are both coastal States and flag States; compliance with the general obligation
within the EEZ with disregard for obligations on the high seas, or vice versa, attracts blame.
The final category are the very institutions responsible for the management of highly
migratory fish stocks in a region. Tuna RFMOs arguably have an inherent obligation to
ensure that States dependent on the stocks are not adversely affected by the impacts of fishing
activities on the high seas and in the EEZ. A reasonable argument may be made by
developing coastal States in particular, relying on the special requirements provisions in the
1995 Agreement, and various instruments, to justify the need for redress in the event of stock
depletion or collapse. Tuna RFMOs have an immense task of ensuring that the objective of
The Court said: "the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the
very health of human beings, including generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation
of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or
of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment."
223
The Tribunal in the SRFC Advisory Opinion recognised that coastal States have primary responsibility and
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sustainability is maintained and are obliged, albeit implicitly, to consider the interests of
States dependent on the stocks. In the event of a significant adverse impact on the stocks,
tuna RFMOs (together with their members) may likely be held accountable by adversely
affected States.

V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This Chapter has identified the impact of tuna RFMOs upon the jurisdiction, in its widest
sense, of coastal States. It may be summarised that international law as reflected in the 1982
LOSC, recognises that the coastal State has a general obligation for the conservation and
management of highly migratory fish stocks. This general obligation may be derived from
article 64 of the 1982 LOSC, the general obligation to protect and preserve the marine
environment in Part XII of the 1982 LOSC, and the general obligation of States to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States and of
areas beyond national control. Although the ITLOS has elaborated on the sovereign rights of
coastal States within their EEZ and considered State practice in interpreting provisions of the
1982 LOSC, the decisions of tuna RFMOs may in some respects be diminishing the
significance of the jurisdiction of coastal States. Further, notwithstanding that coastal States
have primary responsibility for the management of highly migratory fish stocks, certain tuna
RFMO measures advocate and in practice do share with States and entities, management
responsibility.

The jurisdiction of coastal States is interlinked with the jurisdiction of flag States over its
vessels. On the high seas, the flag State has ‘primary’, as opposed to ‘exclusive’, jurisdiction
over its vessels. The next chapter considers how tuna RFMOs are influencing conservation
and management on the high seas including their perceived impacts on flag State
responsibility.
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IV
High Seas
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tuna RFMOs are established with a mandate to conserve and manage highly migratory fish
stocks primarily in the high seas. It is suggested that since the establishment of the IATTC in
1950, tuna RFMOs are contributing significantly to the evolution of the high seas regime.
This Chapter focuses on key issues in order to identify how tuna RFMOs are gradually
influencing change in the high seas regime, namely, the influence of tuna RFMOs on the
international fisheries management regime on the high seas, the impact on the freedoms of
States on the high seas, particularly the freedom of fishing and the freedom of navigation, the
impact on the international monitoring control and surveillance framework, and the related
system for compliance and enforcement on the high seas.

First, this Chapter starts with a discussion of the regime of the high seas in international law
followed by an analysis of international fisheries treaties, namely the 1958 High Seas
Convention,1 the 1958 Fishing Convention,2 the 1982 LOSC3, the 1995 Agreement4 and the
FAO Compliance Agreement5. There is also an exploration of the relationships between the
1958 treaties and the 1982 LOSC and its implementing agreement of 1995. Then there is an
1

Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 11 (entered into force 30
September 1962).
2
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, opened for signature 29
April 1958, 559 UNTS 285 (entered into force 20 March 1966), hereinafter ‘1958 Fishing Convention’.
3
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1245
(entered into force 16 November 1994), hereinafter ‘1982 LOSC’.
4
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 August 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (entered into force 11 December
2001), hereinafter ‘1995 Agreement’.
5
FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, FAO, Rome, 1995, reprinted in (1994) 33 ILM 968, hereinafter ‘Compliance
Agreement’.
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evaluation of the practice of tuna RFMOs to identify the perceived contribution of tuna
RFMOs to the regime of the high seas.

II.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

The high seas regime in international law has been considered extensively by legal scholars. 6
International courts and arbitral tribunals have also deliberated on the high seas regime in
treaties, particularly the Convention on the High Seas, and aspects of the regime that are
customary international law.7 Within the high seas, all States enjoys certain freedoms,
including the freedom of navigation, the freedom of overflight, and the freedom to fish
subject to treaty obligations. The International Court of Justice has also acknowledged that
the freedoms of the seas are customary international law.8

A

The High Seas Regime prior to 1982 LOSC9

The history of the regime of the high seas before the adoption of the 1982 LOSC is well
documented. Suffice to say that centuries of debate between the proponents of open seas
epitomised by Grotius and the proponents of closed seas such as Welwood and Selden
resulted in a realisation among States for the need to codify international law relating to the
sea.10 This led to several international initiatives including the Hague Conference initiated by
the League of Nations in 1930. Although the 1930 conference was not able to adopt a

6

See James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2012) 297
– 326; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2008) 223 246; Robin R Churchill and A Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd edn, 1999)
203 - 222; Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 150 – 70;
Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005) 90 - 92; Jan Klabbers,
International Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2013) 241 - 2.
7
See for instance North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands; Federal
Republic of Germany v Denmark) [1969] ICJ Rep 3 [65]. Also: Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of
International Law by the International Court (Cambridge University Press, 1982).
8
North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v The Netherlands; Federal Republic of
Germany v Denmark), [1969] ICJ Rep 3 [65].
9
Although this section provides a historical perspective, some States, notably the United States, are party to all
the 1958 conventions and are not party to the 1982 LOSC.
10
See Churchill and Lowe, above n 6 for a good summary.
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convention on territorial waters, its draft articles laid the foundation for the work of the first
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, commonly referred to as UNCLOS I.
UNCLOS I has been lauded as a success because of the outcomes of the conference. Five
treaties were adopted at the 1958 conference.11 For the present purposes, emphasis will be
placed on the 1958 High Seas Convention and the 1958 Fishing Convention.

The 1958 High Seas Convention is an attempt by States to codify the rules of international
law relating to the high seas. Indeed the preamble of the treaty regards, ‘the following
provisions as generally declaratory of established principles of international law’.12 The treaty
is quite comprehensive and provides for, inter alia, the freedom of the high seas, invalidity of
claims of sovereignty over the high seas, right of navigation, nationality of ships, status of
ships, ships flying the UN flag, duties of the flag State, immunity of warships on the high
seas, immunity of ships used only on government non-commercial service, jurisdiction in
collisions, duty to render assistance, prohibition of transport of slaves, piracy, right of visit,
right of hot pursuit, and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines.

Article 2 identifies the freedoms of States on the high seas which are to be exercised in
accordance with the treaty and by other rules of international law. According to the Article
the freedoms listed and others are recognised by the general principles of international law.
With the use of the term ‘inter alia’ Article 2 provides a non exhaustive list of freedoms
which States may enjoy on the high seas, including the freedom of navigation, freedom of
fishing, freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, and the freedom to fly over the high
seas. Although the word ‘freedom’ is used, States are not free to do as they wish since the
freedoms are not absolute. The 1958 High Seas Convention places two important caveats: (a)
the freedoms are to be exercised under the conditions laid down by the treaty and other rules

11

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature 29 April 1958, 516 UNTS
205 (entered into force 10 September 1964); Convention on the High Seas, above n 1; Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, above n 2; Convention on the Continental Shelf,
opened for signature 29 April 1958, 499 UNTS 311 (entered into force 10 June 1964); Optional Protocol for
Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes arising from the Law of the Sea Conventions,
opened for signature 29 April 1958, 450 UNTS 169 (entered into force 30 September 1962).
12
The ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, above n 7, has agreed that the 1958 High Seas Convention
as ‘generally reflective of established principles of international law’.
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of international law, and (b) States shall have ‘reasonable regard to the interests of other
States’ in the exercise of the freedom of the high seas.

Putting the 1958 High Seas Convention aside, the 1958 Fishing Convention was developed
with the objective of addressing the danger of resources being over exploited and recognises
that the conservation of living resources of the high seas requires international cooperation
between the States concerned. Article 1 sets out the principle that all States have the right for
their nationals to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject to (a) their treaty obligations, (b)
the interests and rights of coastal States provided in the convention, and (c) the provisions
concerning conservation of the living resources of the high seas. States are also mandated to
adopt or cooperate with other States in adopting measures for their nationals in order to
support the conservation of living resources of the high seas.

For the first time perhaps in a treaty, the expression ‘conservation of the living resources of
the high seas’ is defined. The 1958 Fishing Convention was not as attractive in terms of
ratifications compared to the other 1958 treaties because of the then novel obligation to
conserve living resources of the high seas. Conservation of the living resources of the high
seas means ‘the aggregate of the measures rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield
from those resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other marine products’;
this definition seems to lean towards maximum sustainable yield.13 In addition the treaty
mandates that conservation programmes developed prioritised the supply of living resources
for human consumption.14

The 1958 Fishing Convention also sets out provisions for the control of nationals fishing on
the high seas. A State whose nationals are engaged in fishing any stock or stocks of fish in
any area of the high seas where the nationals of other States are not fishing is required to
adopt measures for its own nationals for the purpose of the conservation of the living
resources affected.15Where the nationals of two or more States are engaged in fishing on the
13

1958 Fishing Convention, art 2.
1958 Fishing Convention, art 2.
15
1958 Fishing Convention, art 3.
14
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high seas, then the States concerned are to cooperate and enter into negotiations with a view
to prescribing measures to be applied to their nationals, an obligation pactum de
negotiando.16 The Permanent Court of Justice, predecessor to the ICJ, defined the content of
the obligation to negotiate as an obligation ‘not only to enter into negotiations but also to
pursue them as far as possible with a view to concluding agreements’ regardless of whether
the obligation implied that an agreement had to be reached.17 Absent an agreement within a
year, any of the States concerned may invoke the dispute settlement procedure thereby
submitting the matter to a special commission or other dispute settlement mechanism agreed
by the parties to the dispute.18In an attempt to include nationals of other States that may be
engaged in fishing on the high seas for the same stocks, the 1958 Fishing Convention
provided a means for the notification, application and resolution of disputes relating to
applicable measures.19

Given the then proximity of the high seas to the territorial sea of the coastal State, the
interests of the coastal State is important in the maintenance of productivity of living
resources in high seas areas adjacent to the territorial sea. Indeed the 1958 Convention
declares that a coastal State has a ‘special interest’ in the continued productivity of living
resources in adjacent high seas areas.20Coastal States are entitled to participate on an equal
basis in any research or regulation for the purposes of conserving living resources of the high
seas, even though their nationals may not fish on the high seas. In addition, if a coastal State
requested, a State whose nationals are fishing on the adjacent high seas is obliged to enter
into negotiations with the requesting coastal State with a view to agreeing measures
necessary for the conservation of the living resources of the high seas.21 The obligation on the
fishing State is to negotiate with a view to agreeing to measures or an obligation pactum de
negotiando; that does not mean that measures must be agreed. Moreover a fishing State is
prohibited from enforcing conservation measures on the high seas areas adjacent to the
territorial sea of a coastal State if such measures are ‘opposed’ to those adopted by the coastal

16

1958 Fishing Convention, art 4.
Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland, Advisory Opinion, PCIJ, Series A/B, No 42, 1931, 116;
followed by the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases above n X [87].
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1958 Fishing Convention, art 4.2 and art 9.
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State.22 This is perhaps one of the earliest treaty applications of what is now known as the
principle of compatibility. Both the fishing State and the coastal State concerned are
encouraged to enter into negotiations with a view to agreeing to the necessary measures,
implying that the measures to be prescribed are to be compatible rather than opposite.23

Where negotiations of measures have not resulted in an agreement within six months, any
coastal State may adopt unilateral conservation measures for fish stocks or marine resources
in high seas areas adjacent to its territorial sea.24 However such unilateral measures will only
be valid if they comply with the following conditions: (a) there is an urgent need for the
application of conservation measures in the light of the existing knowledge of the fishery; (b)
the measures adopted are based on appropriate scientific findings; and (c) the measures do
not discriminate in form or in fact against fishers of another State.25It is noteworthy that the
unilateral measures remain in force unless there is a disagreement as to their validity. Other
States that disagree with the validity of such measures may initiate the dispute settlement
procedures through the special commission.26

Besides the coastal State, any State that has a special interest in the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas in an area may request the State(s) engaged in fishing there to take
necessary conservation measures.27 This appears to be an innovative provision at that time
allowing any State to require conservation action but it also reflects the status of the high seas
as part of the international commons and that all States have an interest in its long term
sustainability. Special interest does not depend on whether the nationals of a State are fishing
in that high seas area but a State with such an interest has to show scientific reasons why
conservation measures are necessary. The State with a special interest may also invoke the
dispute settlement procedure if no agreement on conservation measures is reached within
twelve months.28
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1958 Fishing Convention, art 6.4.
The article uses the term ‘may’ against the obligation to enter into negotiations, indicating a level of
discretion.
24
1958 Fishing Convention, art 7.
25
1958 Fishing Convention, art 7.2.
26
1958 Fishing Convention, art 7.3 and art 7.4.
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1958 Fishing Convention, art 8.1.
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1958 Fishing Convention, art 8.2.
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Although not the most attractive of the 1958 conventions in terms of ratifications, the 1958
Fishing Convention provides the foundation for the conservation of living resources of the
high seas.29 It sets the framework for cooperation among States, regardless of whether those
States are in fact engaged in fishing for the fish stocks concerned. The special interest of a
coastal State with its territorial sea adjacent to the high seas area in question is upheld. That
coastal State is permitted in certain circumstances to take unilateral conservation measures
provided such measures comply with the validity requirements.

While the outcomes of UNCLOS I were positive, the conference could not reach agreement
on the breadth of the territorial sea. At UNCLOS I the main differences on the breadth of the
territorial sea were confined to disagreements on the breadth that did not exceed twelve
miles. Consequently the second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS
II, was convened in 1960 to deal inter alia with a joint United States of America and
Canadian proposal relating to the breadth of the territorial sea and the limits of fisheries
zones. The second conference could not reach agreement on the proposal to establish a six
mile territorial sea and six mile fishery zone.30 Given that UNCLOS II could not reach
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea, the second conference is considered
unsuccessful. Hence the United Nations convened the third conference, UNCLOS III, which
began in 1973 and culminated in December 1982 on the adoption of the 1982 LOSC.

29

The 1958 Fishing Convention entered into force on 20 March 1966 and is the last of the 1958 treaties to enter
into force. The High Seas Convention entered into force on 30 September 1962, while the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone Convention and the Continental Shelf Convention respectively entered into force on 10
September 1964 and 10 June 1964. The Parties to the 1958 Fishing Convention are: Australia, Belgium, Boznia
and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Colombia, Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland,
France, Haiti, Jamaica, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain,
Switzerland, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States of America, and
Venezuela.
30
Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Summary Records of Plenary Meetings and of
Meetings of the Committee of the Whole, 17 March – 26 April 1960, Geneva
<http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-1960/vol/english/vol1SummaryRecordsofPlenaryandCommitteeoftheWhole.pdf> . R R Churchill and A V Lowe, above n 6, 15.
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B

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

A proposal by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta on the question of the deep seabed beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction initiated the process for the negotiation of what is now the
1982 LOSC. Ambassador Pardo called for an international charter that would treat ocean
space as an organic and ecological whole. In response the UN General Assembly decided in
1967 to establish the Sea Bed Committee to consider that subject thus give rise to the
convening of the third UN conference on the Law of the Sea, UNCLOS III. There were
eleven sessions between 1973 and 1982 culminating with the opening for signature of the
1982 LOSC and the Final Act of the conference. Shortly after the adoption of the 1982
LOSC, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore, the president of the conference said that the
1982 LOSC was the first treaty which deals comprehensively with the uses and resources of
the sea and that it not only codified existing international law but also introduced ‘many new
and innovative concepts of international law’.31

The 1982 LOSC defines the area of application of the high seas regime as all parts of the sea
that are not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in
the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State.32 The customary international law principle
that the high seas are open to all States is affirmed and the freedoms of the high seas are set
out. The provisions of the 1958 High Seas Convention are largely reflected in Articles 86 –
115 of the 1982 LOSC. As well, the provisions of the 1958 Fishing Convention are reflected
in Articles 116 to 119 of the 1982 LOSC. Like the 1958 High Seas Convention, there are two
caveats in the 1982 LOSC to the freedoms of the high seas, namely, that they may be
exercised under the conditions in the 1982 LOSC and in other rules of international law, and
that they may be exercised with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise of
the freedom of the high seas.33 But unlike the 1958 High Seas Convention, there is an
additional condition that the exercise of freedom of the high seas must be with due regard for
the rights arising from activities in the Area, since the Area was only established in the 1982
LOSC. With respect to freedom of the high seas, the 1982 LOSC differs from the 1958 High

Tommy Koh, ‘The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: What was accomplished?’ (1983)
46(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 5 – 9, 6.
32
1982 LOSC, art 86.
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1982 LOSC, art 87.2.
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149

Seas Convention by adding the freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations
and the freedom of scientific research, as well as by emphasising that the freedom of fishing
is subject to the caveats identified and the need to have due regard for the rights emanating
from activities in the Area.

Concerning the living resources of the high seas, the 1982 LOSC accommodates the right of
all States to fish on the high seas, the duty to adopt measures to control nationals, the duty to
cooperate in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas, and also sets out rules
for the determination of allowable catch and for the formulation of conservation measures.34
Pertaining to the duty to conserve the living resources of the high seas in Article 117 of the
1982 LOSC, the ICJ has held that there is a general obligation of conservation in customary
international law. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, the ICJ stated that,
…the former laissez-faire treatment of the living resources of the sea in the high seas
has been replaced by a recognition of a duty to have due regard to the rights of other
States and the needs of conservation for the benefit of all.35

All States have the right for their nationals to fish on the high seas and like the 1958 Fishing
Convention the rights are not absolute. The right to fish on the high seas is subject to treaty
obligations, the rights and duties as well as the interests of coastal States, and the provisions
relating to the conservation and management of living resources of the high seas.36With the
right to fish is the duty to adopt measures to control nationals engaged in fishing on the high
seas. This is a two-fold duty, first comprised of the duty to take measures with respect to
nationals, and second, the duty to cooperate with other States in taking measures with respect
to their nationals. In addition, there is a general obligation to cooperate with other States in
the conservation and management of the living resources of the high seas. This customary
international law obligation is supplemented for States whose nationals are fishing on the
same stocks or on different stocks in the same area with the duty to enter into negotiations

1982 LOSC, art 116 – 119.
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 3, [72]; Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal
Republic of Germany v Iceland) [1974] ICJ Rep 175, [64].
36
1982 LOSC, art 116.2.
34
35

150

with a view to taking necessary measures. The duty to enter into negotiations, the notion of
pactum de negotiando, is the same as that set out in the 1958 Fish Convention.37

The 1982 LOSC elaborates on the framework in the 1958 Fishing Convention for the
conservation of living resources of the high seas.38 In determining allowable catch and in
establishing other conservation measures for living resources in the high seas, States are
required to take measures using the best scientific evidence available in order to maintain or
restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum
sustainable yield, and to consider the effects on species associated with or dependent on the
harvested species to ensure that populations of associated or dependent species are not
seriously threatened. The goal of maximum sustainable yield, also reflected in tuna RFMO
instruments, may be qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the
special requirements of developing States, and is to take into account fishing patterns, the
interdependence of stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards,
whether subregional, regional or global.39 Scientific information and other data relevant to the
conservation of fish stocks are to be exchanged regularly through competent international
organisations and with all States concerned.40 There is also a final condition that conservation
measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the fishers
of any State.

Besides the conservation and management of living resources of the high seas, the 1982
LOSC also provides duties that, although not directly pertaining to conservation and
management, indirectly supports such efforts. This includes the duty to protect and preserve
the marine environment.41 States have the sovereign right to exploit their fisheries resources
pursuant to their policies but must do so in accordance with their duty to protect and preserve
the marine environment.42 By extension the right to fish on the high seas together with its
associated conditions must also be carried out in a manner that ensures the protection and
37

Railway Traffic between Lithuania and Poland case, PCIJ Series A/B, No 42, 116. Pactum de negotiando is
simply defined as the obligation to enter into negotiations in good faith.
38
1982 LOSC, art 119.
39
1982 LOSC, art 119.1.
40
1982 LOSC, art 119.2.
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1982 LOSC, art 192.
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preservation of the marine environment. Indeed the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea stated in the Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases that ‘the conservation of the living resources
of the sea is an element in the protection and preservation of the marine environment’.43

C

The Fish Stocks Agreement

The 1995 Agreement, in implementing the 1982 LOSC, elaborates on the conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks on the high seas. Of
primary importance is the framework in the 1995 Agreement for the establishment and
functions of regional and subregional fisheries management organisations. These
organisations are intended to apply contemporary principles in the governance of straddling
fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in support of their long term sustainability. The
1995 Agreement maintains the strong legal relationship with the 1982 LOSC providing that,
‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, jurisdiction and duties of States under
the Convention’ and that the ‘Agreement shall be interpreted and applied in the context of
and in a manner consistent with the Convention’. In practice this relationship provision may
be considered an overarching policy rather than a strictly binding principle. One is likely
interpret the Agreement so that it falls within the parameters laid down in the 1982 LOSC.
For example, the jurisdiction of a flag State on the high seas is not prejudiced by the
measures adopted by an RFMO that apply within that zone. According to this view the 1982
LOSC provides a rigid framework and no departure from that is permitted. This view may not
accommodate two important points, the first being that as circumstances changes,
international law is likely to change as well, and the second is that States can enter into
treaties and engage in practices that modify their respective national obligations vis-à-vis
original treaty obligations.44 In contrast another view is that the relationship provision is an
ideal which States endeavour to achieve, but do not necessarily do so. So if measures of an
RFMO impinge on the jurisdiction of the flag State on the high seas, that is acceptable as
long as the interaction is managed in a way that is in conformity with the 1982 LOSC. As
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Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August
1999, ITLOS Reports 1999, 280, 295, [70]. This is supported in the Request for an Advisory Opinion submitted
by the Sub-regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory Opinion, 2 April 2015, ITLOS, 59 [216]
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discussed in Chapter III, tuna RFMO practice observed seems to show an absence of regard
for the relationship provision. The reasons raised there are applicable here.

With respect to the fisheries governance on the high seas, the 1995 Agreement introduces
several innovations, including: (a) the need for greater transparency in decision making and
activities of regional fisheries management organisations; (b) elaboration of the obligation to
cooperate for the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish stocks on the high seas; (c) identification of general principles to be applied by
States and regional fisheries management organisations; (d) elaboration of the precautionary
approach and guidelines for the determination of precautionary reference points, namely
target and limit reference points;45 (e) requirement for the compatibility of measures taken in
areas under national jurisdiction and measures adopted for the high seas; (f) attempt at
harmonisation of the core functions of management organisations; (g) description of the
factors that need to be considered in the determination of conservation and management
measures; (h) a framework for the determination of the nature and extent of participatory
rights for new members or new participants; (i) provision of a framework for compliance and
enforcement including international cooperation in enforcement; (j) elaboration of the rights
and responsibilities of a flag State; (k) framework for cooperation with non members and non
participants; and the (l) recognition of the special requirements of developing States. The
1995 Agreement also introduces a new concept for the management of stocks in an area of
high seas surrounded entirely by an area under the national jurisdiction of a single State.46In
such areas States fishing for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks shall
cooperate with the coastal State to establish conservation and management measures and
promote compatibility. Where measures are not able to be agreed upon within a reasonable
period of time, States are to apply provisional arrangements or measures. This regime would

45

Note that the ITLOS in the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission advisory opinion (at para 208(ii)) asserted
that SRFC Member States are mandated to apply the precautionary approach when scientific evidence is
insufficient, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the Determination of the Minimal
Conditions for Access and Exploitation of Marine Resources within the Maritime Areas under Jurisdiction of
the Member States of the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission (without reference to the 1995 Agreement).
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Law International, 1999), 193 – 216; Andre Tahindro, ‘Conservation and management of transboundary fish
stocks: Comments in light of the adoption of the 1995 agreement for the conservation and management of
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apply to the ‘Peanut Hole’ in the Sea of Okhotsk, two high seas area in the Pacific Ocean to
the north of New Zealand that are surrounded entirely by the EEZ of that State, and a high
seas pocket surrounded by the EEZ of Japan.47 Notably, there is no reference to a requirement
for cooperation through a competent regional or subregional fisheries management
organisation.48

The requirement of compatibility between measures adopted by coastal States and RFMOs
recognises the biological characteristics of the stocks and ensures that such stocks are
managed throughout their range or in their entirety. At the Review Conference of the 1995
Agreement, delegations stressed that compatibility was important because straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks could not be managed on the high seas or within
EEZs alone.49 Several delegations at the conference emphasised that RFMO measures had to
be compatible with coastal State measures and not the reverse.50This is contrary to Article 7
of the 1995 Agreement which clearly sets out the requirement for compatibility between
measures established for the high seas and measures adopted for areas under national
jurisdiction; compatibility goes both ways. Further, delegates at the conference suggested that
measures of RFMOs should not undermine measures adopted by the coastal States for the
same stocks or replace measures adopted by coastal States in their EEZs. Reference to the
47

These are to be distinguished from high seas enclaves surrounded by EEZs of more than one State such as the
Barents Sea ‘Loop Hole’ located north of the EEZs of the Russian Federation and Norway and east of the
Svalbard, the Atlantic ‘Donut Hole’ in the Norwegian Sea surrounded by the EEZs of Norway, Denmark and
Iceland, the Bering Sea ‘Donut Hole’ located between the EEZs of the United States and the Russian Federation,
the high seas pocket in the Pacific Ocean surrounded by the EEZs of the Cook Islands, Kiribati and French
Polynesia, the high seas area in the Pacific Ocean surrounded by the EEZs of the Federated States of
Micronesia, Indonesia, Palau and Papua New Guinea, and the high seas pocket in the Pacific Ocean surrounded
by the EEZs of Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. For Barent Sea Loophole see: Olav Schram Stokke, ‘The
Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime’ in Olav S Stokke (ed), Governing High Seas Fisheries: The
Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford University Press, 2001) 273-301.
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‘without prejudice’ clause in the 1995 Agreement in fact supports the notion that a coastal
State may adopt separate measures for its EEZ while ensuring compatibility with high seas
measures. The conference also stated that ‘conservation of the resources should be the
predominant interest in developing compatible measures in RFMO/As, and should ensure the
biological integrity of the stocks’.51Given the interests involved, ensuring compatibility and
the biological integrity of the stocks continues to be a challenge.

Importantly the 1995 Agreement provides the mechanism for international cooperation
concerning straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.52In doing so the
Agreement not only elaborates on articles 63, 64 and 118 of the 1982 LOSC but also provides
guidance on the obligation to cooperate. It will be recalled that article 63 provides the
obligation of pactum de negotiando obliging parties to negotiate with a view to reaching
agreement on necessary conservation measures but not including the requirement to reach an
agreement, while article 64 provides for pactum de contrahendo requiring parties to reach an
agreement in ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation of
highly migratory fish stocks through the region. Article 118 establishes a pactum de
negotiando obliging States to negotiate with a view to taking necessary measures but falls
short of requiring that an agreement be reached. Turning to the 1995 Agreement, article 8
requires coastal States and fishing States to pursue cooperation directly or through
subregional or regional fisheries management organisations to ensure effective conservation
and management of stocks. A pactum de negotiando is also included obliging States to enter
into consultations in good faith and without delay with a view to establishing appropriate
arrangements to ensure conservation and management of stocks. A rider is also placed: in the
event that an agreement is yet to be agreed, States are required to observe the provisions of
the 1995 Agreement and act in good faith with due regard to the rights, interests and
responsibilities of other States.53The mechanism for international cooperation also includes
rules for participation and exclusion from subregional and regional fisheries management
organisations. Indeed it is recalled that the duty to cooperate is a well established principle in
the 1982 LOSC. In its advisory opinion to the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, the
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ITLOS underlined the obligation to cooperate and emphasised that the failure to cooperate is
a failure of due diligence.54 The Tribunal opined:
…that the obligation to “seek to agree …” under article 63, paragraph 1, and the
obligation to cooperate under article 64, paragraph 1, of the Convention are “due
diligence” obligations which require the States concerned to consult with one another
in good faith, pursuant to article 300 of the Convention. The consultations should be
meaningful in the sense that substantial effort should be made by all States concerned,
with a view to adopting effective measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the
conservation and development of shared stocks.55

Concerning participation, the 1995 Agreement provides that States fishing for stocks on the
high seas and relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty to cooperate by either
agreeing to become members of RFMOs or participants in management arrangements, or by
agreeing to apply measures established by such organisations or arrangements. Other States
having a real interest in the fisheries may become members or participants.56 The
requirements of participation in management organisations or arrangements is not to preclude
States that have a real interest in the fisheries nor be applied discriminately against such State
or groups of States that have a real interest. Drafted subtly the exclusionary provision is
found in paragraph 4 of article 8 which states that only States which are members of an
organisation or participant in an arrangement or which agree to apply established measures
are to have access to the fishery resources. According to this, third States cannot have access
to the fisheries even though customary international law and the 1982 LOSC provides for the
freedom of fishing on the high seas subject to a State’s treaty obligations. The provision
therefore appears to be a departure from the 1982 LOSC and an illustration of how the
relationship provision (Article 4) is difficult to implement. The exclusionary provision may
also be seen as an exclusivity provision guaranteeing only compliant States with a real
54
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See for instance: Erik Molenaar, ‘The Concept of "Real Interest" and Other Aspects of Co-operation
through Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms’ (2000) 15(5) International Journal of Marine and
Coastal Law, 475.

156

interest access. Tuna RFMO practice in dealing with third States is discussed further in
Chapter V.

In addition, the 1995 Agreement provides the formula for the functions of subregional and
regional fisheries management organisations and arrangements, and the obligations of States
in such organisations and arrangements.57 Article 10 entitled ‘functions of subregional and
regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements’ provides the core functions
of such organisations and arrangements, and promotes harmonisation. This is supplemented
in Article 11 which provides the criteria for determining the nature and extent of participatory
rights of new members or participants. As will be seen below, all tuna RFMOs follow the
functions identified here even though the majority of constituent instruments do not stipulate
such functions.

Moreover, the 1995 Agreement also sets out the framework for international cooperation in
fisheries compliance and enforcement.58 The framework first provides for the obligations of
the flag State to enforce where contraventions occur, to investigate when required, and to take
appropriate action against its flagged vessel and masters or officers on such vessels.
Secondly, international cooperation in enforcement is called for. All States are obliged to
cooperate either directly or through subregional or regional fisheries management
organisations or arrangements to ensure compliance with measures. In the conduct of
investigations and enquiries, the flag State and other States are to cooperate. Similarly States
are to assist each other in identifying vessels that are reported to have engaged in activities
undermining the effectiveness of measures. Cooperation in cases where a vessel is believed to
have engaged in unauthorised fishing in areas under national jurisdiction is included. In that
instance, the flag State at the request of the coastal State concerned is required to immediately
and fully investigate the matter and cooperate with the coastal State in taking appropriate
enforcement action including authorising the coastal State to board and inspect the vessel on
the high seas.59
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Besides that, the compliance and enforcement framework also supports subregional and
regional cooperation. A party to the 1995 Agreement which is also a member of an RFMO
may board and inspect on the high seas a fishing vessel of another party to the Agreement to
ensure compliance with measures, even though the other party is not a member of the
organisation.60Boarding and inspection is to be conducted in accordance with the procedures
laid out in Articles 21 and 22 of the 1995 Agreement. These boarding and inspection rules are
the first of its kind and also distinguish indirectly between the minor and serious fishing
contraventions. Serious violations include fishing without a valid licence, permit or
authorisation, failing to maintain accurate catch records, fishing in a closed area, multiple
violations, and other violations identified as serious violations by RFMOs.61 These rules have
also influenced tuna RFMOs to develop their respective procedures. Moreover the procedures
allow management organisations to establish an alternative mechanism which effectively
discharges obligations under the Agreement. In such alternative, members of the organisation
agree to limit the boarding and inspection requirement between themselves in ensuring
compliance with measures on the high seas. One tuna RFMO has agreed to an alternative
mechanism depending primarily on the effectiveness of its observer programme covering all
authorised vessels.

The final component of the international compliance and enforcement framework involves
port States laid out in article 23.62 This provision goes beyond the 1982 LOSC in that it is
perhaps the first occasion in which port State obligations are associated with the monitoring
and control of fishing vessels to ensure compliance with measures. A State exercises its
sovereignty over ports in its territory and the 1995 Agreement goes further in identifying
actions that a State may undertake in exercising its prerogative. While there is a recognition
of this right, a port State also has a duty to take measures in accordance with international law
to promote the effectiveness of subregional, regional and international measures. A port State
may exercise its discretion in inspecting documents, gear and catch on board fishing vessels
when those vessels are voluntarily in port. A State may also enact legislation to prohibit the
landings or transshipments of catch from a vessel which have been fishing in a manner that
60
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undermines conservation and management measures on the high seas. While the 1995
Agreement provides the framework, RFMOs are the implementing mechanisms.

In the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish
stocks on the high seas, the 1995 Agreement provides the factors to be considered in the
determination of the nature and extent of the rights of a participating State. These factors
apply mainly to new entrants but in the practice of tuna RFMOs seem to be considered in the
determination and allocation of high seas fishing rights. While the special requirements of
developing States are fully recognised under the 1995 Agreement (and in instruments of tuna
RFMOs), aside from the fund established under Part VII they are yet to be fully implemented.
Particularly, the obligation of States to take into account the special requirements, such as the
need to ensure that measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a
disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States, and the obligation of
States to cooperate, for instance, in facilitating participation of developing States in RFMOs,
and in assisting developing States particularly the least developed among them and small
island developing States to enable them to participate in high seas fisheries.63These
provisions support the notion that the 1995 Agreement seems to show bias to the interests of
developing States , in the determination of access and participatory rights to high seas
fisheries.

A related question is whether the 1995 Agreement is bias towards the fishing interests of
coastal States whose waters lie adjacent to the high seas. This notion was considered in the
well known fisheries jurisdiction case between the United Kingdom and Iceland.64 In that
case, Iceland unilaterally extended its fishing limits from twelve to fifty miles and the ICJ had
to determine the validity of the extension. The Court in considering among other things, the
Icelandic proposal on the concept of preferential rights submitted at UNCLOS I, the Brazil,
Cuba and Uruguay joint amendment supporting the concept at UNCLOS II, and State
practice revealing an ‘increasing and widespread acceptance’ of the concept, held that under
customary international law a coastal State with a special dependence on fishing for its
63
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economic livelihood in certain situations had preferential fishing rights to high seas fishery
resources adjacent to its waters.65 While the decision has been criticised by several writers
because of the lack of supporting evidence and imprecision of the rule, Crawford opines that
‘the concept of preferential fishing rights seems to have survived in customary law despite its
absence from UNCLOS’.66Indeed the 1982 LOSC contains several provisions which appear
to favour the interests of coastal States.67 Similarly the 1995 Agreement contains provisions
tilting towards coastal State interests including the special requirement of developing coastal
States in accessing high seas fisheries.68That said, although there does not seem to be explicit
reliance on preferential rights of access to high seas fisheries, the special requirements of
developing coastal States may be regarded by such States and applied as a preferential right
of access.69

III. TUNA RFMO PRACTICE
During the negotiations at UNCLOS III, fishing States strongly supported the formation of
competent international organisations to be responsible for the conservation and management
of highly migratory fish stocks in a region. In contrast, coastal States were generally of the
view that the exercise of sovereign rights within the EEZ would support the conservation and
development of such stocks.70 Article 64 of the 1982 LOSC sets out the framework for
cooperation including through competent international organisations and this is elaborated in
the 1995 Agreement. Although article 64 is within Part V of the 1982 LOSC dealing with the
EEZ, its elaboration in the 1995 Agreement extends the rights and duties to the high seas.
Constituent instruments and measures of tuna RFMOs operationalise those provisions and an
examination of how each functions with respect to selected themes is now undertaken. Given
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high seas.
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the content of other chapters, emphasis is placed on management measures on the high seas,
monitoring, control and surveillance tools, and compliance and enforcement initiatives.

A.

IATTC

1 High seas regime

The Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of Costa Rica
provided the initial management framework for cooperation for highly migratory fish stocks
in the Eastern Pacific Ocean and has been succeeded by the Antigua Convention.71 The area
of competence of the IATTC comprises the area of the Pacific Ocean bounded by The
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, and the Antigua Convention
are the international instruments that now govern management.72

Given the overlapping management area over which the IATTC and the WCPFC have
mandates, the organisations entered into a memorandum of understanding to foster
cooperation and collaboration.73In the memorandum the tuna RFMOs identify areas of
cooperation including in (a) the exchange of data and information, in a manner consistent
with the information-sharing policies of the respective Commissions; (b) research
collaboration on stocks and species of mutual interest, including Pacific-wide stock
assessments; and the (c) development of conservation and management measures for stocks
and species of mutual interest. The manner in which cooperation between the two secretariats
is to be effected is also provided. Cooperation includes reciprocal participation in relevant
meetings of each organisation, information-sharing about stocks and species of mutual
71

Convention for the Establishment of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 31 May 1949, 80 UNTS
3 (entered into force 3 March 1950); Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission Established by the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the Republic of
Costa Rica, 14 November 2003 (entered into force 27 August 2010), hereafter ‘Antigua Convention’.
72
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program, 21 May 1998, hereafter ‘AIDCP’.
73
Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission. See also C-12-11 Recommendation on IATTC - WCPFC Overlap area and WCPFC…
Memorandum of Understanding between WCPFC and IATTC signed in 2006 and the Memorandum of
Cooperation signed in 2009 <http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFCIATTC%20Memorandum%20of%20Understanding.pdf>. See also Memorandum on Exchange of Data between
WCPFC and IATTC, signed 11 December 2009,
<http://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/IATTC%20WCPFC%20MOC%20on%20Exchange%20of%20Data%20200
9%20ENG%20SIGNED%20DATED.pdf>.
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interest; the development of processes to promote harmonisation and compatibility of
conservation and management measures, including measures relating to monitoring, control
and surveillance; and regular exchange of relevant meeting reports, information, and
publications regarding matters of mutual interest. As well, there are consultative meetings
between the secretariats to review and strengthen cooperation. The inter tuna RFMO
memorandum is significant in that it is perhaps the first occasion in which two tuna RFMOs
with joint responsibility over the same area have agreed to cooperate and specified the terms
of cooperation.74 Effectiveness of cooperation initiatives will ultimately be assessed by the
status of highly migratory stocks in the overlap area and its surrounds. A final point is that the
IATTC and WCPFC have agreed that in the overlap area, a State that is a member of the
IATTC only must apply IATTC measures, a State that is a member of the WCPFC, WCPFC
measures, and a State that is a member or participant in both commissions may choose to
apply the measures of either.75 This is a practical solution aligned with treaty law and gives
rise to the implementation of different measures for the same area and the same stock and
may potentially lead to the application of the weaker measure in the overlap area by States
parties to both commissions.

High seas management initiatives, such as time and areas closures, of the IATTC are widely
known. The 2013 resolution adopting a multiyear programme for the conservation of tuna in
the Eastern Pacific Ocean is noteworthy.76That resolution provides time closures for
applicable purse seine vessels of a duration of 62 days for 2015, 2016 and 2017 and makes an
exception for IATTC purse seine vessels with carrying capacity between 182 to 272 metric
tonnes carrying capacity. These vessels are allowed a single fishing trip of up to 30 days
during the closure period on the condition that the vessel carries an observer of the AIDCP on
74

Cf MOU between CCSBT and IOTC on the monitoring of transhipments at sea of large scale tuna longline
fishing vessels, entered into effect 1 July 2015, <http://www.iotc.org/.../Memorandum/CCSBTIOTC MoU_2015 - SIGNED.pdf>; MOU between CCSBT and IOTC on the monitoring of transhipments at sea
of large scale tuna longline fishing vessels, entered into effect 1 April 2009 <
http://iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/commission/Memorandum/CCSBTIOTC_Memorandum_of_Understanding_2009.pdf>.
75
IATTC Recommendation C-12-11 IATTC – WCPFC Overlap Area (also set out in WCPFC9-2012-16(rev
1)); WCPFC, Summary Report, Ninth Regular Session, Manila, Philippines, 2 – 6 December 2012, [80], <
https://www.wcpfc.int/system/files/WCPFC9-Summary-Report-final.pdf>.
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Resolution C-13-01 Multiannual program for the conservation of tuna in the Eastern Pacific Ocean during
2014 – 2016. Measures in the resolution apply to all CPCs’ purse seine vessels of IATTC capacity classes 4 to 6
(more than 182 tonnes carrying capacity), and to all longline vessels over 24 metres overall length, that fish for
yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack tuna. The resolution does not apply to pole and line, troll and sport fishing
vessels, and purse seine vessels of IATTC capacity classes 1 – 3 (182 metric tonne carrying capacity or less).
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board observer programme. In addition, the fishery for yellowfin, bigeye and skipjack tuna by
purse seine vessels within the area of 96 and 110 W and between 4 N and 3 S is closed for a
month from 0000 hours on 29 September to 2400 hours on 29 October.77In addition all purse
seiners are to retain on board tuna caught except where the fish is unfit for human
consumption for reasons other than size or in the final set of a fishing trip there is insufficient
well space. For longliners, limits on total annual catches of bigeye tuna in the IATTC
convention area are imposed.78

2 Functions

Article VII of the Antigua Convention provides for the functions of the Commission and is
influenced by the 1995 Agreement. The functions include the need to use the best scientific
information available in the assessment of stocks and the making of measures and to have
due regard to species that belong to the same ecosystem and species that are associated or
dependent on the targeted species. These are consistent with contemporary functions of other
tuna RFMOs. However, unlike other tuna RFMOs, the IATTC has an additional agreement,
in the AIDCP, with which decision making needs to conform to. The Antigua Convention
provides that the Commission in developing measures to be adopted must ensure that due
consideration is given to the need for coordination and compatibility with measures adopted
under the AIDCP.79Excepting that, a comparison with the functions of other tuna RFMOs
will result in the conclusion that functions are generally harmonised.

3 Application of principles

Like other tuna RFMOs, the IATTC by virtue of Article VII of the Antigua Convention and
recent measures is applying contemporary fisheries management principles such as the
precautionary approach, the use of the best scientific information available in decision
making, and the principle of compatibility.80Suffice to say that in the high seas in the Eastern
77

Resolution C-13-01, above n 76, [5].
Resolution C-13-01, above n 76, [9] – [12].
79
Antigua Convention, art VII.1(j).
80
It is useful to note that Antigua Convention provides for the ‘best scientific information available’ and the
‘best scientific evidence available’. Apart from the use of different words, it is suggested that the expressions are
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Pacific Ocean the IATTC is applying contemporary principles for the conservation and
management of highly migratory fish stocks.

Perhaps a challenge for the IATTC is to ensure that its measures are compatible with
measures adopted by the WCPFC for the overlap area. Indeed the requirements for
compatibility in the 1995 Agreement and in the Antigua Convention applies to areas under
national jurisdiction and the high seas. In the present situation, the overlap area comprises
high seas and waters under the national jurisdiction of coastal States. Compatibility between
measures of IATTC and WCPFC is required, albeit not prescribed in the 1995 Agreement. To
this end both Commissions have approved initial practical arrangements but these are to be
reviewed and strengthened. For its part the IATTC commits to compatibility:

The IATTC shall continue efforts to promote compatibility between the conservation
and management measures adopted by the IATTC and WCPFC in their goals and
effectiveness, especially in the overlap area, including by frequent consultations with
the WCPFC, in order to maintain, and inform their respective members of, a thorough
understanding of conservation and management measures directed at bigeye,
yellowfin, and other tunas, and the scientific bases and effectiveness of those
measures.81

4 Compliance and enforcement

Each party to the Antigua Convention is required to take necessary measures to support
implementation of and compliance with that Convention and measures adopted by the
commission.82These obligations are extended to cooperating non contracting parties and
fishing entities through the resolution setting out the criteria for attaining the status of
cooperating non party or fishing entity in IATTC.83 Pursuant to Article X of the Antigua
the same in terms of outcomes. See also the decision on best available science, C-12-10 Recommendation on
best available science.
81
Resolution C-13-01, above n 76, [18].
82
Antigua Convention, art XVIII.1.
83
IATTC Resolution C-04-02 on Criteria for attaining the Status of Cooperating Non-Party or Cooperating
Fishing Entity to AIDCP and IATTC, replaced by IATTC Resolution C-07-02 on Criteria for attaining the
Status of Cooperating Non-Party or Fishing Entity in IATTC.
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Convention, the IATTC established the Committee for the Review of Implementation of
Measures adopted by the Commission which replaced the Permanent Working Group on
Compliance.84 Each party to the Antigua Convention is required to promptly inform the
Committee legal and administrative provisions that have been enacted to support compliance
with measures, and actions taken to ensure compliance with measures.85Among other
obligations, each party is required to submit reports to the Committee including the six
monthly reports of activities of each of its tuna fishing vessels and any other information
necessary for the work of the Committee.86Each party is required to take measures that ensure
that any vessel operating in waters under its national jurisdiction complies with the
convention and conservation and management measures. This seems to suggest a heavier
burden on a coastal State to ensure that vessels operating in its EEZ are compliant but is
congruent with the coastal State’s sovereign rights to monitor and control fishing and related
activities and enforce contraventions of its laws. In a separate provision a flag State is
required to take measures to ensure that its vessel do not fish in an area under the sovereign
or national jurisdiction of a coastal State without appropriate authorisation.87

Where a party has reasonable grounds to believe that a foreign vessel has engaged in any
activity that undermines the effectiveness of measures that party may notify the flag State
concerned and the Commission and provide full supporting evidence to the former and a
summary of evidence to the latter.88While the Antigua Convention aligns with the pacta
tertiis rule in only accommodating flag States that are party to the convention in requiring
certain actions to be undertaken, a notified State whether it is a party or not is expected to
take necessary action to investigate and respond.89Arguably a notified third State may not be
obliged to act at all. But if the obligation on a flag State to investigate alleged contraventions
by its vessel stands in customary international law, then the requirement is sound and a
notified third State has to act. Penalties to be applied by a flag State party have to be of
‘sufficient gravity’ in order to secure compliance with the convention and measures and to
deprive offenders of the benefits arising from their ‘illegal activities’.90 The choice of words
84

C-99-01 Permanent Working Group on Compliance.
Antigua Convention, art XVIII.3.
86
Antigua Convention, art XVIII.4.
87
Antigua Convention, art XX.3.
88
Antigua Convention, art XVIII.6.
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Antigua Convention, art XVIII.7.
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Antigua Convention, art XVIII.8.
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used deserves comment. By only referring to ‘illegal’ activities, there is an assumption that
all of the national laws of the parties deem illegal or unlawful activities that does not comply
with the convention or undermines any conservation and management measures of the
IATTC. Unless there is a specific offence as such, then illegal fishing activities would be
restricted in scope to traditional offences such as fishing without a licence or authorisation,
fishing in contravention of licence terms and conditions, or fishing in a prohibited area.
Contracting Parties that are flag States, coastal States adjacent to the convention area or port
States in whose territory catch is landed are required to cooperate with a view to ensure
compliance with the Antigua Convention and measures of the Commission.91

Where a fishing vessel undermines the effectiveness or contravenes measures of the
Commission, the Commission may recommend that parties take action in accordance with the
convention and international law to deter such vessels from undertaking such activities until
appropriate action is taken by the flag State to prohibit those activities.92 This provision begs
a response since it appears to place ultimate responsibility for action on the flag State
concerned. So if a flag State does not respond or cooperate with the request for action, then
according to the provision, only the deterrent actions of the parties would be applied. Also,
the provision has implications on the process for the listing of vessels that have engaged in
IUU fishing. Where there is a non responsive or non cooperative flag State, the vessel would
be listed in perpetuity until the Commission itself decides to take assertive action. But in
doing so, the Commission may be acting in a manner that is not consistent with the terms of
that very provision which relies on the flag State as the final arbiter.

Finally there are several resolutions and recommendations of the Commission and the AIDCP
that support compliance and enforcement.93These implement and elaborate on the provisions
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Antigua Convention, art XVIII.9.
Antigua Convention, art XVIII.10; and by extension cooperating non parties and fishing entities: IATTC
Resolution C-07-02.
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IATTC: C-14-01 Resolution (Amended) on a Regional Vessel Register replaced Resolution C-11-06 on a
Regional Vessel Register; C-13-01 Tuna conservation in the EPO 2014-2016; Resolution C-12-07 Amendment
to Resolution C-11-09 on Establishing a Program for Transshipments by Large-scale Fishing Vessels; C-11-07
Compliance; C-11-08 Observers on longline vessels; C-05-07 IUU Vessel list; C-04-03 Notification of sightings
of vessels; C-04-06 Vessel Monitoring System; C-04-10 Catch reporting; AIDCP: A-09-02 Reporting
infractions; A-04-03 Vessel inspections; A-03-02 At-sea reporting; A-04-07 IUU vessel list;
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of the Antigua Convention and are generally consistent with the practice of other tuna
RFMOs.

5 Monitoring control and surveillance

Monitoring, control and surveillance are effected in the IATTC through, inter alia, reporting
requirements at sea, observers, vessel monitoring system, in port inspections, and the
monitoring of landings and transshipments.94At sea reporting appears to be confined to purse
seine fishing vessels only. All purse seine vessels are required to carry an on board observer
to send to the IATTC secretariat weekly reports that include the estimated catch of tuna by
species and set type and dolphin mortalities by stock.95 Purse seine vessels that do not carry
on board observers are to be encouraged to send the same information.

Observers are supported in various decisions of the AIDCP and the IATTC. The AIDCP on
board observer programme for instance focuses on the collection of information on dolphin
mortalities. The 2011 observer resolution for longline vessels sets out the main objective of
scientific observers to record any available biological information, catches of targeted fish
species, species composition and any other biological information and interactions with non
target species, namely sea turtles, seabirds and sharks. Each member and cooperating non
member is mandated to ensure that at least 5 percent of fishing effort by its longline vessels
greater than 20 metres in overall length carries an observer, and that observer coverage is
representative of its fleet. Hence the IATTC observer programme objective is primarily
scientific in nature with no explicit inclusion of a compliance monitoring role.
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See IATTC Resolutions C-03-04 Resolution on at-sea reporting, Resolution C-04-06 Resolution on the
Establishment of a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) replaced by Resolution C-14-02 Resolution (Amended)
on the Establishment of a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), Resolution C-11-08 Resolution on Scientific
Observers for Longline Vessels, Resolution C-12-07 Amendment to Resolution C-11-09 on Establishing a
Program for Transshipments by Large-scale Fishing Vessels, and Resolution C-11-05 Resolution (Amended) on
the Establishment of a List of Longline Fishing Vessels over 24 metres (LSTFVs) Authorised to operate in the
Eastern Pacific Ocean.
95
Resolution C-03-04, ibid.
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On VMS, the IATTC does not have a compulsory system but relies on members and
cooperating non members, collectively referred to as ‘CPCs’, to ensure that all their
commercial fishing vessels that are 24 metres or more in length are equipped with VMS from
1 January 2016.96The date for commencement of the VMS appears to have shifted from a
requirement in the earlier 2004 resolution of 1 January 2005 ‘or as soon as possible
thereafter’.97The 2014 resolution provides specific operational details that a CPCs’ VMS is to
meet including vessel details, geographical position, date and time, speed and course, and the
polling frequency for longline vessels and other vessels.98VMS equipment must not be
tampered with and withstand environmental conditions in order to be operational at all times
and automatically report the required information. Where there is a technical failure or
malfunction, the equipment is to be capable of manual transmissions, and is to be repaired or
replaced within one month. Reliance on CPCs to install and operate VMS may possibly lead
to opportunities for the interference with VMS information, and creates a dependence on
CPCs to implement. Although the resolution assures that the Director IATTC will maintain
VMS information in strict accordance with the Commission’s rules and procedures on
confidentiality, the integrity of several CPCs VMS may in theory be weaker than a central
VMS operated by the Commission. Nevertheless, each CPC is to provide a progress report on
its VMS by 31 May 2017 and the Commission at its annual meeting in 2015 is expected to
consider the possible development of a central VMS but a decision does not appear to have
been reached.99

The monitoring of transshipments at sea and in port is important to all tuna RFMOs. In the
IATTC, general and specific rules for transshipments by large scale tuna fishing vessels
(LSTFVs) are in place.100Also, carrier vessels authorised by flag CPCs to receive
transshipments from LSTFVs at sea are to comply with the requirements. The onus is on each
CPC to take necessary measures to ensure that its LSTFVs and authorised carrier vessels
comply with obligations in the resolution. The resolution however does not apply to troll
vessels, pole and line vessels or vessels engaged in the transshipment of fresh fish at sea or by
96
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100
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implication, fishing vessels that fish only within areas under national jurisdiction.101Primary
responsibility rests with the flag CPC who determines whether or not to authorise its LSTFVs
to transship at sea and to take necessary measures to ensure compliance. The Commission has
established and maintains a record of carrier vessels authorised to receive at sea
transshipments from LSTFVs known as the IATTC Record of Carrier Vessels.
Transshipments at sea in areas under the national jurisdiction of a CPC must be authorised by
the coastal CPC concerned and comply with a range of requirements, including prior
authorisation from the flag CPC, satisfy notification obligations, and have an IATTC
observer on board the carrier vessel. Of note, the IATTC observer is obliged to monitor
compliance with the transshipment resolution and ensure that transshipped catches are
consistent with the amount of catch reported on the IATTC transshipment
declaration.102Unless there is a force majeure situation, transshipments at sea cannot
commence or continue without an IATTC observer on board.

6 Alternative mechanism for high seas boarding and inspection

Among tuna RFMOs, the IATTC seems to be the only Commission that does not favour the
adoption of a high seas boarding and inspection regime for the Eastern Pacific Ocean.103 This
position has been stated by the secretariat and IATTC members at a number of international
meetings.104According to the secretariat, the high seas boarding and inspection regime is not
the only option as there are alternative mechanisms that may be utilised in accord with
paragraph 15 of Article 21 of the 1995 Agreement. Paragraph 15 reads:

Where a subregional or regional fisheries management organization or

Resolution C-12-07, above n 94, [3]. Fresh fish means ‘tuna or tuna-like species that are alive, whole or
dressed/gutted, but not further processed or frozen’.
102
Resolution C-12-07, above n 94, [16].
103
Notwithstanding, all members and cooperating non members of tuna RFMOs are supportive of boarding and
inspection regimes. See for instance, ICCAT Report of the 9th Meeting of the Working Group on Integrated
Monitoring Measures, Doc. No. PLE-101 / 2014, 3 < http://www.iccat.int/com2014/DocENG/PLE101_ENG.pdf>.
104
Such as the Review conference 2006 – Outcomes of the Review Conference, New York, 26 May 2006,
Document A/CONF.210/2006/15, para 42 acknowledges concerns about board and inspection and alternative
mechanisms. and the resumed Review conference of 2010 - Report of the resumed Review Conference on the
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 24-28 May 2010, Document A/CONF.210/2010_/.
101
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arrangement has established an alternative mechanism which effectively discharges
the obligation under this Agreement of its members or participants to ensure
compliance with the conservation and management measures established by the
organization or arrangement, members of such organization or participants in such
arrangement may agree to limit the application of paragraph 1 as between themselves
in respect of the conservation and management measures which have been established
in the relevant high seas area.

In raising concerns at international meetings, the IATTC secretariat and IATTC members
indicate that there are other elements of a comprehensive monitoring control and surveillance
scheme that could constitute alternative mechanisms.105Rebutting this, delegations at the
2010 resumed Review Conference emphasised that high seas boarding and inspection of
vessels was one of the important tools to improve compliance with conservation and
management measures.106 The examples of how the WCPFC and South Pacific Regional
Fisheries Management Organisation had incorporated Articles 21 and 22 of the 1995
Agreement into their constituent instruments and were implementing procedures regionally to
the satisfaction of members and non member States was highlighted.107 Delegations at that
meeting further stressed that the consideration of alternative mechanisms should not replace
existing mechanisms of enforcement in RFMOs, but rather add to such mechanisms.

The alternative is the IATTC observer programme and the question that arises is whether
such an alternative is satisfactory.108 To facilitate fishing activities of vessels fishing in the
Eastern Pacific Ocean then migrating into the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, the IATTC
supported the development of a memorandum with the WCPFC for the cross endorsement of
observers from the respective programmes. 109 The memorandum is novel amongst tuna
RFMOs but not without flaws. Of its perceived flaws, the most significant is that the
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See for instance reports of the 2006 Review Conference, above n 104, [43](o) and the 2010 resumed Review
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memorandum envisaged a seamless transition from the EPO to the WCPO without some
regard for the different maritime zones of coastal States in the WCPO and the need for legal
recognition in each jurisdiction of the foreign observer permitted to carry out observer
responsibilities within the respective zones.110

B.

ICCAT

1 High seas management regime

The constituent instrument of ICCAT provides its management objective of applying
scientific evidence in the making of recommendations designed to maintain populations of
tuna and tuna-like species at levels which permit the maximum sustainable catch or yield.
111

As far as management initiatives are concerned, ICCAT (like IATTC) have regulated

certain fisheries, particularly, swordfish, bigeye tuna and bluefin tuna fisheries, through timearea closures. The aim of such closures is the rebuilding of stocks. Time area closures may be
considered to be more successful for highly migratory species compared to the allocation of
quotas.

2 Functions

Given the focus in the 1960s, Article IV of the ICCAT Convention in describing functions
emphasises the study of tuna populations. The Commission shall be responsible for the study
of the populations of tuna and tuna-like species and such other species of fishes exploited in
tuna fishing in the Convention area.112This pursuit is to be supported by the: (a) collection
and analysis of statistical information relating to the current conditions and trends of the tuna
fishery resources; (b) studying information concerning measures and methods to ensure
maintenance of the populations of tuna and tuna-like fishes at levels which will permit the
110

At the time of writing most if not all coastal States in the WCPO do not automatically recognise or permit an
observer from another State to exercise observer functions within their respective EEZs.
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International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna, opened for signature 14 May 1966, 673
UNTS 63 (entered into force 21 March 1969), Preamble and Art XVIII.
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maximum sustainable catch; (c) recommendation of studies and investigations to the
Contracting Parties; (d) publication and dissemination of reports of findings and statistical,
biological and other scientific information relative to the ICCAT tuna fisheries. Basic
functions identified in the ICCAT Convention are complemented by responsibilities of the
Commission identified in its binding recommendations.

Notwithstanding the seemingly narrow scope of functions in the ICCAT Convention, the
commission has adopted several decisions which effectively leads to an interpretation that it
has broadened its mandate. This appears to be consistent with the subsequent agreement or
subsequent practice provision in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.113That
said, the parties to the ICCAT Convention are currently considering amendments to the
constituent instrument.114

3 Application of principles

Negotiated in the 1960s, the ICCAT Convention lacks reference to contemporary fisheries
conservation and management principles. Nevertheless, ICCAT is progressive in applying
principles such as the precautionary approach. An international expert consultation on the
implications of the precautionary approach for biological and technological research on tuna
held in Thailand in March 2000 was sponsored by ICCAT and also originated from a
recommendation of the ICCAT Tuna Symposium held in Portugal in 1996.115 The expert
consultation recognised that there are similar issues in the implementation of the
precautionary approach for tuna fisheries on the global scale and suggested that it would be
appropriate to consider research implications for tuna as a group. The distribution of tuna and
tuna like species world wide and the peculiarities and biology of such species make the
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VCLT 1969, art 31.3 states: There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b)
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scientific knowledge and uncertainties on these stocks unique to them, so much so that it
would be difficult to compare with other species.116

Another ICCAT initiative on the precautionary approach is the establishment of the ICCAT
ad hoc working group on the precautionary approach. The ad hoc working group met in
Ireland in May 1999 and emphasised the need for greater information and understanding
about the fishery:

Information underpins the precautionary approach, given that more caution is
required when information is uncertain. In order to achieve an adequate balance
between resource usage and precaution, increased funding at all levels (data
collection, analysis, monitoring and enforcement) may be necessary.

The ad hoc working group also developed specific recommendations aimed at improving the
data or knowledge base used in stock assessments.117Since the 1990s, the Commission has
developed more prescriptive guidelines in its binding recommendations for the application of
the precautionary approach.118But differences remain. At its 2014 meeting, the working group
considered draft recommendations on the application of the precautionary approach and
ecosystem considerations as general principles for the adoption of ICCAT management
measures but consensus could not be attained.119 Some CPCs supported the notion indicating
that no amendment to the convention was required but others opined that fundamental
principles need to be reflected in the convention.120 Others were more pragmatic indicating
that the recommendations were an interim step while amendments to the convention is
deliberated. However, one CPC raised doubts that the current convention did not allow for
recommendations of this nature.121So it seems that while the principles can be discussed
separately, its application and integration into the process for adopting management measures
is not supported by all CPCs. Ironically the precautionary approach and ecosystem
116
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considerations, especially in relation to associated and dependent species and non target
species, are already accommodated within binding and non binding decisions of the
Commission.122

4 Compliance and enforcement

Compliance with the ICCAT Convention and binding measures is the responsibility of
CPCs.123 The Commission takes an overarching role in promoting and monitoring levels of
compliance.124 An essential obligation is to furnish to the Commission any relevant statistical,
biological and other scientific information that may be required. With respect to enforcement
CPCs are required to take necessary action to enforce the ICCAT convention and its binding
measures.125Moreover the contracting parties (and later CPCs) are to establish a system of
international enforcement to be applied in the convention area except the territorial sea and
other waters in which a State is entitled under international law to exercise jurisdiction over
fisheries.126The provision facilitating the establishment of an international enforcement
system is visionary because during the 1960s there was already recognition in customary
international law and in the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention that a coastal State has a
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See for instance [04-10] Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the conservation of sharks
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Recommendation [Rec. 04-10] concerning the conservation of sharks caught in association with fisheries
managed by ICCAT; [06-10] Supplementary Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning the Conservation
of Sharks Caught in Association with Fisheries Managed by ICCAT; [07-06] Supplemental Recommendation
by ICCAT Concerning Sharks; [07-07] Recommendation by ICCAT on Reducing Incidental By-Catch of
Seabirds in Longline Fisheries; [09-07] Recommendation by ICCAT on the Conservation of Thresher
Sharks Caught in Association with Fisheries in the ICCAT Convention Area; [10-06] Recommendation by
ICCAT on Atlantic Shortfin Mako Sharks Caught in Association with ICCAT Fisheries; [10-07]
Recommendation by ICCAT on the Conservation of Oceanic Whitetip Sharks caught in Association with
fisheries in the ICCAT Convention Area; [10-08] Recommendation by ICCAT on Hammerhead Sharks (family
Sphyrnidae) Caught in Association with Fisheries Managed by ICCAT; [10-09] Recommendation by ICCAT on
the By-catch of Sea Turtles in ICCAT Fisheries; [11-08] Recommendation by ICCAT on the Conservation of
Silky Sharks Caught in Association with ICCAT Fisheries; [11-09] Supplemental Recommendation by ICCAT
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territorial sea adjacent to its land territory over which sovereignty applied. However, there
was still no agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea. The inclusion in the ICCAT
Convention of the reference to the territorial sea and waters in which a State exercises
jurisdiction over fisheries appears to have affirmed the emerging concept of a fisheries zone
in the Law of the Sea negotiations.

In the general outline of integrated monitoring measures adopted in 2002 the ICCAT
provides compliance and enforcement parameters. Contracting Parties, through the
Commission, are required to establish an observation and inspection programme to ensure
compliance with ICCAT conservation and management measures. The programme
envisaged, inter alia, (a) high seas inspection; (b) procedures for an effective investigation of
an alleged contravention of ICCAT measures, for reporting to the Commission on the actions
taken and for the exchange of information; (c) procedures when inspections reveal serious
violations; (d) port inspections; (e) monitoring of landings and catches, including statistical
follow-up for management purposes; (f) specific monitoring programmes including boarding
and inspection; and (g) observer programmes.127 It is worth noting that the elements of the
programme are being implemented with the exception of a robust high seas boarding and
inspection scheme, although such scheme is being considered.128 The monitoring and
inspection programme works together with a programme to promote compliance by vessels
of non contracting parties, entities or fishing entities. The general outline also suggested that
the compliance programme would introduce measures consistent with international law to
deter activities of vessels which undermine ICCAT measures, implement relevant elements of
the FAO IPOA IUU fishing, and prohibit the landings and transshipments of ICCAT species
by vessels of non contracting parties, entities or fishing entities that do not comply with
ICCAT measures.
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General outline of integrated monitoring measures adopted by ICCAT (Ref 02-31).
ICCAT Report of the 9th Meeting of the Working Group on Integrated Monitoring Measures, Spain - May
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5 Monitoring control and surveillance

In Recommendation 02-31 the components of a monitoring and control framework are
identified together with underlying principles, being, (a) consistency with the ICCAT
Convention and existing relevant international law, (b) complementarity between current
ICCAT measures and new measures, and (c) the general obligation to co-operate and a
commitment to implement the measures in a transparent manner. Contracting parties and non
contracting parties are to contribute to the improvement of data collection and dissemination
for scientific as well as monitoring purposes. In addition, the Commission should provide a
means to ensure compliance by both Contracting and non-Contracting Parties, and to prevent,
deter and eliminate IUU fishing in the ICCAT Convention Area.

The 2003 meeting of ICCAT Working Group to develop integrated monitoring measures
influenced the Commission to put in place a recommendation to control flagged vessels of
CPCs through a range of measures for flag CPCs including: the adoption of measures to
promote compliance with ICCAT measures; the authorisation of vessels fishing in the ICCAT
area through fishing authorisations, licences or permits; preclusion of authorisation to fish
unless flag CPCs are able to effective exercise their responsibilities; the requirement that
flagged vessels do not conduct unauthorised fishing within areas under the national
jurisdiction of other States; the condition that flagged vessels fishing on the high seas to carry
their authorisation, licence or permit on board at all times and to produce such document on
demand for inspection by an authorised person; the investigation of alleged contraventions by
flagged vessels and reporting of the results of such investigation and actions taken where a
contravention has taken place. Flag CPCs are also required to maintain a record of fishing
vessels authorised to fish on the high seas including foreign flagged vessels under charter
agreements. Further, flag CPCs are to ensure that authorised fishing vessels and fishing gears
on board such vessels are clearly marked in accordance with generally accepted standards
such as the FAO standard specification for the marking and the identification of fishing
vessels.
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An important component of the monitoring control and surveillance programme of the
ICCAT is the vessel monitoring system or VMS. The VMS recommendation adopted in 2003
applies the requirement primarily to commercial fishing vessels exceeding 20 meters between
perpendiculars or 24 meters length overall from 1 November 2005.129Each flag CPCs must
require its fishing vessel to be equipped with vessel monitoring system unit that is able to
automatically transmit vessel position and other information on a continuous basis to the land
based fisheries monitoring centre. The responsibility is on the flag CPC to take necessary
measures to ensure that its flagged vessel is reporting correctly and to require masters of
flagged fishing vessels to ensure that the vessel monitoring system unit on board the vessel is
permanently operational and transmitting frequently each day. The recommendation also
provides procedures to be followed in the event of a technical failure or malfunction. CPCs
are encouraged to extend the requirements in the recommendation to smaller fishing vessels
if considered appropriate to ensure effectiveness of ICCAT measures.

6 Mechanism for high seas boarding and inspection

The ICCAT is yet to give effect to its commitment in 2002 to provide for high seas boarding
and inspection.

C. IOTC
1 High seas regime

As described in Chapter I, the areas of competence of the IOTC is the Indian Ocean and
adjacent seas, north of the Antarctic Convergence, ‘insofar as it is necessary to cover such
seas for the purpose of conserving and managing stocks that migrate into or out of the Indian
Ocean’.130Through the Commission, members cooperate to achieve the management
objective of the conservation and optimum utilisation of tuna and tuna like stocks and the
sustainable development of fisheries based on such stocks.
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[03-14] Recommendation by ICCAT concerning minimum standards for the establishment of a vessel
fishing monitoring system in the ICCAT Convention area.
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Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, opened for signature 25 November
1993 (entered into force 27 March 1996), hereafter ‘IOTC Agreement’, Article 2.
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2 Functions

Although the IOTC Agreement was adopted before the adoption of the 1995 Agreement, the
functions and responsibilities of the Commission are to be exercised in accord with the
principles expressed in the relevant provisions of the 1982 LOSC.1311982 LOSC provisions
include Articles 55, 56, 64, and 116 to 119. The basic functions of the Commission are: (a)
the responsibility to review the conditions and trends of the stocks and to collect, analyse and
disseminate scientific information, catch and effort statistics and other data relevant to the
conservation and management of the stocks; (b) to encourage, recommend, and coordinate
research and development activities in respect of the stocks and fisheries covered, and such
other activities as the Commission deems appropriate, including activities connected with
transfer of technology, and capacity building, having due regard to the need to ensure the
equitable participation of members of the Commission in the fisheries and the special
interests and needs of members in the region that are developing States; and (c) to adopt
conservation and management measures to ensure the conservation of the stocks and to
promote their optimum utilisation throughout the IOTC Area.132

These basic functions and responsibilities are supplemented by others contained in binding
resolutions of the Commission. As is discussed below, the Commission now plays an
important role in the monitoring, control and surveillance as well as in ensuring compliance.
Like other tuna RFMOs, the IOTC for instance maintains a register of all fishing vessels
authorised to fishing in the IOTC area and administers any changes to that register. All
authorised fishing vessels catching tuna or tuna-like species that are covered by the
Commission’s statistical document programme must comply with the requirements. Through
statistical documentation, the Commission monitors catch of species and the volume that is
transported, landed and imported. In addition, fishing vessels that are presumed to have
engaged in IUU fishing may be nominated on the list of IUU fishing vessels maintained by
the Commission. Significant repercussions are associated with listing on the IUU fishing
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IOTC Agreement, Art V.2.
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vessel list including prohibitions on landing, transshipment, trade and any commercial
transactions relating the catch.133

3 Application of principles

Of the contemporary principles enunciated in the 1995 Agreement and the FAO Code of
Conduct, the precautionary approach and the ecosystem based approach to fisheries features
in binding decisions of the Commission. As in the ICCAT, an institutional mechanism for the
application of the precautionary approach in the IOTC is the dialogue workshops between
fisheries scientists and fisheries managers.134The terms of reference for such dialogue
workshops include: (a) the identification and recommendation of management strategies for
the IOTC fisheries, which are consistent with the objectives of the IOTC Agreement,
including factors identified by the Commission, ecosystem-based approach to fisheries and
the precautionary approach, for consideration by the Commission; (b) the identification of
overarching management objectives to guide the development of management strategies; (c)
the application of target and limit reference points with reference to the use of interim
biomass MSY and fishing MSY or other proxies; (d) the development of harvest control
rules, and associated probabilities of achieving these targets or limits, allowing, in particular,
the implementation of a precautionary approach; (e) identification of risks to the fishery and
the resource at these limit and target reference points in the context of different hypothetical
harvest control rules. These terms appear to be aligned with the precautionary approach
guidelines in Annex II of the 1995 Agreement but can be argued to go further with the
development of harvest control rules under different scenarios. Aside from decisions of the
IOTC in support of the application of the precautionary approach, there have been several
decisions in favour of the protection of biodiversity and the ecosystem through resolutions on
non target species and vulnerable and threatened species.135
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See Chapter VII below for IUU listing.
IOTC Resolution 14/03 On enhancing the dialogue between fisheries scientists and managers.
135
On the precautionary approach, see for example Resolution 12/01 On the implementation of the
precautionary approach, Resolution 13/10 On interim target and limit reference points and a decision
framework, Recommendation 12/15 On the best available science. On the protection of biodiversity and the
application of an ecosystem of approach, see Resolution 13/04 On the conservation of cetaceans, Resolution
13/05 On the conservation of whale sharks (Rhincodon typus), Resolution 13/06 On a scientific and
management framework on the conservation of shark species caught in association with IOTC managed
fisheries, Resolution 13/11 On a ban on discards of bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna, and a
recommendation for non targeted species caught by purse seine vessels in the IOTC area of competence,
Resolution 12/04 on the conservation of marine turtles, Resolution 12/06 On reducing the incidental bycatch of
134

179

4 Compliance and enforcement

While the responsibility for monitoring compliance appears to be shared between the
Contracting Party or Cooperating Non Contracting Party (CPC) and the Commission,
enforcement rests with the CPC. Article X of the IOTC Agreement provides that each
member shall ensure that actions taken against a vessel is adequate to ensure the effectiveness
of the agreement and binding measure of the Commission. Such actions are to be sent to the
Commission annually. Members, through the Commission are to establish an appropriate
system to monitor implementation of the measures through effective tools and techniques to
monitor fishing and related activities and to gather relevant scientific information.

Although compliance by a CPC with the IOTC Agreement and binding measures is
paramount, the first reference to a penalty for non compliance relates to financial
contributions. A Commission member which is in arrears in the payment of its financial
contributions shall have no vote in the Commission if the arrears equals or exceeds the
amount of the contributions due from it for the two preceding calendar years.136 However
there is a concession. Notwithstanding the arrears, the Commission may allow the defaulting
member to vote if it is satisfied that the failure was due to conditions beyond the control of
the defaulting member.

5 Monitoring control and surveillance

Among other tools, the IOTC has a regional observer scheme and also imposes requirements
on markets.137 IOTC Resolution 2009/04 establishes a regional observer scheme with the
seabirds in longline fisheries, and Resolution 12/09 On the conservation of thresher sharks (Family Alopiidae)
caught in association with fisheries in the IOTC area of competence.
136
IOTC Agreement, Art XIII.8.
137
IOTC Resolution 10/10 Concerning market related measures
<http://www.iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/compliance/cmm/iotc_cmm_10-10_en.pdf>.
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objective of collecting verified catch data and other scientific data related to the fisheries for
tuna and tuna-like species in the IOTC area.138 Like other tuna RFMOs, the IOTC also has a
scheme to monitor compliance by CPCs. Each CPC is required to report on implementation
including description of actions taken under national law to implement the constituent
instrument and conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission.

6 Mechanism for high seas boarding and inspection

The IOTC at its Seventeenth Session, requested its Secretariat to review existing practices in
other RFMOs with regards to high-seas boarding and inspection scheme, and to propose a
guideline for the development of a binding management measure for the consideration of the
its Compliance Committee. After considering the guidelines for high seas boarding and
inspection, the committee recommended the creation of either an informal, inter-sessional
working group of interested CPCs to discuss the regional inspection scheme, or a working
party on compliance if the Commission supported the further development of the
guideline.139Although the IOTC has not adopted a regional high seas boarding and inspection
scheme, it appears likely in the near future.

D.

CCSBT

1 High seas regime

The Commission on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna and its Extended
Commission function in order to ensure the conservation, management and optimum
utilisation of southern bluefin tuna, both within areas under national jurisdiction and on the
high seas. While noting the sovereign rights of member States to manage tuna fisheries
within their respective EEZs, the constituent instrument of the Commission focuses on the
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See the 2011 resolution on observers
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IOTC Report of the Eleventh Session of the Compliance Committee, Sri Lanka, 26 – 28 May 2014, IOTC–
2014–CoC11–R[E], [110], available at: http://www.iotc.org/sites/default/files/documents/2014/05/IOTC-2014CoC11-RE_-_V_FINAL_DO_NOT_MODIFY.pdf.

181

southern bluefin tuna stocks in their entirety and the responsibilities of States fishing for such
stocks.140

An essential responsibility of the Commission and the Extended Commission is the allocation
of total allowable catch amongst members. Considerations in the allocation of catch include:
(a) scientific evidence; (b) the need for orderly and sustainable development of southern
bluefin tuna fisheries; (c) the interests of Parties through whose EEZs southern bluefin tuna
migrates; (d) the interests of Parties whose vessels engage in fishing for southern Bluefin tuna
including those which have historically engaged in such fishing and those which have
southern bluefin tuna fisheries under development; and (e) the contribution of each Party to
the conservation and enhancement of, and scientific research on, southern bluefin tuna.141

2 Functions

Compared to the constituent instruments of the IOTC and ICCAT, the constituent instrument
of the CCSBT draws on the principles of management and allocation of participatory rights
emerging in the 1990s in describing the functions of the Commission. Like all other tuna
RFMOs, the Commission determines the total allowable catch and its allocation among the
members based on recommendations of its scientific committee, and also determines whether
additional measures are necessary. However unlike most tuna RFMOs, the additional
functions of the Commission apart from administrative arrangements are not stipulated
further. For example factors to be considered in the development of conservation and
management measures are not prescribed in the CCSBT Convention. This indicates perhaps
that the convention may have been negotiated in haste to primarily establish a management
framework for the determination of total allowable catch and the allocation of that catch
amongst the negotiating parties.

3 Application of principles
140

Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, opened for signature 10 May 1993, 26 LOSB 57
1994 (entered into force 20 May 1994), hereafter ‘CCSBT Convention’.
141
CCSBT Convention, art 8.4.
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While the requirement to apply contemporary fisheries principles in the conservation and
management of southern bluefin tuna is not explicit in the CCSBT Convention, it may be
suggested that there is a general implication in the frequent use of the term ‘conservation’ and
the dependence on scientific advice for the determination of total allowable catch and
allocation of such catch. In addition, the absence of contemporary fisheries principles in the
constituent instruments of the Commission and Extended Commission has not precluded the
incorporation of such principles in decision making, in particular in the assessment of stocks
and determination of total allowable catch and quotas.142 The management procedure and its
‘metarules’ agreed in 2011 incorporates the precautionary approach. Further the management
procedure has been viewed favourably as the mechanism to buffer the possible effects of
climate change on the rebuilding of the stock.143

In addition to the precautionary approach, there has been an initial attempt at accommodating
the ecosystem approach through the formation of the Ecologically Related Species working
group, the adoption of the recommendation to mitigate the impact on ecologically related
species, and the inclusion of components in the 2011 Strategic Plan for the
Commission.144The attention on species other than southern Bluefin tuna was at first viewed
with reluctance as it was perceived as a departure from the specific mandate of the
organisation. The formation of the working group on ecologically related species was
influenced by the 1995 Agreement as well as the Kobe criteria which influenced tuna RFMOs
in varying degrees to expand their respective mandates to consider such species.145 In this
regard the 2014 independent performance review of the CCSBT sought a change in attitude
and action in support of: (a) reduced tolerance for the depletion of target and ecologically
related species; (b) greater compliance with the 1982 LOSC provisions and interaction with
species related international instruments and environmental organisations; and (c) the
adoption and implementation of the ecosystem approach, in order to maintain the structure
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and function of the ecosystem.146Given the impetus in the strategic plan, the Commission is
expected to implement the ecosystem approach incrementally.

Furthermore, the requirement of compatibility does not find support in the resolutions of the
Commission. This is perhaps due in part to the emphasis on the determination and allocation
of a global total allowable catch amongst members and cooperating non members of the
Commission. Since the resolutions on national allocations and management apply to the stock
throughout the convention area and do not differentiate between the high seas and areas under
national jurisdiction, the compatibility requirement in the current management framework
remains unresolved.147In addition, the existence of overlaps with other tuna RFMOs requires
the CCSBT to develop measures that are compatible with such organisations, namely the
WCPFC and the IOTC. Recognition of the need for compatibility of measures with
neighbouring tuna RFMOs is effected in the 2011 strategic plan and in resolutions of the
Commission.

4 Compliance and enforcement

Unlike the most recent constituent instruments of tuna RFMOs, the CCSBT Convention is
not prescriptive on the compliance and enforcement rights and duties of States parties. Article
5.1 provides that each Party shall take all action necessary to ensure the enforcement of the
convention and compliance with binding resolutions. There are other obligations that require
the collection of information, and cooperation in the exchange of information but these may
not be regarded as substantive compliance and enforcement provisions like those in the 1995
Agreement. With the exception of that provision, it follows that the CCSBT Convention does
not provide substantively for compliance and enforcement. Indeed, this is the conclusion
reached by the first performance review of the Commission in 2008 and the second in
2014.148
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Notwithstanding that absence, the 2011 strategic plan, compliance plans and programmes,
and binding resolutions of the Commission and the Extended Commission have
supplemented this gap in the CCSBT Convention. In 1997 the CCSBT created a compliance
committee with the primary function of monitoring compliance by members and cooperating
non members. Since then the structure and functions of the committee have been amended
and the CCSBT has also adopted a suite of compliance policies and programmes.149 The
corrective actions policy for instance aims to ensure compliance of CCSBT obligations by
members and cooperating non members in a manner that ‘maintains the stability and
cohesion’ within the Commission. The policy sets out a framework for addressing non
compliance by setting guidelines for corrective actions. Where a member or cooperating non
members’ catch is in excess of their annual or multi-year national catch limit, such excess
needs to be repaid in full over an agreed time frame and the Commission may impose a
higher ratio for the payback where there are aggravating factors. Relevant aggravating factors
include the harm caused to other members and non members, continual non compliance
without good cause, or evidence of an intention to avoid CCSBT obligations.150 Theoretically
these policies are expected to strengthen compliance and enforcement initiatives but effective
implementation is the ultimate test.

5 Monitoring control and surveillance

Although the CCSBT Convention does not prescribe monitoring control and surveillance
systems that the Commission is to employ, Article 8.9 requires the Commission to develop at
the earliest opportunity, systems to monitor all fishing activities related to southern bluefin
tuna in order to accomplish two objectives. The first is the enhancement of scientific
knowledge required for conservation and management, and the second is to support effective
implementation of the convention and measures adopted by the Commission. Since its

See CCSBT Compliance Plan, 16 October 2014; CCSBT Compliance Policy Guideline 3 – Corrective
actions policy; CCSBT Compliance Policy Guideline 4 – MCS information collection and sharing; Resolution
on action plans to ensure compliance with Conservation and Management Measures, 20 – 23 October 2009;
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inception the Commission and its Extended Commission have been unhurried in adopting
monitoring control and surveillance systems.

The first tool initiated in 2000 is the trade information scheme. But the scheme focussed
attention on the trade of southern bluefin tuna and neglected the documentation of harvesting
of the stock and was not attractive to all members and cooperating non members.151In 2005
the CCSBT adopted principles to guide the development of a catch documentation scheme
(CDS) and a year later adopted the CDS resolution.152The CDS resolution requires all
members and cooperating non members to implement the CDS for southern bluefin tuna
including the documentation and tagging of such species. Apart from CDS, there are
resolutions in support of a scientific observer programme, vessel monitoring system and the
regulation of transhipments by large scale fishing vessels.

For observers, in 2001 the CCSBT endorsed proposals from its scientific committee to
establish a scientific observer programme.153The objectives of the CCSBT scientific observer
programme are to provide a framework for the alignment of members’ scientific observer
programmes with the scientific research programme, to standardise scientific observer
programmes through the fleets and amongst members, and to identify minimum standards for
the development of an observer programme for members without such programme. Coverage
of 10 percent of fishing operations is targeted. In addition to this scientific observer coverage,
there is a CCSBT regional observer programme which includes a compliance function. For
instance observers are required to monitor transhipments from authorised carrier vessels.
Observer functions on board carrier vessels include checking the validity of authorisations,
checking vessel equipment, reporting violations, and monitoring the carrier vessel’s
compliance with relevant measures adopted by the Commission.154Compared to other tuna
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RFMOs such as the WCPFC, the CCSBT regional observer programme seems to be weak
and coverage of all fishing vessels is expected to significantly strengthen compliance.

Observers aside, the CCSBT like the IATTC does not have an integrated or central Vessel
Monitoring System. In 2006 the CCSBT resolved to develop and implement a VMS but then
deferred to requiring members and cooperating non members to implement their respective
VMS for their flagged vessels catching southern bluefin tuna by 1 January 2008.155When the
next resolution on VMS was adopted the CCSBT agreed that the VMS for vessels fishing for
southern bluefin tuna would be in accordance with the VMS measures of RFMOs where the
fishing activity takes place.156 Thus a vessel fishing in the IOTC area would need to comply
with the IOTC VMS resolution, a vessel fishing in the WCPFC area, the WCPFC VMS
measure, a vessel fishing in the CCAMLR area, the CCAMLR VMS measure and so on.
Given that the VMS of these RFMOs are not the same, the CCSBT VMS may not be
considered a uniform system and relies on compliance with different rules and requirements.
On the other hand, the CCSBT VMS arrangement may be one that may influence RFMOs,
albeit weakly at this juncture, to consider a harmonised global VMS. Notwithstanding, in the
short term the CCSBT would need to enhance vessel monitoring including perhaps
establishing an integrated VMS.

6 Mechanism for high seas boarding and inspection

High seas boarding and inspections is a difficult issue within the CCSBT and rules have not
been adopted. Indeed a founding member of the CCSBT has raised concerns about the
boarding and inspection procedures in the 1995 Agreement. In the 2008 self assessment the
CCSBT suggested that since there is no convention area, the implementation of boarding and
inspection rules ‘would be complex because they would cover all oceans’. In response it is
submitted that this reasoning may be resolved by confining the exercise of high seas boarding
and inspection to specific areas.
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E.

WCPFC

1 High seas management regime

The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission convention area covers the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean and overlaps slightly with the area of competence of the IATTC.
Like the IATTC the Commission has imposed measures prohibiting activities of fishing
vessels on the high seas. In 2008 for instance the Commission decided that the purse seine
fishery on the high seas in the area bounded by 20ºN and 20ºS shall be closed to fishing on
Fish Aggregating Devices (FAD) between 1 August and 30 September.157 During that period
all purse seine vessels without an observer from the Commission’s observer programme on
board were to cease fishing and return directly to port. The duration of the prohibition on
FAD fishing has since expanded and also includes alternative arrangements that a State may
apply.158

In 2008 the Commission also agreed on a prohibition on fishing on two high seas pockets
wholly enclosed by the EEZs of surrounding coastal States from 1 January 2010. This closure
was directly influenced by the Third Implementing Arrangement of the Parties to the Nauru
Agreement. The closure of the two high seas pockets was aligned with measures in the Third
Implementing Arrangement but may not have been compatible with measures adopted within
surrounding EEZs. This is because that Arrangement only prohibited foreign fishing vessels
licensed to fish in the EEZ from fishing in the high seas pockets. The prohibition on fishing
on the high seas pockets may have been seen as a conservation measure to among others
things support greater recruitment into the EEZ but also concentrate fishing activity within
EEZs. In 2008 the Commission also stated that at its sixth session in 2009, it would consider
closing all high seas areas between 20ºN and 20ºS. As a response to several fishing States
including the concerns of the Philippines, the Commission in 2009 initially decided to grant
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an exemption to the Philippines’ traditional fresh/ice chilled fishing vessels operating as a
group, and in 2012 agreed not to continue with the high seas pocket closures.159

With respect to high seas areas surrounded entirely by EEZ of a single State, the
Commission’s area of competence include two distinct pockets surrounded by the EEZ of
New Zealand, and possibly a third pocket surrounded entirely by the EEZ of Japan.160Both
New Zealand and Japan are prominent in the deliberations of the Commission and have not
shown any concerns with the application of measures covering all high seas areas. It may
therefore be submitted that the practice of the Commission appears to have surpassed
requirement for cooperation in Article 16 of the 1995 Agreement. In this manner the
obligation between the fishing State(s) and the coastal State to cooperate in establishing
measures for highly migratory fish stocks and monitoring compliance has been arguably
made subordinate to the mandate of the Commission.

More over through in its decision in 2008 to close two high seas pockets, the Commission
may have introduced a novel practice in the management of high seas areas surrounded by
EEZs of more than one State. In the interests of compatibility with measures adopted by
coastal States for fishing access to their EEZs, the Commission effectively removes the
already qualified freedom to fish for highly migratory fish stocks of its members, cooperating
non members and Parties to the 1995 Agreement. This has led one to suggest a possible shift
toward mare clausum.161

In addition, the Commission in 2010 agreed to set aside the eastern high seas pocket of the
area of application of the WCPF Convention as a ‘special management area’.162The ‘special
management area’ a first of its kind for tuna RFMOs was established following a joint
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proposal from the Cook Islands, France on behalf of French Polynesia, and Kiribati, whose
respective EEZs completely surround the pocket. The rationale for the establishment of such
an area is the increased illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activity within the pocket.
Associated with the special management area are reporting and monitoring obligations.
Firstly, flag States are to require their vessels to submit reports at least six hours before entry
and no later than six hours before exiting the high seas pocket. Reports are to contain
information on the estimated catch (kilograms) on board the vessel. Secondly each fishing
vessel entering the pocket must have vessel monitoring equipment in operation and the
Commission secretariat would permit monitoring of the fishing vessel through the satellite
reliant monitoring system by the neighbouring coastal States, and maintain a near real time
list of all vessel active within the pocket. Within the special management area, the fishing
vessel must report to its flag State as well as the Commission, supporting concurrent
monitoring responsibilities.

2 Functions

The functions of the Commission are supported by Article 10 of the WCPF Convention, an
amalgam of Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the 1995 Agreement, and supplemented through
conservation and management measures. The functions of the Commission exercised over the
area of application are without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States for the
purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing highly migratory fish stocks
within respective EEZs.

3 Application of principles

Before the establishment of the WCPFC, the need for further fisheries research and collection
of data to obtain good science in support of the application of the precautionary approach was
identified by a scientific meeting in the region. The Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish
indicated in 1998 that:
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The current levels of funding support for data collection, research and stock
assessment of tuna fisheries of the western central Pacific are insufficient (< 1% of the
value of the catch). Funding support will need to be increased substantially to allow
management of this valuable fishery to be guided by good science. ... One response to
[this] uncertainty is to reduce catch or fishing effort in order to reduce the risk that a
limit or target reference point is exceeded. A second, longer-term response to
uncertainty is to reduce it by investment in carefully targeted data collection and
research.163

Given the explicit inclusion of contemporary principles in the WCPF Convention and in
binding measures, the precautionary approach and other principles are being implemented at
the Commission level and by members and cooperating non members at the national level.

4 Compliance and enforcement

Responsibilities related to compliance and enforcement within the WCPF Commission is
shared between members and cooperating non members, the technical and compliance
committee, and the Commission. Within the Commission compliance is monitored primarily
by the technical and compliance committee, a subsidiary body which provides
recommendations, among other things, on the implementation of and compliance with the
WCPF Convention and conservation and management measures.164 Members and
cooperating non members have the primary responsibility for enforcing the WCPF
Convention and measures issued by the Commission.165 Where a fishing vessel flagged to a
member or cooperating non member is alleged to have contravened the WCPF Convention or
any measure of the Commission, that State or entity is required to fully investigate the matter
and report the outcome of the investigation and any action taken or proposed to be taken.

In addition, the Commission adopted a measure to establish a compliance with management
measures committee, akin to similar committees or working groups in other tuna RFMOs,
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that would function within the framework of the technical and compliance committee.166 The
compliance with measures committee assesses reports from each member on the
implementation of the WCPF Convention and measures adopted by the Commission.
Although the compliance committee is still considered in its infancy at the time of writing, its
objective and scope of functions is expected to gradually grow to a point that it would be
recommending penalties for non compliance with obligations. It is noteworthy that this
concept of sanctioning a member for non compliance with the WCPF Convention or
measures may not have been envisaged by the drafters of the convention. Indeed, the only
sanction prescribed in the text is a ban from participating in decision making when the
payment of financial contributions to the Commission are in arrears for the preceding two full
years.167Before the introduction of the compliance with measures committee, the primary
responsibility for enforcement was with the member concerned, and the member is obliged to
report and to take action and cooperate in furthering the objectives of the WCPF Convention.
Recent developments appear to be shifting some of the enforcement responsibility to the
Commission so that it would then be in a position to sanction a non compliant member or
cooperating non member.

Thus the Commission seems to be broadening its responsibility in relation to compliance and
enforcement. In Chapter III, it is suggested that the Commission’s oversight role in
monitoring compliance and placing sanctions on a non compliant member or cooperating non
member, appears to be extending into the EEZ and potentially into the territory. It is put that
this role of the Commission is likely to be more substantive in relation to fishing or related
activities on the high seas. This seems to be due to the fact that it may be easier for the
international community to place an obligation, even if only a moral one, and hold
accountable a tuna RFMO or international organisation rather than a State or entity. On the
issue of responsibility, the ITLOS dictum discussed in Chapter III is equally pertinent.168

5 Monitoring control and surveillance
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Through the WCPF Convention and conservation and management measures the
Commission employs several monitoring control and surveillance tools.169 A unique tool is
the vessel monitoring system. During the Multilateral High Level Conference process to
negotiate the WCPF Convention, there was an underlying concern amongst FFA Members of
the implications of the Commission VMS covering the entire convention area. The concern
seems to be based on two grounds. Firstly, that including national waters within the
Commission VMS gives the Commission some reach into a coastal State’s EEZ and is
perceived as undermining the sovereign rights of that coastal State. Secondly, by allowing for
the extension of the Commission VMS a coastal State may be seen as not capable of
effectively exercising its sovereign right to manage fisheries in its EEZ. To the contrary, there
is the opposing view that allowing access strengthens the capability of the coastal State in
managing the fisheries. Regardless, the scope of the Commission VMS in the convention was
restricted to the high seas, with a proviso that coastal States may request in writing that the
Commission VMS apply to its EEZ.170 Hitherto a few States have chosen to ‘open’ their
EEZs to the Commission VMS but the majority remain sceptical. The effect of the restriction
on the application of the Commission VMS to the high seas only is that the Commission
itself will not be able to view the authorised vessel if it enters an EEZ. From a compliance
perspective, the coastal State cannot rely on the Commission VMS to see the vessel in its
waters. This lacunae has led some coastal States to require that all vessels entering waters
under its jurisdiction report in one form or other to its authorities, thereby maintaining the
delineation with the Commission VMS. However for those States that have allowed
Commission VMS access to their waters, there is visibility of all authorised vessels within
such waters.

6 Mechanism for high seas boarding and inspection
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The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission is the first tuna RFMO to adopt
measures providing for high seas boarding and inspection based on the 1995 Agreement.171
By adopting a high seas boarding and inspection procedures, the WCPFC effectively creates
an additional exception to the ‘exclusivity’ of flag State jurisdiction over its vessel on the
high seas. Traditionally, inspections on the high seas are only permitted in certain
circumstances.172These inspections do not extend to any foreign vessel, whether they are
fishing vessels or not. The high seas boarding and inspection regime of the WCPFC however
seems to be extending the traditional practice to any fishing vessel on the high seas. A refusal
to accept boarding and inspection may lead to the presumption that the vessel has been or is
engaged in IUU fishing.173

IV. PERCEIVED CONTRIBUTIONS OF TUNA RFMOs TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. Mechanisms for the Development and Implementation of International
Fisheries Management Regime for Highly Migratory Fish Stocks on the
High Seas

Tuna RFMOs now appear to be positioned at the apex of the international regime for the
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the high seas, implementing
the 1982 LOSC in particular Articles 64 and 116 – 119, and the 1995 Agreement. While the
IATTC was established in 1950 and the ICCAT in 1969, the establishment of the CCSBT,
IOTC and the WCPFC since the 1990s ensures global management coverage in the
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks. Notwithstanding, management
objectives differ. The most recent constituent instruments of tuna RFMOs in the WCPF
Convention and the Antigua Convention both support the long term conservation and
sustainable use. In contrast the CCSBT and IOTC have the goals of achieving optimum
171
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utilisation and conservation of the stocks. ICCAT on the other hand has the general objective
to maintain stocks at levels that allow for maximum sustainable yield. Despite these
differences in management goals and objectives, each tuna RFMO appears to have some
flexibility, albeit with internal differences, to determine programmes and measures that may
be used to strengthen management.

Although management objectives differ, there is an emerging trend in the range of
management initiatives that are applied to high seas fisheries. Management initiatives include
time area closures, gear restrictions, and general requirements for high seas fishing such as
vessel markings, enlistment on a positive vessel list, compliance with observer requirement,
and vessel monitoring system. In addition, there may be specific requirements such as the
establishment by the WCPFC of the eastern high seas pocket special management area. With
that area, specific reporting, vessel monitoring and compliance obligations arise. Tuna
RFMOs may therefore be considered the mechanisms for developing and implementing
management regimes for highly migratory fish stocks in the high seas. Their functions in
constitutive and other instruments are generally harmonised and aligned with the framework
in the 1995 Agreement. Moreover, tuna RFMO practice reveals a pleasantly surprising level
of flexibility which has evolved beyond what is envisaged in their respective constituent
instruments.

There does not appear to be any doubt that tuna RFMOs are now recognised as the
mechanisms for the development and implementation of international fisheries management
measures for highly migratory fish stocks. Ad hoc arrangements which characterised
management prior to the existence of tuna RFMOs have been replaced by international
organisations mandated to manage highly migratory fish stocks within their respective areas
of competence yet continually collaborating to promote harmonisation of procedures and
measures to attain their common goal.

B. Creation of an additional exception to freedom of fishing on the high seas

Freedom of fishing is not only subject to treaty obligations but also the conservation and
management measures of a tuna RFMO. Such an exception extends beyond what the 1995
195

Agreement provides, because the requirements of that treaty appears to remain aligned to the
pacta tertiis rule.174The practice of tuna RFMOs in the listing of vessels presumed to be
engaged in IUU fishing seems to extend to all States regardless of whether they are party to
the 1982 LOSC, 1995 Agreement or the relevant tuna RFMO.175 It follows that despite
potential challenges, the practice of tuna RFMOs in adopting measures for its members yet
enforcing compliance on all vessels, does appear to lend support to the point that an
exception is emerging. Unless there are protests or objections by affected States, the
exception will eventually enter the corpus of customary international law.

C. Qualified Freedom of Fishing

In addition to the creation of an additional exception to freedom of fishing on the high seas,
tuna RFMOs have qualified the freedom of fishing on the high seas. The 1958 High Seas
Convention and the 1958 Fishing Convention both recognised the customary international
law freedom of fishing that belongs to all States. Both provide for a qualified freedom, the
former treaty stating that the freedoms are exercised in accordance with its provisions and
with due regard for the interests of other States, and the latter treaty subjecting the freedom to
treaty obligations, the rights and interests of coastal States, and responsibilities relating to the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas. Similar to the 1958 Fishing Convention,
the 1982 LOSC qualifies the freedom of fishing against treaty obligations, the rights and
interests of coastal States that are provided for instance in Article 63.2 and Articles 64 to 67,
and provisions relating to the conservation of living resources of the high seas. The 1995
Agreement in implementing Articles 63 and 64 of the 1982 LOSC set the bar high in terms of
qualifying the freedom further. One effect is that States Parties to the 1995 Agreement that
are not members of a tuna RFMO are not discharged from their obligation to cooperate. Thus
a State that is a party to the 1995 Agreement but not a member or participant to the WCPFC,
for instance, must not authorise its fishing vessel to fish in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean for tuna or tuna-like species.
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Tuna RFMOs established also have a level of flexibility and may introduce requirements and
initiatives for fishing and related activity on the high seas. Examples include time area
closures, gear restrictions, and the requirement to be on the list of authorised vessels. A
fishing vessel flagged to a third State that is not on the list of authorised vessels of a tuna
RFMO may be listed on the organisation’s IUU fishing vessel list. Similarly the failure of the
fishing vessel of a third State to comply with the reporting requirement may result in the
same predicament.176

In the conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks on the high seas, tuna
RFMOs are in fact introducing requirements and management initiatives that gradually
diminish the already qualified freedom of all States to fish on the high seas. Notwithstanding
the customary international law pacta tertiis rule, the freedom to fish on the high seas of even
States that are not party to the 1995 Agreement or the 1982 LOSC is challenged. It therefore
seems probable that the contribution of tuna RFMOs in restricting the freedom of third States
to fish on the high seas may be the subject of dispute settlement in the future.

D. Mechanism for the Determination of the Nature and Extent of Participatory
Rights to high seas fisheries

The allocation and participatory rights of contracting Parties, cooperating non contracting
parties, entities and fishing entities (with the exception of the IOTC) is determined by tuna
RFMOs for specified stocks within their respective areas of competence. Unlike the previous
situation when a flag State has the authority to determine participatory rights, tuna RFMOs
now determine the amount to be allocated and the nature and extent of participatory rights to
highly migratory fish stocks in the high seas. This is particularly relevant in the case of non
contracting parties or third States that agree to cooperate and are granted such status. In some
cases the cooperating third State is not granted participatory rights for fishing on the high
seas for highly migratory fish stocks but may seek authorisation to fish within the EEZ of a
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coastal State in the region.177 High seas fishing rights may also be restricted to specific levels
of fishing effort, certain species, or specific gear types or activities in support of fishing.178

E. Implementation of Contemporary Principles of Fisheries Management

The application of contemporary principles in waters under national jurisdiction is addressed
in chapter III. For the present purposes it is sufficient to say that despite the fact that most
constituent instruments of tuna RFMOs are dated, contemporary principles are being applied
by such organisations to high seas fisheries. Despite slight variations in their respective
objectives for management, tuna RFMOs have embraced the broad objective of long term
sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks thereby affirming the 1995 Agreement. While
management objectives refer to the goals of optimum utilisation and maximum sustainable
yield, as identified in the 1982 LOSC, it is suggested that there is some convergence in tuna
RFMO practice to achieve the common goal. All now explicitly support the use of best
science available or the best scientific information for management, as well as the protection
of biological diversity, ecosystem considerations, and the applicable of the precautionary
approach. The practice of tuna RFMOs and their respective contracting parties and
cooperating non parties, entities and fishing entities in implementing such principles broaden
the scope and legitimises the inclusion of principles such as the precautionary approach in
customary international law obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment.

Of the contemporary principles in the 1995 Agreement and reflected in tuna RFMO
instruments, the least implemented appears to be the requirement for compatibility. One
reason for this is that some States are of the view that highly migratory fish stocks are to be
managed throughout their range regardless of national maritime zones and so tuna RFMO
measures for a stock applies wherever the stocks traverse. This is the globalist view. Another
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reason is the absence of clear international guidelines on compatibility and how it is achieved
and the lack of political will within the tuna RFMO. A third view is that coastal State
measures for the EEZ may set a high standard that is difficult to replicate for the high seas, or
vice versa. Finally, there may be an unwillingness by members and cooperating non members
within the tuna RFMO to develop measures for the high seas that are compatible with coastal
State measures for the EEZ.

F. Establishment of International Monitoring, Control and Surveillance
Framework

Each tuna RFMO utilises a range of monitoring control and surveillance tools on the high
seas including the use of observers, vessel monitoring system, inspection of vessels at sea,
and the requirement for port inspections. It has been shown that although all tuna RFMOs
have established observer programmes, there are similarities but also significant differences
in the scope of some programmes. For instance, the IATTC emphasises scientific observers
as opposed to the inclusion of compliance roles in the observer programmes of the WCPFC
and ICCAT among others. While there are differences on the scope of the monitoring tools
applied, through these international organisations, State practice is emerging. Flag States for
instance are mandated to ensure that their flagged fishing vessels are appropriately marked,
authorised, and comply with the observer and vessel monitoring requirements. By default,
tuna RFMOs have established an international framework for the monitoring and control of
fishing vessels engaged in fishing or related activity on the high seas.

The WCPFC is unique in that its VMS is confined to high seas areas. However, a coastal
State member may explicitly request that the WCPFC VMS extend to areas under its national
jurisdiction. In such circumstance, both the coastal State and the WCPFC secretariat may be
able to monitor the activities WCPFC authorised fishing vessels within the waters of the
requesting coastal State.

Along the same line, collaboration between the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organisation and the International Maritime Organisation in the monitoring of fishing vessels
led to the approval to extend the Universal Vessel Identifier (UVI) to fishing vessels in 2013.
That year the IMO Assembly agreed to a proposal to include fishing vessels of 100 gross
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tonnage and above in the IMO Ship Identification Number Scheme through IMO Resolution
A.1078 (28). Tuna RFMOs are already requiring all authorised fishing vessels to comply with
the UVI requirement in order to enhance the monitoring of a vessel throughout its life. Flag
States and coastal States alike in turn are to benefit.

G. Addition of Fishing Vessels to the Right of Visit on the High Seas

By far the most contentious tool is high seas boarding and inspection modelled on the
provisions of the 1995 Agreement. The WCPFC high seas boarding and inspection
procedures is the benchmark for tuna RFMOs. States in other tuna RFMOs have suggested
that high seas boarding and inspection schemes are part of the existing mechanism for
monitoring control and surveillance and, despite suggestions to the contrary, there are no
comparable alternatives.

It has been observed that for RFMOs in accordance with the 1995 Agreement, that their
‘…obligations are bolstered by a boarding, inspection and enforcement regime which exceed
that directed to even more serious international maladies such as drug running, human
trafficking, the smuggling of migrants, and the transport of biological, chemical and nuclear
weapons’..179 Members of RFMOs under high seas boarding and inspection schemes can
board and inspect vessels of any State Party to the 1995 Agreement regardless of whether the
vessel is flagged to a member of the RFMO or otherwise.

H. Establishment of an International Enforcement Framework

Connected to the establishment of an international MCS framework is the apparent role of
tuna RFMOs in developing an international enforcement framework. The components of such
a framework may include the role and responsibilities of flag States in enforcement, the
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, above n 6, 324; See also Churchill and Lowe,
above n 6, 310; Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (Cambridge University Press,
2009), 106.
179
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responsibilities of coastal States, high seas boarding and inspection schemes identified
earlier, and the establishment of IUU lists. With respect to flag States, tuna RFMOs appear to
promote greater accountability of flag States in the monitoring and control of flagged vessels,
and require proactive measures to ensure that flagged vessels do not undermine conservation
and management measures. In circumstances where a vessel is alleged to have undermined
such measures, the flag State once notified is to investigate, take necessary action and report
on such action. This is a change from the situation where there is no organisation responsible
for the management of stocks on the high seas, virtually no measures to comply with (apart
from those imposed by the flag), and no mechanism to compel the flag State to take action.
Accountability is an essential tenet of the tuna RFMO enforcement framework. In each tuna
RFMO, accountability of all States, the REIO and the fishing entity, is promoted through the
identification of a contravention of obligations under constituent instruments as well as
binding measures. Perhaps the most effective tool within the enforcement framework is the
IUU listing measures. Tuna RFMOs or international organisations for that matter traditionally
did not have any enforcement powers as there are within the domain of sovereign States. But
the IUU listing of vessels in itself is a sanction for the vessel and its flag for
noncompliance.180 Finally the implementation of high seas boarding and inspection schemes
is expected to provide a platform for monitoring and, where required, the taking of measures
to enforce compliance.

I. Management of High Seas Enclaves/Pockets surrounded entirely by EEZs
of more than one coastal State

The management of high seas enclaves or pockets surrounded by EEZs of more than one
coastal State is novel among RFMOs. It is recalled that the 1995 Agreement only makes
provision for areas of high seas surrounded entirely by waters under the national jurisdiction
of a single State.181 Tuna RFMO practice, in particular the WCPFC, in relation to providing
measures specifically for high seas pockets such as closure of fishing by purse seine vessels
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in various pockets, and the institution of management requirements for specially managed
high seas areas surrounded entirely by the EEZs of more than one State, such as the WCPFC
Eastern high seas special management area, illustrates emerging practice which may
complement State practice elsewhere.182 Such was not envisaged in the 1995 Agreement and
is considered a precedent in international fisheries management as well as in international
fisheries law. It also demonstrates how tuna RFMOs are utilised to manage high seas areas
particularly affecting the interests of adjacent coastal States.

J. Management of High Seas Pockets surrounded entirely by EEZ of a coastal
State

In contrast, tuna RFMOs appear to be departing from the provisions of the 1995 Agreement
in relation to the management of highly migratory fish stocks in high seas areas surrounded
entirely by the EEZ of a single State. The 1995 Agreement provides for cooperation between
the coastal State and States fishing in that high seas pocket. This provision in the 1995
Agreement reflects State practice spanning a few decades where fishing States entered into
treaties with the coastal State concerned to access fish stocks in the high seas pockets.183With
the establishment of tuna RFMOs, it appears that the coastal State concerned may defer to the
tuna RFMO to provide management measures in all high seas areas within its area of
competence. An example may be found in the practice of New Zealand in respect of two high
seas pockets surrounded entirely by its EEZ. Given that New Zealand has not insisted on text
that excludes its enclosed high seas pockets in WCPFC conservation and management
measures, it seems that there is consent, albeit implicit, to the commission’s responsibility
over such pockets.184 By changing the management regime for such high seas pockets, the
WCPFC and other tuna RFMOs depart from the 1995 Agreement. This divergence may not
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necessarily be challenged by affected coastal States if such States support the need for the
management of highly migratory fish stocks throughout their range.

V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The freedom of fishing and the jurisdiction of a flag State over its vessel on the high seas,
both of which have been long recognised in customary international law, are gradually
changing. Tuna RFMO decisions and measures that are implemented by States impact on the
jurisdiction of flag States on the high seas and challenges the primacy of flag State
jurisdiction. There is also a significant impact on the freedom to fish through the adoption of
requirements for fishing and prohibitions which have been extended to third States without
their consent. Also, the long standing freedom of navigation on the high seas is encroached
by tuna RFMO measures which require prior authorisation, the satisfaction of vessel and gear
requirements as well as compulsory reporting at all times. A conclusion that tuna RFMOs
play a significant role in the governance of fishing on the high seas is reasonable.

While this chapter has briefly identified the implications of tuna RFMOs on the freedoms of
third States on the high seas, it is a subject that extends beyond. At the heart is the customary
international law rule known as the pacta tertiis rule. Simply put, a State that is not a party to
a treaty does not have any rights or obligations under that treaty without its consent. Chapter
V is devoted to the impact of tuna RFMOs on third States and whether customary
international law is being challenged.

203

V
Third States
I.

INTRODUCTION

Although third States are a concern for RFMOs generally, tuna RFMOs have developed
mechanisms for the participation of third States as parties or cooperating non-parties. The
objective of this chapter is to determine the contribution of tuna RFMOs to international law
on third States. This is undertaken through an analysis of tuna RFMO constituent instruments
and decisions and the resultant influence on the practice of States vis-à-vis third States.

While a useful endeavour, it is not the intention of this chapter to examine why States do not
become parties to a treaty.1 That is a decision made by a sovereign State upon its evaluation
of the benefits and implications of being a party. Nor is there an analysis of why States do not
become a party to an RFMO or cooperate with its terms. Neither will there be a survey of
States that are not party to relevant instruments such as the 1982 LOSC and the 1995
Agreement.2 Despite being labelled as the constitution for the oceans and its wide acceptance,
the 1982 LOSC has yet to attract universal acceptance, although there is no doubt that its

In relation to fisheries treaties, see for instance Tore Henriksen, ‘Revisiting the Freedom of Fishing and Legal
Obligations on States Not Party to Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (2009) 40 Ocean
Development & International Law 80 – 96, 87 – 92; Erik J Molenaar, ‘Non-participation in the Fish Stocks
Agreement: Status and Reasons’ (2011) 26 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 195 – 234.
2
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1245
(entered into force 16 November 1994), hereinafter ‘1982 LOSC’; Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for
signature 4 August 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542 (entered into force 11 December 2001), hereinafter ‘1995 Agreement’.
This information is contained in the status of instruments published by the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and
the Law of the Sea <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/status2010.pdf >.
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acceptance is near universal.3 In comparison, the 1995 Agreement has hitherto only attracted
82 parties.4

This chapter first examines general international law relating to third States and highlights
exceptions to the classic rule. This is followed by an analysis of international fisheries
instruments, especially the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement. The third part is devoted to
tuna RFMO constituent instruments and practice relating to third States. In the fourth part an
evaluation of the perceived contribution of tuna RFMOs to international law is made.

II.

GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

A. Classic Rule

The classic rule in international law is that treaties only bind parties and do not create rights
or obligations for third parties: pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt (or the “pacta tertiis
rule”). This rule upholds voluntarism as an important precept in international law and is
entrenched in article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.5 In its
commentary on the pacta tertiis rule, the International Law Commission stated that, “(t)here
is abundant evidence of the recognition of (this) rule in State practice and in the decisions of
international tribunals, as well as in the writings of jurists.”6 This principle has been
recognised in the practice of States as fundamental and several writers have provided their
affirmation.7 There is no dispute that the classic rule requires the consent of a third party for a
treaty to be binding on such party. The rule also equates treaties to contracts under domestic

3

At the time of writing, there are 166 Parties to the 1982 LOSC. In comparison, there are 193 Member States of
the United Nations <http://www.un.org/en/member-states/index.html>.
4
Above n 2.
5
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679
(1969) (entered into force 27 January 1980), hereafter ‘VCLT’.
6
Report of the ILC on the Second Part of its Seventeenth Session and on its Eighteenth Session, in 1966
Yearbook of ILC, vol. II, p.226.
7
See for instance: Allen Boyle and Christine Chinkin The Making of International Law, (Oxford University
Press, 2007) 238 – 240; Ronald Roxburgh, International Conventions and Third States ( Longmans, Green &
Co, 1917); M Fitzmaurice, 2002, Third Parties and the Law of Treaties, in: J A Frowein and Rudiger Wolfrum
(eds.) Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 6: 37 – 137.
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laws, without the requirement for consideration for treaties.8 It also denies third parties any
autonomous law-making effect on the treaty in question.9

The VCLT provides three exceptions to the classic rule. The first is that obligations are only
imposed on a third State if the parties to a treaty so intend and the third State expressly
accepts such obligation in writing.10 Effectively an agreement alongside the treaty is created
vis-à-vis the third State. This is considered in detail in this chapter in the practice of tuna
RFMOs dealing with cooperating non-contracting parties or cooperating non-members. The
second exception is that rights can be conferred on third States where the parties to a treaty so
intend and the third State assents.11 Third State assent may not necessarily be in writing and
is presumed unless there is evidence otherwise.12

The third exception in the VCLT is one based on morals. A treaty is void if it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of jus cogens.13 A peremptory norm of general
international law is “a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character”.14 For example, third States that are not party to the Genocide Convention are
nevertheless bound by the peremptory norm and must not engage in, support or condone the
crime of genocide.15

Put another way, treaty rules become binding on third States after having acquired the status
of a customary norm of international law. Circumstances in which treaty rules may acquire

8

See the historical analysis of Sir Ronald Roxburgh, ibid.
Boyle and Chinkin, above n75.
10
VCLT art 35.
11
VCLT art 36: 1.A right arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the
provision to accord that right either to the third State, or to a group of States to which it belongs, or to all States,
and the third State assents thereto. Its assent shall be presumed so long as the contrary is not indicated, unless
the treaty otherwise provides.
12
An example is article 38 of the LOSC which provide for the right of transit passage through international
straits for “all ships and aircraft”. But note however the statements of delegations, in particular the G77 at the
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea that the provisions do not give rise to rights or
obligations on third States. Statements are quoted in L T Lee, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States’
(1983) 77(3) American Journal of International Law, July 1983, 541 – 568.
13
VCLT art 53.
14
Ibid.
15
See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Advisory
Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep .23. Brownlie, above n X, 596; Antonio Cassese, International Law (Oxford
University Press, 2nd edn, 2005) 442 – 444.
9
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the status of customary norms were authoritatively laid by the ICJ in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases.16 In summary, in that case the ICJ decided that to be a customary
norm the treaty rule must be of “fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be
regarded as forming the basis of a general rule of law”, the rule must have received
widespread and representative support, and State practice in relation to the rule should be
extensive and virtually uniform.17 The burden of proving the formation of a new rule of
customary law is on the States so asserting. Churchill and Lowe posit that there needs to be
sufficient general acceptance of the treaty rules by non-parties, coupled with the necessary
opinio juris , or by Parties acting in a manner evidencing a belief that the treaty rules
represent not merely treaty obligations but also customary law.18 The freedom to fish on the
high seas subject to treaty obligations is an example of a customary norm that is contained in
treaties.19
Decisions of the Permanent Court of International Justice support the pacta tertiis rule.20 By
way of illustration, in its 1925 decision in the Case concerning certain German interests in
Polish Upper Silesia, the PCIJ stated, “a treaty only creates law as between the States which
are parties to it; in case of doubt, no rights can be deduced from it in favour of third States.”21
The PCIJ’s successor has upheld the legal framework established by the VCLT with regard to
treaties and third states.22

16

North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3. See also Nicaragua (Merits) Case [1986] ICJ Rep 3.
17
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 1969 ICJ Rep, 41 – 44.
18
Robin Churchill and Vaughan Lowe, The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd edn, 1999) 8.
19
1958 Convention on the High Seas, art 2; 1982 LOSC, arts 87 & 116.
20
See, inter alia: The case of the S.S. “Lotus”(Judgement) [1927] PCIJ (Ser A) No 10, 14 “international law
governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States therefore emanate from
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law
and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a
view to the achievement of common aims.” Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex
(Judgement) [1932] PCIJ (Ser A/B) No 46, 39 “it is certain that, in any case, Article 435 of the Treaty of
Versailles is not binding upon Switzerland, who is not a Party to that Treaty, except to the extent to which that
country accepted it.” These decisions of the PCIJ are all available online at:<
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions.htm>. See generally E Jimenez de Arechaga, 1956, Treaty
Stipulations in Favor of Third States, American Journal of International Law, 50(2), April 1956, 338 – 357 for a
good discussion on the PCIJ decision in the Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex PCIJ
Series A/B, Nos 22 & 46.
21
Judgement, 25 August 1925, Ser. A., No. 7, at 25.
22
See, inter alia: ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co (United Kingdom vs Iran), (Judgment) 22 July 1952, at 109 “a third
party treaty, independent and isolated from the basic treaty, can not produce any effect as between the United
Kingdom and Iran: it is res inter alios acta.” < http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/16/1997.pdf> ; ICJ, North Sea
Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany vs. Netherlands)(Judgement) 20 February 1969, [28], 26 and
ICJ, North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany vs. Denmark) (Judgement), 20 February 1969,
[28], 26 “in principle, when a number of States, including the one whose conduct is invoked, and those invoking
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Aside from the VCLT exceptions, there is an additional exception in dispositive treaties.
Unlike the exception of jus cogens, this exception is based on a functional rather than moral
basis.23 Although such treaties may establish boundaries or an international legal regime and
be concluded between two or more States, they create obligations erga omnes binding on all
other States. Treaties establishing boundaries include terrestrial boundary agreements and
maritime boundary agreements. In contrast, a treaty establishing an international legal regime
may for instance establish communication rights through international waterways. The PCIJ
in considering the Kiel Canal in the SS Wimbledon Case, agreed that the waterway, “…has
ceased to be an internal and national navigable waterway, the use of which by the vessels of
other states other than the riparian state is left entirely to the discretion of that state, and that
it has become an international waterway intended to provide under treaty guarantee easier
access to the Baltic for the benefit of all nations of the world.”24
Some writers differentiate between an external pacta tertiis and internal pacta tertiis.25 The
former relates to the application of the rule vis-à-vis third States outside the treaty framework
while the latter applies within. An example of internal pacta tertiis in the current context is
the opposition of a State party to a binding decision of the tuna RFMO. In general, the
opposing State is not expected to be bound by such a decision in accord with the rules of
decision-making.26This view appears to be at odds with the notion that a State is bound to
measures of an RFMO upon ratifying, acceding to or accepting the constitutive instrument at
the outset. On evaluation it is possible for internal pacta tertiis rule and in such cases, the
critical consent to be bound is distinct and separate matter altogether. The internal third State

it, have drawn up a convention specifically providing for a particular method by which the intention to become
bound by the regime of the convention is to be manifested, namely by the carrying out of certain prescribed
formalities (ratification, accession), it is not lightly to be presumed that a State which has not carried out these
formalities, though at all times fully able and entitled to do so, has nevertheless somehow become bound in
another way.” < http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf> and
<http://www.icjcij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=3&k=e2&case=51&code=cs&p3=4> respectively.
23
Boyle and Chinkin, above n 7, 239.
24
UK, France, Italy and Japan v. Germany [1923] PCIJ (ser A) No 1, 22. [Günther Handl, 1997, Regional
Arrangements and Third State Vessels: Is the Pacta Tertiis Principle being Modified? in Henrik Ringbom ed.,
Competing Norms In The Law Of Marine Environment Protection 217.]
25
See for example E Franckx, 2000. Pacta Tertiis and the Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, 5. Available online at:
http://www.fao.org/legal/prsol/ lpo8.pdf (accessed: 23 September 2013).
26
See decision-making rules of tuna RFMOs, such as Article 20 WCPF Convention and Rules of Procedure.
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in relation to that decision as it were would not be bound without its consent or in accordance
with the rules for decision making of the tuna RFMO. (implied and expressed)

B. International Fisheries Instruments

The 1982 LOSC does not explicitly provide for third States, aside from the provisions on
signature, ratification and formal confirmation, and accession extended to all States, and
various articles providing rights for States.27 Be that as it may the LOSC contains several
provisions that are now part of the corpus of customary international law, such as the freedom
to fish on the high seas, the exclusive economic zone (or exclusive fishing zone) regime,28
and sovereignty of a coastal State over its internal waters, archipelagic waters and territorial
sea. Since these are part of customary international law, they are binding on all States.

In the 1995 Agreement, third States are explicitly accommodated in Articles 17 and 33 and in
the broad references to “States” throughout the text.29Although certain articles in the
Agreement may appear to negate the pacta tertiis rule, a close analysis proves otherwise.30
With respect to language that appears to bind States such as in Article 8(3) bestowing a duty
on all States harvesting straddling or highly migratory fish stocks on the high seas to apply
conservation and management measures adopted by a subregional or regional fisheries
management organisation, Article 17(2) obliging non-members of an such organisation not to
authorise its vessels to harvest the said stocks, and Article 17(3) requiring non-member to
cooperate in the implementation of measures. Regardless of the language used that appears to
bind both member and non-member States, ultimately, the classical rule applies. As it was
aptly put:

LOSC arts 305 – 307. See generally Lee, L. T., 1983, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States,
American Journal of International Law, 77(3), July 1983, 541 – 568; Vasciannie, S, 1989, Part XI of the Law of
the Sea Convention and Third States: Some General Observations, Cambridge Law Journal, 48(1), March 1989,
85 – 97.
28
In the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) [1982] ICJ Rep 18, [100],
the Court said that “the concept of the exclusive economic zone…may be regarded as part of modern
international law”.
29
See for instance the distinction in the meaning of “State Parties” in art 1.2, and references to “States” and
“coastal State” and “flag State” in arts 3.2, 3.3, 4 - 29.
30
See in particular art 8(3) and (4), 21(1), 21(3). A good analysis is contained in Franckx, 2000, above n 25.
27
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[s]uch language is designed to create obligations for non-parties to the 1995
Agreement, but mere semantics cannot overcome the principle that treaties are only
binding upon ratifying states.31

The linkage between the 1995 Agreement and tuna RFMOs has strengthened in recent years
as tuna RFMOs established before 1995 have adopted new constituent instruments and
binding decisions to accommodate contemporary principles and initiatives in the 1995
Agreement.

Given the fisheries treaties in existence and the fact that States may be party to one or more
treaty, or none at all, in analysing the rights and obligations of third States the following
scenarios are used:

(1) States party to the 1982 LOSC but not party to the 1995 Agreement or the RFMO
and not cooperating with the RFMO;

(2) States party to the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement only;

(3) States party to the 1995 Agreement only;

(4) States party to the RFMO constituent instrument only;

(5) States not party to the 1982 LOSC and any other fisheries treaty;

(6) States not party to the 1982 LOSC and any other fisheries treaty but cooperating
with relevant RFMO.

In scenario (1), a State is bound by the provisions contained the 1982 LOSC. For the current
purpose, obligations include a general obligation to cooperate in the conservation of fisheries
on the high seas, and the obligation to take measures against nationals fishing on the high
31

Orebech, P., Sigurjonsson, K. & McDorman, T. 1998. The 1995 United Nations Straddling and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks Agreement: Management, Enforcement and Dispute Settlement, 13 International Journal
of Marine and Coastal Law 119, 121.
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seas.32 A third State not party to the 1995 Agreement or the constituent instrument of a tuna
RFMO, or not cooperating with such RFMO is bound only by the general obligation in the
1982 LOSC. It follows that that third State may not be required to comply with specific
measures or decisions of an RFMO without its explicit consent.

For scenario (2), the third State not party to a tuna RFMO constituent instrument or
cooperating with such RFMO, is bound by the general obligations in the 1982 LOSC, and the
obligations arising from the 1995 Agreement. As a party to the 1995 Agreement, the third
State is not discharged from the specific obligation to cooperate with a tuna RFMO that it
may not be a member of or cooperating with. In terms of resultant obligations on the third
State, scenario (3) is similar to (2) – the third State is obligated to cooperate with measures of
the tuna RFMO and is not to authorise its vessels to fish for species regulated by that RFMO.

Where a State is not party to the 1982 LOSC or the 1995 Agreement but is a party to the
RFMO instrument, all specific obligations for the RFMO apply (scenario (4)). Although not a
party, that State may also be indirectly linked to the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement
through the tuna RFMO constituent instrument.33 For instance, Article 4 of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Convention provides that that instrument shall be interpreted and
applied in a manner consistent with the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement. In addition,
dispute settlement options available in a tuna RFMO instrument are linked to those set out in
the 1982 LOSC, and the UN Charter.

Further, if a State is not party to the 1982 LOSC or any other fisheries treaty (scenario (5)) it
would not have any obligations unless there is an exception to the classic rule.

Scenario (6) is a popular exception to the classic rule. The third State enters into an
agreement with tuna RFMO member States to accept obligations and rights to participate in
the fishery. This is the first exception in the Vienna Convention and is analysed below with
respect to how each tuna RFMO deals with cooperating non-members or cooperating noncontracting parties.

32

1982 LOSC arts 64, 116 and 117.
This might also apply where the tuna RFMO established prior to the adoption of the 1982 LOSC and the 1995
Agreement has updated its constituent instruments such as the IATTC in adoption of the Antigua Convention.
33
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III. TUNA RFMOS AND THIRD STATES

In examining the practice of tuna RFMOs in relation to third States, this part analyses their
constituent instruments, decisions and subsequent practice.34 Although constituent
instruments of tuna RFMOs may be restrictive in scope for third State membership or
participation, the respective parties have subsequently widened the scope of application in its
binding decisions. Decisions extending to third States may be considered as mere semantics
and should ultimately be tested against the classic rule. The practice of tuna RFMOs and
members in granting the status of cooperating non-member or cooperating non-contracting
party is an important contribution which is addressed below and elsewhere.35

A. IATTC

Constituent Instrument

Addressing concerns at the time of adoption, the 1949 Convention of the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission focussed on cooperation in the collection of data and research for
the management of the fisheries. While the 1949 Convention does not include explicit
reference to non Parties or non members, the Antigua Convention contains several references
in articles XVI (Transparency), XXVI (Non-members), and annex 2 (principles and criteria
for participation of observers).

The Antigua Convention mandates that the Commission shall promote transparency in the
implementation of the Convention in its decision-making processes and other activities.36

34

Tuna RFMOs vary in the nomenclature of binding and non-binding decisions: For the IATTC, IOTC, and
CCSBT, resolutions contain binding decisions, while this is not the case in the WCPFC. In ICCAT
Recommendations contain binding decisions and Resolutions generally provide non-binding decisions.
Decisions entitled “Conservation and Management Measure” often reduced to “CMM” are binding in the
WCPFC.
35
See for instance: Moritaka Hayashi, 2007, Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Non-Members,
in T. Ndiaye and R. Wolfrum (eds.), Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and Settlement of Disputes, Liber
Amicorum Judge Thomas A. Mensah, (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 751–765.
36
Article XVI.1.
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Thus it allows for the representation of non Parties in meetings of the Commission and its
subsidiary organs, as observers or otherwise, and their timely access to relevant information,
subject to the rules of procedure and of confidentiality on access to such information.37 On
request, the Director is required to invite to meetings of the Commission observers
intergovernmental organisations and non-Parties “interested in conservation and sustainable
use of the fish stocks covered by this Convention”.38

The Antigua Convention devotes an article to non-members which has a three-fold objective:
encouraging membership or cooperation, exchanging information on non-member vessels,
and deterring non-member vessels that undermine the effectiveness of the management
regime.39 The Commission and its members are required to encourage all States and regional
economic integration organisations and, as appropriate, fishing entities that are not members
of the Commission to become members or to adopt laws and regulations consistent with this
Antigua Convention. 40 The option to become a member or to adopt consistent laws and
regulations is noteworthy since other tuna RFMO constituent instruments only encourage
membership and do not include the latter. With the option to choose, a non-member may be
content with adopting laws and regulations without the additional obligations (including
financial) of membership, and is likely to rely on that to demonstrate its cooperation and
adherence with the management regime in place. This may obviously lead to a precarious
situation where there are non-member participants in the fishery that have adopted
implementing legislation but are not fully committed to the conservation and management of
the fishery. The adoption of consistent laws and regulations may also be viewed as a partial
fulfilment of the duty to cooperate.

In addition, the exchange of information and deterrence of vessels of non-members that
engage in activities that undermine the Antigua Convention deserves comment. The Antigua
Convention provides that the “Commission and its members shall cooperate, consistent with
this Convention and international law, to jointly deter vessels of non-members from carrying
out activities that undermine the effectiveness of this Convention”.41 Applying the
fundamental principle that third States to a treaty do not have any obligations arising from
37

Article XVI.2.
Annex 2.1.
39
Article XXVI.
40
Article XXVI.1.
41
Article XXVI.3.
38
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that treaty, the deterrence of non-member vessels may constitute a violation of the nonmember’s freedom to fish on the high seas and discriminates in form or in fact against the
non-member.42
IATTC Resolutions
The IATTC has also adopted several resolutions relating to non Parties.43 Recognising the
importance of addressing fishing in the eastern Pacific Ocean by vessels of States or entities
not members of the Commission, the IATTC initiated a process in 2000.44 The process was to
an extent exploratory - the Parties were encouraged to gather and exchange information with
respect to fishing vessels of States or fishing entities not members of the IATTC which
undermine the IATTC conservation and management measures.45 Where non-compliance by
non-party vessels was detected, the IATTC Director was requested to communicate with nonparty governments urging compliance with the measure “and to remind them of their
obligation, in accordance with international law, to cooperate in the implementation of agreed
regional conservation and management measures”.46 On analysis, there is no such obligation
to cooperate in the implementation of agreed regional measures on a non-party, unless the
State had ratified or acceded to the 1995 Agreement (which incidentally in 2000 had not
entered into force). The inclusion of that text in the decision indicates a sense of desperation
on the part of the IATTC to bind non-parties in the absence of strong support in international
law. Further the IATTC requested that the Director report the results of communications with
non-parties so that they may, in accordance with international law, take necessary measures
to ensure that non-party vessel do not undermine the effectiveness of the measures.47 While
the proactiveness of the IATTC in addressing non-party vessel compliance over a decade ago
is commendable, the basis for invoking necessary measures in international law was weak.

42

In time this is likely to be tested by international adjudicatory bodies. Although not a third State, in 2013
Russia took the SPRFMO to Permanent Court of Arbitration on the same argument. The PCA found that the
Commission had unjustifiably discriminated in form or in fact against the Russian Federation by not including a
fishing allocation at the first Commission meeting: Findings and Recommendations of the Review Panel, 5 July
2013, The Hague, the Netherlands.
43
See for instance C-00-07 Fishing by non-party vessels; C-04-02 Criteria for cooperating non parties; C-03-11
Criteria for cooperating non parties; C-07-02 Cooperating non-party status; C-01-02 Fishing by non-party
vessels; C-01-05 IATTC-AIDCP joint WG on fishing by non-Parties.
44
C-00-07 Fishing by non-party vessels.
45
C-00-07 Fishing by non-party vessels, [1], [2].
46
C-00-07 Fishing by non-party vessels, [3].
47
C-00-07 Fishing by non-party vessels, [4].
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Considering the duty to cooperate in general, the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) in its advisory opinion to the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission emphasizes the
importance of cooperation, which it has characterized as a “due diligence” obligation:48
210. The Tribunal observes that the obligation to “seek to agree …” under article 63,
paragraph 1, and the obligation to cooperate under article 64, paragraph 1, of the
Convention are “due diligence” obligations which require the States concerned to
consult with one another in good faith, pursuant to article 300 of the Convention. The
consultations should be meaningful in the sense that substantial effort should be made
by all States concerned, with a view to adopting effective measures necessary to
coordinate and ensure the conservation and development of shared stocks.

This shows that ITLOS is both seeking to strengthen the obligation to consult over the shared
stocks (requiring a “substantial effort”), and linking the good faith requirement to Article 300
of 1982 LOSC. The Tribunal also adds that the obligation to “seek to agree” in Article 63.1
(shared stocks) and the obligation to cooperate under Article 64 1 (highly migratory species)
are “due diligence” obligations. Moreover, the treatment here of the obligation to cooperate
and consult and its elevation to a “due diligence” obligation elaborates upon these otherwise
vague obligations set out in the 1982 LOSC.

In 2001 the IATTC agreed to establish a joint working group with the Parties to the
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program (AIDCP).49 The objective of
the joint working group was to address fishing in the region by vessels under the jurisdiction
of non-Parties to either the AIDCP or the IATTC Convention. At the same meeting the
IATTC resolved to deal with vessels of non-parties by establishing a vessel list.50 Vessels
identified as fishing in the eastern Pacific Ocean that did not meet the compliance criteria
would be placed on a list of non-cooperating vessels and not be included in the Regional
Vessel Register.51 The two criteria are whether: 1) the vessel is operating under the

48

Request for an Advisory Opinion from the Sub Regional Fisheries Commission (SRFC), Advisory Opinion, 2
April 2015, ITLOS Case No 21, para 21
<https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.21/advisory_opinion/C21_AdvOp_02.04.pdf>.
49
C-01-05 IATTC-AIDCP joint WG on fishing by non-Parties.
50
C-01-02 Fishing by non-party vessels.
51
C-01-02 Fishing by non-party vessels, [4].
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jurisdiction of a member to the Commission; or 2) the vessel is operating under the
jurisdiction of a non-member that is cooperating with the IATTC by applying the IATTC’s
conservation and management measures. A non-party that was not prepared but able to apply
the relevant IATTC conservation and management measures to its vessel would be deemed
non-cooperating.

IATTC Cooperating Non-contracting Parties

The IATTC in 2003 adopted a resolution on criteria for attaining the status of
Cooperating Non-party or Cooperating Fishing Entity to the AIDCP and IATTC.52 Among
other things, the resolution conditioned participation as a cooperating non-party or
cooperating fishing entity with the submission of information and a compliance commitment.
Information to be communicated include historical fisheries data, annual catch and effort
data, current fishing presence and research programmes in the IATTC area.53 The applicant
also had to submit an explicit commitment to comply with all conservation measures in force
in IATTC-AIDCP, respect capacity limits, promote compliance by its vessels, and respond to
alleged violations by its vessels.54 If the status is approved, the cooperating non-party or
fishing entity could participate as an observer to plenary and scientific meetings for that year
and would need to reapply on an annual basis. Although it set the fundamental requirements
on cooperating non-parties or fishing entities, the resolution did not provide a clear process
for the submission and consideration of applications.

A year later the IATTC adopted another resolution on cooperating non-parties or fishing
entities that replaced the 2003 resolution and served to provide clear criteria to enable nonparties or fishing entities intending to attain the status of Cooperating non-Party or
Cooperating Fishing Entity.55 The 2004 resolution included all of the operative provisions of
the 2003 resolution, delineated the role of the Director in receiving requests and identified the
Joint Working Group on Fishing by non-Parties with the responsibility for reviewing requests

52

Resolution C-03-11 Resolution on criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Non-party or Cooperating
Fishing Entity to AIDCP and IATTC.
53
Resolution C-03-11, [1].
54
Resolution C-03-11, [2].
55
Resolution C-04-02 Resolution on criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Non-party or Fishing Entity
in IATTC.
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for Cooperating Status and for making recommendations to the Commission accordingly. 56
Apart from adherence with the information and compliance requirements, the granting of
IATTC Cooperating Status was also conditioned by concerns of excess fishing capacity and
IUU fishing activities in the IATTC Convention area.57

In 2007, the IATTC again revisited the criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Nonparty or Fishing Entity.58 Compared to its predecessor, the 2007 resolution mimicked the
2004 resolution and exempted any Cooperating Non-Party or Cooperating Fishing Entity that
had signed, ratified or acceded to the Antigua Convention or the Instrument for the
Participation of Fishing Entities from requesting cooperating status since the State or fishing
entity was now a member.59

B. ICCAT

Constituent instrument

When the Convention establishing the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas was adopted in 1966, the accommodation of third States in fisheries
governance was not a priority, hence the absence of explicit reference. Over time, the
Commission has adopted measures and rules promoting transparency and inclusivity. For
instance, the rules of procedure of ICCAT allow for notification of regular and special
meetings to be sent by the Executive Secretary to, aside from members, any Government or
international organisation invited by the Commission to send observers to the meeting.60 The
observer guidelines allow for the Commission to invite international organisations and any
Government which is a Member of the United Nations or of any Specialised Agency of the
United Nations and which is not a member of the Commission, to send observers to

56

Resolution C-04-02, [5].
Resolution C-04-02, [5].
58
Resolution C-07-02 Criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Non-party
or Fishing Entity in IATTC. This resolution replaced the 2004 resolution.
59
Resolution C-07-02, [7].
60
ICCAT Rules of Procedure, Rules 2.2 and 3.2.
57
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Commission meetings.61 In addition to the rules of procedure, there have been several
binding recommendations of the Commission relating to non-Parties or cooperating non
Contracting Parties.62

ICCAT decisions on non-Parties
In 1994 ICCAT adopted a resolution on coordination with non-Parties.63 While non-binding,
the resolution directed the Executive Secretary to contact all non-parties fishing in the
ICCAT Convention Area and encourage them to become cooperating non-contracting parties.
Cooperating non-parties could attend meetings as observers. A non-party deciding against
attaining cooperating status, is to be advised that their continued fishing outside ICCAT's
conservation measures will diminish the effectiveness of those measures. Notwithstanding,
all non-Parties are to be provided a copy of all relevant ICCAT resolutions and
recommendations. The resolution is a feeble attempt at coordination and may be better
described as attempting to promote adherence by non-parties to ICCAT measures. The text of
the resolution is not contentious vis-à-vis the rights of non-parties.

At the same meeting, ICCAT adopted another resolution that encouraged contracting parties
to monitor and report sightings of non-party vessels in the Convention area, directed the
Secretary to correspond with non-parties seeking action to ensure that its vessels not
undermine ICCAT measures, and also supported “courtesy boardings” of non-party vessels
undertaken with the consent of the master to monitor compliance and collect information.64
Each Contracting Party is to discourage, in accordance with its law, its nationals from
associating with the activities of non- Parties which undermine the effectiveness of the
61

ICCAT Rules of Procedure, Rule 5. The Guidelines and Criteria for Granting Observer Status at ICCAT
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non-Contracting Party, Entity or Fishing Entity in ICCAT; 2003-12 Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the
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infringement;
63
[94-06] Resolution by ICCAT on coordination with non-Contracting Parties.
64
[94-09] Resolution by ICCAT on compliance with the ICCAT conservation and management measures
(including Addendum).

218

ICCAT conservation and management measures.65 This resolution appears to be the first
amongst tuna RFMOs encouraging proactive monitoring, collection and dissemination of
specific information obtained from non-party vessels.66 It also appears to be the first
encouraging “courtesy boardings” of non-party vessels at sea.

Three years later, the Commission adopted a recommendation on transshipments and vessel
sightings which, among other things, provided a framework for reporting of stateless vessels
and vessels of non-parties fishing in manner that undermines ICCAT measures.67The 1998
recommendation adopted by ICCAT relating to non-Parties affirmed that any non-party
vessel sighted under the 1997 resolution would be presumed to be undermining ICCAT
measures.68 Use of a presumption in this context seems to be relied upon as a way to avoid
harming the rights of a third State under international law. To the contrary, presuming that a
third State vessel is undermining ICCAT measures based on sightings does in fact undermine
the right of such State to fish on the high seas in accordance with its obligations, albeit
limited. The resolution provided that such vessels would not be permitted to land or tranship
catch in port of all contracting Parties unless the vessel establishes that the fish were caught
outside the ICCAT Convention Area or in compliance with the relevant ICCAT conservation
measures and requirements under the Convention.69This recommendation was pioneering in
that no other tuna RFMO had adopted a binding measure against vessels flagged to nonparties identified as having committed a serious infringement. The following year, nonparties were urged to comply with a resolution on the deterrence of IUU fishing activity. 70

ICCAT cooperating non-contracting Parties
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To promote inclusivity, the 71Commission adopted a binding recommendation for the criteria
for cooperating non-contracting parties and entities in 2001.72 The 2001 recommendation was
replaced two years later by another recommendation and a resolution on coordination with
non-parties.73 Generally the 2003 recommendation is similar to the equivalent measure of the
IATTC in terms of the information requirements. For compliance requirements, a non-party
applicant must confirm its commitment to respect ICCAT’s conservation and management
measures, and inform ICCAT of measures it takes to ensure compliance by its vessels with
ICCAT conservation and management measures.74 The ICCAT Permanent Working Group
for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures is responsible for
reviewing requests for cooperating status and for making recommendations to the
Commission accordingly. Like the IATTC measure, caution is exercised if the granting of
cooperating status would introduce excessive fishing capacity or IUU fishing activities into
the ICCAT Convention Area.75The obligations and rights of a non-party or third State is
changed upon the explicit acceptance of obligations and responsibilities and the granting of
cooperating status. ICCAT currently has four co-operators.76

C. IOTC

Constituent instrument
The IOTC Agreement provides for “non FAO Member States” in Articles XIII (Finances)
and XXIV (Depositary). Non FAO Member States upon admission as a member of the
Commission would be required to contribute financially to the budget of the Commission and
be entitled to receive notifications from the depositary.77 Besides these references, the IOTC
Agreement does not provide for third States that may be fishing for highly migratory fish
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stocks in the Indian Ocean or for a mechanism to facilitate cooperation with the Agreement
and conservation and management measures adopted by the Commission.
Notwithstanding, the Commission has adopted several binding resolutions78 providing for
cooperating non-contracting parties.79 The first decision of the Commission was taken at its
Third Session in 1998 where direction was given for the secretary to contact all noncontracting parties known to have vessels fishing in the Area for species covered by the
IOTC Agreement and invite them to become parties or at least to cooperate with the
Commission, through the exchange of information and statistical data on fishing activities on
the stocks falling within the remit of the Commission.80 Recent resolutions of the
Commission promote compliance with IOTC resolutions by non-contracting party vessels,
limits the fishing effort for bigeye tuna of non-IOTC members, and establish a port
monitoring scheme to ensure compliance by non parties, members and cooperating noncontracting parties.81 The requirements in these Resolutions impose an obligation on non
parties to cooperate with the IOTC and not undermine its resolutions and measures. These
obligations appear to be contrary to fundamental principles.

To illustrate, Resolution 01/03 promotes compliance by non Parties to IOTC measures. If a
fishing vessel of a non party is sighted fishing in the IOTC Area “indicating that there are
grounds for believing that these vessels are fishing contrary to IOTC Conservation or
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Resolutions are binding on the Commission Members, unless there is a specific objection on the part of a
Member, and require a two-thirds majority of Members present and voting to adopt them. On the other hand,
Recommendations are not binding on the Members and rely on voluntary implementation. The Commission
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See for instance Resolution 01/03 Establishing a scheme to promote compliance by Non-Contracting Party
vessels with Resolutions established by IOTC; Resolution 01/04 On limitation of fishing effort of Non Members
of IOTC whose vessels fish bigeye tuna; and Resolution 05/03
Relating to the Establishment of an IOTC Programme of Inspection in Port.
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Management Measures”, the observing vessel shall immediately notify its flag State, and its
flag State will subsequently notify the Commission.82 The measure does not elucidate the
grounds for holding such belief although grounds would include the simple act of fishing for
species regulated by the IOTC. A vessel flying the flag of a Non-Contracting Party, Entity or
fishing Entity, which has been sighted in the IOTC Area, is presumed to be undermining
IOTC Conservation and Management Measures.83 Given that the resolutions of the IOTC
cover a wide range of activities and species, the measure effectively presumes that any
fishing activity by a vessel of a non Party undermines IOTC measures. It is posited that this is
contrary to fundamental principles relating to third States, and arguably in opposition to the
freedom to fish on the high seas. For the latter, a non party that is not bound by the 1982
LOSC, 1995 Agreement, and the IOTC Agreement enjoys the freedom to fish on the high
seas in customary international law.

Furthermore, IOTC Resolution 01/04 limits the fishing effort for bigeye tuna of Non
Members. Although the title is imposing, the Resolution provides for the Commission
requesting non-Members of IOTC to reduce their fishing effort in 2002 in relation to 1999
levels.84 The call to reduce fishing effort for bigeye tuna was a response to global concerns
that there is overfishing on bigeye tuna stocks. Non members were further urged to inform
the Commission of the measures they have taken in order to ensure the implementation of
this Resolution, including their 1999 fishing effort in terms of catch and effort data, and the
number of vessels.85 This Resolution is another example of a resolution that is contrary to
fundamental principles relating to third States, and the freedom to fish on the high seas.

Fishing vessels of non parties that have engaged in fishing in the IOTC Area are likely to be
refused landing or transhipment in the port of a contracting party.86 However landing and
transhipment may be permitted if the vessel establishes that the fish were caught outside the
IOTC Area or in compliance with the relevant IOTC measures and requirements under the
Agreement.87 Ultimately the Resolution coerces non parties to comply with IOTC measures
and the Agreement as a condition of the entry and use of port services of its contracting
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parties. Where a port State finds evidence of a violation of a conservation and management
measure by a non-contracting party vessel, such evidence shall be transmitted to the nonParty, and the non-Party is required to notify the Commission of actions taken against its
vessel.88 Applying the classic rule, a third State has no obligation to comply with. But if it
wishes to access port services, the third State is to ensure compliance by its vessel(s) with
port State requirements, and investigate and report on any allegations of infringements.

IOTC cooperating non-contracting parties

The IOTC first adopted a Resolution at its Fourth Session in 1999 on cooperating noncontracting parties.89 That resolution was superseded in 2003 by a Resolution that identifies
the criteria and process for attaining that status of cooperating non-contracting party.90
Among other things, the 2003 Resolution requires the production of onerous information
from a potential cooperating non-contracting party, including, a) where available, data on its
historical fisheries in the IOTC Area, including nominal catches, number/type of vessels,
name of fishing vessels, fishing effort and fishing areas; b) all the data that Contracting
Parties have to submit to IOTC based on the Resolutions adopted by IOTC; c) details on
current fishing presence in the IOTC Area, number of vessels and vessel characteristics; and
d) information on any research programmes it may have conducted in the IOTC Area and the
information and the results of this research.91 Importantly an applicant must confirm its
commitment to respect the Commission’s Conservation and Management Measures and
inform the Commission of the measures it takes to ensure compliance by its vessels of IOTC
Conservation and Management Measures.92 The Commission’s Compliance Committee
reviews each application, considers other relevant RFMO data relating to the applicant, and
exercises caution in ensuring that excessive fishing capacity in not introduced into the IOTC
Area or IUU fishing is promoted in the granting of cooperating status.93Despite the resolution
supporting the participation of cooperating non contracting parties, in light of the IOTC
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institutional complexities discussed in Chapter II, the fishing entity of Taiwan has not been
able to participate in a separate capacity.

D. CCSBT

Constituent instrument

Non parties in the CCSBT context refers to any State or entity not party to the convention
“whose nationals, residents or fishing vessels harvest southern bluefin tuna, and any coastal
State through whose exclusive economic or fishery zone southern bluefin tuna
migrates”.94Articles 14 and 15 of the convention establishing the CCSBT provides for nonparties in two ways. First it allows non-parties to send observers to meetings of the
Commission and its scientific committee. The second is more proactive – the Commission
and its member will notify non parties of the objectives of the Convention and the actions of
vessels flagged to non parties, and where necessary, take action by not associating with
vessels flagged to non parties, prohibiting reflagging of member vessels to non parties, and
deterring fishing activities by vessels of non parties that undermine the objectives of the
convention.

CCSBT decisions
The most prominent decisions of the CCSBT relating to third States can be found in the
Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee,95
and the Resolution to Establish the Status of Cooperating Non-Member of the Extended
Commission and the Extended Scientific Committee.96 A specific resolution was required by
the CCSBT to extend the Commission for three primary reasons. First the Convention
confined membership to States eligible to ratify, accept or approve the Convention, i.e.,
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Australia, Japan and New Zealand, and States that are eligible to accede to the Convention.97
Second, there were no criteria in its constituent instrument or previous decisions for the
admission of cooperating non members. Thirdly the participation of entities namely the
European Union and Chinese Taipei could not be effected without explicit rules. Thus the
Commission acting under the Convention established an Extended Commission comprised of
Parties “and any entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any
time in the previous three calendar years, that is admitted to membership by the Extended
Commission”.98 The qualification on membership may be viewed as undermining the “real
interest” criteria in the 1995 Agreement, and the practice of inclusivity.99 Any entity or
fishing entity whose vessels caught SBT at any time in the time period specific could express
its willingness to the Executive Secretary of the Commission to become a member of the
Extended Commission.100 The expression must be accompanied by a firm commitment to
respect the terms of the Convention and to comply with decisions of the Extended
Commission. This will then be followed by an Exchange of Letters between the entity or
fishing entity and the Executive Secretary on behalf of the Commission. Once the Extended
Commission decides to admit the entity or fishing entity, a formula to determine the level of
catch by the applicant would be negotiated for the interim period before an allocation
decision by the Commission.101

The CCSBT Extended Commission Resolution demonstrates both the subsequent agreement
and subsequent practice of the Parties in addressing gaps in the constituent instrument which
may not have been envisaged at adoption.102 It also illustrates the evolution of the
Commission in broadening its scope and powers to better achieve its objectives. Unlike other
tuna RFMOs, new Members become part of the Extended Commission through Exchange of
Letters rather than through the formal accession or acceptance process. Technically these new
members may not be considered “parties” because they are not party to the constituent
instrument, but nevertheless assume all commitments, rights and obligations through Letters
as if they were. The process for third States intending to become members of the Extended
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Commission is a unique illustration amongst tuna RFMOs that supports the State consent
exception to the classic rule. Parties to the Convention through their subsequent practice
created the Extended Commission which parallels the Commission. On the granting of
membership, new members assume equal rights as the parties in decision-making for the
fishery.

CCSBT cooperating non-members

Compared to the practice of other tuna RFMOs, the CCSBT cooperating non-member
resolution is novel in three ways. Firstly, cooperating non-member applicants are confined to
the requirements in the cooperating non-member resolution.103 Secondly, there is an option
by an intending cooperating non-member to negotiate with members of the Extended
Commission, any other criteria for its admission.104 The third is the process for admission.105

In relation to eligibility, a third State whose fishing vessels harvest SBT or through whose
exclusive economic or fishery zone SBT migrates, may apply to the Extended Commission
for the status of a cooperating non-member. Fishing activity appears to require
contemporaneity due to the use of present tense. This excludes a State outside the SBT region
that is not fishing but may be a market or processing State. Similarly States which may not
satisfy either criteria but have a real interest, albeit based on historical activity, would not be
eligible. In comparison, the WCPFC has admitted Thailand as a cooperating non-member
even though it does not have fishing presence in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.106

The ability of a cooperating non-member applicant to negotiate other criteria for admission is
noteworthy. As part of its formal written statement, the candidate State or entity for
cooperating non-member status will provide its commitment to: “g. negotiate with the
members of the Extended Commission to develop any other criteria for its admission in the
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capacity of a Cooperating Non- Member specific to its situation.”107 Similar rules of other
tuna RFMOs do not allow for additional criteria, although creative decisions have been made
by the respective Commissions in determining the extent of participation in a fishery of a
cooperating third State. The inclusion of this allows the applicant to negotiate the extent of its
participation in the fishery.

Finally, compared to other tuna RFMOs, the CCSBT cooperating non-member resolution
provides the most elaborate framework for cooperating non-member applications. In addition
to the formal written statement, that commitment will form the basis of an Exchange of
Letters between the applicant and the Extended Commission. Admission of the third State as
a cooperating non-member only occurs after the conclusion of the Exchange of Letters. The
process adopted by the CCSBT is useful in that it allows for clarification and substantiation
of the commitments expressed by a third State applicant through a formal written process.
For other tuna RFMOs the written commitment by the applicant is expressed only at the
outset of the process upon application for cooperating status, and there does not appear to be
a formal process to seek written clarification or to substantiate commitments made by the
applicant before consideration by the respective Commission or its subsidiary body. In any
case, clarity in the explicit commitments made by a cooperating third State ensures that all
members and cooperating third States of a tuna RFMO have agreed to the same
commitments.

E. WCPFC

Constituent instrument

Compared to other constituent instruments of tuna RFMOs, the Western and Central Pacific
Fisheries Convention (WCPF Convention) provides the most elaborate text on non-parties.
Article 32 of the WCPF Convention is pitched in a more proactive manner by first mandating
each member to take measures consistent with the 1982 LOSC, the 1995 Agreement and
international law to deter the activities of vessels flying the flags of non-parties which

107

CCSBT cooperating non-member resolution, [4g].

227

undermine the effectiveness of the Commission’s conservation and management measures.108
Consistency with the 1982 LOSC, the 1995 Agreement and international law is expected to
ensure that non-parties that are neither party to the 1982 LOSC nor the 1995 Agreement are
dealt with in accordance with customary international law. The deterrence of vessels
undermining conservation and management measures relies on the timely exchange of
information, and notification to the non-party of the activities of its nationals or flagged
vessels in the area.109 Non-parties on request and concurrence of the Commission may be
invited to attend meetings as observers.110

By far, the unique provision allowing explicitly for cooperation and participation of nonparties is contained in the WCPF Convention:
4. The members of the Commission shall, individually or jointly, request non-parties
to this Convention whose vessels fish in the Convention Area to cooperate fully in the
implementation of conservation and management measures adopted by the
Commission with a view to ensuring that such measures are applied to all fishing
activities in the Convention Area. Such cooperating non-parties to this Convention
shall enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery commensurate with their
commitment to comply with, and their record of compliance with, conservation and
management measures in respect of the relevant stocks.111
This provision explicitly empowers the Commission to adopt decisions supporting the
participation of non-parties in its work. No other tuna RFMO constituent instrument has a
similar provision, not even the Antigua Convention adopted three years after the adoption of
the WCPF Convention. During the final stages of the negotiations in 2000, the word
“cooperating” was inserted in the last sentence to qualify “non-parties”, and their record of
compliance with measures was introduced to strengthen the provision.112 To implement
article 32.4 of the WCPF Convention, the Commission adopted a binding conservation and
management measure on cooperating non-members in 2004, which was replaced in 2008, and
replaced again in 2009.113 These are considered later.
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Conservation and management measures

Aside from the measures on cooperating non-members, the Commission has included
provisions in several conservation and management measures. Generally the provisions are
akin to those contained in measures of other tuna RFMOs with some exceptions. For
example, the tropical tuna conservation and management measure adopted by the
Commission in 2012 includes a provision on fishing opportunities by species for non-parties
wishing to acquire cooperating non-member status. Under that measure, non-parties are
forewarned based on advice of the scientific committee that bigeye tuna mortality rate is
above maximum sustainable yield and a reduction in fishing for bigeye tuna is recommended,
yellowfin tuna is not being overfished but fishing is approaching maximum sustainable yield
and no increase in fishing is recommended, while skipjack tuna is not being overfished and
the adoption of limits are to be considered.114 The provision effectively conditions potential
cooperating non-members wishing to harvest fish in the Western and Central Pacific.

Registration of non-member carriers and bunkers

Another exception is the allowance given by the Commission to the operation of non-member
carriers and bunkers in the region. The matter was considered in 2009 when the Commission
adopted a revised measure for the record of fishing vessels and established the WCPFC
Interim Register of non-Member Carrier and Bunker Vessels in the Convention Area.115 This
mechanism resulted from the insistence of Small Island Developing State members of the
Commission seeking the legitimisation of non-member carrier and bunker vessels supporting
fishing activity in the region. Each member and cooperating non-member is required to take
necessary measures to ensure that fishing for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention
Area is conducted only by vessels flying the flag of a member of the Commission, and in
respect of non-party carriers and bunkers, in accordance with a separate regime.
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The regime for the registration of non-party carriers and bunker vessels is centred on the
establishment of the Interim Register of non-Member Carrier and Bunker Vessels.116
Inclusion of a vessel on the Register is subject to several requirements to be met by the
member and the owner or operator of the vessel. The non-party flag State appears to have a
secondary role rather than the primary role. Vessels that are included by the Commission on
the Register are authorised to be used in the Convention Area to receive transhipments of
highly migratory fish stocks and to bunker or otherwise supply member or cooperating nonmember flagged fishing vessels fishing in the region. Any Commission member or
cooperating non-member may submit a list of any non-party carrier and bunker vessel to be
included on the Register and the vessel information to be supplied is identical to that supplied
for any vessel on the main WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels. In submitting a list the
member or cooperating non-member attests that the vessels:117

(a) do not have a history of illegal, unreported or unregulated (IUU) fishing, unless
ownership of the vessel has changed and the new owner has provided sufficient
evidence demonstrating that the previous owner or operator has no legal, beneficial or
financial interest in, or control of the vessels, or the CCM concerned is satisfied that,
having taken into account all relevant facts, the vessel is no longer engaged in or
associated with IUU fishing; or

(b) are not currently listed on any IUU fishing vessel lists adopted by regional fishery
management organisations; or

(c) were not removed from the Register because of non-compliance with the
submission of information requirements.

This situation is unusual because a member or cooperating non-member takes the active role
in promoting the interests of a non-party. By acting on behalf of the non-party, a member or
cooperating non-member is representing by default the flag State. Indeed this is a precarious
situation since the assumption of flag State responsibilities may arguably give rise to
concomitant legal responsibility. For example, if a member attests that a non-party carrier or
116
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bunker vessel does not have a history of supporting IUU fishing when in fact it does, the
responsibility rests with the attesting member to prove otherwise or to take action against the
vessel. The range of actions against a non-party vessel available to the attesting member,
depends on the circumstances. Where there is no binding agreement in place with the flag
State or the owner or operator of the vessel, the options are limited perhaps to trade and port
sanctions. However where there is a binding agreement such as a joint venture between the
attesting State and the vessel operator, the terms of such agreement will determine national
actions available including institution of legal proceedings. The situation is interesting when
a cooperating non-party attests that the vessel of another non-party satisfies the compliance
requirements. Given that the cooperating non-party may not have explicit laws in place to
give effect to its obligations under the Commission, its attestation of another non-party in a
similar predicament is a concern. No other tuna RFMO replicates the situation.

With the attesting member or cooperating non-member, the owner, manager or operator of
the vessel must provide a written undertaking to the Commission. The undertaking is a
commitment that the owner, manager or operator and master of the carrier or bunker vessel
will fully comply with all applicable decisions of the Commission, including conservation
and management measures. All Commission decisions referring to member or cooperating
non-member vessels are construed to include non-party vessels. There must also be an
explicit commitment to allow any inspection duly authorised under the Commission’s High
Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures to board and inspect the vessel on the high seas and
the settlement of costs associated the Commission vessel monitoring system and observer
placement.

The owner, manager or operator also acts for the interests of the non-party flag State. It must
ensure that any commitment is compliant with national laws of its flag State and is
encouraged to obtain a statement of support from the flag State, including an explicit
statement of its position in respect of high seas boarding and inspection.118 Explicit support
from the flag State is supposed to be the first task for the owner or operator and the attesting
member or cooperating non-member. The use of the verb “encourage” denotes passivity and
acknowledges the sovereign decision that the flag State may make. The flag State has
primary jurisdiction over its vessels and the placement of several obligations and
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commitments through the process for registration deserves its consent. After all the owner or
operator do not have legal jurisdiction over the vessel or have the authority to attach legal
obligations to the non-party flag State. Further, the WCPFC Secretariat is also mandated to
notify the flag State and “provide an opportunity for the flag State to convey its position,
including an explicit statement or position in respect of high seas boarding and inspection”.119
The addition of the secretariat’s role may be important in terms of collaboration with the nonparty flag State but may not be particularly helpful in attracting consent. It follows that in the
event that a non-party flag State does not provide a statement of support, the undertaking or
commitments cannot be made on its behalf.

A failure to comply with the decisions of the Commission would constitute a basis for
placement on the Commission’s draft IUU vessel list.120 Placement of such list may be
justified if transparent procedures were followed and the non-party flag State had granted
explicit consent to registration. However if the non-party flag State had not consented to
registration and the associated commitments, then it could argue that it did not consent to
registration and the obligations and as a non-party should not be held accountable. The nonparty flag State may even assert that to place its vessel on the draft IUU vessel list would be
tantamount to discrimination, and may seek avenues for legal redress.

IUU Listing of Third State Vessels

While the subject of IUU listing is dealt with in Chapter VII, it is useful to briefly consider
the progressiveness of the Commission in listing the vessel of third States as well as stateless
vessels.121 In 2010, the WCPFC technical and compliance committee considered the
provisional IUU listing of the fishing vessel Neptune, a Georgia flagged vessel for fishing in
the WCPFC area without being in the WCPFC Record of Fishing Vessels.122 Georgia had
been contacted but did not respond. France, the inspecting State requested placement on the
provisional IUU list for that year. The question before the committee was whether Georgia, a
party to the 1982 LOSC but a third State to the WCPFC, has any duties under the measures of
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the WCPFC.123 As seen above, as a party Georgia has two obligations – 1) to cooperate in the
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks, and 2) to take measures to
regulate fishing activities of its nationals on the high seas. For its part Georgia had issued a
high seas fishing licence to the vessel which included a condition that the vessel not fish in a
manner that undermines international conservation and management measures. Although the
legal advice to the committee took into account the ineligibility of Georgia to place its vessel
on the record, and that the absence of the vessel from the record “might not be a valid cause
for IUU fishing”, the key issue was whether the vessel had fished in a manner that violated
specific conservation and management measures.124 The majority of the committee agreed to
list the Neptune on the provisional IUU list but there was a minority opposed to listing. When
the matter was considered by the Commission, the same legal arguments were put but the
Commission agreed by consensus to list the vessel on its IUU list.125 Listing appears to have
been supported by the intervention during the discussions that the vessel had also been listed
by the IATTC for the incident described by France.126 Hence, members of the Commission
may have inadvertently assumed that listing of the vessel by the IATTC for the reported
incident meant that the vessel had indeed engaged in IUU fishing.127 But the key issue
remains, does non-compliance by a third State of specific obligations in the WCPFC measure
warrant IUU listing.

If the legal technicalities are to be followed, then IUU listing without taking into account
international law and the classic rule is fallible. In the circumstances Georgia may have
discharged its obligations as a responsible flag State by conditioning its vessel not to
undermine international conservation and management measures. The violation of specific
measures would be actionable by the flag State Georgia for the contravention of its high seas
fishing licence condition rather than the Commission or its committee. Also, as a third State
Georgia is not eligible to nominate its vessel on the WCPFC record so there is no possible
way that Georgia could have complied with that specific requirement. Further obligations
under the 1982 LOSC stated above are clear and the general duty to cooperate has arguably
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been met. It is suggested that the legal responsibility that may arise from unsound decisions
of tuna RFMOs should be accorded greater importance by such bodies when taking decisions.

The possibility of legal responsibility of a tuna RFMO or the flag State for an international
wrongful act is yet to be considered in detail in the literature or by international adjudicatory
bodies. There is however some case law on when a State is responsible and incurs liability for
the acts of private individuals or companies – which would apply to ships.128 The ICJ in the
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, considered the obligations of “due diligence” and
obligations “of conduct”. In summary, that dispute concerned the breach, allegedly
committed by Uruguay, of obligations under the Statute of the River Uruguay129. The ICJ
stated that, “[a]n obligation to adopt regulatory or administrative measures…and to enforce
them is an obligation of conduct. Both parties are therefore called upon, under article 36 [of
the Statute of the River Uruguay], to exercise due diligence in acting through the [Uruguay
River] Commission for the necessary measures to preserve the ecological balance of the
river”.130 The ICJ also elucidated the obligation to act with due diligence as, “an obligation
which entails not only the adoption of appropriate rules and measures, but also a certain level
of vigilance in their enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to
public and private operators, such as the monitoring of activities undertaken by such
operators…”131 The ITLOS Seabed Disputes Chamber in its 2011 Advisory Opinion relied on
the ICJ elucidations and broadly defined the “due diligence” obligation. Due diligence is
indeed a concept that changes over time and depends on the context of the activity.132 In
relation to the Area, the Tribunal advised that States sponsoring the activities of private
individuals or entities in the Area are not limited to the due diligence “obligation to ensure”
but also direct obligations to ensure certain behaviour by sponsored individuals or entities.133
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While the Pulp Mills case and the ITLOS Advisory Opinion both stem from an obligation to
ensure certain conduct in treaty text, the circumstances concerning the Georgia vessel differs.
Article 117 of the1982 LOSC provides that:

All States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with other States in taking, such measures
for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the conservation of the living
resources of the high seas.
The “obligation to take measures” or the “obligation to cooperate with other States in taking
measures” for nationals “as may be necessary for the conservation of the living resources of
the high seas”, may be seen as providing a general and less onerous burden compared to the
expression to “ensure” attached to specific obligations considered for instance in the Pulp
Mills case. Further the inclusion of the words “as may be” can be used to undermine
“necessary” and arguably adds discretion to the control of nationals. Georgia may arguably
have satisfied its obligation through conditions on its fishing authorisation. In comparison,
Article 118 of the 1982 LOSC reads:

States shall cooperate with each other in the conservation and management of living
resources in the areas of the high seas. States whose nationals exploit identical living
resources, or different living resources in the same area, shall enter into negotiations with
a view to taking the measures necessary for the conservation of the living resources
concerned. They shall, as appropriate, cooperate to establish subregional or regional
fisheries organizations to this end.
Article 118 sets out three obligations – the obligation to cooperate in the conservation and
management of high seas living resources, the obligation to enter into negotiations with a
view to taking necessary measures, and the obligation to cooperate in the establishment or
regional and subregional fisheries organisations. The first obligation is pertinent - Georgia
may argue that the conditioning of its vessel not to undermine conservation and management
measures was sufficient. However the opposing view is that the adoption of regulatory or
administrative measures through the fishing authorisation and its conditions may satisfy the
obligation of conduct but the obligation of due diligence may not have been exercised
effectively. These concepts are analysed in detail in Chapter VII below.
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Obligations of a flag States are addressed in the ITLOS Advisory Opinion requested by the
Subregional Fisheries Commission. The ITLOS observed that the issue of flag State
responsibility for IUU fishing is not directly addressed in the 1982 LOSC. The Tribunal
characterised obligations of a flag State as ‘due diligence’ obligations:
129. In the case of IUU fishing in the exclusive economic zones…., the obligation of
a flag State ….to ensure that vessels flying its flag are not involved in IUU fishing is
also an obligation “of conduct”. In other words, as stated in the Advisory Opinion of
the Seabed Disputes Chamber, this is an obligation “to deploy adequate means, to
exercise best possible efforts, to do the utmost” to prevent IUU fishing by ships flying
its flag. However, as an obligation “of conduct” this is a “due diligence obligation”,
not an obligation “of result”. This means that this is not an obligation of the flag State
to achieve compliance by fishing vessels flying its flag in each case with the
requirement not to engage in IUU fishing in the exclusive economic zones of the
SRFC Member States. The flag State is under the “due diligence obligation” to take
all necessary measures to ensure compliance and to prevent IUU fishing by fishing
vessels flying its flag.

This statement by the Tribunal is important and reflects the reality that it would be virtually
impossible for a flag State to achieve total compliance by all of its fishing vessels in different
parts of the world. In essence, the Tribunal is looking for the existence of measures or
“conduct” that will enable the flag State to exercise the control necessary to prevent IUU
fishing by its flagged vessels. It concludes that this is achieved by “due diligence”.

In reaching its conclusion, ITLOS also referred to the Advisory Opinion in the Seabed
Disputes Chamber where it explained the content of “due diligence”:

132. The Seabed Disputes Chamber in its Advisory Opinion pointed out that: The
content of “due diligence” obligations may not easily be described in precise terms.
Among the factors that make such a description difficult is the fact that “due
diligence” is a variable concept. It may change over time as measures considered
sufficiently diligent at a certain moment may become not diligent enough in light, for
instance, of new scientific or technological knowledge.
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The Tribunal gave some indication as to the content of the obligation of the flag State, and
these may be summarised as follows:134

(a) An obligation by the flag State to adopt measures to ensure compliance with the laws
and regulations of the coastal State;
(b) An obligation requiring its vessels to obtain authorisations to fish;
(c) An obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment, including observing
the laws and regulations of the coastal State;
(d) Take measures, including those of enforcement, to ensure compliance with the law of
coastal States in whose waters they fish;
(e) Exercise effective jurisdiction and control over their vessels in respect of
administrative, social and technical matters;
(f) Enact sanctions of sufficient gravity to deter violations and deprive offenders of the
benefits of IUU fishing;
(g) Investigate complaints about IUU fishing reported by the coastal State, and where
appropriate, take necessary action to remedy the situation;
(h) Cooperate where complaints about alleged fishing activities have been made.

WCPFC Cooperating Non-Members
The WCPF Commission’s conservation and management measure on the criteria for attaining
the status of cooperating non-member is similar to criteria adopted by other tuna RFMOs.135
The measure combines the information and compliance requirements delineated in other tuna
RFMO measures. Initial responsibility for assessing applications rests with the Technical and
Compliance Committee, which given its composition, would naturally focus on compliance
matters in the applications rather than scientific matters. Through the explicit commitment or
undertaking, a non-party applying for cooperating status may consent to assuming the
stipulated obligations and responsibilities. Ultimately the language of the undertaking or
commitment deserves special attention. In the experience of the author, the words used by
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certain applicants may be interpreted otherwise. For example, Mexico applied for cooperating
non-member status in 2008. Since then it has been granted such status on an annual basis. In
its application for cooperating non-member status in 2008, Mexico stated:
“2. Mexico expresses and reiterates its commitment to cooperate fully in the
implementation of conservation and management measures adopted by the
Commission, and to ensure that fishing vessels flying its flag, fishing in the
convention area, and to the greatest extent possible, our nationals, comply with the
provisions of the Convention and conservation and management measures adopted
under it. Mexico’s record on this type of obligations permits us to commit to it.”136

With respect to the high seas boarding and inspection regime and the acceptance of high seas
inspectors, Mexico has expressed concern at international meetings about the usefulness of
high seas boarding and inspections.137 It has called on States to look at the range of
instruments available to ensure compliance and the need for a flexible approach under the
1995 Agreement, particularly the use of observers as the alternative. However Mexico on
applying for cooperating non member status with the WCPFC expressed its commitment and
willingness to comply with all conservation and management measures adopted including the
high seas boarding and inspection measure.138 In this subsequent practice, Mexico has
effectively changed its position, at least with respect to its fishing vessels in the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean. The inclusion of the last sentence in its undertaking is not clear
particularly in relation to the acceptance of the high seas boarding regime, and may be
attributed to a mere oversight.

Unlike most tuna RFMOs, the WCPFC explicitly provides the criteria for determining the
extent of participation in the fishery, and invites cooperating non-members to make a
financial contribution commensurate with their obligations if they were a member. Following
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the granting of cooperating non-member status, the Commission shall determine the
participatory rights of the cooperating non-member taking into account inter alia:139

a. the status of the highly migratory fish stocks and the existing level of fishing effort
in the fishery;
b. the special requirements of developing States in the Convention Area, in particular
small island developing States, and of territories and possessions, in relation to
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area
and development of fisheries for such stocks;
c. the respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and existing
members or participants;
d. the respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to
conservation and management of the stocks, to the collection and provision of
accurate data and to the conduct of scientific research on the stocks;
e. the needs of coastal fishing communities which are depend[e]nt mainly on fishing
for the stocks;
f. the needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of living marine resources; and
g. the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas of
national jurisdiction the stocks also occur.

The criteria for determining participation was introduced into the measure amidst concerns
from Small Island Developing States in the region that they would effectively be precluded
from accessing the fishery with the introduction of cooperating non-members from outside
the region. A cooperating non-member consenting to the obligations identified in the measure
would also agree to restrictions on participatory rights.

Participatory rights aside, the invitation to a cooperating non-member to make a financial
contribution commensurate with their obligations if they were a member, appears to be
consistent with the fundamental rule. As an invitation, the choice is with a cooperating nonmember. If a cooperating non-member chooses not to make such a contribution, the
Commission may not have the legal authority to compel, apart from deciding against granting
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cooperating status in future.140 The main reasons are that the non-member, although
cooperating, (i) is not a party to the convention and does not assume financial responsibilities
required therein, (ii) only assumes the obligation if it consents, and (iii) does not need to
contribute if other cooperating non-members have also not contributed accordingly. Despite
the encouragement to contribute to the budget of the Commission, in practice most
cooperating non-members of the WCPFC have not obliged. The reasons for not contributing
is not clear but is interpreted to include the reasons raised and other financial or national
legislative constraints.141 On the whole non-parties cooperating with the WCPF Commission
have enjoyed the benefits of participation in the fishery without the onerous burden of
contributing to its budget.

IV. CONTRIBUTION OF TUNA RFMOS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING TO
THIRD STATES

A

Regime for Cooperating Third States

Each tuna RFMO has adopted a regime to support the participation of cooperating third
States. Upon applying for cooperating status, the third State explicitly commits to
undertaking specific obligations. While the process for admission is generally similar, the
CCSBT process through the formal exchange of letters is noteworthy.

In the determination of whether cooperating third State commitments and practice is
contribution to emerging customary international law, the criteria in the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases may be applied as a guide. Bearing in mind that the cooperating third
State regime is developed through decisions of tuna RFMOs rather then in treaties
themselves, the four precedent conditions in support of a treaty rule acquiring the status of
customary international law are:142

140

The Commission however has not used non-payment of a financial contribution as a basis of rejecting a
CNM application.
141
Cooperating non-member such as Indonesia and Mexico have stated that financial contributions from their
respective national budget may only be approved if their country ratifies or accedes to the constituent
instrument.
142
1969 ICJ Rep. at 41 – 44.

240

(1) Presence of a “fundamentally norm-creating character such as could be regarded
as forming the basis of a general rule of law”;
(2) A “very widespread and representative participation in the convention” including
“that of States whose interests were specially affected”;
(3) The extensiveness and virtual uniformity of State practice evidencing “a general
recognition that a rule of law of legal obligation is involved”; and

(4) The passage of time.

The foregoing discussions show the cooperating third State regime has been in place for the
majority of tuna RFMOs since 2003. Although there have been refinements, the basic
components remain in effect. It is posited that the cooperating third State regime is gaining
acceptance and participation, and for those States that are cooperating, there appears to be
uniformity in practice. With regard to time, the ICJ stated that:

(a)lthough the passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a
bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law…and indispensable
requirement would be that within the period in question, short though it might be,
State practice, including those of States whose interests are specially affected, should
have been both extensive and virtually uniform in the sense of the provision
involved.143

Despite tuna RFMO practice in the last decade and on application of the four precedents, the
tuna RFMO regime for cooperating third States has arguably not attained the status of
customary international law but State practice influenced by tuna RFMOs is gradually
emerging.

The result may change if one applies a more basic analysis based on domestic contract law.
In general terms, when a third State applies for cooperating status it is entering into a parallel
agreement with the Parties and in such circumstances two options exist. The first is whether
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the commitments and undertakings of a cooperating third State is incidental to the enjoyment
of participatory rights in the fishery. If a third State performs its obligations merely because
they are the terms and conditions of participating in a fishery, then it may be argued that the
requisite conviction or opinio juris does not exist.

On the other hand, the second option is whether the commitments and obligations of a
cooperating third State are not directly connected to the enjoyment of participatory rights but
are part of mutual arrangements under a treaty. In such situation, one writer opines that if the
performance by a third State is tacitly accepted by the contracting parties, it may be sufficient
to raise a presumption that the third State believed that the treaty had become a rule of
customary international law144. Alternatively put, the third State performs its obligations
under the conviction that it was legally bound to perform such duties.

Applying the options, it appears more likely that the first is applicable (at least in the initial
years of participation). Cooperating third States commit to specific undertakings to merely
facilitate participation in a fishery. However if the cooperating third State consents to such
terms and conditions on a yearly basis for several years, it may be argued that the practice of
the third State acknowledges the emergence of customary international law, at least, a
regional custom.145

Using a different approach, a unilateral undertaking by a cooperating status applicant may be
seen as acquiescence by that State. Acquiescence may be equated with the State’s consent to
assuming the obligations and exercising rights under a treaty.146 The unilateral statement by
France that it would stop atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific was satisfactory for the
purposes of the cases against France by Australia and New Zealand without the need for
additional formalities.147 The ICJ for instance confirmed that a unilateral declaration
concerning legal or factual situations may have the effect of creating legal obligations:
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It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal
or factual situations, may have the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of
this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that
intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State
being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the
declaration. An undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be
bound, even though not made within the context of international negotiations, is
binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo, nor any
subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other
States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement would be
inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the
pronouncement by the State was made.148

Interestingly the ICJ stated that whether the unilateral statement is given verbally or in
writing makes no difference as the question of form is not decisive.149 The language of the
statement however must reveal a clear intention. If these requirements are applied to a
cooperating non-member application, the two key criteria would appear to be specificity and
a clear intention to be bound by the requirements of a tuna RFMO. Without satisfying these
criteria, there may be an argument, albeit weak, that the intention to be bound is absent.

Where there is acquiescence, the doctrine of estoppel may be invoked. If a State consistently
gives the impression to agree on a certain course of conduct, it cannot later claim to have
never formally done so. The ICJ in the Temple of Preah Vihear case affirmed estoppel and
decided that Thailand had given Cambodia the impression that it accepted a boundary line
and could not subsequently deny this.150 Therefore if a cooperating third State had acquiesced
to specific commitments to participate in a fishery over several years, estoppel may be
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applied to demonstrate that the third State has indeed accepted the commitments and could
not later deny them.151

B

Explicit consent required for cooperating third States

To attain cooperating status, all tuna RFMOs require third States to explicitly agree to
comply with stipulated requirements. This is consistent with the decision of the ICJ in the
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases where the court stated that a third State could not claim
any rights under a treaty “until the professed willingness and acceptance had been manifested
in the prescribed form”.152 Notwithstanding the views of some writers commenting generally
on the classic rule that implicit consent is sufficient, there is no evidence in support.

C

Third State consent not required for listing on tuna RFMO records

The monitoring, control and surveillance frameworks of tuna RFMOs promote compliance by
all fishing vessels within their respective regulatory areas. A third State fishing vessel seen
fishing or engaged in a fishing related activity within an area may be placed on a list of noncooperating vessels without the consent of the third State. Depending on the circumstances,
the act of listing may be seen as contrary to the rights of the third State, in particular the
freedom of navigation and the freedom to fish on the high seas. In response to such listing,
the third State may consider challenging the listing on the basis that it is inconsistent with
international law and unjustifiably discriminates against its vessel.

Another initiative is the listing of third State vessels on a list of authorised vessels. The
example of the WCPFC non CCM carrier and bunker vessel list is unique in that third State
consent was not required for listing and the coastal or fishing State reliant on the use of
carrier and bunker vessels sought listing in order to protect its fishing interests. Unlike the
first example, this form of listing is aligned to the interests of the third State but may be
considered an additional responsibility on the listing State.
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D

Third State consent not required for IUU listing

While the criteria for IUU listing is addressed in Chapter VII, the consent of a third State is
not required in the listing of its vessel on a tuna RFMO IUU list. All tuna RFMOs have
developed procedures for the listing of vessels alleged to have engaged in IUU fishing which
accommodate the right of flag States to respond to such listing. However the procedures are
not suspended when a third State does not respond to the listing of its vessel. The case study
of the Georgia flagged vessel listed by both the IATTC and WCPFC illustrates the need for
greater third State participation. That case raises responsibility issues and the third State may
consider challenging the IUU listing on the basis that it is inconsistent with international law
and unjustifiably discriminates against its vessel. In response the respective Commission may
rely on the doctrine of estoppel on the basis that the third State, while given ample
opportunity, did not respond of challenge listing and effectively acquiesced. However this use
of estoppel requires existence of several listings of the third State’s vessels and consistency in
the action or inaction of the third State in the circumstances. It follows that a single listing
may not provide a strong basis to rely on the doctrine of estoppel.

E

Amendment to customary international law?

In customary international law all States have, inter alia, the freedom to navigate on the high
seas, and the freedom to fish on the high seas subject to their treaty obligations. States Parties
to the 1982 LOSC have two general obligations on the high seas – i) to cooperate in the
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks, and ii) to take measures to
control nationals on the high seas. Tuna RFMOs appear to be changing these obligations by
requiring that States Parties to the 1982 LOSC (but not party to the 1995 Agreement or the
RFMO instrument), comply with the specific conservation and management measures
adopted by the RFMO. This is evident in the example of the Georgia vessel where both the
IATTC and the WCPFC imposed specific obligations, perhaps, erroneously. The opposing
argument is that the freedom of fishing is conditioned by obligations set out in the LOSC
including the duty on States with respect to high seas fisheries conservation. Therefore the
obligation for third States to accept specific conservation and management measures adopted
by an RFMO would not mean that its vessels were subjected to the jurisdiction of other States
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but would rather be “strongly supportive” of the duty to conserve high seas fisheries.153 In
taking decisions against third States, tuna RFMOs have not utilised the opposing argument
and seem to be inadvertently advocating a position that is in effect contrary to obligations in
customary international law.

F

No conferral of participatory rights to third States

Tuna RFMOs have further qualified the participatory rights accorded to States having a real
interest in a fishery.154 Although the requirement of a “real interest” for participation is
introduced by the 1995 Agreement, tuna RFMOs have generally taken a different pathway. A
third State may apply for cooperating or membership status if it satisfies the eligibility
requirements. Conferral of participatory rights is not automatic and depends on the explicit
acceptance of the terms and conditions of participation. In the case of the CCSBT for
instance, participation of States (other than Australia, Japan and New Zealand) was only
enabled after the adoption of the extended commission. Cooperating status or membership in
the extended commission can only be applied by a State or fishing entity, whose vessels have
caught southern bluefin tuna at any time in the previous three calendar years. The
qualification on participation makes it difficult for a third State to exercise its right to fish on
the high seas. Further, in order to establish a fishing presence, the third State must commence
fishing outside the framework of the extended commission and possibly be categorised by
such commission as non-cooperating or engaged in IUU fishing.

G

Imposition of additional obligations on third States

Within the monitoring, control and surveillance framework of tuna RFMOs is the imposition
of obligations on third States for compliance. Examples of obligations include the
requirement to report fishing or related activity by its vessel on the high seas within an
RFMO area, the requirement to provide fishing information, and the requirement to comply
with specific conservation and management measures. Applying the classic rule, a third State
cannot be compelled to satisfy such obligations unless it consents. Tuna RFMOs continue to

153
154

Henriksen, above n1, 91.
1995 Agreement, art 8[3].
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be creative in addressing these gaps by obliging States other than the third State, vessel
owners and operators to carry out obligations that primarily belong to the flag State. The
WCPFC requirements for registration of non-member carrier and bunker vessels is an
illustration.

H

Emerging practice in the IUU listing of stateless and “unknown” flagged vessels

Tuna RFMOs have developed procedures for the listing of stateless or “unknown” flagged
vessels on non-cooperating vessel lists or IUU lists. A Stateless or “unknown” flagged vessel
is not protected by any State. In the WCPFC, the commission decided to list stateless vessels
on the IUU list in 2010 and agreed to develop procedures for the delisting of such vessels.
Given its nature, the vessel owner or operator and current flag State have prominent
responsibilities in the delisting process. In such circumstances, the new flag State plays a
secondary role to the vessel owner or operator. As is alluded above, the primary jurisdiction
of the new flag State is supported significantly by the vessel owner or operator. Whether the
primacy of flag State jurisdiction over fishing vessels remains intact or whether the
jurisdiction of other States with the role of the owner or operator parallels that of the flag
State, should be apparent over time.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

To ensure that third States are compliant with international conservation and management
measures, tuna RFMOs have employed creative initiatives that may be argued to be at odds
with international law. The practice of the ICCAT in the 1990s to attract compliance
illustrates somewhat the progression from passive statements encouraging compliance to
binding requirements. These requirements suggesting obligations on third States were
developed without a solid framework within the tuna RFMO and in international law. It may
be on the one hand described as ‘mere semantics’ expressing a desire to bind, and on the
other, it may viewed as a decision contrary to the classic rule. Tuna RFMO practice then
progressed into binding measures that attached a presumption of undermining constitutive
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instruments or measures if a third State vessel was sighted in the tuna RFMO area of
competence. The adoption of records of authorised vessels galvanised somewhat tuna RFMO
practice in relation to third States. A third State vessel had to be on the tuna RFMO record of
authorised vessels in order to be eligible to undertake fishing or related activities. Even
though third States are technically not obliged to comply with such specific requirements,
tuna RFMOs applied this requirement anyway. In fact, not being on the authorised vessel
record is a criterion for listing on the IUU vessel list.

This discourse on the interaction of tuna RFMOs and third States has identified initiatives
that seem to challenge the pacta tertiis rule. Unless a third State has consented to or
acquiesced, no rights or obligations under a treaty should be applied. A State that has
consented to be a cooperating non party is therefore bound. Yet there does not appear to be
opposition to the prevailing practice of tuna RFMOs applying specific obligations to third
States. It is likely that third States may be seen as acquiescing to tuna RFMO initiatives
especially without any protest or challenge. In these circumstances, third States indirectly
affirm that gradual change to the classic rule with respect to regimes for the conservation and
management or highly migratory fish stocks.

Like third States, the participation of fishing entities, in particular Taiwan, is important to
ensuring long term sustainability of highly migratory stocks. The next chapter explores the
role of tuna RFMOs in developing innovative mechanisms for the participation of Taiwan.
Such mechanisms have in effect strengthened the legal identity of Taiwan in tuna RFMOs.
To this the thesis now turns.
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VI
Fishing Entities
I.

INTRODUCTION

As international organisations with legal personality, tuna RFMOs have developed
mechanisms for the participation of entities, in particular the European Union and the fishing
entities. Given the plethora of literature on the EU, this Chapter focuses only on the fishing
entity of Taiwan.
The political situation between the Peoples’ Republic of China (hereafter “PRC”) and Taiwan
has been documented extensively elsewhere and will not be revisited. Suffice to say that
Taiwan (formerly known as Formosa) was an original member of the United Nations but
pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 2758 of 1971 the Republic of China (Taiwan) was
expelled from the United Nations in 1971 after the General Assembly accorded the seat of
China to the Peoples’ Republic of China.1 Taiwan has since been described as having the
status of a ‘non-recognised State’ or an ‘entity sui generis’, with modified personality, that in
one view may be approximated to that of a State.2

This Chapter first examines general international law relating to legal personality and the
recognition of entities. This is followed by an analysis of international fisheries instruments,

1

UNGA Resolution 2758 provides for the restoring of all rights to the government of the Peoples Republic of
China and recognises the PRC as ‘the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations’.
2
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th edition,
2012) 124 – 5. Crawford add that though not recognised as a State, Taiwan has an international legal identity;
Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th edition, 2008) 64 - 5.
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especially the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement. The last part evaluates the perceived
contribution of tuna RFMOs to international law relating to the fishing entity.

II.

GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

Legal Personality

As discussed earlier, a subject of international law is capable of possessing rights and
obligations and the capacity to maintain its rights.3 Historically sovereign States only were
regarded as subjects of the law but since the early 1900s other entities have been recognised
as having legal personality. A subject with international legal personality may act on the
international plane.4 The two approaches identified above in the case of international
organisations are the normative approach, and the functional necessity approach. Unlike
international organisations, the international legal personality for States is determined by
more rigid criteria. In accordance with the Montevideo Convention, States should have: i) a
permanent population, ii) a defined territory, iii) government, and iv) the capacity to enter
into relations with other States.5 Brownlie observed that not all conditions are peremptory and
that it is “no more than a basis for further investigation”.6 This view appears to introduce a
level of flexibility into the formula. In any case a State satisfying the formula would have
international legal personality.

Irrespective of whether an entity is a State or non-State, the legal capacity accorded to the
entity is intertwined with its personality. O’Connell supported a liberal approach: 7

[c]apacity implies personality, but always it is capacity to do those particular acts.
Therefore “personality” as a term is only shorthand for the proposition that an entity is
Crawford, above n 2, 115 - 126; Brownlie, above n 2, 676 – 679; H G Schermers, N M, Blokker, International
Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, (Martinus Nijhoff, 2003) 987 – 994; Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein,
Bowett’s Law of International Institutions, (Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edition, 2009) 474 – 516; N Klabbers, An
Introduction to International Institutional Law, (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 46 – 51.
4
Ibid.
5
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States, opened for signature 26 December 1933, (entered into
force 26 December 1934), art 1. See also Crawford, above n 2, 128 - 136; Brownlie, above n 2, 70 – 83; James
Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2006); Antonio
Cassese, International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005) 71 – 80; Jan Klabbers, International Law,
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 69 – 84.
6
Brownlie, above n 2, 70; Crawford, above n 2, 128.
7
D P O’Connell, International Law, (Stevens and Sons, 2nd edn, 1970) Volume 1, 81 – 82.
3

250

endowed by international law with legal capacity. But entity A may have capacity to
perform acts X and Y, but not act Z, entity B to perform acts Y and Z but not act X,
and entity C to perform all three. “Personality” is not, therefore, a synonym for
capacity to perform acts X, Y and Z; it is an index, not of capacity per se, but of
specific and different capacities….So a State may have capacity to do acts X, Y and
Z, the United Nations to do acts Y and Z, the International Labour Organisation to do
act X, and the human being to do acts X and Y. All four entities have capacities. To
deny that the last three have personality is to argue that only entities with all
capacities are persons, an argument that removes all meaning from the term
“personality”.
This was the error made by generations of international lawyers who asserted that
“States only are the subjects of international law”.

Other writers support pragmatism in the assessment of international legal personality through
the application of the normative and functional approaches.8 It is suggested that the practice
of tuna RFMOs has effectively accorded the fishing entity of Taiwan the necessary legal
capacities to be a subject of international law. In assessing the international legal personality
of Taiwan in international law, this Chapter analyses and contrasts the specific
responsibilities and capacities granted by the tuna RFMOs.

B.

Recognition

This Chapter would not be complete without some attention on the recognition of Taiwan by
tuna RFMOs. In general, recognition of States is more a question of national policy aligned to
serve national interests, than a matter governed by law.9 Recognition by a State signifies that
an entity satisfies the criteria of statehood.10
In theory there are two ways for the recognition of a new State. The constitutive theory of
recognition promotes recognition as a matter of fact while the declaratory theory of

8

See for instance Klabbers, International Institutional Law, above n 3, and Sands & Klein, above n 3.
Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (Cambridge, 1947) 1; Jan Klabbers, International Law
(Cambridge, 2013) 72 – 6.
10
James Crawford, ‘The Criteria for Statehood in International Law’, (1976) 48(1) British Yearbook of
International Law, 93 – 182; Crawford, above, n 2;
9
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recognition is based on overt or obvious form of effectiveness.11 This distinction is not
without flaws as everything would depend on the intention of the recognising government
concerned and the general context of fact and law.12 Crawford asserts that neither theory of
recognition adequately explains contemporary State practice in this area.13

There may also be de jure recognition or de facto recognition. In these instances, the
intention of the recognising State is paramount. De jure recognition, aligned to the
declaratory theory of recognition, allows for recognition of governments that have the
legitimate authority to govern in the view of the recognising State. On the other hand, a de
facto entity is one that may in fact be exercising control, even though the recognising State
may not agree with how that entity came into power.14 A de facto entity with international
personality and with the attributes of a state or government may carry out foreign relations
with other States including entering into international agreements and sending and receiving
official missions. Interestingly, Taiwan received de jure recognition from the United States of
America up until 1 January 1979 when such recognition shifted to the Peoples Republic of
China.15 This followed the UN General Assembly resolution on 25 October 1971 that
compelled Taiwan to withdraw from the UN. Since then, the US appears to recognise Taiwan
is as a de facto entity with international legal personality. Enacted in 1979, the US Taiwan
Relations Act with the dual objective of helping maintain peace, security and stability in the
Western Pacific and promoting the foreign policy of the US by supporting the continuation of
commercial, cultural and other relations provides the legal basis for their relationship and de
facto recognition.16 In contrast, the United Kingdom since 1972 recognises the Government
of the PRC as the sole Government of China and affirms that Taiwan is a province of China,
and does not have a legal basis for a relationship with Taiwan similar to the United States.

Crawford, ‘The Criteria for Statehood in International Law’, above n 10.
See for instance Brownlie, above n 2, 91.
13
Crawford, above n 10, 95.
14
Klabbers, above n 5, 74.
15
The 1979 Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Between the United States of
America and the People’s Republic of China shifted diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC and
provides for US recognition of the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. Victor H Li,
‘The Law of Non-Recognition: The Case of Taiwan’, (1979) 1 Northwestern Journal of International Law &
Business 134 – 162,
<http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=njilb>.
16
Section 4 of the Act provides that, “whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries,
nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with respect
to Taiwan.”
11
12
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It has been asserted that recognition gives rise to difficult questions that are yet to be clarified
in international law: ‘How many states must recognize? Can existence be relative only to
those states which do recognize? Is existence dependent on recognition only when this rests
on an adequate knowledge of the facts?17There are at least 21 UN member States and the
Holy See which formerly recognise Taiwan.18 Whilst significant in the circumstances, this
number does not appear to have attracted the necessary debate to address the questions posed.
In addition, there are examples of limited recognition provided by States and international
organisations. One such organisation, the European Union, recognises Taiwan as a ‘State’
and ‘country’ but only in relation to its regulations on IUU fishing.19

Although the literature focuses largely on State recognition, there is literature that details
recognition by international organisations, particular the League of Nations and the United
Nations.20 The admission of an entity into the United Nations is not without problems
especially in relation to the implied recognition arising from the admission.21 Collective
recognition through admission into the United Nations for instance does not equate to
recognition by each member State. Each UN member State may need to validate
recognition.22 Lauterpacht and others favour the express adoption of a rule for admission that
satisfies the existence of the requirements of statehood or of government capacity, and in turn
the right to recognition: ‘this in itself would constitute a weighty step in the direction of the
rational solution of the problem of recognition in general, namely, its collectivization by joint
action of the organized international community.’23 Indeed the United Nations has admission
rules in Article 4 of the UN Charter that must be satisfied, particularly, that membership in
the UN is open to all States, that are peace loving, accept the obligations contained in the
Charter, have the ability and are willing to carry out those obligations.24 Despite the existence

17

Crawford, above n 2, 146; Brownlie, above n 2, 88.
They are: Belize, Burkina Faso, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Kiribati,
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent
and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Swaziland, Tuvalu, and the Holy See.
19
European Commission, Commission Decision of 1 October 2015 on notifying a third country of the
possibility of being identified as a non-cooperating third country in fighting illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing (2015/C 324/10), Official Journal of the European Union, 2 October 2015.
20
Lauterpacht, above n X, 401 – 2; Brownlie, above n 1, 93 – 4; Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of
International Law through the Political Organs of the United Nations (Oxford University Press, 1963) 135 –
152.
21
Ibid, 400 – 403.
22
Klabbers, above n 5, 74.
23
Lauterpacht, above n X, 403; Klabbers, above n Y (IL), 74.
24
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), ICJ
Advisory Opinion, 28 May 1948, ICJ Reports 1948, 57.
18
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of clear criteria on membership, political considerations continue to dominate decisions on
membership. The ICJ in the Admissions Case indicated that overlaying political interests in
the consideration of the conditions for membership would confer on members an “indefinite
and practically unlimited power of discretion in the imposition of new conditions” and would
be inconsistent with paragraph 1 of Article 4.25 Although admission to membership in a
general international political organisation is prima facie evidence of statehood, the test of
statehood in general international law may not be applicable to the issue of membership in
the specialised agencies of the United Nations.26 The admission of Palestine in 2011 into the
United Nations Educations, Scientific and Cultural Organisation provides an illustration.
Taiwan’s membership in international organisations is increasing. In 1991, Taiwan became a
member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation as the “economy” of Taiwan. Ten years
later Taiwan was permitted to be a member of the World Trade Organisation after eleven
years of holding observer status.27 While membership in the WTO is considered to be a
diplomatic victory for Taiwan, Taiwan was able to join because WTO membership is not
restricted to States. Taiwan joined in accordance with the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organisation as a ‘separate customs territory possessing full autonomy in the conduct
of its external commercial relations and of other matters’.28 According to one author being a
WTO member ‘does not carry with it any implication about statehood or independence and is
not necessarily a way-station to statehood’.29 This statement does not consider the positive
implications of recognition by the WTO of Taiwan’s membership; such recognition being on
the same level as that according to the Peoples Republic of China. Taiwan’s membership also
appears to strengthen its official status in other international organisations.

25

Admission Case, above n 24, 63. After also applying the same reasoning to Rule 60 of the Security Council
Rules of Procedure, the Court decided that members are not juridically entitled to make its consent to admission
dependent on conditions that are not expressly provided in paragraph 1 of Article 4 of the Charter.
26
Brownlie, above n 1, 93 – 4.
27
For a background see Han-Wei, Liu, ‘An Entity Sui Generis in the WTO: Taiwan’s WTO Membership and its
Trade Law Regime’ (2009) 4(4) Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology 252 – 261; Steve
Charnovitz, ‘Taiwan’s WTO Membership and its International Implications’ (2006) 1 Asian Journal of WTO
and International Health Law and Policy 401
<http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1436&context=faculty_publications>; Pasha L
Hsieh, ‘An Unrecognized State in Foreign and International Courts: The Case of The Republic of China on
Taiwan’ (2008) 28 Michigan Journal of International Law 765, 804 – 810.
28
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature 15 April 1994, 33 ILM 1143
(entered into force 1 January 1995), Article XII. Taiwan joined as the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan,
Penghu, Kimmen and Matsu.
29
Charnovitz, above n 27, 420.
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Like the United Nations and its specialised agencies, tuna RFMOs are international
organisations with distinct legal personality from its members. But because tuna RFMOs are
international organisations with a technical mandate, admission of Taiwan to a tuna RFMO
cannot be prima facie evidence of statehood. However the argument may be made that the
admission of Taiwan into all tuna RFMOs signifies general or near universal acceptance of
the ability of Taiwan to discharge all responsibilities of a member or cooperating member.
Admission of Taiwan into tuna RFMOs may first be considered a necessity in the interests of
long term sustainability of fish stocks rather than a question of statehood.

Be that as it may, the admission of the fishing entity into a tuna RFMO automatically also
gives rise to obligations on the part of members States of that organisation. The member
States are duty bound to respect for example, the freedom of the high seas of the fishing
entity, the fishing entity’ right of innocent passage in the territorial sea, and the right to fish
on the high seas in accordance with applicable rules. Even though a member State of a tuna
RFMO does not formally recognise the fishing entity of Taiwan, the non recognising State is
still duty bound in relation to the fishing entity for obligations that are enshrined in
international fisheries law as well as in the specific rules pertaining to the tuna RFMO.

III.

FISHING ENTITY

The term ‘entity’ is contained in the 1982 LOSC and refers to: i) geographical, economic or
political characteristics of archipelagic States; ii) entities in Article 305 that are able to sign,
accede to or ratify that convention; and iii) entities involved in activities in the Area. While
the term “fishing entity” is foreign to the 1982 LOSC, it is contained in its 1995 Agreement
and this is addressed in the next section.30

30

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management
of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 August 1995, 34 I.L.M. 1542
(entered into force 11 December 2001), hereinafter ‘Fish Stocks Agreement’; Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Emergence of the
Concept of Fishing Entities: A Note’, (2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law,117-121.
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Historically, the term “fishing entity” in relation to Taiwan appears to have first been made in
an FAO paper presented at a technical consultation on high seas fishing in 1992.31 Among
other things, the consultation identified the issues surrounding non contracting parties and the
significance of the non participation of Taiwan to the management of high seas fisheries.32
Particularly:

46. The exclusion of parties from management bodies for political or other reasons
poses particular difficulties. Taiwan (Province of China) is a major international
fishing entity. Its high seas fishing capacity is extensive and likely to increase,
especially in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans. However, due to political nonrecognition, Taiwan (Province of China) does not participate fully in any fishery
management bodies…33

The participation in fisheries of Taiwan as the fishing entity continues to gain international
recognition.34 This has been attributed to several factors including the capacity of Taiwan’s
fishing fleet, the need to ensure Taiwan’s participation in order to maintain the viability of
conservation and management measures. According to one writer, ‘without Taiwan’s
participation, any conservation and management measures would be futile’.35

IV.

INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES INSTRUMENTS

The 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is a voluntary instrument that sets
out principles and international standards for responsible fisheries with the objective of

FAO, “International Fisheries Bodies: Considerations for High Seas Management,” FAO Fisheries Report No.
484 Supplement, (FAO, 1993) FIPL/ R484(Suppl), 44 – 54. The paper was presented at the FAO Technical
Consultation on High Seas Fishing, Rome, 7 – 15 September 1992…
32
See discussion in Alfred Hu Nien-Tsu, ‘Fishing Entities: Their Emergence, Evolution, and Practice from
Taiwan’s Perspective’ (2006) 37 Ocean Development and International Law 149 – 183. On the characteristics
of the fishery see Marcus Haward and Anthony Bergin, ‘Taiwan’s distant water tuna fisheries’, (2000) 24
Marine Policy 33 – 43.
33
FAO, above n 31, 52.
34
See Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The Legal Substance and Status of Fishing Entities in International Law: A Note’,
(2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law, 123-131; Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, above n 32.
35
Shih-Ming Kao, ‘Fishing Entity in International Law: An Analysis of Taiwan’s Practice in the Pacific Ocean’
(2012) 39(3) J. Fish. Soc. Taiwan 158.
31
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ensuring long term sustainability.36States and everyone involved in fisheries are encouraged
to implement the Code, a non binding instrument. The Code makes reference to fishing
entities in its provisions relation to scope and implementation. Article 1.2 directs the Code to
‘members and non-members of FAO, fishing entities, sub regional, regional and global
organizations, whether governmental or non-governmental, and all persons concerned with
the conservation of fishery resources and management and development of fisheries’. Fishing
entities are thus required to collaborate in the fulfilment and implementation of the objectives
and principles in the Code along with all of the other bodies identified.37 Moreover,
International Plans of Action of the FAO all of which are voluntary refer explicitly to fishing
entities. For example, paragraph 5 of the IPOA – IUU fishing stipulates that the IPOA is also
directed towards fishing entities as referred to in the Code.

Acknowledging that the 1982 LOSC does not explicitly provide for fishing entities, the 1995
Agreement provides a modest framework enabling the participation of the fishing entity.38
The 1995 Agreement is the first legally binding international fisheries instrument that
supports the participation of the fishing entity in regional fisheries management
organisations.39 Article 1.3 of the Agreement provides that: [t]his Agreement applies mutatis
mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas.40 In addition, Article
17.3 provides for collaboration with the fishing entity and the participation of the fishing
entity proportionate to its commitment to comply with conservation and management
measures.

3. States which are members of a subregional or regional fisheries management
organization or participants in a subregional or regional fisheries management
arrangement shall, individually or jointly, request the fishing entities referred to in
article 1, paragraph 3, which have fishing vessels in the relevant area to cooperate
fully with such organization or arrangement in implementing the conservation and
management measures it has established, with a view to having such measures applied
36

FAO. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995), hereafter ‘Code’.
Code art 4.1.
38
See also Peter S C Ho, ‘The Impact of the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement on Taiwan’s Participation in
International Fisheries Fora’ (2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law 133 – 148; Nien-Tsu Hu,
above n 32, especially 151 - 154;
39
Ho, ibid.
40
See also Article 17.3 on encouraging compliance and the commensurate benefits for vessels of fishing entities
fishing in the area.
37
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de facto as extensively as possible to fishing activities in the relevant area. Such
fishing entities shall enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery commensurate
with their commitment to comply with conservation and management measures in
respect of the stocks.

This provision underpins decisions of tuna RFMOs discussed below that support the
participation of the fishing entity as a cooperating entity in return for the enjoyment of
benefits and the obligation to comply.

The Commission on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna became the first international
fisheries body to apply Article 1 of the 1995 Agreement in support of the participation of
Taiwan as a fishing entity. Taiwan, although not party (and not eligible to become a party) to
the 1995 Agreement, argued in that Commission that it had a real interest and a right under
the 1995 Agreement to join regional fisheries management regimes.41

V.

TUNA RFMO PRACTICE

In examining the practice of tuna RFMOs in relation to the fishing entities, this part analyses
their constituent instruments, decisions and subsequent practice.42 Given the legal difficulties
with the membership of Taiwan, tuna RFMOs have accommodated the participation of the
fishing entity through decisions for the inclusion of cooperating non members or cooperating
non contracting parties.43

With respect to fishing entities, the main objective in all tuna RFMO negotiations was to
achieve an outcomes which creates legal obligations on fishing entities and facilitates
Andrew Serdy, ‘Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a Fishing
Entity’ (2004) BYBIL (75th edn) 183 – 221, indicates that the Taiwan argument is probably based on Article 1.3,
8.3 and 17.3 of the 1995 Agreement.
42
Tuna RFMOs vary in the nomenclature of binding and non-binding decisions: For the IATTC, IOTC, and
CCSBT, resolutions contain binding decisions, while this is not the case in the WCPFC. In ICCAT
Recommendations contain binding decisions and Resolutions generally provide non-binding decisions.
Decisions entitled “Conservation and Management Measure” often reduced to “CMM” are binding in the
WCPFC.
43
See William Edeson, ‘Some Future Directions for Fishing Entities in Certain
Regional Fisheries Management Bodies’, (2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law, 245-264.
41
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substantive participation. As was identified by Ambassador Nandan during the WCPF
Convention negotiations, “[t]he difficulty is how to find a formula which creates a legally
binding relationship without prejudging the legal and political status of such entities.”44

A.

IATTC

The Inter-America Tropical Tuna Commission is now considered progressive in relation to
the participation of the fishing entity.45Although the 1949 Convention of the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission does not allow for the participation of fishing entities, its
successor, the Antigua Convention, contains references within the body of the treaty.
Concerning the fishing entity, there are several references that effectively extend all rights
and obligations enjoyed by member States of the Commission to fishing entities that are
members, namely: Article XIX Implementation, Compliance and Enforcement by Fishing
Entities, Article XXI Duties of Fishing Entities, Article XXVI Non Members, Article XXVIII
Fishing Entities, and Annex I. Article XIX for example, applies all the requirements for
implementation, compliance and enforcement of member States, with the necessary changes,
to the fishing entity member. Similarly, duties of member States in Article XX apply to the
fishing entity member. Compared to the constituent instruments of other tuna RFMOs, the
Antigua Convention contains the most references. This has been attributed to two factors –
the “vision” of the chair of the working group, and the intention of the working group not to
emulate developments in the Western and Central Pacific Convention.46

Article XXVIII of the Antigua Convention allows for signature of an instrument by the
fishing entity and or the submission of a written instrument to the depositary indicating its
consent. The eligibility is restricted to any fishing entity whose vessels fished for highly
migratory stocks during the four years preceding 2003. The fishing entity may express its
firm commitment to abide by the Antigua Convention and comply with any conservation and
management measures. Both options of signature and the submission of a written instrument
of acceptance are acts traditionally reserved for States. Inclusion within the constitutive

44

Closing Statement by the Chairman, Ambassador Satya N. Nandan, to the Sixth Session of the Multilateral
High-Level Conference, 19 April 2000, on file with author.
45
Dustin Kuan-Hsiung Wang, ‘Taiwan's Participation in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and the
Conceptual Revolution on Fishing Entity: The Case of the IATTC’, (2006) 37(2)
Ocean Development & International Law, 209-219.
46
Wang, above n 45; Kao, above n 35.
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instrument of the IATTC signifies the importance of the fishing entity in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean.

The IATTC in 2003 adopted a resolution on criteria for attaining the status of
Cooperating Non-party or Cooperating Fishing Entity to the AIDCP and IATTC.47 Among
other things, the resolution conditioned participation as a cooperating non-party or
cooperating fishing entity with the submission of information and a compliance commitment.
Information to be communicated include historical fisheries data, annual catch and effort
data, current fishing presence and research programmes in the IATTC area.48 The applicant
also had to submit an explicit commitment to comply with all conservation measures in force
in IATTC-AIDCP, respect capacity limits, promote compliance by its vessels, and respond to
alleged violations by its vessels.49 If the status is approved, the cooperating non-party or
fishing entity could participate as an observer to plenary and scientific meetings for that year
and would need to reapply on an annual basis. Although it set the fundamental requirements
on cooperating non-parties or fishing entities, the resolution did not provide a clear process
for the submission and consideration of applications.

A year later the IATTC adopted another resolution on cooperating non-parties or fishing
entities that replaced the 2003 resolution and served to provide clear criteria to enable nonparties or fishing entities intending to attain the status of Cooperating non-Party or
Cooperating Fishing Entity.50 The 2004 resolution included all of the operative provisions of
the 2003 resolution, delineated the role of the Director in receiving requests and identified the
Joint Working Group on Fishing by non-Parties with the responsibility for reviewing requests
for Cooperating Status and for making recommendations to the Commission accordingly. 51
Apart from adherence with the information and compliance requirements, the granting of
IATTC Cooperating Status was also conditioned by concerns of excess fishing capacity and
IUU fishing activities in the IATTC Convention area.52
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Resolution C-03-11 Resolution on criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Non-party or Cooperating
Fishing Entity to AIDCP and IATTC.
48
Resolution C-03-11, [1].
49
Resolution C-03-11, [2].
50
Resolution C-04-02 Resolution on criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Non-party or Fishing Entity
in IATTC.
51
Resolution C-04-02, [5].
52
Resolution C-04-02, [5].
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By Resolution C-03-09 adopted at its 70th meeting in June 2003, the IATTC recognised the
active participation of Taiwan as an observer in the work of the IATTC, its role in the
negotiation of the Antigua Convention and its significant presence in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean over 30 years, and called on the observer to sign the instrument in its character as a
fishing entity under the name Chinese Taipei.53

In 2007, the IATTC again revisited the criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Nonparty or Fishing Entity.54 Compared to its predecessor, the 2007 resolution mimicked the
2004 resolution and exempted any Cooperating Non-Party or Cooperating Fishing Entity that
had signed, ratified or acceded to the Antigua Convention or the Instrument for the
Participation of Fishing Entities from requesting cooperating status since the State or fishing
entity was now a member.55

B.

ICCAT

The Convention establishing the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas adopted in 1966, does not provide for fishing entities. This is simply because fishing
entities were not in issue at the time. Since the 1990s the Commission has considered the
issue of the participation of fishing entities.56

The Commission in 1997 adopted the Resolution on Becoming a Cooperating Party, Entity or
Fishing Entity.57 As a consequence, Taiwan has participated as a cooperating fishing entity at
the meetings of the ICCAT.58 The weaknesses in the 1997 resolution were addressed when
the Commission adopted a binding resolution for the criteria for cooperating non-contracting
parties and entities in 2001.59 The 2001 resolution was replaced two years later by another
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Resolution C-03-09 Resolution on the Participation of a Fishing Entity in the Antigua Convention.
Resolution C-07-02 Criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating Non-party
or Fishing Entity in IATTC. This resolution replaced the 2004 resolution.
55
Resolution C-07-02, [7].
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Edeson, above n 43.
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Resolution 97-17.
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See Edeson, above n 43, for the identification of weaknesses with the 1997 resolution.
Resolution by ICCAT on Becoming a Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity [01-17] adopted at the 17th
Regular Meeting in 2001.
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and a resolution on coordination with non-parties.60 Generally the 2003 resolution is similar
to the equivalent measure of the IATTC in terms of the information requirements. For
compliance requirements, a non-party applicant must confirm its commitment to respect
ICCAT’s conservation and management measures, and inform ICCAT of measures it takes to
ensure compliance by its vessels with ICCAT conservation and management measures. 61 The
ICCAT Permanent Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and
Conservation Measures is responsible for reviewing requests for Cooperating Status and for
making recommendations to the Commission accordingly. Like the IATTC measure, caution
is exercised if the granting of cooperating status would introduce excessive fishing capacity
or IUU fishing activities into the ICCAT Convention Area.62

C.

IOTC

Like the constituent instrument of ICCAT, the IOTC Agreement does not provide for the
participation of fishing entities. The IOTC Agreement is referred to as an Article XIV body
given that it is established in accordance with Article XIV of the FAO Constitution. As an
Article XIV body, it is politically difficult to amend the constituent instrument or to allow for
the participation of the fishing entity within the FAO framework in view of the fact that the
FAO is within the United Nations system.63 Early attempts to accommodate fishing entities
were not successful including a proposed resolution supporting cooperation with fishing
entities modelled on the IOTC Resolution concerning cooperation with non contracting
parties.64
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2003-20 Recommendation by ICCAT on criteria for attaining the status of Cooperating non-Contracting
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Commission’s 9th Special Meeting in 1994.
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IATTC Resolution C-07-02, op cit, n.52.
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Notwithstanding, the Commission has adopted several binding resolutions65 providing for
cooperating non-contracting parties.66 Some resolutions contain references to fishing entities
but fall short of providing a relatively robust framework for the participation of the fishing
entity.67Taiwan however is present at IOTC meetings as “invited experts”.68

D.

CCSBT

Although the CCSBT Convention does not contain any reference to “fishing entity”, the most
prominent decisions of the CCSBT relating to the fishing entity can be found in the
Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee,69
and the Resolution to Establish the Status of Cooperating Non-Member of the Extended
Commission and the Extended Scientific Committee.70The participation of Chinese Taipei
could not be effected without explicit rules. Thus the Commission acting under the
Convention established an Extended Commission comprised of Parties “and any entity or
65

Resolutions are binding on the Commission Members, unless there is a specific objection on the part of a
Member, and require a two-thirds majority of Members present and voting to adopt them. On the other hand,
Recommendations are not binding on the Members and rely on voluntary implementation. The Commission
may, by a simple majority of its Members present and voting, adopt Recommendations concerning conservation
and management of the stocks for furthering the objectives of the IOTC Agreement.
66
Resolution 12/11 On The Implementation Of A Limitation Of Fishing Capacity Of Contracting Parties And
Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties; Resolution 10/02 Mandatory statistical requirements for IOTC Members
and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties (CPC’s); Resolution 10/05 On the establishment of a meeting
participation fund for developing IOTC Members and Non-Contracting Cooperating Parties (CPCs); Resolution
07/01 To promote compliance by nationals of Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties with
IOTC Conservation and Management Measures; Resolution 03/01 On the limitation of fishing capacity of
Contracting Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties; Resolution 03/02 On criteria for attaining the
status of Co-Operating Non-Contracting Party; Resolution 01/03 Establishing a scheme to promote compliance
by Non-Contracting Party vessels with Resolutions established by IOTC; Resolution 01/04 On limitation of
fishing effort of Non Members of IOTC whose vessels fish bigeye tuna; Resolution 00/01 On compliance with
mandatory statistical requirements for IOTC Members and requesting cooperation with Non-Contracting
Parties; Resolution 98/05 On Cooperation with Non-Contracting Parties.
67
See for instance Resolution 99/02 Call for actions against fishing activities by large scale flag of convenience
long line vessels.
68
IOTC Rules of Procedure (2014) Rule XIV, [9] provides: ‘The Commission may invite consultants or
experts, in their individual capacity, to attend the meetings or participate in the work of the Commission as well
as the Committees and the other subsidiary bodies of the Commission’. Taiwan’s participation in the Scientific
Committee is supported in paragraph 4 of the rules of procedure for that committee - SC Terms of Reference
and Rules of Procedure (Appendix IV of the IOTC Rules of Procedure (2014)). Paragraph 5 of the SC
procedures provides that the Commission may finance the participation of the experts invited in their individual
capacity thus providing a possibility, albeit remote, that the participation of an invited expert from Taiwan may
be financed by the Commission.
69
Resolution adopted at the Seventh Annual Meeting (18 – 21 April 2001) and revised at the Tenth Annual
Meeting (7 – 10 October 2003), hereafter “CCSBT Extended Commission Resolution”.
70
Adopted at the Tenth Annual Meeting (7 – 10 October 2003), hereafter “CCSBT Cooperating Non-Member
Resolution”. See also the Rules of Procedure for the Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern
Bluefin Tuna, adopted 2001 and revised 2003.
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fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any time in the previous three
calendar years, that is admitted to membership by the Extended Commission”.71 The
qualification on membership may be viewed as undermining the “real interest” criteria in the
Agreement, and the practice of inclusivity.72 Any entity or fishing entity whose vessels
caught SBT at any time in the time period specific could express its willingness to the
Executive Secretary of the Commission to become a member of the Extended Commission.73

The process for fishing entities intending to become members of the Extended Commission is
a unique illustration amongst tuna RFMOs that supports the exercise of implied powers.74
The International Court of Justice in Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in
Armed Conflict described implied powers of international organisation as follows:

The powers conferred on international organizations are normally the subject
of an express statement in their constituent instruments. Nevertheless, the
necessities of international life may point to the need for organizations, in
order to achieve their objectives, to possess subsidiary powers which are not
provided for in the basic instruments which govern their activities. It is
generally accepted that international organizations can exercise such powers,
known as “implied” powers.75

Parties to the Convention through their subsequent practice and applying implied powers
created the Extended Commission which works in tandem with the Commission. On the
granting of membership, new members assume equal rights as the parties in decision-making
for the fishery. With rights come responsibilities. The responsibility of the fishing entity of
Taiwan in the accounting of southern Bluefin tuna catch has previously come under attention.
The responsibility assumed by fishing entities under binding measures is tantamount to the
responsibility of States.76
71

See Articles 8.3(b) and 15.4 of the Convention, and paragraph 1 of the CCSBT Extended Commission
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See options in William Edeson, ‘Some Future Directions for Fishing Entities in Certain
Regional Fisheries Management Bodies’, (2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law, 245-264.
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E.

WCPFC

The WCPF Convention appears to be the first agreement of its kind to provide a mechanism
for participation of both the PRC and Taiwan, ROC. Lodge provides a comprehensive
account of the negotiations leading toward the adoption of the Convention.77 Taiwan ROC
declined to attend the first Multilateral High Level Conference (MHLC) in 1994 primarily
because it was not able to participate under the official name of ‘the Republic of China’.
Taiwan did however participate in the second MHLC in the Republic of the Marshall Islands
because the host did not recognise PRC and the concept of ‘fishing entity’ had then recently
been adopted in the 1995 Agreement. The outcome of the second MHLC, the Majuro
Declaration, included a reference to fishing entities fishing in the high seas in the region, and
provides a decision that reads:
…to ensure that the fishing activities in the region are conducted in a manner fully
consistent with the respective rights, obligations and responsibilities of coastal States
and territories and other States and fishing entities fishing on the high seas in the
region under the Convention and the Implementing Agreement.78

This inclusion seems to support the interpretation that fishing entities have rights, obligations
and responsibilities akin to coastal States.79 The Chair of the third MHLC decided to progress
the issue through “quiet consultation among the most interested parties”.80 At the conclusion
of the fourth MHLC, the Chair’s draft included a provision for “fishing entity being a
separate customs territory…to affirm in writing its acceptance of the Convention regime”.81
The PRC opposed this provision on the ground that acceptance by Taiwan could be
interpreted as equivalent to a treaty act. As a compromise the PRC supported the inclusion of
Taiwan in the provision on territories but Taiwan objected in that it sought to be treated as a
Michael W Lodge, ‘The Practice of Fishing Entities in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: The
Case of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific Ocean’ (2006) 37(2) Ocean Development and International Law 185 – 207.
78
The Majuro Declaration of the Second Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific, Majuro, Marshall Islands, 10
– 13 June 1997, [3] < http://legal.icsf.net/icsflegal/uploads/pdf/instruments/maj0201.pdf >.
79
Lodge, above, n 77.
80
Chairman’s opening statement, MHLC3, Tokyo, Japan, June 1998, cited by Lodge, above n 77.
81
Draft article 35 cited by Lodge, above n 77.
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full member with the same rights and obligations of a contracting party. By April 2000,
Taiwan had accepted the name ‘fishing entity’ and argued that as a fishing entity it had the
same capacity as a contracting party. In response, the PRC maintained its position that the
entity enjoys benefits commensurate with compliance with adopted measures and should be
treated as an observer.82 The final negotiated text of the Convention explicitly provides for
fishing entities in Annex I.

Annex I first allows for a procedure for the acceptance and withdrawal of the Convention by
the fishing entity. However, the Commission may only accept the membership application of
a fishing entity only after the entry into force of the Convention; this was to ensure that
Taiwan played no part in the entry into force of the Convention, such role considered by
some, especially China, to be reserved for a sovereign State.83 Secondly participation by the
fishing entity in the work of the Commission, including decision making, is stipulated. The
fishing entity is also required to comply with obligations under the Convention. The Annex
states that any reference to the Commission or members of the Commission includes the
fishing entity and Contracting Parties.84 As the practice of States in RFMOs evolves
gradually over time, it is anticipated that the distinct delineation between the fishing entity
and other Parties of the Convention will fade. Finally, the Annex sets out the dispute
settlement procedures concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention. Where
a dispute involving a fishing entity arises and such dispute cannot be settled by agreement,
the dispute shall at the request of either party to the dispute be submitted to final and binding
arbitration in accordance with the relevant rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.85
While the dispute settlement procedure involving the fishing entity is yet to be tested, its
inclusion is novel amongst the constituent instruments of tuna RFMOs.

Putting Annex I aside, although conservation and management measures of the WCPF
Commission are legally binding on Commission members, Participating Territories and
Cooperating Non Members, a few measures contain provisions designed specifically to
address relations with the fishing entity. The best example is the measure setting out high

See the analysis of positions of the PRC and Taiwan in Lodge, above n 77: 192 – 193.
WCPF Convention, annex I. See also art 9.7 on the location of headquarters and the appointment of the
Executive Secretary as matters only for Contracting Parties.
84
WCPF Convention annex I.2.
85
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seas boarding and inspection procedures.86 In sum, the measure contains rules and procedures
for the boarding and inspection of fishing vessels on the high seas within the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean. During the negotiations China in particular took exception to the
potential boarding of its vessels on the high seas by authorised inspectors of Taiwan and
insisted on conditioning such boarding by the entity. The innovative provision that acts as a
condition reads:

Unless otherwise decided by the Commission, these procedures shall also apply in
their entirety as between a Contracting Party and a Fishing Entity, subject to a
notification to that effect to the Commission from the Contracting Party concerned.87

This provision is crafted in a manner that supports a reciprocal arrangement between the
Contracting Party and fishing entity before boarding on the high seas and due notification to
the Commission “by the Contracting Party concerned”. The requirement for reciprocity in the
measure was deliberate in light of sensitivities on the floor.88 The United States has this
understanding and in their notification to the Commission under paragraph 6 stipulated that
until such time a reciprocal arrangement is in place, a Contracting Party should refrain from
boarding vessels of the fishing entity.89 In the implementation of this paragraph, some States
have a different interpretation. New Zealand for instance based on informal discussions with
its representatives initially held the view that there does not have to be a reciprocal
arrangement in place.

VI.

CONTRIBUTION OF TUNA RFMOS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
RELATING TO FISHING ENTITY

A

Creation of New Subject of International Law
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CMM 2006-08 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission boarding and inspection procedures.
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This point however is not articulated in a recent publication – Chung-Ling Chen, ‘Realization of high seas
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management’ (2014) 50 Marine Policy 162 – 170.
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The majority of tuna RFMOs in admitting the fishing entity of Taiwan as a member or
cooperating non member also accord international rights and impose obligations. In so doing,
tuna RFMOs grant to the fishing entity of Taiwan the necessary legal capacities to be a
subject of international law. Writers assert that the concept of fishing entity has gained
international acceptance and recognise that Taiwan possesses “full autonomy” regarding the
conduct of its fleet and in relations with other States on fisheries.90 This position is correct
and affirms the point that a new subject of international law has been established and
recognised primarily through tuna RFMOs.

Fishing entities are now a new subject of international law within the field of international
fisheries law given the legal basis in the 1995 Agreement and ‘by their recognition in
international fisheries instruments and the creation of obligations for such entities’.91 A
fishing entity may possess full autonomy in fisheries related issues and may be accorded
international fisheries rights and obligations ‘analogous’ to those accorded to States.92 If it
were not for the provisions in the Agreement and the practice of tuna RFMOs, it is argued
that fishing entities would today not be considered subjects of international law.

That said, the challenge now is for fishing entities to take responsibility for their obligations.
The responsibilities of complying with conservation and management measures, limiting
fishing capacity and catch where required, and accounting catch taken in a fishery are
examples of fishing entity responsibilities that are equivalent to State responsibilities.

B.

Responsibility

Tuna RFMOs that have admitted fishing entities can play a unique role in monitoring and
ensuring compliance with responsibilities. It is foreseeable that tuna RFMOs will be at the
Warwick Gullett, ‘Fishing industry – Taiwan’, in M Bagg (ed), Berkshire encyclopedia of China: modern and
historic views of the world’s newest and oldest global power (Berkshire Publishing Group, 2009) 824 – 826,
825; Djalal, above n 30; Tsamenyi, above n 34.
91
Shih-Ming Kao, ‘Fishing Entity in International Law: An Analysis of Taiwan’s Practice in the Pacific Ocean’
(2012) 39(3) J. Fish. Soc. Taiwan 149 – 161 quoting Tsamenyi, above n 34.
92
N T A Hu, ‘Fishing entities: their emergence, evolution and practice from Taiwan’s perspective’ (2006) 37(2)
Ocean Development and International Law 149 – 183; Kao, above n 35.
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forefront in attaching responsibility to the fishing entity where required. Responsibility flows
from an internationally wrongful act and international law governs the characterisation of
when an act of a State is “internationally wrongful”. It is suggested that the articles on State
responsibility will be applied to fishing entities mutatis mutandis. The ILC Articles on State
Responsibility state two elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State: attribution,
and breach of an international obligation.93 These elements may be proved with the
deliberations of the respective tuna RFMO and sanctions may be taken within that
organisation in the first instance.

C.

Collective Recognition?

The earlier discussion identifies how admission into a general international political
organisation such as the United Nations signifies collective recognition of the organisation
that an entity satisfies the requirements of statehood. Admission is prima facie evidence of
statehood.

Although tuna RFMOs are not international political organisations but international
organisations with a technical mandate, admission as a member or cooperating non member
signifies broad acceptance by the respective organisation that the State or entity has legal
personality under international law. An argument may be made that admission of fishing
entities in all except one tuna RFMO provides collective recognition, at the very least, of the
fishing entities legal personality and autonomy to possess international rights and
responsibilities in fisheries.

C.

Application of State Party Responsibilities mutatis mutandis to Fishing Entities

Legally binding instruments of tuna RFMOs apply to fishing entities on acceptance of
admission as a member or cooperating non member. All of the tuna RFMOs have conditions
93

ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries,
2001, ..., art 2. In identifying the two elements, the ILC relied on decisions of international courts and tribunals
particularly the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the Phosphates in Morocco Case,
1938, PCIJ Series A/B, No 74, 10. See also James Crawford, The International Law Commission’s Articles on
State Responsibility Introduction, Text and Commentaries (Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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for admission which importantly include the requirement to comply with constituent
instruments and binding conservation and management measures. Hence, the fishing entity of
Taiwan, will indirectly be required to comply with binding treaties such as the Agreement
and the constituent instrument of the RFMO together with binding measures. In the case of
the IATTC, the Antigua Convention applies all State Party responsibilities to fishing entities.

Further for recently established tuna RFMOs the application of key principles of conservation
in areas under national jurisdiction and the principle of compatibility examples of State
responsibilities that need to be met by fishing entities. Therefore, fishing entities will be
required to ensure that measures taken within areas under its national jurisdiction are
compatible with measures adopted by a tuna RFMO in adjacent high seas areas. Despite the
difference in terms used, fishing entities have the same responsibilities as a State and will
need to account accordingly.

D.

Exercise of Coastal State Rights and Responsibilities

Through the constitutive instruments, measures and decisions of tuna RFMOs, Taiwan is in
fact exercising coastal State rights and responsibilities. Coastal State rights are codified in the
1982 LOSC and are entrenched in international law. For example, these rights allow for the
coastal State to exercise its sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage its
natural resources, both living and non living, within its exclusive economic zone.94 Further
the coastal State has the power to enforce violations of its fisheries law within that zone.95 In
its internal waters, archipelagic waters and the territorial sea,, the coastal State enjoys
sovereignty including for the regulation of fishing and related activity. By facilitating
participation, setting measures and monitoring compliance with those measures, tuna RFMOs
individually and collectively recognise that the fishing entity of Taiwan is in fact carrying out
the rights of coastal States in international law.

With the same token, coastal State responsibilities such as the obligations to conserve and
manage fisheries resources at agreed levels, the obligation of enabling the freedom of

94
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LOSC art 56.
LOSC art 73.
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navigation of vessels of other States within its exclusive economic zone, and the obligation to
cooperate in the management of fisheries, is being undertaken by the fishing entity. Tuna
RFMOs continue to effectively monitor and compel its members, including the fishing entity,
to comply with fisheries conservation and management obligations. In this way, tuna RFMOs
and its members directly and indirectly recognise the fishing entity as equivalent to a coastal
State in terms of rights and responsibilities. Finally there are no provisions that exempt,
qualify or diminish the obligations of fishing entities.

E.

Exercise of Flag State Rights and Responsibilities

Similarly, flag State rights and responsibilities are being exercised by the fishing entity of
Taiwan through tuna RFMOs. There is little doubt that the fishing fleet of Taiwan is
significant in terms of numbers and capacity. Taiwan is responsible for its vessels fishing
around the globe and is required to discharge its responsibilities as a flag State.

By extending its application to fishing entities, the 1995 Agreement sets the overarching
duties that the fishing entity is to adhere to. The fundamental duties are contained in Articles
18 and 19 of the 1995 Agreement and elaborated in various instruments of tuna RFMOs. In
brief, the flag State may authorise its vessels to fish on the high seas only if such State is able
to effectively monitor and control the vessel. Flag State duties also include procedures for
investigations, institution of legal proceedings, sanctions, and the control of nationals.
Further, monitoring control and surveillance requirements must also be met by the flag and
these include the markings and identification of the vessel, placement of observers,
requirement to operate vessel monitoring equipment, and reporting requirements.

Tuna RFMOs are at the forefront in facilitating the implementation of flag State rights and
responsibilities. An illustration is the notification and reporting requirements relating to the
listing of a vessel on the IUU fishing vessel list. In several instances when a vessel of the
fishing entity has been listed in such list, Taiwan is notified, required to investigate and report
to the tuna RFMO on its findings and actions taken. Although the actions taken by Taiwan in
relation to listed vessel(s) may not be adequate to remove its vessel, they are nonetheless
actions reserved for flag States acting in accordance with its laws. Another illustration is the
requirement for a reciprocal arrangement for high seas boarding and inspections between
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Taiwan and another Contracting Party of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission. Without such arrangement in place, no high seas boarding and inspection can
be undertaken. While paragraph 6 of that WCPFC measure was primarily intended to
preclude the boarding by Taiwan inspectors of PRC fishing vessels, it has also lent support to
Taiwan’s flag jurisdiction to approve the boarding of its vessels on the high seas.

In the ways identified, tuna RFMOs and its members directly and indirectly recognise the
fishing entity as equivalent to a flag State in the exercise of associated jurisdiction and
responsibilities. China however has on occasion argued in favour of applying Article 17.3 of
the 1995 Agreement literally.

F.

Exercise of Port State Rights and Responsibilities

According to international fisheries instruments, a port State has the right and duties to take
measures to promote the effectiveness of conservation and management measures.96
Measures of tuna RFMOs contain requirements for port States to comply with. These range
from the requirement to establish and comply with catch documentation schemes, the
prohibition of landing and support for IUU fishing vessels, the control of fishing input and
outputs, port monitoring, inspection of catch, and the inspection of fishing vessels. It is
noteworthy that there are no provisions that exempt the fishing entity from these obligations.

To illustrate, in 2012 the Atlantic Tuna Commission approved the ICCAT scheme for
minimum standards for inspection in port. The scheme is intended to bolster ICCAT’s
monitoring, control, and surveillance regime to promote implementation of and compliance
with its conservation and management measures. Largely modelled on the FAO Port States
Measures Agreement, the scheme sets a requirement that five percent of the total number of
foreign fishing vessels using a port are inspected on an annual basis.97 Moreover the
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statistical document programmes of the Atlantic Tuna Commission also impose a significant
burden on its members in the monitoring and documentation of imports and exports of tuna
and other species using ports for landings and transhipments.98

As with the contributions relating to coastal State and flag State rights and responsibilities,
the fishing entity of Taiwan is exercising the rights and obligations of a port State through
tuna RFMOs. Tuna RFMOs and its members directly and indirectly recognise the fishing
entity akin to a port State in the exercise of associated jurisdiction and responsibilities.

G.

Mechanism for Formal Acceptance of Treaty or Instrument

Tuna RFMOs have also contributed to international law by providing various mechanisms for
the formal acceptance of a treaty or instrument by the fishing entity of Taiwan. Formal
acceptance of a treaty or instrument is a practice traditionally reserved only for States, , or
more recently, international organisations. As discussed above, Annex I of the WCPF
Convention allows for the submission of a written instrument of acceptance by the fishing
entity.99 This is analogous to the act of ratification. Similarly, the Antigua Convention
adopted in 2003 provides for signature of an instrument by the fishing entity and or the
submission of a written instrument of acceptance.100Both options are diplomatic acts
traditionally reserved for States.
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In relation to the statistical documentation rules of ICCAT only, see the following recommendations:
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In contrast, the other tuna RFMOs provide an indirect mechanism for the acceptance of
constituent instruments and compliance with conservation and management measures. For
the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, the fishing entity is required
to accede to the Resolution on the Extended Commission and Extended Scientific
Committee. On acceding, the fishing entity agrees to comply with the conservation and
management measures of the Commission. In contrast in the ICCAT, the fishing entity is
required to apply for cooperating status and confirm its commitment to comply with the
Commission measures as well as indicate actions it will take to ensure compliance by its
vessels.101 The IOTC is yet to provide a similar mechanism for the cooperation of fishing
entities. Through these indirect mechanisms the fishing entity accepts to be bound through an
instrument of accession in the case of CCSBT, or an explicit commitment to be bound when
applying for cooperating status.

H.

Fishing Entity Consent Not Required for IUU Listing

While the criteria for IUU listing is addressed in Chapter VII, the consent of a fishing entity
is not required in the listing of its vessel on a tuna RFMO IUU list. The tuna RFMO IUU lists
are an important mechanism towards preventing, deterring and eliminating IUU fishing. This
emerging practice of tuna RFMOs is significant because: 1) the same criteria for IUU listing
is applied to all fishing vessels; 2) the international regime for IUU listing promoted by the
tuna RFMOs applies uniformly to the fishing entity; and 3) it places the fishing entity on the
same level as States with respect to listing of vessels.

Fishing vessels flagged to the fishing entity are treated in the same way as other fishing
vessels in the IUU listing process of tuna RFMOs. Other principles applied include the point
that vessels on the draft or provisional IUU lists should not be unfairly treated or
discriminated against.

I.

Entitlement to Participate in Decision-making

101

Recommendation by ICCAT on Criteria for Attaining the Status of Cooperating Non-Contracting Party,
Entity or Fishing Entity in ICCAT [03-20].

274

Tuna RFMOs are perhaps the only international organisations which have accorded the
fishing entity with the right to participate in decision making including the right to vote.
Among tuna RFMOs, the WCPFC is at the forefront in allowing for the participation of the
fishing entity in the work of the Commission, including decision-making.102 Notwithstanding,
the fishing entity was not permitted to be involved in the decision on the location of the
headquarters and in the appointment of the Executive Director. Unlike the WCPF
Convention, in Article IX of the Antigua Convention the distinction is made between
“members of the Commission” and “Parties”. The fishing entity is included in the former but
excluded from the latter. Hence, the fishing entity may participate in consensus decision
making involving members of the Commission. However the entity is precluded from
participating in decisions for the adoption of amendments to the Antigua Convention or
decisions to invite a State to accede to the Convention since these are both reserved for
Parties.103

By far the CCSBT is the most creative in facilitating the participation of the fishing entity in
decision making. Through the Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and an
Extended Scientific Committee, the Commission introduced “parallel institutions” which
perform the same tasks as the Commission and the Scientific Committee. Tasks include
making decisions on a total allowable catch and allocation among members. Importantly all
members of the Extended Commission have equal voting rights.104

Despite the fact that the IOTC and the ICCAT restrict decision making to their contracting
parties, the trends shown by the inclusive decision making processes in the CCSBT, IATTC
and WCPFC are noteworthy. These tuna RFMOs have indeed established precedents in the
practice of international organisations for the inclusion of the fishing entity of Taiwan in
decision making.

J.

Access to Tuna RFMO Dispute Settlement Mechanisms
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WCPF Convention art 9.2 and annex I.2. The WCPFC Rules of Procedure indicate in footnote 2 that any
reference to the Commission or members of the Commission includes such fishing entity as well as Contracting
Parties.
103
Antigua Convention art IX.2.
104
Paragraph 2 of Resolution.
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Participation in tuna RFMOs provides Taiwan access to dispute settlement mechanisms
which was previously only available to States.105 Traditionally these dispute settlement
mechanisms are tailored for disputes between States and are derived from international
instruments such as the Charter of the United Nations.106

In 2004, Taiwan became a member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
after submitting its instrument in accordance with Annex I of the WCPF Convention. Annex I
provides that in the event of a dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the
Convention, the parties failing settlement by agreement and at the request of either party, may
resolve the dispute through final and binding arbitration in accordance with the applicable
rules of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.107 In contrast, Taiwan’s membership of the
Antigua Convention allows for the resolution of non-technical disputes through ‘any peaceful
means … in accordance with international law’, and for technical disputes to be submitted to
a non-binding ad hoc expert panel constituted within the framework of the Commission.108
Further, Taiwan’s membership as a fishing entity of the Extended Commission for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna enables the resolution of disputes by ‘negotiation,
inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means’.109

Tuna RFMOs in allowing for participation of the fishing entity have positioned Taiwan on a
footing comparable in several respects with States in the resolution of disputes. This is an
historic feat that began in August 2002 with Taiwan’s membership of the Extended
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.110 Tuna RFMOs as international
organisations are providing the fishing entity through their respective international binding
instruments, dispute settlement mechanisms traditionally available only to States.

K.

Supporting Taiwan’s Access to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea

Michael Sheng-Ti Gau, ‘The Practice of the Concept of Fishing Entities: Dispute Settlement Mechanisms’,
(2006) 37(2) Ocean Development & International Law, 221-243.
106
See UN Charter arts 2 [3] and 33.
107
WCPF Convention annex I [3].
108
Antigua Convention art XXV.
109
Extended Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, Resolution to Establish and Extended
Commission and an Extended Committee, [2].
110
Taiwan’s membership in 200[9] of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation
responsible, among other things, for the management of straddling fish stocks in the South Pacific Ocean, also
allows access to dispute settlement mechanisms, in particular arbitration.
105
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The term ‘peaceful means’ used in the dispute settlement provisions of all the tuna RFMO is
broad and may be interpreted to extend to the resolution of disputes before the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). ITLOS established pursuant to Annex VI of the
1982 LOSC is increasingly recognised as an authoritative judicial forum in maritime affairs.
Article 288 of the 1982 LOSC provides for the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals identified
including ITLOS. Accordingly ITLOS will have jurisdiction over disputes concerning ‘the
interpretation or application of an international agreement related to the purposes of this
Convention’, which is submitted in accordance with that agreement.111 The ITLOS Statute
permits an entity ‘other than State Parties’ to access the Tribunal ‘pursuant to any other
agreement conferring jurisdiction’.112 The jurisdiction of ITLOS also comprises ‘all matters
specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the
Tribunal’.113

In response, it is conceivable that the PRC may challenge the invocation of Article 288 on the
grounds that an international agreement is by definition an agreement between States and
since Taiwan is not a State, Article 288 cannot be relied upon.114 In comparison, the
provisions under the ITLOS Statute are accommodating. Gudmundur Eiriksson, the former
president of ITLOS argues that, ‘other entities…would fall under [Article 288(2) of the 1982
LOSC], for example, non-governmental organizations or natural or juridical persons or other
entities whose international status is unclear’.115 Based on the analysis in the foregoing
chapters of tuna RFMO constituent instruments as international agreements, this challenge is
possible, albeit, weak. Although tuna RFMO instruments may not constitute ‘treaties’ in
relation to Taiwan, they are nevertheless international agreements.
Tuna RFMOs, as a consequence of Taiwan’s participation, are supporting potential access to
ITLOS. As the standing of Taiwan in international courts continues to be advocated, tuna
RFMO constituent instruments provide a tenable platform that is the basis for jurisdiction of
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LOSC art 288[2].
Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Annex VI 1982 LOSC, hereafter ‘ITLOS Statute’
art 20.
113
ITLOS Statute art 21.
114
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331, hereafter
Vienna Convention. The Vienna Convention in art 2(a) defines a treaty as ‘an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international law’.
115
Gudmundur Eiriksson, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Nijhoff, 2000) 115.
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ITLOS.116Despite arguments that ITLOS does not have jurisdiction, the recent Advisory
Opinion of ITLOS on a request from the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission confirms that if
the prerequisites are met, there is a basis for jurisdiction.117In analysing Article 21 of its
Statute to determine whether it had jurisdiction, ITLOS summarises that there are three
elements: (i) all “disputes” submitted to ITLOS in accordance with the LOSC; (ii) all
“applications” submitted to ITLOS in accordance with the LOSC; and (iii) all “matters”
specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on
ITLOS.118While there is no debate on the scope of the first two, ITLOS opined that the third
element provided it with the jurisdiction to provide an advisory opinion. It clarified that the
expression “all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers
jurisdiction on the Tribunal” does not by itself establish the advisory jurisdiction of ITLOS,
but the use of the “other agreement” which confers such jurisdiction on ITLOS.119 According
to the Advisory Opinion:
When the “other agreement” confers advisory jurisdiction on the Tribunal, the
Tribunal then is rendered competent to exercise such jurisdiction with regard to “all
matters” specifically provided for in the “other agreement”. Article 21 and the “other
agreement” conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal are interconnected and constitute
the substantive legal basis of the advisory jurisdiction of the Tribunal.120
To attract the advisory jurisdiction of ITLOS, the prerequisites are: an international
agreement related to the purposes of the LOSC which explicitly provides for the submission
to ITLOS of a request for an advisory opinion; the request must be transmitted to ITLOS by a
body authorised by or in accordance with such an international agreement; and the advisory
opinion may be given on “a legal question”.121Thus with such prerequisites met, it is
conceivable that tuna RFMO instruments may be used as a platform to attract the jurisdiction
of ITLOS on legal questions including those relating to the fishing entity.
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Hsieh, above n 27.
Request for Advisory Opinion submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission, Advisory Opinion, 2
April 2015, ITLOS Reports 2015, to be published.
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Ibid, [54].
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Ibid, [58].
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Ibid, [58].
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L.

Promoting Adherence by the Fishing Entity to International Soft Law Instruments

Adherence to soft law, voluntary, or non-binding instruments is often worked into binding
decisions of tuna RFMOs. International soft law instruments such as the International Plan of
Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, or
IPOA-IUU, and the International Plan of Action on the Management of Fishing Capacity, or
IPOA-Capacity, are included in binding decisions and must be implemented. For example,
the IUU listing measures of tuna RFMOs defers to the IPOA-IUU for a description of
activities that would be presumed IUU fishing activities, and alludes to non-discriminatory
sanctions that may be taken.122 The IPOA-Capacity is also identified in capacity decisions of
tuna RFMOs. The fishing entity in response has adopted in September 2014 a National Plan
of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity. In addition to detailing fishing capacity in
its various fisheries, the National Plan of Action makes commitments including ‘aggressive’
compliance with management mechanisms of RFMOs and the timely adjustment to domestic
fishing capacity.123

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Tuna RFMOs in the exercise of powers and responsibilities on the international plane are
contributing to the evolution of international law relating to the fishing entity of Taiwan. In
developing innovative mechanisms for the participation of Taiwan in tuna fisheries around
the world, tuna RFMOs are indirectly solidifying the legal personality of Taiwan, at the very
least within regional fisheries fora. Practice within the majority of tuna RFMOs reveals
significant compromise including but not limited to permitting the fishing entity to participate
in decision making, albeit with few exceptions. The involvement of Taiwan in high seas
boarding and inspections within the WCPFC is in itself significant because officials of the
fishing entity on a reciprocal basis are empowered to board and inspect fishing vessels of
States on the high seas.
122

See for instance WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to
Have Carried out Illegal Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the WCPO 2010-06, [3], [22].
123
The Republic of China (Taiwan), National Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity,
(September 2014) < http://www.fa.gov.tw/upload/218/2014102218442787905.pdf>.
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The next chapter explores the role of tuna RFMOs in the listing of IUU fishing vessels. IUU
fishing vessel listing is perhaps that most effective tool to combat IUU fishing but it is not
without flaws. Unlike the relatively varied practice among tuna RFMOs in addressing the
participation of the fishing entity, with IUU listing there is an apparent convergence of listing
criteria and procedures.
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VII
Combatting Illegal Unreported and Unregulated
Fishing

I.

INTRODUCTION

Illegal fishing has occurred ever since laws were first enacted to regulate fishing. In contrast,
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated fishing, or “IUU” fishing, is relatively new. Estimates of
the global cost of IUU fishing are between $10 - $23.5 billion annually, with developing
States being the most susceptible.1 Since the late 1990s, the international community through
the United Nations General Assembly has called on States to take action against unauthorised
fishing in zones of national jurisdiction and on the high seas.2From 2001, the UNGA
expressed its concern that IUU fishing seriously threatens to deplete populations of certain
fish species and urged States as a matter of priority to cooperate directly and through RFMOs
to combat IUU fishing.3 By 2005, the UNGA elevated its position and expressed its ‘serious

1

David J Agnew, John Pearce, Ganapathiraju Pramod, Tom Peatman, Reg Watson, John R Beddington, Tony J
Pitcher (2009) Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing. PLoS ONE 4(2): e4570. Cf MRAG in 2005
in undertaking regional assessments found that the value of catch of IUU fishing is at a minimum $2.4 billion.
2
UNGA Resolution 53/33 (1999). Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing, unauthorized fishing in zones of
national jurisdiction and on the high seas, fisheries by-catch and discards, and other developments; UNGA
Resolution 55/8 (2001). Large-scale pelagic drift-net fishing, unauthorized fishing in zones of national
jurisdiction and on the high seas, fisheries by-catch and discards, and other developments. In this resolution
there is recognition of the need to strengthen the international legal framework for cooperation in the
management of fish stocks and in combatting IUU fishing and the central role of RFMOs in the conservation
and sustainable use of fish stocks – see [18], [19].
3
UNGA Resolution 56/13 (2001). Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; UNGA Resolution 57/142 (2003). Large-scale
pelagic drift-net fishing, authorized fishing in zones of national jurisdiction and on the high seas/illegal,
unreported and unregulated fishing, fisheries by-catch and discards, and other developments; UNGA Resolution
58/14 (2004). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
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concern’ that IUU fishing remains one of the greatest threats to marine ecosystems with
serious and major implications to the conservation and management of marine resources.4
Although the term ‘IUU’ fishing emerged within the last two decades, its usage at the
international and regional levels is pervasive. In contrast the usage of the term in national
practice and laws varies. States that have adopted national plans of action to combat IUU
fishing have largely accommodated the definition in the FAO International Plan of Action on
IUU fishing. However, application in national laws has been slow. Up until 2000, most if not

Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related
instruments. UNGA Resolution 57/142 is incidentally the first and perhaps the only resolution to include the
term IUU fishing in its title. UNGA Resolution 58/14 is the first resolution to include a section on IUU fishing
[19] – [29].
4
UNGA Resolution 59/25 (2005). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the
Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and
related instruments, [26]; UNGA Resolution 60/31 (2006). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, [33]; UNGA Resolution 61/105 (2007). Sustainable fisheries,
including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, [33]; UNGA Resolution
62/177 (2008). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related
instruments, [33]; UNGA Resolution 63/112 (2009). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of
10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, [42]; UNGA Resolution 64/72 (2010). Sustainable fisheries,
including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, [44]; UNGA Resolution
65/38 (2011). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related
instruments, [40]; UNGA Resolution 66/68 (2012). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory
Fish Stocks, and related instruments, [43]; UNGA Resolution 67/79 (2013). Sustainable fisheries, including
through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, [48]; UNGA Resolution 68/71 (2014). Sustainable
fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related instruments, [49]; UNGA Resolution
69/109 (2015). Sustainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and related
instruments, [56].
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all national legislation were only concerned with illegal fishing, i.e., fishing in contravention
of national law. RFMOs then, also deferred to States in taking action against illegal fishing.

With the introduction and gradual support for the application of initiatives to combat IUU
fishing, States and RFMOs in general have enhanced individual and collective efforts. The
term ‘IUU fishing’ is now the umbrella under which various initiatives of States and RFMOs
to deal with such fishing activities are housed. Initiatives of tuna RFMOs to combat IUU
fishing such as: reporting requirements, catch documentation schemes, vessel monitoring
system, observers, high seas inspections, and port State controls, are in place. Since these are
adequately covered in the literature, this Chapter only focuses on the contributions of tuna
RFMOs in the processes associated with the listing of vessels presumed to have been engaged
in IUU fishing or related activities in support of such fishing.5

Tuna RFMOs are working collectively to promote harmonisation in combatting IUU fishing.
Notwithstanding their good intentions, certain IUU listing decisions of tuna RFMOs may be
scrutinised with respect to their consistency with international law. This Chapter first
provides a short history of the term and its implications, then there is a focus on the
applicable international law, before the initiatives of tuna RFMOs are addressed. The final
part reflects on the perceived contributions of tuna RFMOs in the listing of IUU fishing
vessels.

II.

IUU fishing

There were several fora that influenced the development of the concept of IUU fishing, in
particular, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, the
Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, the United Nations
General Assembly, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the UN
Commission on Sustainable Development, the International Maritime Organization, the FAO

5

For background, see for instance: Mary Ann Palma, Martin Tsamenyi and William Edeson, Promoting
Sustainable Fisheries The International Legal and Policy Framework to Combat Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing (Martinus Nijhoff, 2010); Evelyne Meltzer, The quest for sustainable international
fisheries: regional efforts to implement the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement: an overview for the
May 2006 review (National Research Council, 2009).
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experts consultation held in 2000, and the Joint FAO/IMO Ad hoc Working Group on IUU
fishing.6

The first international instrument to define the term IUU fishing is the International Plan of
Action to address IUU fishing.7 The IPOA-IUU, an instrument developed under the
framework of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries is in itself voluntary.8Given the
inherent difficulties of providing a consolidated meaning, the IPOA-IUU defines the three
components as follows:

3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities:
3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a
State, without the permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and
regulations;

3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant
regional fisheries management organization but operate in contravention of the
conservation and management measures adopted by that organization and by which
the States are bound, or relevant provisions
of the applicable international law; or

3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those
undertaken by cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management
organization.

3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national
authority, in contravention of national laws and regulations; or

For an overview of the contribution of each fora, see Palma et al, above n 5, 29 – 34.
Food and Agriculture Organization, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, adopted 23 June 2001 at the 120 th Session of the FAO Council, hereafter
‘IPOA-IUU’.
8
See in particular Article 2(d) of the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
6
7
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3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries
management organization which have not been reported or have been misreported, in
contravention of the reporting procedures of that organization.

3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities:
3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management
organization that are conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the
flag of a State not party to that organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is
not consistent with or contravenes the conservation and management measures of that
organization; or

3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable
conservation or management measures and where such fishing activities are
conducted in a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for the conservation of
living marine resources under international law.

Whilst illegal fishing and unreported fishing have long been outlawed in national legislation,
the suggested offence of ‘unregulated fishing’ is novel and has attracted the most debate. If
the fishing activity is not regulated by a regional fisheries management organisation, or by a
flag State, then there presumably will not be any specific conservation and management
measures applicable and no contravention. In national legislation the absence of a
conservation and management measure being undermined, may not give rise to an offence at
all. To add focus, the ‘unregulated’ component targets fishing activities by Stateless vessels,
vessels flying the flag of third States not party to (or not cooperating with) the management
organisation, and vessels of a fishing entity.

The IPOA-IUU itself recognises the limitations with unregulated fishing and cautions that,
‘[n]otwithstanding paragraph 3.3, certain unregulated fishing may take place in a manner
which is not in violation of applicable international law, and may not require the application
of measures envisaged under the International Plan of Action’.9In the practice of RFMOs
generally, it appears that this qualification has been ignored. There does not seem to be any

9

IPOA-IUU, para. 3.4.
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exceptions to IUU fishing in the conservation and management measures or the practice of
RFMOs; neither are States that are members of RFMOs or participating in management
arrangements explicitly recognising that there are in fact certain unregulated fishing that is
not a violation of international law. RFMO instruments tend to refer to the definition in the
IPOA-IUU as applicable to its measures. There is also an apparent unwillingness on the part
of some States to depart from the general definition of IUU fishing laid out in the IPOA-IUU.
The position by some States to maintain the definition of IUU fishing in other international
instruments is a cause for concern because it may be seen to perpetuate a definition that is not
fully workable.10

To illustrate the challenge by States with the definition, in the technical consultations to agree
on minimum terms for port State measures, Canada sought to propose a definition that is
more workable in national legislation.11 Mexico and other States insisted that the IPOA-IUU
definition stands verbatim. In fact, throughout those negotiations reliance on the IPOA-IUU
or the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries texts was an important and
uncompromising position for some States.

III. International law
International law as reflected in the 1982 LOSC is relatively clear on the legislative and
enforcement jurisdiction of States in the regulation of fisheries.12With the adoption of the
1995 Agreement and the evolving role of RFMOs, the legislative jurisdiction of States
10

See Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
fishing, adopted 22 November 2009 (entered into force 5 June 2016).
<http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/2_037t-e.pdf>; Voluntary Guidance for Flag State
Performance, approved by the FAO Committee on Fisheries in 2014 <http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4577t.pdf>.
11
FAO, ‘Report of the Technical Consultation to Draft a Legally-binding Instrument on Port
State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing. Rome, 23–27 June
2008, 26–30 January 2009, 4–8 May 2009 and 24–28 August 2009’ FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Report No
914 (FAO, 2009) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/012/i1122e/i1122e00.pdf>.
12
United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1245
(entered into force 16 November 1994), hereinafter ‘1982 LOSC’. See Robin R Churchill and A Vaughan Lowe,
The Law of the Sea (Manchester University Press, 3rd edn, 1999); Yoshifumi Tanaka, The International Law of
the Sea (Cambridge University Press, 2012); James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International
Law, (Oxford University Press, 8th edn, 2012); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford
University Press, 7th edn, 2008); Antonio Cassese, International Law, (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 2005);
Klabbers, J, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
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appears to be creeping seaward into the high seas.13 A pertinent illustration is the requirement
that States and entities that are members or cooperating non members of RFMOs are to take
certain actions against vessels that are presumed to have been engaged in IUU fishing on the
high seas. By mandating legislative actions, RFMO measures are in effect requiring the
extension of the scope of national legislation to address fishing and related activities beyond
waters under national jurisdiction. On this point, although tuna RFMO measures have shied
away from explicitly defining IUU fishing, there are references to the IPOA-IUU in the
chapeau of paragraphs providing for the criteria for listing of vessels that are presumed to
have engaged in IUU fishing. In the absence of an explicit definition, it is suggested that the
criteria for listing is the accepted definition of IUU fishing for that organisation. Only one
RFMO provides a definition of IUU fishing, albeit in a footnote.14

A

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The 1982 LOSC provides coastal states with sovereignty over its internal waters, archipelagic
waters (in relation to an archipelagic state), and territorial sea.15 In these marine zones, a
coastal state has the right to make laws to regulate fisheries and to enforce such laws, i.e.,
legislative jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction respectively. Fisheries legislation enacted
for zones under sovereignty typically creates an offence is there is fishing without
authorisation, fishing in contravention of such authorisation, fishing in contravention of
conservation and management measures of the coastal State, and fishing in a manner that is
otherwise contrary to the law.

Moving seaward, within its exclusive economic zone the coastal State enjoys rights and
jurisdiction stipulated in Article 56 of the LOSC. For the EEZ, Article 73 enables the exercise

13

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 August 1995, 34 ILM 1542 (entered into force 11 December
2001), hereinafter ‘1995 Agreement’.
14
CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-03 (2014) Port inspections of fishing vessels carrying Antarctic marine
living resources, defines IUU fishing as “the activities described in paragraph 5 of Conservation Measure 10-06
and paragraph 9 of Conservation Measure 10-07. These paragraphs contain the criteria for the listing of vessels
of contracting parties and non contracting parties respectively. Instead of deferring to the definition in the FAO
Port State Measures Agreement, i.e., the IPOA-IUU definition, the measure applies the respective listing
criteria.
15
1982 LOSC art 2.
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of legislative and enforcement jurisdiction with respect to the specific rights and jurisdiction
identified. The coastal state may, in the exercise of its sovereign rights to explore, exploit,
conserve and manage the living resources in the exclusive economic zone, take such
measures, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be
necessary to ensure compliance with its laws adopted in conformity with the 1982 LOSC.16
The ITLOS in the “Virginia G” case in considering the sovereign rights of Guinea Bissau in
regulating bunkering within its EEZ, stated that, “...the term “sovereign rights” in the view of
the tribunal encompasses all rights necessary for and connected with the exploration, exploitation,
conservation and management of the natural resources, including the right to take the necessary
enforcement measures”.17 However the caveat is that penalties for infringements of fisheries

laws and regulations in the exclusive economic zone however are not to include
imprisonment unless there is an agreement between the states concerned, and any form of
corporal punishment.18

Although the 1982 LOSC does not define IUU fishing or any of its elements, the coastal State
may exercise its discretion in the formulation of its laws to regulate fisheries including
provisions to impose penalties for contraventions. Legislation enacted by States immediately
after the adoption of the 1982 LOSC to regulate fishing in the EEZ typically provided for the
offence of fishing without a licence or authorisation, fishing in contravention of the terms and
conditions of a licence or authorisation, fishing in a prohibited area, and fishing with
prohibited gear.19 In addition, there are specific references to foreign fishing vessels and
prerequisites in the EEZ for such vessels, namely, the requirement to stow fishing gear in a
manner that is not readily available for fishing if the vessel is in waters it is not permitted to
fish in, and the rights of foreign fishing vessels recognised under international law. Such
legislative practice seems to show that due to the 1982 LOSC, the legislative emphasis was
placed on illegal fishing.

1982 LOSC, art 73(1). See also the “Virginia G” case (Panama v Guinea Bissau) ITLOS Judgment 14 April
2014 <https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.19/judgment/C19Judgment_14.04.14_corr2.pdf>.
17
Virginia G case, above n 17, [211].
18
1982 LOSC, art 73(3).
19
See for example the fisheries legislation of the first State to ratify the 1982 LOSC, Fiji: Marine Spaces Act
Cap 158A and the Marine Spaces (Foreign Fishing Vessel) Regulations.
16
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Then the scope of illegality extended to unreported fishing. This emerged when there was a
realisation that the reporting of catches was essential in strengthening understanding of a
fishery and consequently improving management.

B

The 1995 Agreement

With respect to the elements of IUU fishing, the 1995 Agreement strengthens the
international framework by elaborating the responsibilities of the coastal, port and flag State
and the functions of subregional and regional fisheries management organisations or
arrangements.20 In so doing, the 1995 Agreement places emphasis on ensuring that fishing
vessels targeting straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks do not undermine
international conservation and management measures and underscores the importance of long
term sustainability.

Although intended to apply primarily to the high seas, there are several provisions which add
to the obligations of a coastal state namely, the requirement to apply general principles,
application of the precautionary approach, principle of compatibility, and provisions on
cooperation, port state and flag state responsibilities. These obligations are expected to apply
to all aspects of fisheries management, including the regulation and enforcement of flagged
vessels. For instance, the compatibility requirement is intended to ensure that measures
within areas under national jurisdiction are compatible with measures beyond ‘subject to the
different legal regimes that apply within areas under national jurisdiction and in areas beyond
national jurisdiction as provided for in the convention’.21 Traditionally compatibility of
measures appears to refer to fisheries management measures such as the determination of
fishing or effort limits for a stock or gear restrictions applicable. This is because the concept
is intended to ensure biological integrity of the stock through its range or in its entirety.22 It
may also be suggested that measures to combat IUU fishing must be compatible, subject to
the applicable legal regimes. Indeed, measures to combat IUU fishing supports the biological
integrity of the stock.
20 See discussion in Andre Tahindro, ‘Conservation and Management of Transboundary Fish Stocks:
Comments in light of the adoption of the 1995 Agreement for the Conservation and Management of Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, (1997) 28(1) Ocean Development and International Law 1 – 58.
21
1995 Agreement, art 3[1].
22
1995 Agreement, art 7.2.
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The emphasis on IUU fishing today as a serious concern to fisheries management globally
has effectively shifted the focus from the regulation of fisheries within areas under national
jurisdiction by a coastal State to the efforts that must be taken by the international community
at all levels. Compatibility of measures to address IUU fishing at the national, regional and
international levels, is envisaged and is reflected somewhat in several resolutions of the UN
General Assembly.23 By providing the framework for RFMOs, the 1995 Agreement is the
primary legal instrument supporting RFMOs in their efforts to combat IUU fishing. That said
it is to be noted that most constituent instruments of tuna RFMOs entered into force before
the adoption of the 1995 Agreement. Notwithstanding, binding decisions in each of these
RFMOs have effectively broadened their respective mandates to include monitoring,
compliance and enforcement provisions. With these powers beyond that stipulated in the
constituent instruments of most tuna RFMOs, tuna RFMOs and the international community
as a whole is in a sense leading international and regional efforts to prevent, deter and
eliminate IUU fishing on highly migratory fish stocks. In the process, there is an influence
upon States to take action.

However it is suggested that compatibility between measures to address IUU, in the strictest
sense, may never be achieved. The reasons are that each State as a sovereign determines its
laws and regulations and an IUU fishing offence in one jurisdiction may not necessarily be an
offence in another. Hitherto it is observed that several States have not enacted a definition of
IUU fishing within legislation, thus showing that in these jurisdictions, illegal fishing
offences are recognised only. Gradually these States may accommodate the unregulated
aspects of IUU fishing within legislation. In terms of compelling change, tuna RFMOs may
not be as effective as States or regional economic integration organisations.24

To identify compatible conservation and management measures, States are mandated to inter
alia: i) take into account conservation and management measures adopted by a coastal state in
23

See above nn 3 & 4.
The EU IUU Regulation has significantly influenced policy, legislative and institutional changes towards
combating IUU fishing in several States exporting fish and fish products to the EU market.
24
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accordance with Article 61 1982 LOSC for the stocks within waters under national
jurisdiction and ensure that measures established for the high seas do not undermine the
effectiveness of coastal state measures;25 ii) take into account previously agreed measures
established for the high seas for the same stocks by coastal states and states fishing on the
high seas;26 iii) take into account measures established and applied to those stocks by a
subregional or regional fisheries management organisation or arrangement;27 and iv) take into
account the biological unity and biological characteristics of the stocks, and geographical
peculiarities.

IV.

Tuna RFMO Practice

Literature on RFMO practice including the role of RFMOs in combating IUU fishing is
growing.28Specifically, tuna RFMO practice to address IUU fishing has already received
some attention.29While other chapters in this thesis have addressed compliance measures
taken by tuna RFMOs, this chapter focuses on tuna RFMO IUU vessel listing and delisting
criteria and related issues.

At the outset it is noted that tuna RFMO lists have been in place for over a decade.
Nevertheless there are issues that are not explicit in the listing measures. For example, if the
vessel nominated for listing is flagged to a member or cooperating non member, then these
States (or fishing entities) is not to participate in the decision making for listing. If they were
permitted, then they could effectively block consensus every time. Therefore, although the
listing measures are not explicit, tuna RFMO practice has resulted in the ‘exclusion’ of such
flag States or fishing entities. Secondly, it may also be observed that IUU lists are linked with
the record of authorised vessels of tuna RFMOs. The listing of a vessel on the IUU vessel list
of a tuna RFMO should automatically result in the deletion of that vessel from the record of
authorised vessels. Normally this transaction should rely on flag State action but this is not

25

1995 Agreement, art 7.2(a).
1995 Agreement, art 7.2(b).
27
1995 Agreement, art 7.2(c).
28
See for instance Palma et al, above n 5, 201 – 38.
29
Palma et al, above n 5.
26
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the case; tuna RFMO measures empower the secretariat of the RFMO to delete the listed
vessel from the record of authorised vessels accordingly. This is evident in the practice of the
WCPFC in 2005 in amending its measure for the vessel record.30

A.

IATTC

The IATTC first adopted a resolution to establish a list of vessels presumed to have carried
out illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean in
2004.31This resolution is almost identical to that adopted in the same year by the parties to the
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program.32 A year after its adoption
the 2004 IATTC resolution was replaced with another which provides the criteria for
nominating a vessel on the IATTC IUU Vessel List. Nominated vessels are placed on a draft
IATTC IUU Vessel List which is transmitted by the Director to all CPCs. Based on the
information received from CPCs, the Director will then draw up a provisional IATTC IUU
Vessel List for consideration by the Annual meeting. Consideration of the provisional list was
then carried out by the IATTC-AIDCP Joint Working Group on Fishing by Non-Parties
which could refer the results of their findings to the Permanent Working Group on
Compliance.33 The Joint Working Group had the power to remove a vessel from the
provisional list if the flag State demonstrates that the vessel did not engage in the IUU fishing
activities identified in its nomination, or, effective action has been taken in response to the
IUU fishing activities in question.34 In addition the Joint Working Group was required to
recommend approval to the Commission of the provisional list as amended.35Once the IUU
vessel list is approved, CPCs are obliged to take the necessary measures stipulated in the
measure in accordance with “their applicable legislation and pursuant to paragraphs 56 and
66 of the IPOA-IUU”.36

30

Given its linkage with other records of good standing in the WCPO region, a subsequent amendment was also
made to the rules of the Forum Fisheries Agency that removed ‘good standing’ from vessels listed on the
WCPFC IUU Vessel List.
31
IATTC, Resolution C-04-04 Resolution to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried out Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
32
AIDCP Resolution A-04-07, Resolution to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried out Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Agreement Area.
33
IATTC Resolution C-05-07, Resolution to Establish a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried out Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, para 6.
34
Ibid.
35
IATTC Resolution C-05-07, para 7.
36
IATTC Resolution C-05-07, [9].
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An examination of the procedures in place for IUU listing by the IATTC under the 2005
resolution reveals potentially significant weaknesses, including the lack of clear procedures
and timeframes as well as the mechanism for the removal of vessels from the IUU Vessel
List. In light of these, the United States in 2014 proposed substantive changes to the 2005
resolution. As a consequence of the implications of the amendments and possibly time
constraints in considering them, the IATTC did not reach agreement in 2014 to amend the
2005 resolution. Consensus was however reached at the 2015 meeting of the Commission.37

Listing Criteria

The 2015 resolution provides that vessels fishing for species covered by the IATTC
Convention are presumed to have carried out IUU fishing activities in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean if a Party, cooperating non Party, fishing entity or regional economic integration
organisation (collectively referred to as CPCs) presents suitably documented information that
such vessels:38
i. Harvest species covered by the IATTC Convention and are not on the IATTC Regional
Vessel Register, or
ii. Harvest species covered by the IATTC Convention in waters under the national jurisdiction of
the coastal State in the Eastern Pacific Ocean without authorisation and/or in contravention
of its laws and regulation, without prejudice to the sovereign rights of coastal States to take
measures against such vessels;

iii. Make false reports of fail to record or report their catches made in the Eastern Pacific
Ocean, or make false reports, or
iv. Engage in fishing activities in a closed area or during a closure period, or
v. Use prohibited fishing gear or methods, or

37

IATTC Resolution C-15-01, Amendment to Resolution C-05-07 on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed
to Have Carried out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the Eastern Pacific Ocean.
38
IATTC Resolution C-15-01, [3]. This resolution appears to have been adopted in haste as the term ‘suitably
document information’ is used, among other mistakes.

293

vi. Transship with or participate in joint fishing operations with vessels included in the
IATTC IUU Vessel List, or
vii. Conduct transshipment operations at sea with vessels not included on the IATTC
Record of Carrier Vessels, or
viii. Are without nationality, or
ix. Engage in fishing activities contrary to any other IATTC conservation and management
measures, or
x. Are under the control of the owner or operator of any vessel on the IATTC IUU Vessel
List.

The 2015 amendment makes significant changes to the 2005 criteria for listing, including
adding the criterion on the harvesting of species in waters under the national jurisdiction of a
coastal State in contravention of national laws and regulations, removing the criterion on the
taking or landing of undersized fish, broadening the criterion on prohibited fishing gear to
extend to methods as well, adding a criterion on the transshipment at sea with vessels not
included on the IATTC Record of Carrier Vessels, restricting the stateless vessel criterion so
that fishing is not a prerequisite, and broadening the scope of the ownership criterion so that
vessels may either be controlled by the same owner or operator.39

Compared to the listing criteria of other tuna RFMOs, the IATTC criteria does not include the
criterion on the harvesting of tuna and tuna-like species within the area of competence of the
RFMO when the flag State is without quota, catch limit or effort allocation under applicable
conservation and management measures. It is not clear why the IATTC does not include this
criterion particularly since there are catch and effort limits in place.40 One possible reason for
the non inclusion is that a flag State may be a third State and not a party to relevant international
fisheries treaties hence the requirements for a quota or catch and effort limit would not apply
to that State under the pacta tertiis rule. However, this reason is weak since other criteria
On the implementation of the ‘ownership’ criterion, the resolution adds ‘operator’ but does not offer a
definition or adapt the rules in the annex of the resolution accordingly. The rules in the annex are similar to that
proposed by the United States in the WCPFC measure several years earlier.
40
IATTC Resolution C-15-01 does not include this criterion, however, the inclusion of the criteria in the
checklist for nominating IUU vessels in the annex of the resolution appears to indicate that it may have been
considered but a review of the US 2014 proposal (IATTC-89 PROP I-1 USA Amendment C-05-07 IUU List
clean 18-Jul-14) with identical criteria and checklist items proves otherwise.
39
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adopted such as the requirement to be on the IATTC Regional Vessel Register appear to apply
to all States regardless of whether a State is a third State. Another criterion that was not present
within the IATTC listing criteria until 2015 is the harvesting of tuna and tuna-like species in
waters under the national jurisdiction of the coastal State without authorization or in
contravention of that State’s laws and regulations. The IATTC area of competence in the
Eastern Pacific Ocean does cover waters under the national jurisdiction of coastal States such
as those in the Americas, Hawai’i (US), Kiribati and French Polynesia (France). Non inclusion
of this criterion may indicate that the IATTC previously regarded this as a matter for the coastal
State in the exercise of its sovereign rights within its EEZ, or that the criterion was not worthy
of inclusion since the majority of fishing activity occurs on the high seas. Regardless of the
reasons, the criterion is now addressed.

Application
In response to listing, CPCs are required to take “all necessary measures” under their legislation
and pursuant to paragraphs 56 and 66 of the IPOA-IUU. By specifically referring to the IPOAIUU, the resolution changes the legal effect of the stipulated paragraphs from a non binding to
binding character. CPCs are to:41
i. ensure that fishing vessels, support vessels, mother ships or cargo vessels flying their flag do
not participate in any transshipment or joint fishing operations with, support, or re-supply
vessels on the IATTC IUU Vessel List;

ii. ensure that vessels on the IATTC IUU Vessel List that enter ports voluntarily are not
authorised to land or transship therein;
iii. prohibit the entry into their ports of vessels included on the IUU Vessel List, except in case of
force majeure or where the vessel is allowed entry into port for the exclusive purpose of
inspection and effective enforcement action;

iv. prohibit the chartering of a vessel on the IATTC IUU Vessel List;
v. refuse to grant their flag to vessels on the IATTC IUU Vessel List, unless the vessel has
changed owner, and the new owner has provided sufficient evidence demonstrating
that the previous owner or operator has no further legal, beneficial or financial interest

41

IATTC Resolution C-15-01, [16]. Cf IATTC Resolution C-05-07, [9].
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in, or control of, the vessel or, having taken into account all relevant facts, the flag
CPC determines that granting the vessel its flag will not result in IUU fishing;
vi. prohibit commercial transactions, imports, landings and/or transshipment of species
covered by the IATTC Convention from vessels on the IATTC IUU Vessel List;
vii. encourage traders, importers, transporters and others involved, to refrain from
transactions in, and transshipment of, species covered by the IATTC Convention
caught by vessels on the IATTC IUU Vessel List;
viii. collect, and exchange with other CPCs, any appropriate information with the aim of
searching for, controlling and preventing false import/export certificates for species
covered by the IATTC Convention from vessels on the IATTC IUU Vessel List.

Compared to the 2005 resolution, the 2015 resolution makes two prominent changes. First it
extends the scope of obligations of CPCs to fishing vessels, support vessels, mother ships or
cargo vessels. Second it elaborates on the obligations of CPCs as port States by prohibiting the
entry into port of vessels on the IUU list, excepting cases of force majeure, and where
inspection is sought. These amendments specifying obligations in port are derived from the
FAO Port State Measures Agreement.

With respect to collaboration with tuna RFMOs on IUU listing, the IATTC allows the
Director to take any measure necessary to ensure publicity of the IATTC IUU Vessel
List.42The Director is also required to transmit the IUU Vessel List to other RFMOs for the
purposes of strengthening cooperation between IATTC and other organizations in combating
IUU fishing.

There are some pertinent issues that emerge from the IATTC IUU listing resolution and its
processes. The first observation is that until 2015 the IATTC resolution did not have the most
robust listing measure amongst tuna RFMOs. The 2015 resolution significantly enhances and
clarifies processes and timeframes and importantly provides a mechanism for the removal of
vessels on the IATTC IUU Vessel List. However issues remain. Notably there is no clear
mechanism in the resolution for the removal of stateless vessels, although by implication any
42

Ibid, [10].
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State may exercise its jurisdiction over a vessel that is without nationality. The resolution
allows for the listing of stateless vessels but since such vessel is without nationality and
cannot claim the protection of any State, it is not clear how the vessel can be removed. After
all the requirement is that the flag State demonstrates either that the vessel did not engage in
the IUU fishing alleged, or that effective action has been taken. The result is that stateless
vessels that are nominated by CPCs may remain on the IATTC IUU Vessel List for an
indefinite period given that there is no clear procedure in the measure for the removal of such
vessels. The 2015 resolution prescribes that CPCs and non-CPCs of a vessel on the IUU Vessel
List may request the removal of the vessel from the list at any time, by submitting to the Director
suitably documented information that proves that:43

a.

i. it has adopted measures intended to guarantee that the vessel complies with
all IATTC measures, and;

ii. it can effectively assume its responsibilities with regard to monitoring and
control of the fishing activities of the vessel in the Convention Area; and

iii. it has undertaken effective actions in response to the IUU fishing activities
which include judicial actions and imposition of suitably severe sanctions; or

b. the vessel has been sunk or scrapped; or

c. the vessel has changed ownership and the new owner can prove that the previous
owner no longer has any legal, financial, or real interest in the vessel, nor does he
exert control over it and that the new owner has not been involved in IUU activities in
the previous five years.
Assuming therefore that a stateless vessel has not been granted the nationality of a State,
there is no mechanism for a State to provide the suitably documented information required.
Alternatively, if the stateless vessel has been granted nationality, the new flag State may
decide that it does not have jurisdiction to undertake effective actions against the vessel as the

43

IATTC Resolution C-15-01, [19].
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incident occurred prior to its grant of nationality. The remaining option of relying on the
owner to provide suitably documented information is not supported in the resolution.44

Aside from the apparent weaknesses of the IATTC listing processes, like other tuna RFMOs,
the IATTC list can include vessels that are under the control of the owner of any vessel on the
IATTC IUU Vessel List. The rationale for introducing this criteria seems to be that an entity
that owns a listed fishing vessel can also have all its fishing vessels listed as well. There are
no caveats to this criteria, hence other vessels owned by the entity fishing in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean or elsewhere can be listed, regardless of whether such vessels have been
compliant with conservation and management measures or not. This scenario gives rise to
fundamental issues that stem from the principle that one is innocent until proven guilty. The
ownership criteria effectively places otherwise compliant vessels on the IUU list simply
because they are owned or operated by the same entity with a listed vessel, or put one way, it
assigns guilt because of same ownership or the same operator. Further, in the event that a
vessel is listed because of the same ownership, the procedure for delisting is not linked with
the vessel listed initially. Therefore if the first vessel listed is removed, the removal of other
vessels owned by the same entity is not automatic. There may be some benefit inserting a
linking provision that allows for the automatic removal of vessels owned by the same entity
once the primary listed vessel is removed. In any case, each vessel listed regardless of the
criteria used for listing would need to follow the general requirements for delisting.

Procedures for the removal of a vessel from the IATTC IUU Vessel List were not explicit
until the adoption of the 2015 resolution. Under the 2015 resolution, the Committee for the
Review of the Implementation of Measures Adopted by the Commission considers the
provisional IUU vessel list and makes recommendations to the Commission.

Finally, the application of the listing measure to vessels greater than 23 metres overall length
is unique to the IATTC.45 The rationale for this provision seems to be that such vessels are of
a size that is capable for fishing within the IATTC area of competence. However that does
not mean that only vessels of that size engage in IUU fishing. In fact the restricted application
44

Cf WCFPC7 Report which provides for the role of the owner in the event that the new flag State is unable or
unwilling to provide the necessary information.
45
IATTC Resolution C-15-01, [24]. Under IATTC Resolution C-05-07, the threshold was 24 metres. 24 meters
was the length set out in the Compliance Agreement much to the annoyance of some States at the time. It was
omitted in the 1995 Agreement.
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of the IUU listing measure to vessels of a certain size may act as an incentive and contribute
to an increase in IUU fishing activities of smaller vessels.

B.

ICCAT

The Atlantic Tuna Commission is progressive and is the first of the tuna RFMOs to establish
a list of vessels presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing in its convention area as well as other
areas. In a recent recommendation on IUU listing the Commission asserts that the IUU listing
‘system’ is widely accepted and ‘could be regarded as common law’. It reads:

Recognising that ICCAT has adopted a system for listing of IUU vessels believed to
be engaged in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing activities in the ICCAT
convention area and other areas. The principle of listing IUU vessels has been taken
up by nine RFMOs, which altogether involves 85 states, the fishing entity of Chinese
Taipei and the European Community. This indicates quite clearly that listing of such
vessels has widespread acceptance, and thus is supported by the international
community in general and could be regarded as common law.46

This statement in the ICCAT recommendation is perplexing. Whether the listing of IUU
fishing is part of customary international law or not is discussed below. For its part, the
Commission first adopted a recommendation in 2002 establishing a list of vessels presumed
to have carried out IUU fishing in the ICCAT convention area.47 The recommendation is
similar to the listing of IUU fishing vessel measures of other tuna RFMOs.

Recommendation by ICCAT amending ICCAT’s list of fishing vessels presumed to be engaged in illegal,
unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing activities in the ICCAT Convention Area and other areas [Rec 200709].
47
Recommendation by ICCAT to establish a list of vessels presumed to have carried out illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing activities in the ICCAT Convention Area [Rec 2002-23]. This has been amended by the
following: Recommendation by ICCAT amending the Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a List of
Vessels presumed to have carried out illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities in the ICCAT
Convention Area [Rec 2006-12]; Recommendation by ICCAT further amending the Recommendation by
ICCAT to Establish a List of Vessels presumed to have carried out illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing
activities in the ICCAT Convention Area [rec 2009-10]; Recommendation by ICCAT further amending
Recommendation 09-10 Establishing a List of Vessels presumed to have carried out illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing activities in the ICCAT Convention Area [Rec 2011-18].
46
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The 2006 Recommendation and provides the framework for the establishment of the ICCAT
IUU Vessel List as well as its associated processes.48 These processes are comparable to the
IATTC, although the timeframes and requirements differ. A Contracting Party, cooperating
non Contracting Party, entity or fishing entity may present evidence of IUU fishing. This
evidence is to be submitted to the Executive Secretary at least 120 days before the annual
meeting and the IUU fishing activities reported must have occurred during that year or the
previous year. The subsidiary body responsible for considering nominations is the Permanent
Working Group for the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures.

Listing Criteria
The ICCAT listing criteria contained in Recommendation 06-12 is progressive and contains
the same elements for listing as in the IATTC criteria together with the criteria for fishing in
the area of competence when the flag State does not have a quota or catch and effort limits
under ICCAT measures. The only exception is the absence of the criterion for listing a vessel
that is under the control of the owner of any vessel on the IUU list.

There are several reasons why ICCAT does not include the ownership criterion. Firstly, it is
conceivably difficult to determine ownership particularly when it is the norm that complex
legal structures are designed to apply the corporate veil to each legal entity while at the same
time avoiding potential liability. Secondly, the term “control” may be defined in various ways
and may be inherently difficult to demonstrate. Thirdly, listing a vessel that may otherwise be
compliant with conservation and management measures under the ownership criterion may
not be considered appropriate.

Application
Like the IATTC, ICCAT appears to restrict application of the IUU listing recommendation to
“large scale fishing vessels”.49 Large scale fishing vessels are defined as fishing vessels 20

48

Rec 2007-09 amended the Rec 2006-12.
ICCAT Recommendation by ICCAT Amending the Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a List of
Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the ICCAT
Convention Area [Rec. 06-12]. Recommendation 06-12 replaced Recommendation by ICCAT to Establish a
List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the
ICCAT Convention Area [Rec. 02-23].
49
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meters in length overall or greater.50Such vessels have been a concern to the commission for
several years prior to the adoption of IUU listing recommendation.51Information on alleged
IUU fishing activities of vessels flying the flag of a non Contracting Party are to be submitted
in accordance with the procedures in the recommendation.52 In that paragraph there is no
guidance on the size of the vessel so there is the assumption that for listing purposes, a vessel
of any size flying the flag of non Party may be listed. However, the recommendation is to be
applied mutatis mutandis to large scale fishing vessels flagged by CPCs.53 This may be either
be interpreted to restrict application of the recommendation to large scale fishing vessels of
non parties as well, or, allow for the listing of non party vessels of any size but for CPCs
confine listing to large scale fishing vessels only. If the first interpretation stands, then there
is a level of fairness in the application of the recommendation but it does allow for vessels
that are not large scale to avoid listing. On the other hand, the second option may be seen as
discriminating against smaller vessels of non parties which can be listed while CPC vessels of
similar size cannot.

ICCAT applies the IUU List recommendation to large scale fishing vessels, and based on the
definition in the recommendation establishing the ICCAT record of vessels, this appears to
refer to vessels that are 20 metres length overall or greater.54Indeed other recommendations
such as the Recommendation by ICCAT Concerning Establishment of an ICCAT Record of
Vessels over 24 metres Authorised to Operation in the Convention Area seem to indicate the
intention of restricting application to vessels in that size category.55Notwithstanding, given
the absence of an explicit definition of large scale fishing vessel in the IUU List
recommendation, it is suggested that the threshold of 20 metres length overall applies.

Recognition of other RFMO IUU Vessel Lists

50

ICCAT Recommendation by ICCAT concerning the establishment of an ICCAT Record of Vessels 20 metres
in length overall or greater authorized to operate in the Convention Area [Rec. 13-13] adjusted the definition of
large scale fishing vessels that are required to be on the record from 24 metres length overall or greater,
established in 2002, to 20 metres length overall or greater.
Vessels 20 metres length overall or greater are referred to as “large scale fishing vessels” or “LSFVs”).
51
See for instance 1998 Resolution by ICCAT Concerning the Unreported and Unregulated Catches of Tunas
by Large-scale Longline Vessels in the Convention Area [Res. 98-18].
52
ICCAT Rec. 06-12, [2].
53
ICCAT Rec. 06-12, [21].
54
ICCAT Rec. 02-23.
55
ICCAT Rec. 02-22.
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Unlike other tuna RFMOs, the ICCAT measure is far reaching in that it recognises all other
tuna RFMO IUU lists. Tuna RFMO IUU lists, once received by the ICCAT secretariat are to
be circulated to CPCs for comments. Unless a party objects within 30 days of date the
information is circulated, listing or delisting from the ICCAT IUU Vessel List proceeds.
There are three grounds for an objection: i) there is satisfactory information that the vessel
did not engage in IUU fishing activities or that effective action has been taken in response to
IUU fishing activities in question; ii) there is satisfactory information that the vessel has not
met any of the requirements to be removed from its respective lists; or iii) there is insufficient
information to make a determination.56The measure also provides RFMOs the opportunity to
object to the listing or removal of a vessel from the ICCAT IUU Vessel List, which can
subsequently result in that vessel being placed on the provisional IUU vessel list.

Putting aside the uniqueness of this initiative, there are certain implications identified. Firstly,
in recognising the lists of other RFMOs the ICCAT indirectly accepts the processes and
procedures followed by the listing RFMO, in spite of differences and inherent flaws.
Secondly, ICCAT also implicitly accepts the responsibility associated with the listing of a
vessel originally listed by another RFMO. Thirdly, and in terms of process, ICCAT appears
to defer to the listing RFMO for any changes and there is no opportunity afforded to the flag
State. While deferring to the listing RFMO is beneficial in terms of delineating respective
roles, affording the affected flag State with an opportunity to challenge and request removal
within ICCAT seems to support the principles of natural justice. The consequence of such an
opportunity may however affect inter RFMO relations.

C. IOTC

As discussed earlier in Chapter II, as an Article XIV body under the FAO Constitution, the
IOTC has strong linkages with the FAO. In the same year as the adoption of the IPOA-IUU
by the FAO Council, the IOTC adopted Resolution 01/07.57In that resolution, the
56

Recommendation by ICCAT amending ICCAT’s List of Fishing Vessels Presumed to be Engaged in Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing Activities in the ICCAT Convention Area and Other Areas.
Recommendation 07-09, [1].
57
Resolution 01/07 has been superseded by Resolution 14/01 on the same subject.
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Commission agreed, among other things, to support the IPOA-IUU, and to encourage its
application, and to put in place a framework for the identification of the vessels engaged in
IUU activities through agreed procedures in a fair, transparent and non-discriminatory
manner.

The IOTC IUU listing measure was first adopted in 2006 and has since been amended.58A
Contracting Party or Cooperating Non-Contracting Party (referred to as “CPCs”) presents
evidence that must satisfy any of the listing criteria. The IOTC Compliance Committee is the
subsidiary body that considers evidence provided and makes recommendations to the
commission. The IOTC measure include procedures for the listing of a vessel on the IOTC
IUU vessel list intersessionally. This may be invoked if the Commission is unable to decide
on the basis of the evidence provided that a vessel be listed. During the intersessional period
and within the timeframe set out in the measure, the majority of members will constitute the
quorum for the purposes of voting. A two-third majority vote is required for placing the
vessel on the list, and failing that, the vessel remains on the provisional IUU vessel list.59

A vessel on the IUU vessel list may be removed from such list intersessionally and all tuna
RFMOs now allow for intersessional delisting. In order for removal to occur, a CPC would
need to provide information and evidence that it has adopted measures to ensure compliance
by its vessel with all IOTC conservation measures, that it is and will continue to exercise its
responsibilities as a flag State, that it has taken effective action in response to the IUU fishing
activities in question, and that the vessel has changed ownership and the new owner can
establish that the previous owner no longer has any legal, financial or real interests in the
vessel or exercises control over it
and that the new owner has not participated in IUU fishing.60With that information, members
of the Commission may consider removal from the IUU Vessel List. Like the procedure for
intersessional inclusion of a vessel on the IUU Vessel List, a two-thirds majority vote is
required for removing a vessel from the list, and if that is not met, the vessel remains.
58

Resolution 06/01 On Establishing A List Of Vessels Presumed To Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported And
Unregulated Fishing In The IOTC Area, superseded by Resolution 09/03 On Establishing A List Of Vessels
Presumed To Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported And Unregulated Fishing In The IOTC Area, superseded by
Resolution 11/03 On Establishing A List Of Vessels Presumed To Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported And
Unregulated Fishing In The IOTC Area of Competence.
59
IOTC Res. 11/03.
60
IOTC Resolution 09/03, above n 59, [16], [17].
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The reference to CPC only in this provision indicates that only CPC vessels on the IUU
Vessel List may request removal from the list during the intersessional period. Vessels of
third States that are not CPCs are not able to rely on the intersessional removal of their
vessels. The question that arises is whether there are any legal implications with the
differentiation. An argument may be tendered by a non CPC that by not affording the same
opportunity for removal during the period between sessions as is given to CPCs, the IOTC is
discriminating against non CPCs.

Listing criteria

Compared to the listing criteria of other tuna RFMOs, the listing criteria adopted by the IOTC
is similar to ICCAT. If the listing criteria of the IATTC may be used as a reference, all of the
criteria exist in the IOTC criteria with the exception of the ownership criterion, which
coincidentally is not included in the criteria adopted by the ICCAT and CCSBT. In addition,
the IOTC like ICCAT includes the criterion that a vessel harvested tuna and tuna-like species
without the flag State having a quota or allocated catch and effort limits, and the fishing in
waters under the national jurisdiction of a coastal State criterion. For the latter, listing by
IOTC is without prejudice to the sovereign rights of a coastal State to take measures against
such vessels. The reference to “sovereign rights” appears to support the notion that the
unlawful fishing activity is alleged to have occurred within the EEZ only. Thus, unlawful
fishing activities within waters under the sovereignty of a coastal State cannot be used as a
basis for listing and it is the prerogative of that coastal State to institute legal proceedings
against such vessels.

The criteria for delisting requires the involvement of the CPC whose vessel is listed. Such
CPC may request removal from the list and provide information and supporting evidence to
show that: a) it has adopted measures to ensure compliance by the vessel with IOTC
Conservation and Management Measures; b) it is and will continue to assume effectively its
responsibilities with respect to this vessel; c) effective action has been taken in response to
the IUU fishing activities in question including prosecution and imposition of sanctions of
adequate severity; and d) the vessel has changed ownership and that the new owner can
establish the previous owner no longer has any legal, financial or real interests in the vessel
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or exercises control over it and that the new owner has not participated in IUU fishing.61The
same information must be supplied by the CPC on requesting removal during the
intersessional period.62

Application

Like other tuna RFMOs each CPCs has obligations in relation to vessels on the IUU Vessel
List. The IOTC resolution specifically states that “CPCs shall take all necessary measures,
under their applicable legislation”.63 This mandatory text assumes that all of the requirements
can be included in legislation; indeed some may effectively be implemented only in national
policies and procedures. The obligations require: a) that the fishing vessels, the mother-ships
and the cargo vessels flying their flag do not participate in any transhipment with vessels on
the IUU Vessels list; b) that IUU vessels that enter ports voluntarily are not authorised to
land, tranship, refuel, re-supply, or engage in other commercial transactions; c) the
prohibition of the chartering of a vessel included on the IUU Vessels List; d) the refusal to
grant nationality to vessels included in the IUU Vessels List, except if the vessel has changed
owner and the new owner has provided sufficient evidence demonstrating the previous owner
or operator has no further legal, beneficial or financial interest in, or control of, the vessel; or
having taken into account all relevant facts, the flag State determines that granting the vessel
its flag will not result in IUU fishing; e) the prohibition of the imports, landing or
transhipment, of tuna and tuna-like species from vessels included in the IUU Vessels List; f)
encouragement of importers, transporters and other sectors concerned, to refrain from
transaction and transhipment of tuna and tuna-like species caught by vessels included in the
IUU Vessels List; and the g) collection and exchange with other CPCs any appropriate
information with the aim of detecting, controlling and preventing false import/export
certificates for tunas and tuna-like species from vessels included in the IUU Vessels List.
Noting these specific obligations, it is suggested that these are yet to be implemented in the
national legislation of all CPCs of the IOTC.

D.

CCSBT
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Resolution 2011/03, [19].
Resolution 2011/03, [20] – [24].
63
Resolution 2011/03, [16] chapeau. Cf WCPFC CMM 2010-06, [22].
62
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Although the Extended Commission revised its IUU listing resolution in October 2014, it
does not contain listing criteria that have been adopted by other tuna RFMOs.64 The
compliance committee is the subsidiary body responsible for consideration nominations and
making recommendations to the commission.

As far as listing is concerned a member or cooperating non member is required to present
“suitably documented evidence” that a vessel has contravened any of the listing criterion.
Unlike most tuna RFMOs, CCSBT provides guidance in the annexures to the resolution for
the reporting form for southern bluefin tuna illegal activity, the format for identifying
criterion that has been contravened including the associated documents that are to be
appended such as boarding reports, court proceedings and photographs. Such guidance on
“suitably documented evidence” is present in the IUU listing resolutions of the IATTC and
IOTC but absent in the others.65 While there is no prescribed format for reporting and the
submission of evidence in the ICCAT and WCPFC, it is observed that the practice of
reporting, both in form and content, in these organisations has gradually improved over the
years.

Once a vessel has been nominated, it will be placed on the draft IUU Vessel List. The draft is
circulated to all members, cooperating non members, and non members including the flag
State of the nominated vessels. The compliance committee considered the draft IUU Vessel
List and the CCSBT IUU vessel list at its annual meeting. The committee is charged with the
responsibility of adopting a Provisional IUU Vessel List and recommending any changes to
the CCSBT IUU Vessel List for the consideration of the Extended Commission. The
procedures for the removal from draft IUU Vessel List is the same as other tuna RFMOs
where the flag State or entity must demonstrate that the vessel did not take part in any IUU
fishing activities for southern bluefin tuna, or, that effective action has been taken in response
to the IUU fishing activities in question.

64

Resolution on Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing Activities For Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT) (revised at the 21st Annual Meeting, 16
October 2014).
65
IOTC Resolution 11/03 On Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported
and Unregulated Fishing in the IOTC Area of Competence, an earlier Resolution 09/03 On Establishing a List of
Vessels Presumed to Have Carried Out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in the IOTC Area. The
IATTC resolution 15/01 provides the same format guidance in its annex.
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Removal of a vessel from the CCSBT IUU Vessel List may be requested by the member,
cooperating non member or non cooperating non member either through the compliance
committee or intersessionally through the Executive Secretary.66 The requesting flag State in
making its application for removal will need to submit suitably documented information
demonstrating that: it has adopted measures to ensure compliance by its vessels with CCSBT
measures, and it continues to exercise effective monitoring and control over its vessels
fishing for southern bluefin tuna, and any one or more of the following: effective action has
been taken in response to the IUU fishing activities, the vessel has changed ownership and
the new owner can establish that the previous owner no longer has any legal, financial or real
interests in or control over the vessel and that the new owner has not participated in IUU
fishing activities for southern bluefin tuna, or, the case regarding the listed vessel has been
settled to the satisfaction of the member or cooperating non member that nominated the
vessel and the flag State or entity involved.

Listing Criteria

Compared to the listing criteria of the other tuna RFMOs, the CCSBT criteria appears to be
the most cautious. The criteria provides for the listing of vessels that have: harvested
southern bluefin tuna and were not authorised by a member or cooperating non member to
fish for such species; harvested such species in waters under the national jurisdiction of a
coastal State in contravention of that States laws and regulations; failed to record or report
catches or catch related data, or have made false reports; used prohibited or non compliant
fishing gear in a way that undermines CCSBT measures; transhipped with or participated in
joint operations with vessels included in the CCSBT IUU Vessel list; and engaged in fishing
activities contrary to CCSBT measures.

It follows that the CCSBT criteria does not include: the taking or landing of undersized fish
in contravention of conservation and management measures; fishing during closures in
contravention of measures; listing vessels without nationality who harvest southern bluefin
tuna, and listing vessels under the control of the owner of any vessel on the CCSBT IUU
Vessel List. The non inclusion of these criteria suggests that the CCSBT, of all the tuna
RFMOs, applies a narrow approach to listing. However the narrow approach gives rise to
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CCSBT Resolution on IUU List, 2014, [22] – [27].
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significant differences. For example, whilst all other tuna RFMOs have allowed for the listing
of vessels without nationality that harvest species that they cover, CCSBT does not. This may
be indicative of the legal uncertainties concerning the listing of stateless vessels since such
vessels are not under the control or protection of any State. Current procedures for the
removal of a vessel from the Draft IUU Vessel List or the IUU Vessel List only allow for
intervention by the flag State or entity. But it may also be that fishing by stateless vessels is
not an issue for the commission. The former reasoning seems to hold more weight.

Further, the CCSBT joins IOTC and ICCAT in not including the ownership criterion in the
listing measure. As discussed earlier for IOTC and ICCAT, the ownership criterion is perhaps
not the most attractive as a listing criterion because it implicates vessels that may otherwise
be compliant, and determining the level of control and ownership gives rise to legal questions
that two tuna RFMOs (IATTC and WCPFC) have begun to explore.

Recognition of lists of other tuna RFMOs

Interestingly, the CCSBT does not adopt the same approach as ICCAT in its recognition of
the IUU vessel lists of other RFMOs. The 2014 resolution provides for cross-listing allowing
for the Extended Commission to consider cross-listing IUU vessel lists with other tuna
RFMOs and relevant organisations “on a case by case basis”.67 In providing for the exercise
of its discretion in the recognition of the IUU fishing vessel lists of other tuna RFMOs, the
CCSBT applies a precautionary approach. While it is not clear whether the CCSBT has
approved parameters for cross-listing, it is envisaged that the CCSBT is more likely to
recognise IUU fishing vessel lists of other tuna RFMOs with similar criteria, procedures and
requirements for listing, taking into account the fundamental principles of natural justice and
protections under the law. This exercise would be conceivably difficult especially since the
listing criteria adopted by the CCSBT does not include a few criteria that all other tuna
RFMOs have.

E.

67

WCPFC

CCSBT Resolution on IUU List, 2014, [20].
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The WCPFC adopted its first conservation and management measure to establish a list of
vessels presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing in 2006. Since then, the IUU fishing vessel
listing measure has been amended to broaden the criteria for IUU listing, change the process
for listing, and provide specific rules for the listing of vessels under the ownership criterion
and the removal of vessels without nationality. The current measure is comparable to the IUU
listing measures of other tuna RFMOs with the notable exception that it provides rules
relating to the ownership criteria.68

CMM 2010-06 provides that members and cooperating non members (collectively referred to
as CCMs) are to transmit to the Executive Director their list of vessels presumed to be
carrying out IUU activities in the WCPFC Convention Area during the current or previous
year with suitably documented information.69 The technical and compliance committee of the
Commission is responsible for reviewing vessels that have been placed on the draft IUU
Vessel List and to recommend vessels that are to be listed on the Provisional IUU Vessel List
for Commission consideration.

Like other tuna RFMOs, the committee is prohibited from including a vessel on the
Provisional IUU Vessel List if the vessel’s flag State demonstrates that: (a) the vessel fished
in a manner consistent with WCPFC Conservation Measures or the laws of a coastal State
where fishing occurred, or the vessel fished exclusively for species not covered by the
WCPFC Convention; or (b) effective action has been taken in response to the IUU fishing
activities in question, such as, inter alia, prosecution or the imposition of sanctions of
adequate severity; or (c) the case regarding the vessel or vessels that conducted IUU fishing
activities has been settled to the satisfaction of the CCM that originally submitted the vessel
for listing and the flag State involved.70While the satisfaction of any of these would suffice,
in practice the WCPFC has not listed a vessel also if there are irregularities. For instance in
2010, seven vessels were nominated by the Solomon Islands on the draft IUU Vessel List on
the grounds of fishing in areas under national jurisdiction contrary to national law.71 It was
submitted by the Solomon Islands that the vessels did not carry a licence issued in accordance
with fisheries legislation but the flag State indicated the vessels had been issued a letter by an
68

WCPFC Conservation and Management Measure 2010-06.
WCPFC CMM 2010-06, [4].
70
WCPFC CMM 2010-06, [15].
71
The vessels are: Liao Da Gan Yu 55048 (BZYK8), Liao Da Gan Yu 55049 (BZYK9), Tai Fu 101 (BZ502),
Tai Fu 102 (BZ508), Xin Shi Ji 101 (BZ4UB), Xin Shi Ji 102 (BZ5UB), and Zhong Tai 1 (BZZW4).
69
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official which suggested that they could fish in the EEZ. Although the Technical and
Compliance Committee did not elaborate on the reasons for non inclusion of those vessels on
the Provisional List, this example seems to suggest that where there are possible internal
issues that need to be addressed by the coastal State and the flag State concerned, the
Commission and its subsidiary bodies will not interfere.

An aspect that is not found in the measures of other tuna RFMOs is that the compliance
committee shall not include a vessel on the Provisional IUU Vessel List if the notifying CCM
did not follow the required procedures.72This has been applied in a number of situations. One
example is the proposed listing of a Vanuatu fishing vessel in 2010 by France on behalf of
French Polynesia. The grounds for listing were that the vessel was not on the WCPFC record
of authorised vessels and was engaged in fishing activities that undermined the WCPFC
Convention and its measures.73 Vanuatu challenged the listing on the premise that the
procedures were not complied with. In particular, the French inspection vessel carried out
‘dangerous’ zig zag manoeuvres when attempting to board the fishing vessels on the high
seas including crossing the longlines of the fishing vessel. Further, Vanuatu stated that it was
not notified through proper channels of the incident. In considering the arguments, the
compliance committee agreed not to list the vessel on the Provisional List. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that the failure to comply with the notification of the flag State through proper
channels has not precluded listings.74

Criteria for listing

As far as listing criteria is concerned, the WCPFC measure contains similar criteria of other
tuna RFMOs except the criterion found only in the ICCAT and IOTC of fishing for tuna and
tuna-like species in the tuna RFMO area, when the vessel’s flag State is without quotas, catch
limit or effort allocation. Nevertheless, the WCPFC includes criteria that may be regarded as
progressive such as the ownership criterion and the fishing by stateless vessels criterion.75
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WCPFC CMM 2010-06, [16].
France also reported that the captain of ‘Tunago No 31’ refused boarding and was uncooperative.
74
Cf IATTC listing of Fiji flagged longline vessel Xin Shi Ji 16 (IATTC vessel number 15579).This vessel was
first listed in July 2014 on the IATTC IUU Vessel List: <https://www.iattc.org//Vessel-PDFfiles/18July2014IUUList.pdf >
75
WCPFC CMM 2010-06, [3(j)] and [3(h)] respectively.
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The latter has been applied and in order to address the absence of rules for the removal of
stateless vessels, the Commission with the leadership of the United States delegation
formulated requirements for the removal of such vessels. Indeed, a Stateless vessel is a vessel
that is without nationality is not under the protection of any State. The former flag State may
therefore no longer have any responsibilities with respect to the now stateless vessel. With
this situation, it appears that other States may be required to assume certain responsibilities
over the vessel. The exact nature of the responsibilities to be assumed by other States would
appear to start when their legal rights or responsibilities are invoked. Hence a stateless fishing
vessel carrying nationals from a certain State can invoke the legal rights and responsibilities
of that State. Given that this is an emerging area of State and RFMO practice, it is likely that
rights and responsibilities of States vis-à-vis a stateless vessel will need to be delineated. It
follows that although stateless vessels may traditionally be considered to be the responsibility
of no State, in the interests on long term sustainable fisheries, States will be expected to share
the responsibility over such vessels.

For its part the WCPFC requirements for stateless vessels provides a role for the new flag
State, or in the alternative, the owner of the vessel. On these requirements, observations may
be made. Firstly the requirements impose obligations on the new flag State of the vessel to
assist in the resolution of the matter. However the new flag State may rightly state that the
matter is outside its jurisdiction. There are also practical uncertainties since if the vessel has
been engaged in IUU fishing, current tuna RFMO obligations and international requirements
discourage the registration of fishing vessels that have been engaged in such fishing. Being
realistic, there may not be a new flag State. Secondly, the major responsibility for removal
rests with the owner. The operator must prove among other things that the vessel is no longer
engaged in IUU fishing and that there are no financial or other links with the former owner of
the vessel. Despite the formulation of these requirements, it is difficult for a stateless vessel
on the WCPFC IUU Vessel List to be removed.

A case in point concerns the F/V Fu Lien No. 1 listed by WCPFC for being without
nationality and harvesting species covered by the WCPFC while on the high seas in that
commission’s area of competence. The WCPFC agreed at its seventh regular session that
although the vessel became a Georgia vessel, the flag State at the time of the contravention is
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responsible.76The legal advice suggested that it would be appropriate to include in the record
of the meeting a procedure to remove the Fu Lien No. 1 or to create an opportunity for the
owner to remove the vessel.77The Commission agreed by consensus to the listing of the
vessel and that the secretariat write to the current flag State to seek assistance in resolving the
matter. It was also agreed that if the current flag determines that this matter is outside its
jurisdiction, then the owner of the vessel may take the following actions: (a) pay a voluntary
contribution to the WCPFC in an amount deemed satisfactory by the Commission; (b) ensure
that the vessel is flagged to a responsible flag State; and (c) provide a written undertaking
with the flag State that it will comply with the WCPF Convention and its measures.78The
vessel Fu Lien No. 1 now flagged to Georgia has been on the list since 10 December 2010
and it is not clear when the vessel will be removed.

Application

Like other tuna RFMOs, the WCPFC allows for the removal of a vessel by the Commission
during its annual session or in the period between sessions. A CCM or non CCM with a
vessel on the WCPFC IUU Vessel List may seek the removal of the vessel by submitting
suitably documented information to the Executive Director who then circulates the
information to all CCMs. If a CCM objects to the removal, the vessel in question remains on
the list for consideration by the compliance committee and the Commission.79

Aside from intersessional removals, the Commission considers requests for removal at its
annual session. Since the establishment of the IUU listing measure, two of the contentious
issues for the Commission are: (a) the adequateness of the sanctions imposed by a flag State
with respect to its vessel that is presumed to have engaged in IUU fishing; and (b) the
resolution of the conflicting interests of the flag State and a coastal State where a fishing
vessel has fished in contravention of the national laws and regulations of the coastal State.
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WCPFC 7 Report, [200].
Ibid.
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WCPFC7 Report, [201].
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WCPFC CMM 2010-06, [25].
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Members of the Forum Fisheries Agency have argued that ‘adequateness’ of sanctions for
contraventions within areas under national jurisdiction of a coastal State should be
determined by that State rather than the flag State. Further, in contrast to the rules for
removal, a demonstration by the flag State that it has imposed adequate sanctions on its
vessel may not be adequate at all for the coastal State. Herein is an apparent problem with the
measure. By elevating the right of the flag State to advocate removal of its vessel, the rules
appear to be incongruous with the coastal State’s rights, in particular the exercise of its
sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve and manage the stocks, and the right to enforce
its laws and regulations.

The resolution of the conflicting rights and interests of the coastal State and flag State in
situations where a vessel has contravened the laws of the coastal State is of ongoing
importance. Until there is clarity in how these rights and interests are reconciled, it would
appear that implementation will favour the flag State rather than the coastal State.

Perhaps the novel contribution of the WCPFC to IUU listing is the proposed procedure for
the involvement of the new flag State and the owner of the vessel. This appears to be the first
occasion in which such a procedure will be tested. Given the obligation on States not to grant
nationality to a vessel on the IUU Vessel List, it is possible that there will not be a new flag
State. The enhanced role of the owner of the vessel deserves some attention. In the WCPFC
procedure it is the owner of the vessel that satisfies the requirements, including obtaining a
written undertaking with the new flag State supporting compliance. The owner effectively
will be held responsible for the actions of the vessel even though there are no specific rules
for the attribution of responsibility in tuna RFMO measures. Also in the likely event that
there is no new flag State, the WCPFC may need to amend its procedures to provide
additional requirements on the owner. In the evolving practice of the WCPFC and possibly
other tuna RFMOs it is suggested that there will be a growing role for vessel owners. There
does not appear to be any other alternative. If the WCPFC procedure is to be sustainable, then
consideration will need to be placed on a mechanism for attributing responsibility and for
ensuring that the owner of a vessel complies. Therefore national legislation of CPCs in which
the owner is a national, may need to accommodate this.80
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A contravention of obligations by the owner may be equated to undermining conservation and management
measures of the RFMO.
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F. OVERVIEW OF LISTING PRACTICE OF NON TUNA RFMOS

In comparison non tuna RFMOs, amongst themselves, are more diverse in terms of criteria
for listing and procedures for listing and removal of vessels from their respective IUU vessel
lists. Of all non tuna RFMOs considered, the South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation is the
only organisation with listing criteria similar to tuna RFMOs.81The obligations of contracting
parties in relation to listed vessels is almost identical to that of tuna RFMOs.82 Interestingly it
is the only non tuna RFMO that includes the ownership criterion. The South Pacific Regional
Fisheries Management Organisation listing framework is also similar to tuna RFMO IUU
listing measures.83 Criteria for listing includes vessels fishing without nationality but does not
include fishing in waters under national jurisdiction in contravention of national laws, and the
ownership criterion.84 Lessons possibly drawn from the CCAMLR listing measure are noted
in the list of obligations of members and cooperating non parties of the SPRFMO.85
Procedures for the modification of the SPRFMO IUU list are congruent with those set out in
the listing measures of most RFMOs.

The establishment of two IUU listing measures differentiating between vessels of parties and
cooperating non parties, and non cooperating non parties, is found in the practice of one non
tuna RFMOs – CCAMLR. In the CCAMLR, the contracting party IUU vessel listing criteria
are similar to tuna RFMO measures with the notable exclusion of the fishing in waters under
national jurisdiction criterion, the stateless vessel criterion, and the ownership criterion.86For
non contracting party vessel listing, there is a presumption that a vessel is undermining the
effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures if the vessel was sighted engaged in
fishing activities in the CCAMLR convention area or has been denied port access, landing or
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SEAFO Conservation Measure 08/06 establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to have carried out Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the South-East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO)
Convention Area, [3].
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SEAFO Conservation Measure 08/06, above n X, [17].
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SPRFMO CMM 1.04 Conservation and Management Measure Establishing a List of Vessels Presumed to
have carried out Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing Activities in the SPRFMO Convention Area.
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It is noted that although the stateless vessel criterion is present, the measure does not provide explicitly for the
removal of a stateless vessel.
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SPRFMO CMM 1.04, [12].
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CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-06 (2008) Scheme to promote compliance by Contracting Party vessels
with CCAMLR conservation measures, [5]. But the criteria does provide for fishing in the CCAMLR
Convention Area without a licence issued in accordance with CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-02.
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transshipment.87 Where the vessel has engaged in transshipment with another vessel, the
presumption also applies to the other vessel. The criteria for listing of non contracting party
vessels includes sighting of the vessel engaged in fishing activities, the denial of port access,
landing or transshipment, and the failure to provide a valid catch document.88 While the
stateless vessel criterion is also absent, the sighting criteria seems to encompass any type of
vessel.89 The procedures for removal from the CCAMLR IUU vessel lists as well as the
obligations upon contracting parties to take specified measures appear to be more
comprehensive than those contained in tuna RFMO measures.

In contrast to CCAMLR, the listing practice in NEAFC may be described as being less
prescriptive in terms of the criteria for listing. In the NEAFC scheme of control and
enforcement, the provisional list of IUU vessels referred to as the “A” list and the confirmed
IUU list, the “B” list.90Sightings or other means of identification of a non contracting party
vessel fishing in the NEAFC convention area leads to a presumption that the vessel is
undermining conservation and enforcement measures, and any transshipment activities by
that vessel with another applies the presumption to the other vessel also.91 Further, if the
master of the vessel does not consent to boarding and inspection at sea or fails to comply with
any obligations during the inspection procedure, then there is a presumption that the vessel
has engaged in IUU fishing activities; compared to the first, this second presumption is
specific.92 The information provided by States that sighted or identified or inspected the
vessel constitutes the evidence that is used for listing.

Compared to tuna RFMO IUU listing measures, listing on the NEAFC A list, already attracts
certain sanctions such as mandatory inspections in port, prohibitions on landings,
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CCAMLR Conservation Measure 10-07 (2009) Scheme to promote compliance by non-Contracting Party
vessels with CCAMLR conservation measures, [4].
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CCAMLR conservation measures 10-07, [9].
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On 18 May 2016, there were 9 vessels of unknown nationalist listed on the Non Contracting Party IUU List:
Aldabra (IMO No. 7428491, call sign 5VAA2, listed since 2007); Amorinn (IMO No. 7036345, call sign
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transshipments in port and within waters under the national jurisdiction of contracting parties,
prohibition on bunkering, provisioning, and any other assistance including joint fishing
operations.93This practice appears to suggest that vessels on a draft or provisional list are
already guilty and is contrary to the practice of all tuna RFMOs.94On the other hand, the
obligations of NEAFC contracting parties for vessels on the confirmed IUU list, the B list,
has parallels with tuna RFMO obligations.95

IUU listing practice in NAFO is comparable to NEAFC. A vessel sighted or identified by
other means to be fishing in the NAFO regulatory area is presumed to be undermining NAFO
conservation and enforcement measures.96 This presumption applies equally to vessels that
are engaged in related activities with the first vessel sighted. Information in support of the
presumption is transmitted by the NAFO secretariat to the flag state as well as the contracting
parties. Of note, the flag State is given a period of 30 dates to respond to the allegations and
to advise on the results of its enquiries or measures that it has taken with respect to its
vessel.97 A vessel cannot be included on the IUU list if the period of time given to the flag
State to respond has not elapsed.98 Like NEAFC, the NAFO listing criteria is open and it
would appear that as long as there is a sighting and information to support that, a vessel may
be listed. Specific criteria for listing applied in all tuna RFMOs and the majority of RFMOs is
nonexistent. The information requirements for a flag State to remove its listed vessel and the
obligations on contracting parties with respect to listed vessels are however similar to other
RFMOs.99

On the recognition of the IUU lists of other RFMOs, NEAFC aside from the difference in
listing criteria and procedures, explicitly recognises the IUU lists of CCAMLR, NAFO and
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SEAFO. Once these RFMOs submit their respective lists of vessels confirmed as having been
engaged in IUU fisheries, the NAFO secretary is required “without delay” to place the non
contracting party vessels on the NEAFC IUU B list. Once listed, a vessel may only be
removed if the originating RFMO notifies the NEAFC secretary of the removal from the
list.100

V.

Perceived Contribution of Tuna RFMOs to International Law
A. Is IUU Listing part of customary international law?

Given the number of States that have accepted IUU listing processes in RFMOs, the ICCAT
has suggested that IUU listing is now part of customary law. Customary international law is
comprised of two components – the practice of States, and opinio juris, which is the concept
that a State acts with the understanding that such acts are correct.

Just because tuna RFMOs (or RFMOs generally) have adopted IUU lists and procedures,
does not mean that this amounts to State practice. But it could if the State is acting through
RFMOs as the appropriate regional mechanism to address IUU fishing. Some may argue that
State practice for listing is found when that State enacts enabling legislation. In any event,
there seems to be growing support that tuna RFMOs in providing comparable, and largely
consistent frameworks for the listing of vessels engaged in IUU fishing are contributing to
emerging customary international law. The important prerequisite according to the ICJ in the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases is the presence of a norm. Bearing in mind the synergies
and the widespread recognition of tuna RFMO IUU lists, it is posited that there may be
sufficient normative aspects for the inclusion of IUU listing as part of customary international
law.

B. Influence on State and REIO Practice
100

NEAFC Scheme for Control and Enforcement 2015, art 44.6.
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Tuna RFMOs activities with the listing of IUU vessels appears to have an influence, both
direct and indirect, on State and REIO practice. With respect to State practice, legislation of
several States requires that specific actions be taken upon fishing vessels that are listed on
IUU vessel lists as well as vessels that undertake related activities with such vessels.101There
is also an influence on the flag State responsibilities. The majority of States would appear to
be complying with requirements for addressing allegations of IUU fishing against vessels
flying their flag. In addition, in terms of licensing, vessels that are listed or have been
engaged in IUU fishing, cannot be licensed.

i)

State practice

As a consequence of the establishment of tuna RFMO IUU vessel lists, coastal States that are
members of such RFMOs have taken concerted action including enacting national
legislation. Notwithstanding the recognition of measures to establish IUU lists, national
legislation generally appears to be lacking in: (i) explicit recognition of the criteria for listing;
(ii) actions to be taken against listed vessels; and (iii) restrictions to be placed on listed
vessels such as the issuance of authorisation to undertake fishing and related activities.
Moreover, there does not appear to be an offence in most legislation for non compliance with
tuna RFMO conservation and management measures, including an offence for actually being
listed. In the event that a vessel is listed, the flag State is implicated not only because of
nationality but also since it has to challenge listing if the evidence provided is not strong or
procedures followed is not correct. The flag State may also be questioned by the vessel owner
if it does not act accordingly. Thus in this particular circumstance, the creation of an offence
for being listed on an IUU Vessel List may have repercussions on the role and responsibilities
of the flag State.102

II)

REIO practice
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For example, United States High Seas Driftnet Fishing Moratorium Protection Act (P.L. 104-43) amending
the Magnuson –Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, section 609.
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With respect to REIO practice, the EU IUU Regulation is noteworthy. Although these
regulations stem from the IPOA-IUU, there are linkages with RFMO IUU lists. The EU IUU
Regulation applies a similar definition of the elements of IUU fishing that is contained in the
IPOA-IUU.103 In addition the EU IUU Regulation identifies twelve circumstances in which a
fishing vessel shall be presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing contrary to applicable
conservation and management measures in the fishing area. A closer look finds that seven of
the twelve are similar to the circumstances that equate to a serious violation under Article 21
paragraph 11 of the 1995 Agreement.104 The remaining five relate to: undersized fish,
engaging in fishing or transshipping with a fishing vessel on the community IUU vessel list
or an RFMO IUU list, fishing in an RFMO area in a manner inconsistent with or in
contravention of conservation and management measures of the RFMO while being flagged
to a third state or a state that is not cooperating with that RFMO, and lastly, vessels without
nationality.
The EU IUU Regulation also establishes the community IUU vessel list.105 Information on
vessels alleged to have engaged in IUU fishing is compiled by the commission and
supplemented by its member states. When sufficient information has been obtained to
presume that the fishing vessel may be engaged in IUU fishing, an official enquiry will be
initiated. The commission then notifies the flag state providing such state with all the
information gathered and to take the necessary measures to investigate and report on actions
taken. Where there is sufficient information that a fishing vessel is presumed to be engaged in
IUU fishing and the flag state has not complied with official requests by the commission,
such vessel will be placed on the community IUU vessel list.106 Before a vessel is placed on
that list, the commission is required to provide the owner and, where appropriate, the operator
of the vessel detailed information of the reasons why the vessel is suspected of carrying out
IUU fishing.107 The information provided to the owner and where appropriate, the operator
will give them the possibility of being heard and to defend their case. The commission
ultimately decides on placing a fishing vessel on the community IUU vessel list. Once a
vessel has been placed, the commission is required to notify the flag state of the inclusion of
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the fishing vessel on the community list and must also provide detailed reasons for listing.
The EU IUU Regulation also provides specific requirements for the removal of a fishing
vessel from the community list. Removal may be initiated by the flag state demonstrating that
either the vessel did engage in the alleged IUU fishing activity or that proportionate and
effective sanctions have been applied, or the owner, or where appropriate, the operator of a
vessel placed on the community list may submit a request to the commission to review the
status of the vessel where the flag state has not been active.108 In situations where neither the
flag state nor the owner or operator are able to satisfy the given requirements, a fishing vessel
can only be removed from the community list upon satisfaction of any of the grounds
provided.109

Interestingly the EU IUU Regulation includes all vessels listed on IUU vessel lists of RFMOs
on the community IUU vessel list. This is novel for a regional economic integration
organization and the majority of States for that matter. The automatic inclusion of RFMO
IUU vessel lists gives rise to several assumptions. Firstly it is assumed that the listing of each
vessel by the respective RFMO complied with fundamental principles of natural justice
including the right to a fair and impartial hearing. Arguably RFMOs may not be able to
provide a fair and impartial consideration given that, among others, there are no set standards
for the conduct of hearings, and decision making by consensus is crude and may discourage
some states voicing their concerns. The second assumption is that RFMOs have the same
procedures for listing IUU vessels on a provisional and final IUU list. Clearly this is not the
case. Generally tuna RFMOs have similar (but not identical) procedures and these are
different from other RFMOs dealing with straddling or discrete species. The third assumption
is that the criteria for listing a vessel is the same amongst RFMOs. Again the criteria for
listing is generally similar for tuna RFMOs but different in other RFMOs. For example, some
tuna RFMOs include the requirement that fishing vessels owned by a person with an existing
vessel on the final IUU list may also be listed. Fourth there is the assumption that the
procedures for the delisting of a vessel on an IUU list is the same. The criteria for delisting
varies across RFMOs with commonalities amongst tuna RFMOs on the one side and non tuna
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Article 28.2, EU IUU Regulation.
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RFMOs on the other. Some tuna RFMOs allow for the removal of vessels intersessionally
while in others listed vessels remain until approval at the next session. Fifth, it is assumed
that the membership of RFMOs is the same. This would in fact ensure some level of
consistency in the decisions to list vessels. In reality, while the membership of dominant
fishing nations overlaps in most RFMOs, there is diversity from one region to another.
Consistency in the decision making process is therefore likely to change with diversity in
membership and interests. Ultimately, the listing of a vessel on an IUU vessel list carries
significant legal implications because it deprives the owner, operator, crew and the entailing
personal and corporate interests, of income and livelihoods for the duration of listing (and
possibly thereafter). With the related legal implications, it is worthwhile for RFMOs to
consider harmonization of processes and the development of agreed measures to be taken in
certain circumstances.

The discussion here is also useful in the context of the decision at the joint tuna RFMO
meeting in 2009 for the compatibility of procedures and criteria for the listing and delisting
from respective IUU vessel lists with the objective of developing a global IUU list.110 So far
only the ICCAT automatically recognises the lists of other tuna RFMOs. Although this is
considered ground breaking amongst tuna RFMOs, it is also a bold initiative that may be
challenged. Recognition of another RFMO’s IUU list is an explicit and indirect acceptance of
the processes and decisions that led to the listing. The strengths and defects in the listing
process are all accepted and enforced by the member states of the recognizing RFMO. It is
also suggested that the recognizing RFMO also accepts the responsibility attached to the
consequences of the listing of a vessel that is later found to have not engaged in IUU fishing.
Given that RFMOs are comprised of individual member states, responsibility for errors in the
listing process is also expected to flow to states. The likelihood of a legal challenge relating
to IUU listing is a real possibility and invites change

The EU IUU Regulation also provide a suite of initiatives including the requirement for
authorization of fishing vessels, the recording of landing or transshipment operations, catch
certification requirements, and port inspections. For the latter, eu member states are required
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to inspect at least 5 percent of land and transshipment operations by third state fishing vessels
each year.

C. Criteria for IUU listing

The tuna RFMO criteria for IUU listing identifies the elements of the IPOA definition of IUU
fishing that are being implemented. Of the eleven criteria identified earlier, six are found in
all the IUU listing measures. They involve: 1) harvesting species while not being on the tuna
RFMO list of authorised vessels; 2) harvesting in waters under national the national
jurisdiction of a coastal State contrary to that State’s laws; 3) failing to record or report
catches made in the area of competence of a tuna RFMO, or making false reports; 4) using
prohibited gear in contravention of measures; 5) transhipping with or participating in joint
operations such as provisioning or bunkering with vessels included in the tuna RFMO IUU
List; and 6) engaging in fishing activities contrary to any other measure of the tuna RFMO.
Notwithstanding the similarities, there are criterion where differences emerge such as the
ownership criterion.

To determine the extent of this contribution, the question of acceptance by States is pertinent.
States that are members and cooperating non members of the tuna RFMO, and the fishing
entity of Taiwan in all except one tuna RFMO, are considered to have accepted the criteria by
consensus. The question is best answered in the response of flag States that have vessels
listed on a tuna RFMO IUU List. Hitherto there appears to be no challenge by flag States
with listed vessels on the criterion or criteria used for listing. This is surprising since a flag
State that is a third State may rely on fundamental principles of treaty law to challenge the
application of specific requirements to its vessel such as the requirement to be listed on the
tuna RFMO’s list of authorised vessels. The absence of protest may be interpreted as
acceptance of the listing criteria. Moreover, without challenge the criteria for listing is
expected to pervade.

Acceptance by States may also be in the form of explicit reference to listing criteria of tuna
RFMOs in national legislation or the course of action to be taken when a vessel is listed. On
the former, there are several States that refer to tuna RFMO IUU listing measures in national
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legislation.111 While these States may be seen to be merely identifying binding measures in
such legislation, the act is significant. The State is first indicating its explicit acceptance of
the measures together with their contents and secondly creating binding obligations for its
nationals. The second option has also found favour in legislation of some States.112 By
identifying actions against vessels that are listed, the State indirectly accepts the processes of
the tuna RFMO that listed the vessel, and complies with the restrictions in the measure to be
imposed on such vessels. Most States define that only vessels listed by tuna RFMOs that they
are members of fall within the scope of legislation but there are examples of States that
include blanket provision recognising any RFMO that has listed a vessel.113

That said, although there appears to be acceptance of the IUU listing criteria of tuna RFMOs,
specific criterion has generally not been included in the definition of IUU fishing in national
legislation. The practice of some States favours reference to the IPOA-IUU definition in
national legislation rather than the specific criterion adopted by tuna RFMOs. In any case,
tuna RFMOs in implementing criteria for the listing of IUU fishing are in fact contributing to
the practice of States that are party to or cooperating with such regimes. Although domestic
legislative implementation varies, it may be suggested that there is acceptance of the criteria
for listing at least within the States participating in the RFMO. With practice over time and
negligible protest or challenge, the IUU listing criteria are likely to emerge as indicia for
determining IUU fishing in customary international law.

D. Treatment of Vessels without Nationality
All of the tuna RFMOs with the exception of the CCSBT enable the listing of a vessel
without nationality that has harvested tuna and tuna-like species in the respective areas of
competence. The 1982 LOSC provides that a vessel without nationality is a vessel that does
not have the nationality of a State or has more than one nationality.114 But the 1982 LOSC
does not mention what actions can be taken on a vessel without nationality. That is a matter
for each State to determine. The 1995 Agreement provides limited guidance and allows for
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boarding and inspection on the high seas if there are reasonable grounds and the discretion to
taken appropriate action in accordance with international law.115 This is to be distinguished
from vessels under charter, particularly bareboat charter arrangements where the chartering
State may have some jurisdiction over the chartered vessel for the duration of the
charterparty. International law recognises that a vessel without nationality does not enjoy the
protection of any State.

The practice of the majority of tuna RFMOs in the listing of vessels without nationality
appears to be built upon the related element in the IPOA-IUU definition of IUU fishing.116
Prior to the IPOA-IUU, the 1982 LOSC is the only binding treaty which allowed for the right
of visit to vessels without nationality on the high seas. In that context, a State vessel may in
accordance with its laws and procedures inspect any stateless vessel on the high seas. The
stateless vessel does not have to be engaged in fishing activity to be visited. At that time the
stateless vessel even if engaged in fishing would not be regarded as being ‘illegal’,
‘unreported’ or ‘unregulated’ under the fisheries legislation of States or in practice. The
introduction of the stateless vessel component within the IPOA-IUU definition was
innovative. Given the nature of the IPOA-IUU as a non binding instrument, States and
RFMOs play a critical role in implementation.

In the inclusion of the stateless vessel criterion, tuna RFMOs appear to be at the forefront
internationally. Firstly, they are implementing within their respective regional management
frameworks the IPOA-IUU stateless vessel element of the definition of IUU
fishing.117Secondly the inclusion of the criterion within binding measures changes the nature
of the criterion. Thirdly the criterion is then incorporated in some form within the national
laws and policies of the members and cooperating non members of the respective
organisations. As identified in this chapter, tuna RFMOs have listed several stateless vessels
on their respective IUU vessel lists. Of these, the WCPFC has formulated rules for the
removal of a stateless vessel.
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Taking this into account, it is submitted that tuna RFMOs are contributing to new regional
and international practice on the listing of stateless vessels. Their practice however for the
removal of such vessels is evolving. On this, specific responsibilities traditionally within the
domain of flag States appears to be transferred to the operator of the vessel. To an extent the
operator assumes responsibilities of a flag State in demonstrating and providing evidence to
show that the vessel in question no longer has any links with the previous operator or is
engaged in IUU fishing or related activities in support of such fishing. It is noteworthy that
there seems to be a higher standard placed upon the operator and specific requirements are
stipulated. The intervention of operators in such instances may result in the gradual
diminishment of the role of former or new flag States in relation to such vessels.

With the majority of tuna RFMOs applying the stateless vessel criterion for listing
notwithstanding differences in the procedure for the removal of such vessels, it is suggested
that the practices of tuna RFMOs are gradually supporting the emergence of customary
international law.

E. Treatment of third State vessels
The treatment of third State vessels is a very uncertain area of the law since a State can also
take trade measures against other States in certain circumstances. Notwithstanding, tuna
RFMOs appear to treat third State vessels as if they were vessels of their members and
cooperating non members. This observation is premised on the practice of each tuna RFMO
in listing vessels of third States on various criterion, including, not being on the record of
authorised vessels, fishing without a quota or catch allocation, and fishing in a manner that is
not compliant with applicable measures. The practice seems to be derived from the IPOAIUU provisions which deems vessels of third States fishing in an area of competence of an
RFMO as engaged in “unregulated” fishing, and thus IUU fishing. Strictly, in including this
component of the IUU definition within the criteria for IUU listing, tuna RFMOs have
transformed the otherwise non binding character of this provision to a binding one.

In so doing tuna RFMOs (with all its members and cooperating non members) have
essentially included a criterion that seems to be challenge customary international law. A
third State is bound to the specific requirements of a tuna RFMO (such as being on the record
of vessels) even though it is not a party or cooperating non party. From one perspective, this
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position progresses the provisions of the 1995 Agreement which stipulate that a third State
which does not otherwise agree to apply the conservation and management measures of an
RFMO, is still not discharged from the obligation to cooperate in accordance with the 1982
LOSC and the 1995 Agreement.118 In addition third States are not to authorise their vessels to
engage in fishing for species subject to the measures of the RFMO.119 So if a third State is not
party to the 1995 Agreement, these specific obligations do not arise. However if the third
State is not party to the 1995 Agreement and the 1982 LOSC, it is suggested that the general
obligation to cooperate recognised in customary international law would apply. By extending
specific obligations to third States, tuna RFMOs may be considered to have progressed the
general rule relating to third States. In contrast, it may also be suggested that the practice of
tuna RFMOs in relation to third States is incongruent with the fundamental rule that rights
and obligations do not flow to States that have not consented to be bound. The implications
of this practice are significant and may potentially be applied by other international
organisations responsible for diverse sectors and activities.

The practice of tuna RFMOs in the application of various criterion for the listing of third
States vessels now appears to be accepted, at least among the States, fishing entity and REIO,
that are members or cooperating non members of tuna RFMOs. Interestingly, there does not
appear to be any protest or challenge by third States to the listing of their vessels. Indeed
there are possible grounds for such challenge primarily arguing the pacta tertiis rule. It may
therefore be concluded that with respect to the application of specific requirements to third
States, tuna RFMOs are arguably creating an exception to customary international law with
respect to the fishing activities of third States.120 Depending on perspective, this change may
be considered positive for long term sustainability, or, inimical to the relations between
States. Given tuna RFMO practice over more than a decade, consistency in its application,
support from its members and cooperating non members, and the absence of protest from
affected third States, the exception to the pacta tertiis rule may have emerged in customary
international law.
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F. Definition of IUU fishing
All tuna RFMO listing measures refer to the IPOA-IUU in one way or another. However in
elaborating on the definition of IUU fishing in the IPOA-IUU, tuna RFMOs have developed
comparable listing criteria. It is also put that tuna RFMOs have in some instances deviated
from the IPOA-IUU definition.

For example, paragraph 3.1.2 of the IPOA-IUU pronounces that illegal fishing also refers to
conduct by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to an RFMO but operate in
contravention of the conservation and management measures adopted by that organisation
and by which the States are bound. However as seen earlier, all tuna RFMOs include the
criterion that presumes IUU fishing when a vessel has harvested species regulated by the tuna
RFMO but is not on the list of authorised vessels of that RFMO. This criterion has been
applied to both vessels flagged by parties and cooperating non parties as well as non
cooperating non parties. Through the wide application of this criterion, tuna RFMOs have
effectively deviated from the IPOA-IUU definition by extending the same to non cooperating
third States.

Another example is the ownership criterion. Most tuna RFMOs have included progressive
criterion for the listing of vessels under the control of the same owner of a vessel that is
already on the IUU list. In practice this criterion is applied irrespective of whether the flag
State is a contracting party, cooperating non party, or non cooperating non party. Although
the focus of the illegal fishing aspect of the IPOA-IUU definition is upon vessels of flag
States that are party or cooperating non parties to an RFMO, the ownership criteria is an
apparently significant deviation. If applied without necessary precautions, it is envisaged that
this criterion may also give rise to potential legal proceedings against the listing tuna RFMO.

Noting the apparent tuna RFMO deviations from the IPOA-IUU definition, the question may
be asked of which definition of IUU fishing is recognised in international law. The general
definition of IUU fishing in the IPOA-IUU has been recognised in the instruments of all tuna
RFMOs as well as in a growing number of national legislation. It is also explicitly recognised
in other FAO instruments such as the Port State Measures Agreement and the Voluntary
Guidelines on Flag State Performance. Nevertheless the inherent difficulty of including the
IPOA-IUU definition verbatim in national legislation has been identified by many States even
within FAO negotiations, such as Canada in the technical consultations to develop the Port
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State Measures Agreement. Tuna RFMO IUU listing measure elaborate (and deviate
somewhat) from the IPOA-IUU definition. That said, there are similarities and some
differences in the criteria for presuming that a vessel has engaged in IUU fishing.

The test for determining which definition of IUU fishing gains recognition in international
law depends on State practice and thinking. The question that may be asked is whether States
have accommodated tuna RFMO IUU definition requirements or the IPOA-IUU definition in
national legislation? If REIO practice is anything to go by, there would appear to be a
mixture of both the IPOA-IUU definition as well as the listing criteria of tuna RFMOs
recognised by the EU. This presents further complications and reveals that it will not be a
simple exercise.

Notwithstanding, it seems that tuna RFMOs are implementing the IPOA-IUU definition and
through their respective practice are, at the very least, contributing to emerging customary
international law.

G. Cross recognition of tuna RFMO lists

Of all the tuna RFMOs, ICCAT is the most progressive in terms of the automatic recognition
of the IUU vessel lists of other RFMOs.121 The Joint Tuna RFMO meeting in 2009 supported
this approach. CCSBT follows ICCAT but adopts a cautious approach by allowing for the
possibility of cross listing on a case by case basis. Hitherto, other tuna RFMOs do not support
cross recognition. The question that arises is whether cross recognition of tuna RFMO lists is
worthwhile? Obviously from a broad perspective, cross recognition ensures that a vessel
presumed to have engaged in IUU fishing in one ocean is effectively prohibited elsewhere.
But this perspective may not take into account the legal implications of cross recognition. By
recognising the IUU vessel list of another tuna RFMO, an RFMO indirectly accepts the
procedures and requirements followed by that RFMO despite differences in listing processes.
Importantly, it is submitted that through cross recognition the recognising tuna RFMO may
also assume secondary responsibility and liability for any actions instituted by the flag State
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of the listed vessel; the tuna RFMO that listed the vessel and its members hold primary
responsibility.122 While a legal challenge to listing has not occurred, it is possible in a
situation where, for instance, the requirements of natural justice have not been met, or the
evidence for listing is accepted despite being weak, or listing is not consistent with
international law. An affected flag State in instituting legal proceedings may also pursue
damages for, inter alia, lost income and fishing opportunities.

The question of whether listing is consistent with international law deserves attention. While
IUU listing measures have been in place for at least a decade, as explored in Chapter V the
listing of third State vessels may be an example of listing that is not consistent with
international law. It is important to be clear that third State vessels in this instance are those
vessels that are not party to the 1982 LOSC, the 1995 Agreement, or any tuna RFMO
instrument. In addition, they may include States that are only party to the 1982 LOSC. For
these States the freedom to fish on the high seas and the general obligation in customary
international law to cooperate in the conservation of living resources on the high seas may
only be applicable. Specific requirements imposed by tuna RFMO listing criteria such as the
requirement to be on the record of vessels, or the requirement to have a specific quota or
fishing allocation on the high seas, or the requirement to report catch, may be argued to be
beyond the obligations of third States in international law. The pacta tertiis rule applies.
Some tuna RFMOs have explored the question of third States in the listing process but
despite concerns raised in plenary, the views of the majority have prevailed.

The question that remains is whether cross recognition of IUU vessel lists by at least one tuna
RFMO is in any way contributing to customary international law. It is submitted that for
cross recognition to occur, the decision of the tuna RFMO has to be implemented in some
form in the domestic legislation and policies of its members and cooperating non members.
Through this process, the satisfaction of the two components of State practice and opinio juris
may be ascertained. It may be put that the cross recognition of IUU vessel lists is still in its
infancy in State practice and thinking and at this juncture cannot be regarded as forming
customary international law. However, if more States implemented the legislative and policy
requirements domestically, State practice even if only at a regional level, will emerge.
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H. Legitimising Tuna RFMOs in the notification of flag States of IUU fishing

Traditionally and under the LOSC, States are responsible for notifying other States through
official channels of alleged contraventions of their fishing vessels. The 1995 Agreement
introduces an important role for subregional and regional fisheries management organisations
or arrangements in the investigation of alleged fishing that undermines international
conservation and management measures. With the establishment of IUU fishing lists, each
tuna RFMO now plays a central role in the nomination and notification process. This may be
viewed as a departure from the traditional pathway for formal notifications but is inevitable
given the role of such organisations in the combatting IUU fishing at the regional level. It is
important to note that tuna RFMOs are mere channels for the notification of a flag State of an
alleged IUU fishing activity and are not active in the process for investigating and identifying
such activity; in notifying the flag State the tuna RFMO forwards the information obtained by
its member to the flag State.

I. Reconciling interests of the coastal State and flag State for contraventions in
areas under the national jurisdiction of a coastal State
The criterion for the listing of vessels that have harvested tuna or tuna-like species in waters
under the national jurisdiction of a coastal State is now found in the measures of all tuna
RFMOs.123Rights and responsibilities of a coastal State in areas under its national
jurisdiction, i.e., the EEZ, are provided for in the 1982 LOSC. In the measures of ICCAT,
IOTC and CCSBT the caveat attached to the criterion is that it is without prejudice to the
sovereign rights of the coastal State to take measures against vessels that have contravened its
laws and regulations. The WCPFC measure precludes this language but an overarching
‘without prejudice’ clause is found in its constituent instrument.124Technically, the placement
of the caveat in the provision that governs the functions of the Commission automatically
extends to all its instruments and decisions.
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The IATTC was the last tuna RFMO to incorporate this criterion and did so in 2015.
WCPF Convention, art 10 (Functions of the Commission) chapeau.
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Notwithstanding the inclusion of the caveat recognising the rights and interests of the coastal
State, IUU listing measures seem to lean in favour of the interests of the flag State. As seen
earlier, flag States may provide evidence and demonstrate that effective action has been taken
but the views of the coastal State appear to be made subordinate. In fact some coastal States
have requested the listing of a vessel under this criterion since the vessel has fled and is no
longer within its jurisdiction. The majority of these listings have been resolved successfully
with the coastal State and the flag State arriving at a mutual agreement. However, for some
listings, the flag State and the coastal State have not been able to reach agreement. In the Yu
Fong 168 case for instance, the fishing entity of Taiwan submitted to the WCPFC that it does
not know the whereabouts of its vessel that was found to have fished without authorisation in
the EEZ of the Marshall Islands.125 In such cases, the vessel remains on the list but the
absence of clarity from the flag begs the question of whether the vessel continues to engage
in fishing and related activities under a different name.

In their IUU listing measures, tuna RFMOs are engaged in resolving conflicting rights and
interests of the flag State and the coastal State in whose waters a vessel has fished unlawfully.
Tuna RFMO practice thus far appears to lean towards the interests of the flag State rather
than the coastal State. This position does not appear to be consistent with the fundamental
rights and responsibilities of international law as reflected in the 1982 LOSC. Within areas
under national jurisdiction, the coastal State has sovereign rights over natural resources and
the right to enforce its laws and regulations. The interests of the flag State enter and can be
used to challenge actions of the coastal State when the coastal State has acted in a manner
that is inconsistent with international law. Provisions in the tuna RFMO IUU listing measures
shift towards the flag State. For removal from a draft IUU list, it is the flag State that has to
demonstrate that its vessel did not engage in IUU fishing, or that adequate sanctions have
been imposed. There is no provision that requires the explicit consent of the coastal State in
situations where the vessel has fished unlawfully in its EEZ. This notable absence may be
seen to undermine the coastal State’s right to enforce its laws for unlawful fishing within its
EEZ.

Although, tuna RFMOs have an important role to ensure that fundamental rights and
responsibilities of States are observed, there appears to be a changing emphasis, at least with
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The vessel has been on the WCPFC IUU fishing vessel list since 11 December 2009.

331

respect to the unlawful fishing in areas under national jurisdiction criterion. If tuna RFMOs
are not able to reconcile these fundamentals, then they may be considered as playing a role in
placing more emphasis on the interests of flag States for the listing of vessels engaged in
unlawful fishing in areas under national jurisdiction, in direct contrast to the 1982 LOSC. It is
put that in such circumstances Article 73 of the 1982 LOSC would prevail, especially in
situations where the tuna RFMO constituent instrument is placed within the context of the
1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement, or international law.126

VI.

Concluding Remarks

There is no doubt that RFMOs play an important role in combatting IUU fishing at the
international and regional levels and are influencing State practice. This Chapter has
elucidated specific aspects where tuna RFMOs are asserting pressure on the boundaries of
international law. Notably, the impact on the jurisdiction of coastal States, flag States, port
States and market States is pronounced. Similarly, the treatment of third States within the
IUU fishing listing criteria and procedures deserves attention, particularly since such
treatment may be challenged by those States. The absence of any protest or challenge by third
States may lead to the conclusion that such States have acquiesced. Indeed, if third States
comply with the requirements for the removal of their vessels from an IUU list without any
protest or challenge, they are in fact acquiescing. On the application of the definition of IUU
fishing and the listing criteria of RFMOs, State and regional practice is evolving and as a
consequence, change is expected to continue.
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As in the WCPF Convention, art 4, and the Antigua Convention, art XVII.
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VIII
Conclusion
I.

Introduction

Chapters II – VII have each analysed and identified the possible contributions of tuna
RFMOs to specific aspects of international law. This final chapter revisits the
hypotheses posed, summarises the evaluation undertaken in preceding chapters, and
explores in broad terms the contributions of tuna RFMOs to international law.

II.

Hypotheses revisited

The thesis raises the following hypotheses: (i) Tuna RFMOs are contributing
positively to the development of international law; (ii) Tuna RFMOs are enhancing
the jurisdiction of sovereign States in international law; and (iii) Tuna RFMOs are
complementing State practice in the development of international law. Each is now
considered.

A

Tuna RFMOs are contributing positively to the development of international
law

Granting that the word ‘positive’ may be interpreted in different ways, this thesis has
focused primarily on whether a contribution is consistent or congruous with
international law. Indeed, if one takes the view that international law is itself
evolving and dynamic, then every contribution is positive because each assists in the
process of the development of the law. However, since the thesis takes a snapshot of
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contributions hitherto, a narrow view is taken. That is to say that a positive
contribution would be one that is considered to build upon, enhance or elaborate on a
rule of international law, while a contribution that is not consistent or congruent will
have the opposite result.

Chapter II has identified how the practice of tuna RFMOs may be considered to be
contributing positively to the corpus of international institutional law. Although such
organisations have a regional management focus, they are international by definition,
membership (in general), and arguably through the scope of their decisions. The legal
characteristics of each organisation in terms of their international legal personality
and legal capacities explored in that chapter demonstrates how the legal framework
and peculiarities of tuna RFMOs may provide a useful contribution to international
institutional law.

In contrast, the contribution of tuna RFMOs to the jurisdiction, in the widest sense, of
coastal States may be described as ‘mixed’. Noteworthy are the following ‘positive’
points: Tuna RFMOs are promoting the implementation of principles for
conservation and management such as the precautionary approach, ecosystem-related
approach, the protection of biodiversity, and the compatibility of measures; Binding
measures are supporting the exercise of coastal State and flag State responsibilities.
However, it appears that tuna RFMOs may be used to ensure that coastal States
implement their fundamental obligations under the 1982 LOSC and indirectly
support or encroach on the jurisdiction of coastal States. In so doing, the measures of
tuna RFMOs seem to be creeping into areas under the jurisdiction of coastal States;
in essence, this is the opposite of the concerns of fishing States at the time the sui
generis exclusive economic zone regime was agreed at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the sea. The measures of tuna RFMOs that qualify the
exercise of the rights of States may be seen to be incongruous with the fundamentals
in the 1982 LOSC but nevertheless is a part of the concessions made by States upon
membership.

For the high seas, tuna RFMOs are significantly enhancing the high seas regime that
is built upon the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement. As Article 64-type
organisations, they are at the forefront of ensuring the sustainability of highly
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migratory fish stocks around the world. Aspects identified in Chapter IV include the:
development of regimes for access including the implementation of the ‘real interest’
requirement in the 1995 Agreement; application of management principles;
imposition of high seas fishing conditions such as the registration requirement,
observer placement, and vessel monitoring; and the imposition of sanctions for non
compliance. While these initiatives are positive in the sense that they have progressed
principles and concepts which cannot be operationalised without tuna RFMO
involvement, they place further qualifications on the ‘freedom’ of fishing on the high
seas.

The treatment of third States by tuna RFMOs is a novel and uncertain area of the law
altogether. Here a distinction is drawn between third States that have consented to
comply with requirements or acquiesced through their conduct on the one hand, and
third States that have not. Contrary to the pacta tertiis rule, tuna RFMOs have
imposed requirements also to third States. Chapter V identifies how measures and
decisions of tuna RFMOs may be contrary to international law, such as the extension
of the registration requirement to vessels of third States irrespective also of whether
the flag State of the vessel is a party to the 1995 Agreement. From the perspective of
a third State affected, the measure and decision of a tuna RFMO may be argued to be
contrary to international law. But in the circumstances where a third State has
consented to be a cooperating non member of a tuna RFMO, the pacta tertiis rule is
not undermined. It is also argued that if a third State (that is not cooperating with an
RFMO) does not object or protest the treatment of its vessel, then the third State may
have in fact acquiesced. Compliance without protest by a non cooperating third State
with the requirements for the removal of its vessel from an IUU list, may be
equivalent to recognition and acquiescence.1 This is an area in which legal challenges
by third States is likely to assist in clarifying the extent of the power of tuna RFMOs
vis-a-vis third States.

Inclusion of specific measures to address all participants in a fishery, including the
fishing entity of Taiwan, is a positive contribution. Chapter VI describes the novel

1

See the unilateral declaration by France in the Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) [1974] ICJ Rep
253; Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v France) [1974] ICJ Rep 457.
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mechanisms adopted by all tuna RFMOs with respect to the fishing entity. While the
majority have extended requirements to the fishing entity, the IOTC has not. This is
due to its constituent instrument and institutional framework within the FAO
Constitution, which is in turn part of the United Nations system. Notwithstanding,
limitations within its constituent instrument, did not preclude the CCSBT from
establishing the Extended Commission and Extended Scientific Committee by
resolution. In sum, tuna RFMOs appear to have progressed the range of international
mechanisms available for the participation of the fishing entity. Moreover, tuna
RFMO practice has supported the recognition of Taiwan as a fishing entity and
importantly, as an entity with a special identity in international law. These initiatives
may be seen as a positive contribution particularly in the implementation of
international fisheries treaties, instruments and principles by entities with a special
identity in international law. Without these initiatives, it is highly likely that a major
proportion of the international fishing fleet would not be effectively regulated, if at
all.

The impact of IUU fishing on marine ecosystems and its implications to the
conservation and management of marine resources is now widely accepted. Through
tuna RFMOs, States have adopted various initiatives to combat IUU fishing,
including through IUU listing. At a glance, the listing of IUU fishing vessels may be
seen as an effective tool to deter IUU fishers. Indirectly, the criteria for listing has
been applied by States in defining IUU fishing in domestic legislation. The process
through tuna RFMOs may not be aligned with requirements for national legislation,
such as the use of legal language in defining a potential offence or violation. This has
seen States adopting either the definition in paragraph 3 of the IPOA-IUU or
applying the criteria for listing by RFMOs, or both. Nevertheless, as State and tuna
RFMO practice matures, greater legal clarity is expected. Taking the findings in
Chapter VII into account, it is put that tuna RFMOs have introduced relatively novel
approaches to combatting IUU fishing. These initiatives may be considered
progressive and delineate additional duties for coastal States, port States and flag
States within the tuna RFMO framework.
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B

Tuna RFMOs are enhancing the jurisdiction of sovereign States in
international law

Whether tuna RFMOs are enhancing the jurisdiction of States in international law is a
matter of perspective. On the one hand, States have established tuna RFMOs and
bestowed legal personality and capacities to facilitate the conservation and
management of highly migratory stocks in their respective area of competence. The
very act of establishing tuna RFMOs may be seen as an enhancement of the
jurisdiction of the States concerned to better regulate the fisheries. On the other,
States are distinct from the tuna RFMO they establish, and the measures and
decisions adopted by such organisations, of which States are members, are to be
treated separately. For the present purpose the latter is applied, albeit with its inherent
flaws and circular nature.

Under international law including the 1982 LOSC, States have jurisdiction, including
legislative and enforcement jurisdiction, over specific marine spaces, nationals, and a
wide range of ocean uses to mention a few. International law already provides for and
delineates the jurisdiction of States. As is seen in Chapter II, tuna RFMOs assume
their legal capacities from the functions and mandate granted by States. In its
decision making, tuna RFMOs may delineate additional rights and duties for States
and entities. The enhancement of jurisdiction, in its widest sense, should result in a
State or entity having greater rights.

With the observations in Chapter III in mind, it is posited that tuna RFMOs have
enhanced the jurisdiction of coastal States in some respect, but appear to have
perhaps qualified jurisdiction in others. Enhancement may be seen in the application
of specific management principles in the 1982 LOSC and the 1995 Agreement, such
as the precautionary approach, and the protection of biodiversity. But it is observed
that the capacities of tuna RFMOs appear to be creeping farther into areas and
matters within the domain of States. Indeed, the conditioning of sovereignty and
sovereign rights of coastal States is prominent in the decisions of tuna RFMOs, for
instance, in the limitations on the exercise of sovereignty in ports, the use of tuna
RFMOs for notification of a foreign State whose vessel has been nominated for IUU
listing, the diminished jurisdiction for contraventions by a foreign fishing vessel in
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the exclusive economic zone of a coastal State, and ‘shared’ management
responsibility between a tuna RFMO and a coastal State. On the impact on
enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal State within its EEZ, it may be argued that
article 73 of the 1982 LOSC would, notwithstanding tuna RFMO requirements to the
contrary, continue to apply. All things considered, the qualification of the jurisdiction
and rights of a coastal State is increasingly evident, and in this respect, the hypothesis
is disproved.

Although it is accepted that no State has jurisdiction or can claim an area of high
seas, Chapter IV identifies potential areas in which State jurisdiction may be
enhanced by tuna RFMOs for the high seas. In this context, analysis is confined to
two aspects of jurisdiction, i.e., legislative jurisdiction and enforcement jurisdiction.
The legislative jurisdiction of States is enhanced in the prescription of specific
measures applicable, inter alia to: fishing and related activities on the high seas;
provision of monitoring, control and surveillance functions; inclusion of fishing
vessels in the right of visit on the high seas; conduct of boarding and inspection of
foreign vessels on the high seas; a greater role in the management of high seas
enclaves surrounded entirely by the EEZs of more than one coastal State; and the
management of high seas pockets surrounded entirely by the EEZ of a coastal State.
Together with legislative jurisdiction, it is foreseeable that States will also have
enforcement jurisdiction supplemented with the ability to monitor, control and, under
certain conditions including a request from the flag State, take enforcement measures
on fishing vessels flagged to a State that is a member of the tuna RFMO.

Chapter V has identified the contributions of tuna RFMOs to international law
relating to third States. While there are positive aspects such as the establishment of
regimes for the participation of cooperating third States, several aspects deviate
perhaps from the norm. For instance, the consent of a third State is not required for
the listing of vessels flagged to that State within tuna RFMO records, the consent of a
third State is not required for IUU listing, and the requirement upon a third State to
comply with conservation and management measures of a tuna RFMO. These
illustrate not only a departure from the pacta tertiis rule but also undermine the rights
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and jurisdiction of third States over their fishing vessels within the area of
competence of a tuna RFMO.

Related to the treatment of third States are the implications on the rights and
jurisdiction of States affected by listing of IUU fishing vessels. Chapter VII outlines
the perceived contribution of tuna RFMOs to combatting IUU fishing.

C

Tuna RFMOs are complementing State practice in the development of
international law

While the formal definition of an international organisation is an entity distinct from
its members, this hypothesis assumes that the practice of tuna RFMOs will always
support and complement State practice. Although this assumption may be naïve, it is
aligned with the traditional notion that State practice is paramount vis-à-vis the
practice of international organisations, and that in theory States will not condone any
practice that is contrary to their view of international law. That is not to say that tuna
RFMO decisions are contrary to international law; States primarily comprise the
membership of RFMOs and without their consent, a decision cannot be taken.

To an extent, the rights and jurisdiction of States embodied in the 1982 LOSC is
supported by tuna RFMOs. This is evident for instance in recent constituent
instruments where the functions of the tuna RFMO are without prejudice to the rights
and jurisdiction of States defined in the 1982 LOSC, and that constituent instruments
are to be interpreted in conformity with the provisions of the 1982 LOSC and the
1995 Agreement. Binding measures of tuna RFMOs are adopted within the
framework of respective constituent instruments and are to be interpreted
accordingly. In this context, complementarity exists.

Since the establishment of IATTC under the 1949 Convention, tuna RFMOs have
developed mechanisms and initiatives for the management of highly migratory fish
stocks. The joint tuna RFMO process begun in Kobe, Japan in January 2007 has
promoted greater harmonisation and compatibility between the decisions of tuna
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RFMOs and a relatively uniform approach is being followed. In relation to
international organisations, the cross fertilisation of basic principles has led to the
formulation of what has been referred to as a ‘common law of international
organisations’.2 With the harmonisation of principles and rules, heightened by the
joint tuna RFMO process, it is submitted that a ‘common law’ of tuna RFMOs may
be emerging. Indeed, in relation to IUU listing procedures, Chapter VII has identified
the harmonisation of listing criteria.

In some respects, tuna RFMO decisions may be considered to be leading or
influencing the practice of its membership. This is demonstrated in the decisions to
combat IUU fishing including the procedures for the identification of an IUU fishing
vessel. The criteria for the listing of a vessel presumed to have or be engaged in IUU
fishing has influenced the enactment of complementary legislation in member States.
A State may define IUU fishing either by reference to paragraph 3 of the FAO IPOAIUU or to the criteria for the listing of IUU fishing vessels, or both. Notwithstanding
the lack of precision of the components of paragraph 3 and the criteria from a
legislative drafting perspective, this situation results in the application of two
separate definitions of IUU fishing by a State.3

The question of whether tuna RFMO practice is undermining or complementing State
practice is pertinent. Firstly, it may be difficult to distinguish between the two since
States comprise the membership of the tuna RFMO. Thus a decision of the tuna
RFMO is effectively the collective decision of members. Secondly, if State practice
is to be considered in total isolation from tuna RFMO practice, then this may be the
case if the State did not participate in the decision at all or had an opposing view at
the time but did not wish to block consensus. In light of the observations made in this
thesis and the response to earlier hypotheses, tuna RFMO practice may indeed be
seen to complement State practice in some respects, but in others, may be deviating
from State practice.

2

Schermers and Blokker, International Institutions Law, 834 - 835, C F Amerasinghe, Principles of
the Institutional Law of International Organisations (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 397 – 402.
3
See for example the United States. The application of the former is more common but with the
requirement to implement RFMO binding measures, States are expected to apply the listing criteria in
national legislation.
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Taking all the hypotheses into account, it seems clear that the practice of tuna
RFMOs has achieved mixed results. While certain decisions build upon and
contribute positively to international law, others may deviate and not have the same
effect. Similarly, not all decisions of tuna RFMOs may be considered to enhance the
rights and jurisdiction of States. Moreover, complementarity between State practice
and tuna RFMO practice may not exist all the time. Although tuna RFMO practice
has a marked influence on the practice of States, it is evident that where the former
deviates from a norm, the latter is likely to follow.

III. Contributions to the Development of International
Law
Noting the general contribution of tuna RFMOs to the development of the
international regime for the management of highly migratory fish stocks, there are a
number of specific contributions that are significant and deserve mention. Firstly,
tuna RFMOs are elaborating and operationalising principles for the conservation and
management of fisheries. By accommodating and requiring the implementation of the
precautionary and ecosystem approaches as two fundamental principles for
management, tuna RFMOs appear to have elevated both to be part of customary
international law. Tuna RFMOs have also promoted inter alia the use of the best
science available for decision making, the protection of biodiversity, and the due
recognition of the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers. The incorporation by
many States of these principles in national fisheries laws and policy evidences State
practice and opinio juris. Without the involvement of tuna RFMOs, it is probable that
support by States may not be as expedient.

Secondly, as the recognised mechanism for the regulation of fisheries on the high
seas tuna RFMOs are leading in the development of innovative mechanisms
including but not limited to the imposition of seasonal, gear, or other restrictions. The
creation of seasonal closures for certain gear types by the IATTC and the closure of
specific high seas areas to the purse seine fisheries by the WCPFC are examples of
the measures that have been taken. In the exercise of their mandate, tuna RFMOs are
qualifying the freedom of fishing on the high seas by prescribing measures and
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conditions to be complied with. In theory, the range of measures and conditions that
may be imposed is limited and possibly bound by science considerations but in
practice the scope may be broader. As is seen in Chapter V, the reach of tuna RFMOs
includes third States but this is debatable.

Thirdly, tuna RFMOs also have an impact on the rights and duties of coastal States.
Admittedly, States on becoming a party agree to qualify aspects of their sovereignty.
While there are differences in the dynamics within tuna RFMOs, it appears that in the
CCSBT, IATTC, ICCAT and the IOTC there is little or no opposition to the
management of stocks within the EEZs of the respective coastal States. The situation
differs in the WCPFC where coastal States in the region are reluctant to give the
organisation a greater role within their EEZs; but this seems to be gradually
changing. Additional management requirements adopted by tuna RFMOs are to be
implemented by coastal States; these include compliance with a total allowable catch
or effort determined by the organisation for each coastal State. With this example, the
coastal State’s sovereign right to determine total allowable catch is superseded by the
limits set by the tuna RFMO. Similarly measures within the EEZ and those adopted
for the high seas are to be compatible. Although the meaning of compatible is
debatable, it is anticipated that tuna RFMOs are in a position to influence the
measures applied within the EEZ as do coastal States for measures on the high seas.
In sum the sovereign rights of the coastal State to explore, exploit, conserve and
manage highly migratory fish stocks within the EEZ may be conditioned by the
binding measures of tuna RFMOs. The sovereignty of a State within the territorial
sea, archipelagic waters (in the case of an archipelagic State) and internal waters may
also be affected but it is argued that this only applies on a case by case basis. That is
to say that measures do not automatically apply to areas under the sovereignty of a
State unless they are explicitly supported.

Fourthly, the role of tuna RFMOs in combatting IUU fishing is unparalleled
compared to other RFMOs and seems to have a marked influence on State practice.
In particular, the creation of negative and positive lists of fishing vessels is important.
Positive lists contain the details of all vessels that are authorised by their respective
flag States to fish in the area of competence of the tuna RFMO. On the other hand,
negative lists identify vessels presumed to have engaged in or are currently engaged
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in IUU fishing. The criteria for listing and delisting on IUU fishing vessel lists of
tuna RFMOs are largely harmonised and encompassing. Other vessels that in any
way support a vessel listed on the IUU fishing vessel list may also be listed. An
owner of a vessel on the IUU fishing vessel list may have other vessels that it owns
listed as well. Notwithstanding the scope of the listing criteria, tuna RFMOs need to
ensure that international law, due process, and dispute settlement mechanisms are
built into the IUU fishing listing regime.

Fifthly, the monitoring, control and surveillance regime adopted by tuna RFMOs is
novel and also implements provisions of the 1995 Agreement. The regime includes
the requirement for observers, vessel monitoring, and inspections in port and at sea.
In at least one tuna RFMO, the WCPFC, high seas boarding and inspection is in
place. This scheme builds upon the framework in the 1995 Agreement and is adapted
to the regional (and political) context. Unlike boarding and inspection within the EEZ
for instance, there are currently limited powers for inspectors engaged in high seas
boarding and inspection under the WCPFC procedures. Nevertheless, boarding and
inspections on the high seas have identified vessels presumed to be engaged in IUU
fishing. With time, it is anticipated that greater powers, including possibly
enforcement powers, will be granted to high seas inspectors through tuna RFMOs.

Finally, the development of regimes for the sanctioning of States that have not
complied with specific obligations is a novel contribution to international law. Such
mechanisms depart from the traditional setting in international law where there is
little or no sanction for non-compliance. In joining tuna RFMOs, States have
qualified aspects of their sovereignty in order to be monitored by the organisation, be
held accountable, and incur the penalty for not complying with specific duties. With
the implementation of these sanctioning mechanisms, it is critical that tuna RFMOs
ensure that transparent and non discriminatory procedures are in place before a
sanction is imposed. The existence of flaws in the procedures or the discrimination of
a State exposes the sanction regime to challenge and the tuna RFMO to liability. In
this regard, the responsibility of tuna RFMOs is a subject worthy of study.
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IV. Law making of tuna RFMOs
International organisations have an influence on the development of international
law; indeed, some more so than others based on their competence and membership.
The United Nations is identified as ‘a very appropriate body to look to for indications
of developments in international law’.4 Given its universal membership, the United
Nations provides the best indication of the practice of States. While the United
Nations is considered a special case,5 it is posited that technical international
organisations with the relevant competence and membership may also be considered
as focal points for State practice.

Each tuna RFMO and their subsidiary bodies established under their respective
constituent instruments contributes directly and indirectly to the making of
international law. As indicated in earlier chapters, tuna RFMOs are in fact supporting
the development of norms, an important criterion identified in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, in the governance of highly migratory fish stocks and
associated species. Although tuna RFMOs are not political organisations like the
United Nations, they are on equal basis, forums for the interaction of States on a
specific objective, i.e., the conservation and management of highly migratory fish
stocks. In this regard, tuna RFMOs: a) are forums for State practice; b) prescribe
conservation and management measures; c) are fora for technical experts; d) adopt
non-binding instruments; e) engage externally; and f) have formulated institutional
rules.6 As forums for State practice, States make interventions on their interpretations
of specific concepts and their position with respect to the rights and duties under
international law. But statements made apply to that State alone. Groups of States
may also share a collective position on a particular issue, and that is attributed to the
collective. Tuna RFMOs prescribe binding conservation and management measures
which are themselves indicators for State practice. In addition, each tuna RFMO is a
conduit for the aggregation of expertise, so called ‘epistemic communities’ driven

4

Rosalyn Higgins, The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United
Nations (Oxford, 1963), 2.
5
James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 8th edn, 2012), 193.
6
Cf. Crawford, 192 – 196; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, 7th edn,
2008), 691 – 693.
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towards the objective of ensuing sustainability of the stocks. Experts are able to
influence the direction of management activity and in turn the underlying applicable
principles and rules that promote the interests of the membership. Besides binding
instruments, tuna RFMOs also adopt non-binding instruments. Although such
instruments are not binding, they may prescribe principles of international law that
have normative value and are also important in evaluating whether the necessary
opinio juris exists.7With international legal personality and various capacities, tuna
RFMOs also engage externally by, for instance, entering into agreements with States
or other international organisations, acting for and on behalf of members in
corresponding with States (including non member States), corresponding with flag
States of vessels nominated on IUU vessel lists, and other requirements directed by
the respective commission. Moreover, tuna RFMOs have developed institutional
rules and arrangements relating inter alia to: processes for decision making, both
procedural and substantive, mechanisms for dispute settlement, financial rules and
the formula for contributions to the budget, requirements for voluntary contributions
including for cooperating non members, and arrangements for the provision of
assistance to developing States.

V.

Final remarks

Fisheries governance must incorporate a wider vision that continually adapts to
change and includes the creation of public and private benefits, conserves marine
ecosystems and sustains livelihoods.8 As international organisations driven towards a
mutual objective, tuna RFMOs may be considered to be leading in the application of
the objectives of promoting greater responsibility in the fishing sector in order to
achieve long term sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks. While there are

See Nuclear Weapons opinion, ICJ Reports (1999), 225, 254 – 5 for an analysis of the effect of
United Nations General Assembly resolutions.
8
RQ Grafton, R Hilborn, L Ridgeway, D Squires, M Williams, S Garcia, T Groves, J Joseph, K
Kelleher, T Kompas, G Libecap, CG Lundin, M Makino, T Matthiasson, R McLoughlin, A Parma, G
San Martin, B Satia, CC Schmid, M Tait, LX Zhang, (2008) ‘Positioning fisheries in a changing
world’Marine Policy 32, 630 – 634.
7
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challenges that remain for each tuna RFMO with the management of capacity and
dwindling stocks, a greater level of concerted action seems necessary.

Given the mandates of tuna RFMOs for the conservation and management of stocks
primarily on the high seas, States are likely to use and grant greater powers to such
organisations. The development of sanction mechanisms for non compliance with
select obligations appears to be an important tool which likely to be imposed for the
breach of duties within and beyond waters under the jurisdiction of a coastal State.

Although the emergence of tuna RFMOs over the years was not on the basis of a
logically consistent and overall design and may be characterised as piecemeal and as
ad hoc responses to specific concerns, cooperation between States through such
organisations has heightened within the last decade. Despite perceived contributions
that deviate from international law, tuna RFMOs are contributing to the development
of international law. They are expanding the sphere of international law and that
sphere is expected to grow. While the influence on fundamental concepts such as the
jurisdiction of States is raised, tuna RFMOs have an important role in contributing to
the creation of norms and obligations within the general interest of the international
community for the long term sustainability of highly migratory fish stocks and
ultimately the protection of the environment.

This thesis has underscored that tuna RFMOs are influencing the development of
international law in a number of areas. As long as States, the primary actors in
international law, maintain the relevance of these international organisations and
ensure that there is appropriate oversight in the performance of their functions, tuna
RFMO contribution to international law into the future seems certain.
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